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ABSTRACT
In 1956 the colonial government of Kenya embarked upon a programme 
of land consolidation and registration in the Native Lands, subsequently 
known as the Special Areas. Although the programme initially made little 
headway outside the Kikuyu Land Unit, it has, since Kenya became indepen­
dent in 1963? been presented with great vigour and now covers all but the 
most thinly populated areas of the country. From the outset the objec­
tives of the programme have been various, political, social and economic, 
and although it has not been warmly welcomed in all areas of Kenya, it is 
generally considered to have been a success.
It is the aim of this thesis to examine the operation of the pro­
gramme and to assess its success in terms of its proclaimed objectives. 
While the thesis is written by a lawyer and necessarily relies to a 
considerable extent on traditional legal materials, the subject demands 
an inter disciplinary approach; it is impossible wholly to divorce legal 
issues from those of a political, social or economic nature. Indeed, at 
its most general, this is a study of the interaction of law and society, 
and the land consolidation and registration programme can be seen as an 
ambitious piece of social engineering.
After an introductory chapter the process of land adjudication is 
examined as it was seen to operate in two areas of Kenya, one (chapter II) 
where individual titles were registered and one (chapter III) where group 
titles were registered. Chapters IV, V and VI deal with the consequences 
of land registration, the problems to which it has given rise and the 
successes which it has achieved. Finally chapter VIII looks at the land 
control system in Kenya, a system which is designed to further official 
land policies and could profoundly affect the working of the land reg­
istration programme.
The law is stated as at December 31st, 197^-
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C H A P T E R  I
INTRODUCTION
1. Historical background to the research
When the State of Emergency was declared in 1952, most Africans in 
Kenya were living on the land in tribal reserves known as Native Land 
Units. Several of the reserves bordered on areas of European settlement, 
known as the White Highlands, and the encroachment on African lands both 
by the settlers and by the government had long been a source of concern 
among Africans. Although statutory provision for reserves for the use
2
and enjoyment of the African tribes had been made as long ago as 1915?
it had only been comparatively recently, following the Report of the
3
Kenya Land Commission, that such areas had been effectively delimited 
and a satisfactory system for their control and administration devised.
This system largely dated from the passing of the Kenya (Native Areas)
4
Order in Council 1959? which vested Native Lands in the Native Lands 
Trust Board, and the Native Lands Trust Ordinance 1958, which provided
1. Only a brief outline of the historical background is given here. 
The history of registration of title in the Special Areas of Kenya 
has been fully dealt with elsewhere, particularly in M.P.K. Land 
Reform in the Kikuyu Country (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 
1967), on which this account is largely based.
2. Crown Lands Ordinance 1915, Cap.155 (1948), Part VI. This Act is 
known today as the Government Lands Act, Cap.280 (1970).
5. Cmd. 4556, 1954.
4. G.N. No. 138 of 1959* This Order was revoked by the Kenya (Land) 
Order in Council, L.N. No. 589 of 1960, s.22 and Sched.3»
5. Cap.288. This Act, much amended, is known today as the Trust Land 
Act. Its title was amended by the Kenya (Land) Order in Council, 
L.N. No. 589 of 1960, s.21(1) and Sched.1.
for the administration of these lands. Although this system was generally 
successful in protecting the Native Lands from further encroachments, it 
did not deal with the problem of the increasing land shortage that was 
becoming particularly serious in the Kikuyu Land Unit, and the increasing 
demand for individual titles. The rights of Africans to land in the 
Native Lands were governed by native law and custom, and there was no way 
in which they.could obtain individual titles to land except through the 
procedure of setting land apart,^ a procedure generally used only for the 
leasing of commercial sites to non-Africans.
The Kikuyu Land Unit was largely situated between the Aberdare
\
Mountains and the road running north from Nairobi through Fort Hall to 
Nyeri. Numerous rivers flow down from the Aberdares in an easterly 
direction, creating a landscape of alternating ridges and valleys. 
Traditionally a ridge would be occupied by a mbari, a lineage grouping 
of all Kikuyu who traced their descent through the male line from a 
known ancestor. Each family within the mbari would occupy a segment of 
the ridge with its landholdings extending down one or both sides of a 
ridge. When land became scarce, someone would take his family and settle 
on another ridge that was unoccupied, thus founding a new mbari. Within 
each Kikuyu household there was considerable fragmentation of holdings 
since each wife required several plots in order to grow a variety of 
crops, each requiring different climatic or soil conditions. This frag­
mentation was aggravated both by the custom of succession by which the
mother's plots were divided equally among her sons and by the practice
7
of shifting cultivation.
6. Native Lands Trust Ordinance 19^8, Part IV.
7. Sorrenson, op. cit., pp. ^ 5-
By the time of the second World War it was no longer possible for 
someone to leave his mbari and to go and found another mbari elsewhere. 
There was no unoccupied land; indeed parts of the Kikuyu Land Unit were 
desperately overcrowded. The problem was compounded by the considerable 
degree of fragmentation that had occurred, some families owning literally 
dozens of tiny plots, often separated from each other by great distances. 
Moreover, the growing congestion often led to serious soil erosion as the 
Kikuyu were compelled to over-cultivate and over-graze their lands.
Land shortage together with the increasing cultivation of permanent 
cash crops resulted not only in the stabilisation of agriculture, but in 
the development of a land market. Formerly the alienation of land had 
been controlled by the mbari. If someone wished to sell land to an out­
sider, he had first to offer it to members of his mbari and only if they 
refused it and the head of the mbari, the muramati, agreed, could he 
sell it to an outsider. In some mbari the alienation of land to non-
g
members was prohibited altogether. However, during the colonial period
the importance of the mbari and the powers of the muramati diminished in
this respect, as in many others. This disappearance of traditional
controls over the alienation of land is what is generally meant by the
9
"individualisation of land tenure", an expression that is commonly used 
in this context. This process was accompanied by an increased emphasis 
on boundaries which itself resulted in a considerable amount of land
8. Ibid., p.10.
9. Even in 1929 the individualisation process was "particularly notice­
able among the natives of Kikuyu and Kavirondo." Report of the East 
African Commission (Cmd.2387, 1925), p»25» The theme recurs through­
out the official reports.
10litigation. The demand for individual titles among the Kikuyu arose 
from the belief that they would provide security against possible 
encroachments on the part of the government, the settlers or other 
Kikuyu..
As early as 191# the Governor of Kenya had proposed the prepara­
tion of a record of existing rights as a first step towards the
11registration of individual African titles and several proposals of
12a similar kind were made over the next few decades. However, in 
spite of strong pressure from influential Kikuyu, nothing was done, 
partly due to a division of opinion among administrators about the
13desirability of hastening the demise of traditional institutions. 
Effort was rather concentrated on promoting the agricultural develop­
ment of the Kikuyu Land Unit by taking measures against soil erosion 
and encouraging farmers to consolidate their holdings. However, 
although the provincial administration was keenly aware of the pro­
blems caused by fragmentation, consolidation was carried out informally 
by the sale or exchange of fragments; no programme of systematic con­
solidation had been devised when the State of Emergency was declared in 
1^-October 1932.
1#. Sorrenson, op. cit•, p.79- Back in 1932 it was reported that land 
disputes among the Kikuyu were becoming more frequent and more 
bitter due to the individualisation process. The report continues: 
"This movement [the individualisation process] has also tended to 
undermine the authority of the head of the clan in the matter of
land distribution, as the new generation is intent on holding its
land free of all the encumbrances laid down by immemorial custom." 
Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Native Affairs Department, Annual 
Report, 1932, p.129.
11. Sorrenson, op. cit., p.27-
12. For example, the Kenya Land Commission cautiously proposed the 
experimental introduction of a register in part of Kiambu district. 
Report of the Kenya Land Commission (Cmd.^f^, 193*0 j P-^23«
13. Sorrenson, op. cit., p.32.
1*+. In August 1932 the District Commissioners of the Central Province
agreed that a pilot consolidation scheme should be started in Nyeri; 
ibid., p.68.
During the early years of the Emergency the government's most press­
ing problem was to discover a way of wearing the passive majority of the
Kikuyu from their allegiance to Ma“U M a u The guerillas (mainly Kikuyu.) 
were based in the forests bordering on the Kikuyu Land Unit and depended 
heavily on the passive support of the Kikuyu living in the Land Unit. In 
order to solve the problem the government took two related courses of 
action. It confiscated the land of activists and those suspected of aid­
ing the activists with the intention of distributing it to the loyalists. 
Secondly, it embarked upon a compulsory villagisation policy, as security 
was difficult to maintain while Kikuyu continued to live in scattered 
settlements. It was realised at the same time that this would be an 
appropriate moment to press ahead with land consolidation, especially
since this would provide an opportunity of rewarding loyalists with larger
15and better land holdings. The first large scale consolidation scheme
was started in 1953 in Nyeri district. Fort Hall district and Kiambu
district soon followed suit and in November 1955 land consolidation had
16
been adopted as provincial policy, to be completed within five years.
Consolidation was usually started in a small area (part of a location,
typically) where the cooperation of the local people could be relied upon.
A committee of elders was established to ascertain the ownership of all
17fragments m  the area. Each fragment would be measured and each owner 
would be allocated a single holding of the same acreage as the aggregate 
of his fragments, a small percentage being deducted to cover the area 
required for public purposes. Those with sub-economic holdings were at 
first obliged to live on plots in the villages. In its early stages the
13. Ibid., p.107.
16. Ibid., p.119*
17. At this stage no attempt was made to record rights which did not 
amount to full ownership, nor indeed did the Native Land Tenure 
Rules 1956, make any provision for the recording of such rights. 
It was the Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959? that first 
provided for their entry on the record of existing rights.
land consolidation programme was largely implemented by the Agricultural 
Officers, who were also expected to prepare a farm plan for each new 
holding.
Strangely enough, however, it was not until 1956 that the land 
consolidation programme was given any legal backing. Legislation was 
needed to provide a uniform and rational consolidation procedure and to 
validate what was already happening on the ground. Moreover little con­
sideration had hitherto been given to the nature of the title which the 
owner of a consolidated holding acquired, though by the end of 1955 it
seems to have been agreed that a system of registration of title would
18have to be introduced. The delay in bringing in suitable legislation
can partly be explained by differences of opinion as to what sort of
legislation, if any, was required.
The "setting apart" provisions of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance
1938 were clearly inadequate to deal with a large scale programme of
land consolidation and registration. However, section 64(1)(s) of that
Ordinance confined on the Governor the power to make rules with the
advice and consent of the Native Lands Trust Board, thus providing a
means of dealing with land consolidation and registration within the
^19existing legislative framework. Rules were accordingly made in 1956 
which provided a consolidation procedure based on the one that was 
currently being used in the Kikuyu Land Unit, which validated what had 
already been done and laid down a general legal framework for the
18. Sorrenson, op. cit., p.119.
19* Native Land Tenure Rules 1956, L.N. No.432 of 1936. Moreover, land 
suits in consolidation areas were suspended by virtue of the 
African Courts (Suspension of Land Suits) Ordinance 1956, No.1 of 
1957, s.4(1).
consolidation and registration of holdings and the control of land
transactions. The Rules were designed as a stop-gap until more detailed
20substantive legislation was drafted.
One serious shortcoming of the Rules was that though they provided that 
land transactions must be registered, it was not clear how transactions 
would be effected nor whattransactions would be possible. Native Lands 
were governed by native law and custom and the Rules could not create 
rights or allow dealings in land which were not recognised by customary 
law. Many people, however, saw customary law as an obstacle to agricul­
tural development and recommended that it be replaced by a system based 
on the registration of individual titles. The Swynnerton Plan had pro­
posed that "the African farmer ... be provided with such security of 
tenure through an indefeasible title as will encourage him to invest his
labour and profits into the development of his farm and as will enable
21him to offer it as security against financial credits." The East
Africa . Royal Commission had recommended the adjudication and registration
22of individual titles in suitable areas subject to certain controls and 
the Arusha Conference on land tenure had largely agreed with these recom­
mendations, favouring a simple system of registration based on existing
23
legislation in the Sudan. Clearly it was not going to be enough to 
amend the Native Lands Trust Ordinance 1938; new legislation was
20. Sorrenson, op. cit., p.132.
21. Swynnerton, R.J.M., A Plan to Intensify the Development of African 
Agriculture in Kenya (193^)  ^ s.13*
22. East Africa Royal Commission, 1933~1933> Report (Cmd.9^73» 1933)> 
Ch.23.
23. Report on the Conference on African Land Tenure in East and Central 
Africa, special supplement to the Journal of African Administration, 
(October, 1936).
necessary and in March 1957 a working party was appointed to consider 
what form it should take.
2lf
The working party reported in the summer of 1958, proposing the
enactment of two bills, both of which became law in 1959? as the Native
25
Lands Registration Ordinance and the Land Control (Native Lands)
26Ordinance. Part of the former Ordinance was based on the Native Land 
Tenure Rules and dealt with the processes of land adjudication and 
consolidation. Part of it introduced a system of registration of title 
to be applied to land which was registered in accordance with these 
processes. Once first registration was effected, land ceased to be 
subject to the Native Lands Trust Ordinance 1938; it would be governed 
by the Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959 which contained a com­
plete system of substantive law. Once land was registered, customary
27
law ceased to apply to it.
The Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959 is based largely on
28the Sudan Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance 1925 and the
29Tanganyika Land Registration Ordinance 1953? both of which had intro­
duced systems of registration of title on the English, rather than the
2b. Report of the Working Party on African Land Tenure, 1957-1958, 
(1958).
25. Ordinance No.27 of 1959-
26. This Ordinance, No.28 of 1959? was concerned with the control of 
transactions involving registered land and is discussed in
Ch. VII, infra.
27- Succession to registered land continued to be governed by customary 
law. See Ch. V, infra, for a full discussion of this topic.
28. Title XX, Sub-title 2 (Revised Laws of the Sudan, 1955)-
29- Cap.33^ (Revised Laws of Tanganyika, 1950-5*0-
Torrens, model. A Torrens system of registration of title had been intro-
30duced into Kenya long ago, but it had met with continuous opposition on 
the part of the legal profession and its effect was very limited; few new 
titles were issued under the system and even fewer old titles were brought 
under it. A consideration of the way the system worked and of the reforms 
that were necessary would have taken a considerable amount of time and in 
any case the Working Party felt that it would be quite unsuitable to intro­
duce the Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919 into the Native Land Units.
In addition to this Ordinance there were three other Ordinances in force
31in Kenya providing for the registration of land transactions. The 
existence of five registration systems within a single country was clearly 
anomalous and a committee was set up "... to make recommendations for the 
coordination and, in so far as may be practicable, the unification of the 
existing systems."
32
As a result of its recommendations, the registration provisions of
33the Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959 were repealed and replaced
3b
by the Registered Land Act 1963? while its provisions regarding con­
solidation and registration were retained as a separate Act, the Land
35Adjudication Act. The former Act contains a complete code of land law
30. Registration of Titles Act 1919? Cap.28l.
31. They are still in force and known today as the Registration of 
Documents Act 1901, Cap.285, the Land Titles Act 1908, Cap.282, and 
the Government Lands Act 1915, Cap.280 (1970).
32. Report on the Registration of Title to Land in Kenya (1962).
33* This Ordinance had been renamed the Land Registration (Special
Areas) Ordinance by virtue of the Kenya (Land) Order in Council, 
L.N.589 of 1960, s.21(1) and Sched.1.
3b. Cap.3*#?( 196*0,s. 163 and Sched. It contains much more detailed sub­
stantive law than the Ordinance which it replaced.
35- Cap. 283 (196*0. It was renamed the Land Consolidation Act by virtue 
of the first schedule of the Land Adjudication Act 1968, Cap.28*f 
(197t). The latter Act was mainly passed to provide a simpler 
adjudication procedure in areas where no formal programme of con­
solidation is being carried out.
designed to be applied throughout Kenya. Its registration system was
36intended to replace all other registration systems and its substantive
provisions were intended to replace the Indian Transfer of Property Act 
371882, which, though much criticised, continued to regulate most con­
veyancing outside the Native Lands.
In December 1963 Kenya became independent, but this did not result 
in any deceleration of the land consolidation and registration programme.
On the contrary, the programme is seen to play an important role in the
■zQ
development of rural Kenya and it has been implemented with great vigour.
The programme now covers virtually all agricultural areas and in recent
39years it has been extended to the pastoral areas of Masailand. Although 
the programme was originally devised in response to a very specific sit­
uation in the Kikuyu Land Unit, an attempt had been made, even during the
4#
colonial period, to extend it to other parts of Kenya. After all, the 
sort of conditions that prevailed in Kikuy.uland - overcrowding, land frag­
mentation and the individualisation of land tenure - could all be parallelled 
elsewhere in Kenya. Nevertheless, while efforts to encourage people to con­
solidate their holdings by means of informal sales and exchanges were fairly 
successful, systematic programmes of adjudication and registration were at
36. Registered Land Act 1963? s.12(l).
37» Ibid., s.164. The East African Order in Council 1897» Art. 11(b)
applied the Indian Transfer of Property Act 1882 to Kenya.
38. "Increased emphasis will be given to the land adjudication and
registration programme, for the completion of this procedure is felt
to be an important pre-condition for rapid agricultural development." 
Republic of Kenya, Development Plan.1970-1974, s.8.8.
39- This topic is discussed in Ch. Ill, infra.
4§. The attempt to extend it to Nyanza Province is discussed in 
Ch. II, infra.
first viewed with great suspicion; indeed they were sometimes regarded as
a colonial trap to grab African lands. Consequently, by the end of 1963*
1»330,234 acres had been registered, of which only 373?936 acres lay out-
41side the Central Province, in the Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces.
Since independence, however, land adjudication has made impressive pro­
gress throughout Kenya, the old suspicions have been largely laid to rest 
and the advantages of the programme have become generally appreciated. By
the end of June 1974, 8,034,432 acres had been adjudicated and a further
424,291?138 acres were due to be completed by the end of that year.
2. Research Objectives
The general purpose of the research was to examine how the land 
adjudication and registration programme worked on the ground. Those who, 
in the fifties, supported the introduction of the programme, laid great 
stress on the benefit it would bring to the Africans affected, and these 
claims have been often repeated since. With an effective system of 
registration of title, it is argued, titles and transactions are made 
secure and land rights are clarified, thus reducing the incidence of 
litigation. The system may also have indirect consequences of a bene­
ficial nature. It may give the farmer an incentive to invest in his 
land and an opportunity to raise loans on the security of his registered 
title. It may create a land market and lead to the creation of economic
41. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and 
Registration in Kenya, 1963-19^6, Appendix D, Table B [hereinafter 
cited as the Lawrance Mission Report after its chairman, Mr. J.C.D. 
Lawrance].
42. These figures came from summaries of returns located in the Land 
Adjudication Department in Nairobi. They would form part of the 
Department’s Annual Report, but such reports do not appear to be 
published with much regularity.
holdings by enabling the owner of the uneconomic parcel or the distant 
fragment to dispose of his land to someone capable of putting it to better 
use. It facilitates the implementation of official land policies by giving 
the government the opportunity of controlling transactions involving 
registered land. Moreover, the existence of a land register may assist 
the administration in a variety of ways by providing information for tax­
ation purposes, censuses and so on. It was to some extent the purpose of 
this research to assess the extent to which these claims were justified 
and, where they were not, to speculate upon the reasons for this.
The research also raises issues of a rather broader nature. The 
government of Kenya appears to regard customary law not merely as an 
obstacle to the development of the country, but as a barrier which pre­
vents the creation of a sense of national identity and the building of a
truly united Kenya. A single system of courts administering a uniform
43body of law is seen to be necessary and that law must be largely based 
on Western models in accordance with the political and economic ideals of 
Kenyan leaders. Legislation is regarded as a powerful instrument to bring 
about social change and it was part of the aim of this research to con­
sider the constraints that bear on schemes of social engineering of this 
kind and limit their effectiveness. Customary law has shown itself capable 
of adapting to meet the needs of a rapidly evolving society and unless the 
laws which are designed to replace customary law have roots in the needs 
and perceptions of ordinary people, they will be virtually impossible to 
enforce. Far from contributing to the achievement of national unity,
43* Apart from the land registration programme, examples are afforded 
by the Law of Succession Act 1972, No.14 of 1972 and by the Law 
of Matrimony Bill appended to the Report of the Commission on the 
Law of Marriage and Divorce (1968). It appears that this Bill is 
appearing before the National Assembly in the course of 1976.
they will widen further the gap that exists between the town and the 
country, between the government and the governed.
The problem is not solved by using traditional authorities to 
supervise the implementation of official policies. The history of 
indirect rule throughout Africa demonstrates clearly that where trad­
itional authorities are given new responsibilities, their success in 
carrying them out depends on the new sanctions which they have at their 
disposal, and not on any traditional legitimacy. Once the traditional 
land authorities of an area have been formed into a land adjudication 
committee or a land control board, they cease to act in a traditional 
capacity and such legitimacy as they enjoy depends on their role as 
government servants carrying out government policies and not on their 
position in the local community. Yet an interesting theme which recurs 
throughout the following pages is the degree to which the government 
relies on bodies of local people for the implementation of its land 
policies. The courts play virtually no role at all and the responsi­
bilities of the government departments concerned are kept to a minimum. 
The majority of the work is done by informal bodies of a quasi-tradi- 
tional type.
A further question that arose at various stages of the research 
relates to the socio-economic effects of the land adjudication and 
registration programme and, in particular, the extent to which it has
44
created a rural middle class, as many of its early promoters hoped. 
While it is yet too early to talk about the existence of a class system 
in the countryside, a middle class is emerging and its emergence has
45undoubtedly been hastened by the land programme. The whole process 
of land adjudication favours the man with a bit of money, the man with
44. See Sorrenson, op. cit., pp.117-118.
43. This subject is discussed in Ch. VI, infra.
some education, the man with the right contact, and it is the same people 
who reap most of the benefits of land registration. It is perhaps this 
capacity for manipulating new institutions to his own advantage that dis­
tinguishes the member of the emerging middle class.
3. Research methods and materials 
46Two field-areas were selected for the purpose of discovering the 
consequences of registration of title and assessing the extent to which 
the land registration programme had achieved its goals. One field-area 
was Gathinja sub-location, in Weithaga location of the Muranga (formerly 
Fort Hall) district of Central Province. The other field-area consisted 
of the two adjudication sections of Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro 
in East Kadianga sub-location, in South Nyakach location of the Kisumu 
district of Nyanza Province. Apart from the fact that the former area 
is inhabited by Kikuyu and the latter by Luo, there are considerable 
similarities between the two. Both areas enjoy good soils and a fav­
ourable climate which allow coffee to be grown. Both areas were the
47scene of early missionary activity and have consequently been pro­
vided with schools and hospitals for a long time. Both areas are fairly 
densely populated and had begun to show the effects of land shortage 
(for example, an increasing number of boundary disputes) by the middle 
fifties. It was then that the first attempts to consolidate holdings 
were made, registers for both areas being finally opened in the early
46. See the maps on pp.22-23, Supra.
47. In Gathinja the present writer stayed in a mission school and in 
East Kadianga he stayed on a mission station. Both missions were 
established before the first world war.
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sixties. It was hoped that by controlling a large number of variables, 
generalisations based on the experience of both field-areas would carry 
more weight.
Fieldwork designed to throw light on the process of land adjudication 
was mainly carried out in the East Koguta sub-location, in South Nyakach 
location. As this sub-location adjoined the second field-area described 
above, it was possible to make useful comparisons between the two areas, 
to consider why the adjudication in East Koguta took such a considerable 
time and to speculate upon the likely development of East Koguta in the 
next ten years. In addition, a short time was spent in Narok district 
of the Rift Valley Province with a view to discovering how successfully 
the adjudication of group ranches was proceeding among the pastoral 
Masai.
The present writer spent a month doing fieldwork in Gathinja sub­
location and over two months on Nyabondo plateau where East Koguta and 
East Kadianga sub-locations are situated. In both areas he travelled 
everywhere on foot and was soon a familiar figure on the landscape. In 
the course of his fieldwork he was able to interview a large number of
l±Q
people: about 18$ of registered proprietors in Gathinja, about
in Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro and about k% in East Koguta. In
the two former areas, the choice of informants was largely dictated by
the sort of information that needed to be gathered; thus every attempt 
was made to interview those who had sold or bought land, those who had 
changed their land and the families of those proprietors who had died.
In East Koguta, on the other hand, it was important to interview as 
many of those who had been involved in disputes at the time of land
A8. This fieldwork is discussed in Ch. Ill, infra.
*+9« Where a registered proprietor was absent or had died, it was
generally possible to interview a close relative.
adjudication; of these it was possible to interview about 20$. In none 
of the areas, then, did the informants constitute a random sample; 
nevertheless, as far as the majority of the questions asked is concerned, 
they form as reliable a sample as any random sample.
All informants were asked to explain how they came to be registered 
as owneis of their plots and to describe the way in which land was divided 
among their families at the time of land adjudication; moreover they were 
asked whether their plots had previously had marked boundaries and whether 
any consolidation of plots had occurred. If informants had been involved 
in any disputes at the time of land adjudication, they were asked to talk 
about them. However, most of the questions concentrated on the present 
situation of the informant and it was necessary to discover, particularly 
in connection with those areas registered some ten years ago, how many 
people lived on his plot, whether he employed labour, whether he sold 
any of his farm produce, whether he (or his family) had any off-farm 
income, whether he had raised any loans and whether he had received any 
help from the Agriculture Department. Moreover, it was particularly 
important to obtain details of any disposition of land (including 
transmissions on death) that had occurred. Finally, informants were 
asked to comment generally on the land adjudication and registration 
programme.
While it was obviously essential that a certain amount of informa­
tion had to be gathered for statistical purposes, the interviews were 
not very tightly structured and informants were generally encouraged 
to talk about what interested them. The present writer had studied 
KiSwahili for a year before going to Kenya and found it extremely use­
ful for chatting to informants about their farms and other things and 
thereby (hopefully) gaining their confidence; on one occasion, moreover, 
he was obliged to address a gathering of Luo elders in KiSwahili, at
the baraza of the sub-chief. All interviews, however, were conducted 
either in English or in the vernacular with the assistance of an 
interpreter. In both areas the present writer was fortunate enough to 
find interpreters, both local farmers with a good knowledge of English 
and an understanding of what the research was about. Both were in their 
late forties and were well acquainted with all local land matters. Most 
important of all, perhaps, they were both highly respected within their 
communities and were warmly received wherever they went, a welcome that 
was naturally extended to anyone who accompanied them.
In addition to these interviews, a very considerable number of 
officials was interviewed, usually in English. They included magistrates 
land registrars, land adjudication officers, agricultural officers, 
Agricultural Finance Corporation officials, loans officers of the 
commercial banks, chiefs, sub-chiefs and members of adjudication 
committees and land control boards. Here again most informants were 
very willing to talk and some of the most interesting information was 
obtained in the course of general conversation rather than in response 
to some specific question. Officials readily made the majority of their 
records available and it was in the land registries and the offices of 
the land adjudication department that much of the most relevant material 
was located. It was also possible in the course of the research to visit 
all the High Courts in the country as well as several Resident Magistrate 
courts and District Magistrate's courts. Comparatively few cases are 
reported in Kenya and there is a wealth of material to be found in the 
court registries. While it must be admitted that some of the records 
to which the present writer had access were deficient in one respect 
or another, the general helpfulness of the officials concerned and the 
considerable interest of the records more than compensated for the 
occasional obscurity, inconsistency or lacuna.
The land adjudication programme is a live issue upon which most 
people have very decided views which they are far from afraid of 
expressing. Students at the University of Nairobi will argue at length 
about its merits and demerits, and in bars, buses and homesteads 
throughout the country it is a topic of considerable interest and, 
sometimes, concern. Although the research described in the following 
pages is based on the experience of three specific areas, it is the 
hope and belief of the present writer that the conclusions reached have 
a more general application.
^2.
C H A P T E R  II 
LAND ADJUDICATION: INDIVIDUAL TITLE 
1. Introduction
'I
(i) Land tenure on the Nyabondo plateau before land adjudication,
A visitor to the Nyabondo plateau today will go away with the 
impression of a prosperous farming community, perhaps the most pros­
perous Luo community to be found anywhere outside the larger towns.
The climate is beneficent and the soils are generally good in marked 
contrast both with the Kano plains to the north which are flooded 
during the rainy season and provide insufficient grazing during the 
hot dry season, and with the rocky lands that fall away down to South 
Nyanza in the South. Visible for miles around, the plateau rises up, 
lush and green, from the surrounding barrenness.
Surprisingly enough, however, it seems that it was only towards 
the end of the nineteenth century that settlement of the plateau 
started on any significant scale. Land shortage prompted families to 
move from their lakeside lands, especially the district known today 
as West Kadianga, on to the plateau where they tended to settle near 
families which had come from the same area. The broad pattern of 
settlement is easily recognisable today and it is still rare to find 
farmers who do not belong to one of the three tribal groupings that 
originally settled the plateau, the Kadianga, the Koguta and the 
Ramogi peoples.
1. See the map at p. 23, supra.
Any discussion of the tribal organisation of the Luo is fraught
with difficulty in view of the lack of detailed ethnographical studies.
Mr. Godfrey Wilson, a government anthropologist, divided the tribe into
2
dhoot which he called maximal lineages; each dhoot consisted of several 
libamba, i.e. groups of people claiming a common ancestor, in the male 
line, some four to seven generations back; these in turn were divided 
into Keyo,i.e. groups of people claiming a common ancestor, again in 
the male line, three to five generations back; finally there was the 
nokakwaro consisting of those sharing a paternal grandfather. Neat 
as this classification is, it bears little relation to the findings 
of the present writer. Not only are the words Keyo and libamba not 
used on Nyabondo to refer to kinship groups, but the words dhoot and 
jokakwaro are used much more loosely than this classification would 
lead one to expect. For present purposes it is unimportant what term­
inology is adopted as long as it is clear and used consistently.
The present writer’s interpreter was a Kadianga person, a member 
of the dhoot Kadianga; like all Kadianga people he claimed to trace 
his ancestry back to Dianga (five generations in his case) in the male 
line. The dhoot Kadianga is in turn divided into four clans, descended 
from Dianga’s four children; these clans are Kobongo, Kodul, Kamnwa and 
Kamgan. These are divided into sub-clans named after their founders; 
such sub-clans are really extended families, most of the adult members 
tracing their ancestry back to a common great-grandfather. A given
person may therefore be a member of the dhoot Kadianga, the Kobongo
3
clan and the Abok sub-clan.
2. G. Wilson, Luo customary law and marriage laws customs,(Government 
Printer, Kenya, 196D, pp.3 _et seq.
3. The term jokakwaro is used generally to refer both to clans and 
to sub-clans and will be used in that broad sense here.
The dhoot Kadianga settled in the southern part of the Nyabondo 
plateau, in what is now the East Kadianga sub-location. The dhoot 
Koguta settled in the northern part which is largely separated from 
the agricultural lands of the southern part by the siany, an area of 
open land which becomes waterlogged during the rainy season. In the 
north-eastern corner of the plateau there is a fairly small settlement 
of people of the dhoot Ramogi, migrants from the north. The Koguta and 
Ramogi settlements make up the sub-location of East Koguta.
Not much has been written about the land tenure of the Luo. Mr. 
Wilson’s book is generally accurate, although it was based on research 
undertaken towards the end of the colonial period and takes little 
account of regional variations. Luo words used by Wilson in one sense 
were used by people on Nyabondo in a completely different one. What 
follows, then, is an account of land tenure on Nyabondo as it existed 
in the two or three decades before registration, derived partly from 
written sources, but in the main from discussions with some of the 
older inhabitants. In its essentials the Luo system of land tenure 
differs little from that of many other acephalous agricultural tribes 
of East Africa.
The typical Luo household consists of the head of the family, his 
wives, his unmarried children and perhaps some female dependants, a 
widowed mother, for example, or an unmarried sister. As soon as one 
of his daughters marries, she will go to live on her husband’s land.
As soon as one of his sons marries or reaches marriageable age, he 
will be allocated some land by his father where he may build his house 
and establish his farm. His land will usually comprise part of the 
land hitherto cultivated by his mother, it will lie to the front of
his father’s compound and he will be expected to build and cultivate 
in much the same direction as his father; a son would never build his 
house opposite his father's. Certain land, often land not suitable 
for agricultural purposes, would be set aside for grazing cattle. All 
members of the clan or sub-clan would have the right to graze their 
cattle there.
When it became impossible to continue expanding in a certain 
direction, because, for example, a river or a cliff had been reached 
or because the land in front was already occupied by farmers expanding 
in the opposite direction, it would be necessary to move away and to 
resettle on vacant land nearby. Where this happens, members of dif­
ferent families, sub-clans become interspersed and fragmentation of 
land holdings likely to occur. Thus in East Kadianga, where there 
was some pressure on the land, fragmentation was common and there 
were no clear boundaries between the clans, whereas in East Koguta, 
where there was no great land shortage, holdings are generally not 
fragmented and the boundary between the two Koguta clans, the Kamari 
and the Kachungo, is clearly defined and well-known.
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The rules governing succession are more complicated. The 
general principle is that the deceased's land should be divided equ­
ally among his houses and that within each house his sons should share 
equally, account being taken of any allocation made during his life­
time. Land reserved for the deceased’s own use will go to his youngest 
son, if there is only one house, and to the junior house, if there is 
more than one. This may lead to fragmentation of holdings. The task 
of distribution falls to the deceased's eldest married son or, if he
5. See generally E. Cotran, Restatement of African Law: Kenya,
the Law of Succession (London, Sweet and Maxwell, .
leaves no married son, to his eldest brother. If the deceased's widow 
enters into a leviratic union with a brother or other close male
relative of the deceased, the levir comes to live with her and the sons 
of such a union are regarded as the deceased's sons and are entitled to 
the same share of his land as their "half-brothers." If she remarries 
a stranger, she will go to live on his land and will lose any rights 
over the land of her late husband.
The traditional view regarding the alienation of land is that 
"... although a man may use his land as he pleases, he cannot transfer 
the rights of his lineage to it or the rights of his descendants to it, 
by sale or outright gift to strangers."^ It is hard to know what is 
meant by a stranger in this context. Wilson holds that outright gifts 
of land can only be made to close agnates. One informant claimed that 
gifts of land between person in a wat relationship, i.e. fellow-clansmen 
descended in the male line from a common great-great-grandfather were 
irrevocable. In this sense the clan or the .jokakwaro can be seen as 
the key landholding unit.
Where a stranger was given land within a certain area, his rights 
were in theory extremely precarious. They might be revoked at any time 
and they were automatically extinguished on his death. In practice, of 
course, he was rarely evicted and his family was usually allowed to 
remain after his death. He was not allowed to build without authority 
and his rights were extinguished if he ceased to exercise them. His 
rights could never ripen into ownership no matter how long he had used 
and occupied the land. He was, and is, known as a jadak, that is, a 
member of a different dhoot; thus a Koguta man would be a jadak among 
the Kadianga people and a Kadianga man would be a jadak in Kajimbo. The
6. G. Wilson, op. cit., p.75.
position of the jadak is similar to that of the muhoi among the Kikuyu 
and has similarly given rise to acute difficulties at the time of land 
adjudication.
Although a jadak must remain in occupation in order to retain his 
rights over the land, the possession of rights is not generally depen­
dant or visible occupation. It is true that the existence of such rights 
will usually be indicated on the ground by houses, boundary marks or 
signs of cultivation, but the absence of such evidence does not neces­
sarily signify the absence of any rights over the land. Competing claims 
to unoccupied land constitute an important proportion of land disputes. 
Claims are generally supported by evidence of past user coupled with 
violent denials of any intention permanently to abandon the land in 
dispute.
Such, in outline, is the system of land tenure practised by the 
Luo on Nyabondo in the decades before land adjudication, and many 
features of the system survive today. During the latter part of the 
colonial period, however, rapidly changing socio-economic conditions 
brought about significant changes in customary law. In particular, 
the growing importance of the cash economy and the increasing pressure 
on the land required certain adaptations of the traditional system of 
land tenure. The people of Nyabondo were especially favoured by the 
establishment of two missions, one Roman Catholic and one Evangelical, 
on the southern side of the plateau, both providing educational and 
medical facilities and both employing labour on a small scale. At the 
mission schools many students picked up the rudiments of literacy and 
numeracy as well as basic agricultural skills, while a small minority 
of bright, lucky students could look forward to some form of higher 
education and a post in government service. Although at first it was 
the need to obtain cash for tax purposes that prompted most Luo to 
move temporarily to the towns in search of employment, it was not long
before money began to circulate widely on the plateau and to supplant 
traditional media of exchange.
At the same time commercial farming began to expand. Improved 
communications and the growth of new markets provided excellent opport­
unities for the adaptable farmer willing to experiment with new crops 
7
and new methods. The landscape began to take on the appearance which 
it has today. A few farmers built houses of permanent materials.
g
Some established plantations of coffee or maize and beans and some 
bought grade cattle. It became common to fence holdings to protect 
valuable crops from straying livestock. The imposition of the pax 
Britannica and the provision of medical facilities led to a consider­
able increase in the population, polygamy remaining widespread in 
spite of strong mission opposition. It became harder for families 
with insufficient land to find unclaimed land on the plateau and 
migration further afield was difficult now that the boundaries of 
the various tribal reserves had been clearly defined. However, if 
a farmer with insufficient land had cash, he might contrive to buy 
land. It was by this process that land became a marketable commodity.
The pace of development on the northern side of the plateau 
(East Koguta) was slower than on the southern side (East Kadianga), 
though the direction was the same. The reason for this difference 
seems to lie in the more favourable treatment that East Kadianga has 
received both from man and from nature. The soils are better in
7. The biography of one of the more enterprising farmers, narrated 
infra, p. 331 vividly illustrates the sorts of changes under 
discussion here.
8. The introduction of coffee on Nyabondo seems to have occurred 
during the late forties.
East Kadianga; it is accessible from the main Kisurrra-Kisii road to the 
east, whereas East Koguta is bounded on three sides by a sheer cliff; 
no doubt owing to its relative accessibility, it was in the southern 
part that the missions and the district headquarters were established, 
all linked by a good road, the only road on the plateau. Thus com­
mercial farming was less developed in East Koguta and pressure on the 
land not so great; fewer farmers fenced their holdings and sales of 
land were rare.
Even in East Kadianga sales of land were not very common. Land
was usually sold to a fellow clansman and then only with the consent
of the jokakwaro elders. Some of the wealthier farmers acquired land
by lending money to their poorer neighbours and by taking some of
9
their land on their failure to repay the debt. By the time that 
proposals to start land adjudication on the plateau were mooted, the 
seeds of a land market had already been sown.
(ii) The early history of land adjudication on the Nyabondo plateau.
As early as 193^ the Carter Commission had observed that the 
individualisation of land tenure among the Luo had started, but 
had been reluctant to recommend the establishment of a register of 
holdings in the area in view of the differences of opinion that existed
9. This process was described in these terms by several informants. 
Its effects are similar to those of the so-called "redeemable 
sale", so common among the Kikuyu* where land was conveyed to a 
"purchaser" on the understanding that he would reconvey it on 
repayment of the "purchase price."
10. Report of the Kenya Land Commission (Cmd.A-.556, 193^), s.11#5.
11locally. Nevertheless it was not until the early fifties that the 
government took steps to reform Luo land tenure and it was on the 
Nyabondo plateau, perhaps the most developed of all the areas inhab­
ited by the Luo, that attempts to carry out these reforms were first 
made. In 1952 a report on Nyanza province stated that M... the 
greatest obstacle to proper farming still remains to be overcome and 
that is native land tenure customs which cause fragmentation, the
spoliation of grazing through communal use and the impossibility of
12purchase or exchange of land to consolidate holdings.” The official 
reports throughout the fifties continue to stress the importance of 
land consolidation while recognising that customary law and, in part­
icular, the strong clan system militated against the effective imple­
mentation of such a policy.
The District Administration seems to have realised that land
consolidation could not be carried through in the teeth of widespread
opposition from the traditional authorities, as the following comment
13on Godfrey Wilson’s report makes clear:
These investigations emphasise most strongly the 
necessity for a clear understanding of the authority 
of the indigenous elder if plans for intensive 
agriculture requiring re-allocation of land, con­
solidation of fragmented parcels of land and the 
like are to be carried out with the cooperation of 
the people for whose benefit the plans are made.^
Indeed the involvement of the traditional authorities has become the
11. Ibid., s.1662.
12. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Native Affairs Department, 
Annual Report, 1952, p.6.
13. 0£. cit.
14. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Central Nyanza District Annual 
Reports, 195^? P»7«
corner-stone of the land reform programme. Nevertheless in the fifties 
land consolidation was regarded with considerable hostility both by the 
clan elders (who no doubt felt that their authority was being threatened) 
and, for obvious reasons, by the jodak and indeed by the vast majority 
of Luo farmers. There was only a small minority of farmers who appre­
ciated the potential benefits of land consolidation, but they played an 
important part in persuading their fellow-clansmen to support the pro­
gramme. They were the first farmers to exchange fragments on an informal 
basis and they took every opportunity to expand their holdings in shrewd 
anticipation of the day when individual titles would be granted.
Propaganda in favour of land consolidation made farmers acutely 
conscious of the importance of boundaries. The demarcation of boundaries 
became more common and land which had formerly been used by several 
neighbouring farmers, amiably vague as to the exact nature of their 
rights inter se, would now become the subject of intense despute. The 
District Administration was aware of this problem:
The propaganda given to land consolidation has tended 
to increase these disputes [viz. petty boundary disputes] 
since, although most of the people are still publicly 
against it, there are large numbers of thinking individ­
uals beginning to understand the benefits of it. Private 
swapping of land has therefore started with the result ^  
that boundaries in general have been more in their minds.
The same phenomenon occurs today. Wherever land adjudication is immi­
nent, farmers attempt to extend their holdings, they become very boundary-
15. Ibid., 1956, p.2. A considerable increase in the number of land
cases and land appeals occurs in Nyanza Province in the last
fifties. It is tempting to attribute this increase to the attempts
to introduce land consolidation, although it would be impossible to 
prove a causal link of this kind.
conscious and numerous disputes break out. The statement that ”... as
a result of starting the land consolidation schemes a realisation of
the personal ownership of land has definitely contributed to this [i.e.
16the large number of disputes]" blurs an important point, namely that 
land consolidation, indeed the very threat of land consolidation, 
accelerates the individualisation of land tenure.
Late in 1956 land consolidation was formally started on the 
Nyabondo plateau and in one other district of Nyanza Province. The 
latter scheme immediately ran into insuperable difficulties and a year 
later it was reported: "The biggest scheme of all and the only Luo one 
is that at Nyabondo. This had to be abandoned at the end of the year
17owing to the build-up of political pressure against it." In view of
strong, continuing opposition to its land consolidation programme, a
change of approach on the part of the District Administration was
called for. Instead of forcing reluctant farmers to consolidate their
holdings, consolidation was in future to be voluntary. Groups of
farmers were taken to other parts of Kenya where land consolidation
had been successfully carried out and in August 1959 the Central
Nyanza African District Council passed a resolution "supporting land
consolidation as a first step towards better agriculture in the
district. By this time the farmers living in what was to become
the Kabete-Obuya adjudication section, the most developed part of
East Kadianga sub-location, had already consolidated and planned their
19holdings and were beginning to demand that they be registered. Land
16. Ibid., 1957, p-2.
17. Ibid., 1957? p.10.
18. Ibid., 1959,p.8.
19. Ibid., 1958,p.9.
adjudication was duly started in Kabete-Obuya in 1961 and proceeded 
this time without any difficulty. The register was opened on January 
21st, 196^.
The first, abortive, attempt to consolidate holdings on Nyabondo
was governed by the Native Land Tenure Rules 1956, the forerunner of
Parts I and II of the Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959* which
were later subsumed under the title of the Land Adjudication Act
2#(later renamed the Land Consolidation Act). While the Rules dif­
fered from the provisions of the Ordinance in certain important res­
pects, these differences do not help to explain why the second pro­
gramme succeeded where the first had failed. The official reports 
throw little light on this question, but a fairly clear picture emerges 
from discussions with those affected by the programmes.
In the first place, an attempt was made in 1956 to force farmers 
to live in villages. The enforced villagisation of the Kikuyu during 
the Emergency was making land consolidation much easier in the Central 
Province and it was naturally hoped that once the Nyabondo Luo were 
gathered into villages, they would learn to appreciate the advantages 
of village life; rational farm planning could be undertaken, more 
farmland would be made available and the provision of services facil­
itated. However the Luo, like the Kikuyu, are not accustomed to liv­
ing in villages and just as the Kikuyu moved away from their villages 
to their consolidated plots as soon as they were allowed to, so also 
did the Luo resent any attempt to force them into villages. The 
villagisation policy was eventually stopped.
Secondly, there were many farmers who questioned the good faith 
of the colonial administration. There was a strong suspicion that
20. See p. 32, supra.
land consolidation was a device for depriving them of their lands. It 
was seen as a sort of punishment being inflicted on the rebellious 
Kikuyu which should not in all justice be extended to the loyal Luo.
It is interesting to note that many Nyabondo farmers of this persuasion 
changed their minds when Kikuyu detainees were imported to plant 
boundaries.
Thirdly, it was generally felt that the first committee appointed 
to consolidate holdings, settle disputes and prepare a record of 
existing rights was corrupt. The second committee was conscientious 
and honest.
Finally, the area chosen was considered to be too large, incor­
porating about half of the sub-location of East Kadianga; some parts of 
the area were much more developed than other parts and much more ready 
for land adjudication. The area was finally divided into three parts 
for purposes of adjudication and it was in the most developed of these 
parts, Kabete-Obuya, that the second attempt at adjudication was made. 
It proved highly successful. On October 7th, 19^31 adjudication was 
started in a section adjoining Kabete-Obuya, called Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro 
and here again everything proceeded smoothly, the register being opened 
on April 1st, 1966. Although the District Commissioner for Central 
Nyanza was being unduly optimistic when he stated that consolidation,
"... once resented by the inhabitants of Central Nyanza, is now
21
becoming increasingly popular in the district", there seems little 
doubt that by the early sixties it was being warmly welcomed in these 
areas where population pressure was giving rise to boundary disputes.
While land adjudication was proceeding satisfactorily in East 
Kadianga, it seemed natural to extend the programme to the northern
21. Daily Nation, January 17th, 1961.
part of the plateau. Even though this had always been the intention
of the District Administration during the colonial period, in fact most
of its energies had been concentrated on East Kadianga and the abortive
consolidation attempt of 1956-1957 had only affected a small part of
that sub-location. No doubt the people of East Koguta were fully aware
of developments on the other side of the plateau and one or two of them
made some attempt to consolidate their holdings in an informal way.
However it was not until 196*+ that official steps were taken to con-
22solidate holdings and adjudicate titles in East Koguta. On April 
3rd, ,196^ , the whole sub-location of East Koguta was declared an 
adjudication section. It was not until ten years later, on February 
7th, 197*f, that the land register was opened.
The rest of this chapter will be devoted to a study of the 
process of land adjudication in East Koguta. It is not contended that 
the difficulties encountered there are typical, although evidence from 
other areas of Kenya suggests that they are not uncommon. However, it 
is argued that a large number of land disputes occurring in registered 
areas can be traced to shortcomings in the planning and implementation 
of land adjudication. While it was only in East Koguta that a fairly 
detailed study of land adjudication was carried out, fieldwork in 
other areas of Kenya (both in Nyanza and in Central Province) combined 
with a host of informal conversations with a variety of people (adjudic­
ation officers, farmers, students, anthropologists, magistrates etc.) 
has enabled the present writer to present a picture of more than purely 
local validity and to reach conclusions that have relevance for the land 
adjudication programme as a whole.
22. At a mass meeting held by the Provincial Commissioner in East 
Koguta sometime in 1963 the people, not wholly surprisingly, 
voted unanimously in favour of land adjudication.
2, The adjudication procedure
(i) Introduction
In 1964, as remains the case today, East Koguta was not so highly
developed as East Kadianga. Poorer soils, fewer schools and less
adequate communications combined to point a neat contrast between the
two neighbouring sub-locations. While the late fifties saw the growth
of commercial farming, the enclosure of holdings, the emergence of a
land market and a resulting pressure on the land in East Kadianga, the
pace of change in East Koguta had not been so rapid. Although no steps
to adjudicate land in East Koguta had been taken during the colonial
period, they had been proposed and it can hardly have come as a complete
surprise to many people when East Koguta was declared an adjudication
section in 1964. Indeed one or two farsighted farmers had already begun
to extend their holdings by purchase or the enclosure of vacant land in
anticipation of land adjudication and this in turn had led to disputes.
23The same thing had occurred m  East Kadianga and, as has been seen,
it seems to be a common feature of the period immediately preceding
land adjudication that the shrewder farmers tend to extend their hold-
24ings with a resulting increase in the number of land disputes.
23. See supra, p. 51.
24. Where there is little unclaimed land, they purchase fragments, 
as occurred in the Central Province. Where there is unclaimed 
land nearby, they enclose it. Acute problems arise where land 
is subject to the unclearly defined rights of several adjoining 
farmers, say, to graze or water their cattle. A typical picture 
is given by one writer on Eastern Kenya who states that "... 
owing to present attempts to control large bush areas in antici­
pation of land consolidation and registration, free grazing and 
cutting privileges in wilderness areas are now challenged by 
competing groups." J. Glazier, "Conflict and conciliation among 
the Mbeere of Kenya," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of California at Berkeley, 1972, p.213-
Land adjudication in East Koguta was conducted under the provisions
25of the Land Consolidation Act. This Act had been designed to be applied 
in the Central Province where the consolidation of holdings had been 
carried out, compulsorily and on a large scale. It provided a procedure 
which would prove extremely cumbersome in areas, like East Koguta, where 
fragmentation posed less of a problem and where consolidation was effected 
by the voluntary exchange of fragments. In particular, a process whereby 
first a record of existing rights was drawn up and then holdings were 
consolidated, to be followed finally by the compilation of an adjudication 
register, could hardly be justified in areas where the informal consolida­
tion of fragments took place before adjudication started. As the Lawrance 
Mission pointed out: "In non-consolidation areas there is, of course,
need for only one such record or register and much delay and duplication 
of work has been caused by the provision for both in the Act with two
26separate and different processes of ’objection'.11 As a result of the 
Mission's recommendations the Land Adjudication Act 1968 was passed, 
providing a more straightforward procedure for adoption in those areas 
where consolidation was to occur on an informal basis. In their 
essentials, however, the procedures laid down by the two Acts are 
virtually identical and it should be noted thatthe Land Adjudication Act 
merely gave legal recognition to what was in fact often occurring on the
25. It was formerly known as the Land Adjudication Act: see supra,p.52. 
To avoid confusion it will be referred to as the Land Consolidation 
Act. As land adjudication today usually proceeds under the Land 
Adjudication Act 19^8, reference will generally be made to pro­
visions in that Act; sections in the earlier statute, the Land 
Consolidation Act, will only be cited where they differ signifi­
cantly from the corresponding sections^ in the Land Adjudication 
Act 1968.
26. Lawrance Mission Report, para. 1^3-
ground.
(ii) The Committee.
One of the most distinctive features of the Kenyan land adjudication 
programme is its use of local committees at all stages of the adjudica­
tion process, particularly in the settlement of disputes. It is also 
its most controversial feature whose importance and interest demands a 
much deeper study than the present writer was able to undertake. In 
East Koguta passions ran high over the conduct of the committee and the 
objective evaluation of the committee system in general terms became a 
well-nigh impossible assignment. The present writer derived most of his 
information from records of the proceedings of the adjudication com­
mittee of East Koguta, supplemented by interviews with committee members, 
public officers involved in the adjudication process and a substantial 
number of the local inhabitants, many of them parties to land disputes. 
However, the adjudication records are often incomplete and cannot 
necessarily be trusted to give an accurate account of proceedings. 
Moreover, informants are often partial or biased in their views, the 
extent and nature of such partiality or bias being extremely hard for 
the outsider to assess. The outsider, particularly the lawyer trained 
in the western tradition, runs the additional risk of seeing land 
disputes in isolation from their social context. It has to be con­
tinuously borne in mind that disputants, witnesses, committee members 
and many of the public officers are all known to each other, even if 
they are not actually related, and that any decision that is taken 
merely represents a stage in the history of a complex network of per­
sonal and family relationships.
27Under the Land Adjudication Act 1968, the adjudication officer, a 
public officer appointed by the Minister, is required, in respect of 
each adjudication section, to appoint not less than ten persons resident 
within the section to be the adjudication committee. Large committees
had formerly been favoured, mainly on the spurious grounds that they
23reduced the chances of corruption, the Land Consolidation Act requir­
ing committees to consist of not less than twenty-five members. Thus 
it was that the East Koguta committee had thirty-three members, eleven 
from the Rarnogi clan and twenty-two from the Koguta clan, of whom twelve 
came from the Kamari sub-clan and ten from the Kachungu sub-clan. It 
seems that the Ramogi, Kamari and Kechungu peoples each held meetings 
at which they elected their committee representatives and at the sub­
chief's baraza the committee members elected a chairman and a vice- 
chairman from among their number. In addition, the adjudication officer 
appointed an executive officer to the committee, who acted as a kind of 
general secretary to the committee, advising members generally on points
of law and procedure. Moreover he was responsible for recording committee
29proceedings and for preparing the adjudication record, thus playing a 
crucial role in the adjudication process.
The conscientious committee member would expect to spend a con­
siderable amount of his time carrying out his duties and it is therefore 
hardly surprising that no members had regular employment and few had 
substantial commitments away from their farms. Indeed they tended to
27. S . 6 (1).
28. S.9.
29. Although this is strictly the task of the recording officer, such 
an officer was never appointed for East Koguta, his duties being 
carried out either by the demarcation officer or by the executive 
officer.
be middle-aged and poorly-educated, though many of them ran prosperous 
farms and had espoused, early on, the policy of land consolidation. It 
was elders such as these, household-heads distinguished by their wealth, 
wisdom or good fortune from other household heads, who settled land 
disputes in earlier days and it is on their shoulders that much of the 
burden of land adjudication falls today. They are unpaid, indeed the 
cost of paying committee members would be colossal, and they receive 
no expenses. The motives that prompt men (of course, there are no 
women on the committees) to stand for election are various. The ideal 
of public service, the desire to enhance their status in the community 
and the hope of using their power to enrich themselves may be among 
them.
While the committee is required to advise upon questions of
recognised customary law^ and to assist generally in the adjudication 
31process, its prime function is to "... adjudicate upon and decide m
accordance with recognised customary law any question referred to it by
32the demarcation officer or the recording officer." Such questions
33include boundary disputes and conflicting claims to an interest m  
3^the land. In practice, the demarcation officer, a public officer 
appointed by the adjudication officer and often not a native of the 
area, may come to rely heavily on the committee or certain of its 
members at all stages of the adjudication process. Indeed, in an 
adjudication section as large as East Koguta, with an area of 2,732 
hectares divided ultimately into 1,667 parcels, it is hardly surprising
30. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.20(b).
31. Ibid., s.20(e)
32. Ibid., s.20(a).
33. Ibid., s.13(b).
3*f. Ibid., s.19(2).
to find that committee members distinguished by their knowledge of the 
district or their general level of education or their assiduous interest 
in their work should exercise a considerable influence on the public 
officers and the whole adjudication process.
(iii) The preparation of the register.
(a) General. - -
East Koguta was divided into a number of sub-sections for the 
purposes of land adjudication and each sub-section was systematically 
adjudicated before work started on the next one. The date on which 
land adjudication was due to start in a particular subsection was 
publicised in advance and those with claims to land were expected to 
meet the adjudicating team. In practice this team consisted of the 
demarcation officer, the committee chairman and a handful of committee 
members, usually including those members who resided in the particular 
sub-section. Also attached to the team was a junior employee of the 
Survey Department whose task it was to measure the boundaries. If 
no boundary dispute or any other dispute about land rights arose, the 
boundary would be planted on the spot or at least sufficient marks 
were made to ensure that there could be no doubt as to the line it 
followed. A rough sketch of the plot would be made, the plot would 
be numbered and the names of the owner and those with lesser interests 
in the land entered on the record of existing rights. This record, 
in practice, constituted the adjudication record and it was from it 
that the land register was eventually drawn up.
35Where a dispute arose, it would, of course, be referred to the
committee which would meet at a later date to consider all the disputes
that had arisen within a certain area. When a dispute had been finally
settled, the appropriate entries in the record would be made and
boundaries planted where necessary. When no more disputes remained to
be settled, a Junior Survey Assistant came and, relying on the sketches
that had been made and the boundaries that had been planted, he plotted
all the holdings on an aerial photograph. From this photograph a map
was prepared, known as the demarcation map, which, together with the
36adjudication record, constituted the adjudication register.
This,in outline, was the adjudication procedure adopted in East
Koguta and it seems to be fairly typical of procedures adopted elsewhere
in Kenya. Although it appears to be straightforward, considerable
difficulties may arise particularly in connection with the preparation
of the adjudication record. A heavy responsibility rests on the officer
charged with this task. If he is satisfied that any person has, under
recognised customary law, exercised rights in or over land which should
be recognised as ownership, he is required to determine that person to
37be owner of that land. This determination is entered on the adjudica­
tion record and when the land register is completed from that record, 
the registration of such a person as the proprietor of land operates to
35* The settlement of disputes is discussed in the next part of this 
chapter.
36. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.2k,
37* Ibid., s.23(2)(a). The Land Consolidation Act, s.13(2)(a)
provides for the recording of the name of the person "whose right, 
in the opinion of the Committee or Arbitration Board, should be 
recognised as ownership." It is doubtful whether the difference 
in wording is very significant, though it has been contended that 
the provision in the Land Adjudication Act 1968 is designed to 
preclude the grant of land to a person who has never used the 
land or otherwise exercised his rights over it. S. Rowton 
Simpson, Land Law and Registration (Cambridge University Press,
1976), p.638.
vest in him "the absolute ownership of that land together with all
38rights and privileges belonging or appurtenant thereto." The 
registered proprietor holds free from all other interests and claims,
but "subject to the leases, charges and other encumbrances and to the
39conditions and restrictions, if any, shown on the register" and
subject, of course, to the overriding interests listed in section 3®
of the Registered Land Act 1963* The adjudication record should not
only contain the names of those persons whose rights have been recognised
as ownership, but also the names of those entitled to any interest not
amounting to ownership, including any lease, right of occupation, charge
or other encumbrance, whether by virtue of recognised customary law or 
*f1otherwise.
(b) Customary rights.
These provisions governing the preparation of the adjudication 
record rest on two questionable assumptions. They assume that it is 
possible to equate rights over land recognised by customary law with 
rights recognised by the Registered Land Act 19&3 they assume that 
the officer charged with preparing the adjudication record has the 
time and the expertise necessary to secure the protection of customary
38. Registered Land Act 19&3i s.27(a).
39. Ibid., s.28(a).
4®. Ibid., s.28(b).
*f1. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.23(2)(e). The Land Consolidation
Act, s.15@(c) further provides for the recording of any restriction 
on the power of the landowner or any person having an interest in 
the land to deal with the land or his interest. It was probably 
not felt necessary to include a similar provision in the Land 
Adjudication Act 1968.
rights. It is the argument of the following pages that, owing to the 
considerable problems involved in the adequate definition and protection 
of customary land rights, land adjudication often has the effect of 
depriving some people of their rights while conferring on others 
greater rights than they are entitled to under customary law. Con­
sequently disputes are likely to arise at a later date.
Since the registration of title of land is not intended to effect
42any change in substantive rights, it seems to be assumed that it is 
possible to discover an exact equivalence between customary land rights 
and rights recognised by the Registered Land Act 1963* This is a 
dangerous assumption which leads to the making of wholly spurious 
correlations. It is rarely helpful to apply technical English legal 
terminology to systems of customary law and when a writer states that
43
jodak are nearer to squatters than tenants, he does not really advance 
our understanding of an unusual Luo institution. As far as possible it 
is necessary to adopt a neutral terminology when attempting to describe 
customary laws and procedures.
Of course, such problems of equivalence would no longer arise if 
customary land tenure had evolved to a stage where it had shed its 
more characteristic features and adopted a Western appearance, where, 
for example, the jadak institution had been replaced by a landlord- 
tenant relationship on the English model. It often seems to be thought 
that this stage has been reached when sales of land have become common
42. "It is ... a cardinal principle of adjudication that it recognises 
and confirms rights which actually exist." Republic of Kenya, 
Lawrance Mission Report, para.161.
43. G. Wilson, op. cit. p.57»
in an area and the power of the traditional authorities to control
such sales has withered away. Thus after stating that adjudication
does not purport to give the individual any rights which he did not
44previously enjoy under customary law, the Working Party on African 
Land Tenure declared itself "... satisfied that the rights enjoyed by 
individual Africans in many cases had now evolved to something like
45
full ownership and should be recognised as such.” Even among the 
Kikuyu, however, where the individualisation of land tenure had gone 
further than elsewhere, the continuing powers of the clan elders in 
land matters should not be underestimated; after all, it was on them, 
the traditional land allocators, that much of the burden of land con­
solidation was to fall.
Where the power.of the elders to control land dealings survives 
in an adjudication area, it is almost certain to be ignored by the 
adjudicating authorities; it could, of course, be preserved by, say, 
entering appropriate cautions against individual titles, but such a 
course would undermine the main purposes of land registration. However, 
even where the power of the elders to control land dealings has dis­
appeared, the survival of other aspects of customary law may cause 
problems for the adjudicating authorities. Three aspects will be 
mentioned here. They may be crudely categorised as customary comm­
ercial institutions, clan land and family interests.
Even among the Kikuyu it was the existence of certain commercial 
relationships that posed the most serious problems for those carrying
44. Report of the Working Party on African Land Tenure, 1937-8, (1938), 
para.23.
45. Ibid., para.34.
out land consolidation. The position of the muhoi (whose rights were
similar to the jadak in Luo customary law) was extremely precarious
and he frequently lost, without any compensation, the land where he
and his family might have been living and farming for a long period 
46
of time. The adjudicating authorities were primarily interested in
identifying the owner of a given piece of land and in customary law
47long user by itself could never confer ownership. Difficulty was 
also caused in the Central Province by the institution known as the 
’’redeemable sale” under which the ’’seller” was entitled to recover 
his land on repayment of the "purchase” price. Merely to record one 
of the parties as the owner of the land, as was usually done, was to 
deprive the other party of his rights. No attempt was made to define 
and protect the rights of both parties.
An equally hit-and-miss attitude is taken to what is loosely 
called clan land, that is, land over which a number of related house­
holds may have certain nights, the right to pasture or water their 
cattle, for example, or the right to collect wood. Although in such
48cases the land may be registered as group land, an attempt is usually 
made to divide it among individual right-holders and what was the sub­
ject of an amiable vagueness becomes the centre of stormy disputes.
Even where the division is fairly carried out, it can hardly be said 
that adjudication is confirming existing rights.
46. According to one writer, "... vielen Ahoi wurde die 
Ntltzungserlaubnis entzogen." H. Fliedner, Die Bodenrechtsreform 
in Kenya (Springer Verlag, 1963)* p-39* He also discusses the 
precarious position of widows and other dependant relatives in 
danger of Losing their land rights.
47. A change of policy seems to have occurred. As will be seen in 
the next section, long user does entitle a jadak to be registered 
as absolute owner, the owner’s rights being extinguished.
48. See Ch.Ill, infra.
The most important class of customary land rights that requires to
be protected by the adjudicating authorities consists of what are here
loosely called family interests. While it is at the time of land
adjudication that disputes about customary commercial interests and
clan land tend to arise, it is after registration has been completed,
and often many years after, that disputes about family interests break 
49out, disputes that would in many cases not have broken out, had land
adjudication been more carefully carried out in the first instance.
The role of the clan elders in land matters may have declined, but where
land is unregistered, customary law continues to govern the way in which
the head of a household deals with his land and the way in which it
devolves upon his death. Under customary law most members of his
family will be allocated land over which they have certain rights and
it is the function of the land adjudication programme to recognise and
confirm these rights. It is difficult enough to define the rights of
the widowed mother, the wives, the unmarried daughters, the married
sons and all the other members of the family, but if no way is devised
to protect these rights, there is a danger that they will be extinguished
50on the registration of the household head as absolute owner.
49. These disputes are discussed in Ch. IV, infra.
3®. Among the Kikuyu it was the custom that when a man died, his 
eldest son or, if his eldest son was too young, his eldest 
brother would act as muramati, that is, the person charged 
with looking after his family and seeing to the distribution 
of his estate. It seems that some aramati exploited their 
position to get themselves registered as owners of the deceased's 
lands and then proceeded to cheat their relatives of their rights. 
See H. Fliedner, op. cit., pp.59 et seq.
Where the household head is identified and located, he may decide
that all the land over which he has rights should be registered in his 
51name. The adjudicating authorities are unlikely to make any objection
even though such a step may well have the effect of extinguishing the
rights of members of his family'. Alternatively he may decide to take
into account these rights by adopting one of two courses of action,
both of which, it will be noted, have the effect of conferring on the
family member benefited more extensive rights than he or she enjoyed
under customary law. In the first place, the household head may have
himself recorded as the owner of the land jointly or, more usually,
52in common with one or more (but not more than four) members of his 
family. However the registration of co-proprietors is discouraged by 
the adjudication authorities and is not very common in practice. In 
East Koguta only twenty-five holdings were registered in the names of 
more than one proprietor. In six cases the household head had died 
leaving a young family and his land was registered in the names of his 
widows as co-proprietors. In the majority of the other cases (and 
unfortunately it was impossible to investigate them all) brothers had 
agreed to hold their deceased father's land as co-proprietors, either 
out of a vague sense of family loyalty or because the land was too small 
to be divided up and they wished to continue farming it as a single unit. 
Co-proprietorship clearly does not provide a very satisfactory device 
for ensuring the protection of family interests; it is much simpler for
51. In the Central Province relatives sometimes combined their plots
and registered them together as a single holding in order to evade
the original requirement that those owning plots below a certain 
acreage should live in villages. Nowadays no objection seems to 
be made to the registration of tiny, uneconomic holdings.
52. The practical effect of the Registered Land Act 19&3» s.101(3) 
and (^ ) is that not more than five persons can be registered as 
co-proprietors.
the household head to allot plots of land to members of his family and 
have them registered in their names.
This course of action is frequently taken. Where a household head 
has more than one fragment of land, he may have the extra fragments 
registered in the names of his sons or, less commonly, his wives. Where 
he has only one fragment of land, he may subdivide it among members of 
his family even though this may be economically disastrous, at least 
where the original fragment is small. Unfortunately it is impossible 
to make many very helpful generalisations about the practice of house­
hold heads since the number of variables to be taken into account is 
very large. Much will depend on the number, size and situation of his 
plots and much will depend on the age, marital status and employment 
of his sons. One thing is certain; it is extremely rare for a house­
hold head, however little land he has, to have it all registered in 
his own name where he has adult sons (whether married or not) living 
there. Moreover, it is extremely rare for a woman to be registered as 
the owner of a holding; only 6% of holdings in East Koguta are registered 
in the names of women and in the majority of these cases the household 
head had died leaving a widow and a young family. Generally speaking, 
however, a wide variety of approaches to the question of land allocation 
is encountered, from the household head who distributed his land among 
his fourteen sons (some, being mere children), each getting a tiny 
fraction of an acre to the household head who registered all his land 
in his own name as a way of ensuring the good behaviour of his sons.
It can be seen that it is not enough to rely on the household head 
to ensure the protection of the rights of members of his family. Cer­
tainly some members, particularly married sons, may obtain more 
extensive rights than they enjoyed under customary law, but the rights 
of others may not be recognised and it is therefore the duty of the
adjudicating authorities to devise ways of protecting them. The
Committee is under a statutory duty to safeguard the interests of
53persons under disability and to bring to the attention of officers
5bany interest m  respect of which no claim has been made. The
recording officer is required to record all interests in land not
• 55amounting to ownership and the adjudication officer has the power
to make a claim or otherwise act on behalf of a person who is under 
56
a disability as well as enjoying all the powers of his subordinate 
57officers. If the authorities carried out their statutory duties 
and made use of their statutory powers, they should be able, subject 
to problems of equivalence, to secure the protection of all family 
interests.
In practice, they do nothing at all.’ They may occasionally 
encourage a household head to*divide his land among certain members 
of his family, but their primary concern is to identify the person 
whose rights should be recognised as ownership and recording his name 
as owner on the adjudication record. The adjudication record for East 
Koguta contains not a single mention of an interest in land not 
amounting to ownership and a fortiori the land register which is
53. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.20(c), M... the committee has a 
positive duty to protect the interests of absent landowners 
or people under a disability, e.g. minors, persons of unsound 
mind, or very old people who are generally incapable of 
pressing their claims." Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands 
and Settlement, The Land Adjudication Act. A Handbook for 
the Guidance of Officers of the Land Adjudication Department,
(1970).
5b . Ibid., s.20(d).
55. Ibid., s.23(2)(e).
56. Ibid., s .11(c ).
57. Ibid., s.10(2).
71.
eventually compiled from the adjudication record will contain no mention
either. As it seems reasonable to assume that the adjudication record
is intended to be a complete record of rights over a given piece of
land, rights not entered in the record would appear to be automatically
extinguished. Nevertheless, even though this is the undeniable intention
of the legislation, the courts have become increasingly willing to
entertain the claims of relatives whose interests do not appear on the
adjudication record. As it is not possible to rectify the register in
58
the case of first registration, claimants may assert either an over­
riding interest or an equitable interest in the land concerned. The
59
treatment of such claims is discussed in detail below; suffice to say 
here that the courts often find themselves in the position of having 
to adjudicate questions relating to customary land rights, a task for 
which they are singularly unsuited and one which should have been 
carried out by the land adjudication authorities themselves.
It is rather more difficult to suggest the steps which they should 
take to protect the sort of family interests under discussion. In the 
first place, the problem of equivalence arises. To take a simple 
example, if a man has died leaving a widow and a son, the adjudication 
authorities have four possibilities open to them when they come to draw 
up the record. They may record mother and son as co-proprietors; this 
is rare and does not correspond with the position under customary law. 
They may divide the land in two parts and record the mother as owner 
of one part and the son as owner of the other; this is fairly commonly 
done but again it is at variance with customary law. Thirdly, the
58. Registered Land Act 19^3? s.1^3(1).
59. See Ch.IV, infra.
mother may be recorded as owner. Fourthly, the son may be recorded as 
owner and this is quite usual, at least where he is an adult. The 
question that arises in the third and fourth situations is how to pro­
tect the rights of the person not recorded as owner, that is, the son 
in the third situation and the mother in the fourth.
In practice, of course, no steps are taken to protect these rights 
and problems may arise subsequently where the registered owner seeks 
to evict the other. It is arguable, however, that such problems could 
not arise if adjudication had been properly carried out and a complete 
record prepared. Nevertheless it is far from clear how lesser interests 
of this kind would be recorded. Do a widow's customary rights over her 
husband's land amount to an equitable interest in the land? Does she 
enjoy a right of occupation or does she have a mere licence? Similar 
questions can be asked about the nature of the son's interest where his 
mother is registered as owner of the land. None of the three possibilites 
provide a very satisfactory answer to these questions.
Even if there were no problem of equivalence, the extent to which
such interests should be noted on the register raises another difficulty.
On the one hand, it is undesirable to clutter up the register and thus
make the registration machinery hard to administer, while on the other
hand there is the danger that property rights not noted on the register
would not be enforceable against certain third parties. This danger
would arise if the adjudicating authorities decided that the widow held
the land on trust for her son. Trusts are not entered on the register,
6®
though a person may be registered "as trustee", and the registered 
owner is deemed, for the purpose of registered dealings, to be the
60. Registered Land Act 19&3, s.126(1).
absolute proprietor of the land, no person dealing with the land being
deemed to have notice of the trust. Thus the transfer of the land to
a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration would operate to
extinguish the sorfs equitable interest in the land, a situation which
62could never arise under customary law. The son’s interest could 
however be protected if the Registrar saw fit to enter a suitable rest­
riction on the register, as he is empowered to do ’’for the prevention
63
of fraud or improper dealing or for any other sufficient cause,M He 
could, for example, order that no dealing with the land should be 
registered save with the son’s consent in writing. Such a solution, 
however, would be less appropriate where the beneficial interest was 
shared by a large number of dependent relatives. Indeed it might have 
the effect of rendering the land virtually inalienable. A further 
problem is that/beneficiary would not necessarily be entitled to occupy 
the land. Nevertheless, the trust might sometimes provide a suitable 
means of protecting certain family interests and where this is the case, 
the adjudication authorities should take pains to record details of the
6ktrust, the record being deposited with the Registrar, in the interests
of all concerned.
Alternatively, the adjudication authorities may decide that the
son's interest (in the case where his mother is held to be the owner of
65the land) constitutes a right of occupation. In this case they must
61. Ibid., s.126(3).
62. On the other hand, the title of a volunteer transferee may be 
defeasible by reason of the fact that the disposition amounted 
to a breach of trust, ibid., s.39(2).
63. Ibid., s.136(1).
6k. Ibid., s.126(2). This seems to be the policy of the Act, though 
it is a little difficult to bring the record within the definition 
of an instrument to be found ibid., s.3*
65. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.23(2)(e).
record the right on the adjudication record together with details as to
66its nature, incidents and extent. Such a right of occupation is
67deemed to be a tenancy from year to year and thus constitutes an over- 
68
riding interest. It is not clear what purpose is served by deeming a 
right of occupation to be a tenancy from year to year. Where such a 
tenancy arises in other ways, it may be determined by either party 
giving the other not less than a year’s notice, expiring on one of
69
the days on which rent is payable. However, a right of occupation
may surely be determined only in accordance with its duly recorded
terms. The rights of the occupier are therefore fully protected, though
the land may become unsaleable. Few people will be prepared to purchase
land which is subject to rights whose nature and extent it is impossible
to ascertain without access to the adjudication record.
Finally, the adjudication authorities may decide that the family
member, the son in the above example, has no interest in the land at all
and is at best a licensee. While licences are not capable of registra- 
7§
tion, a licensee may protect his interest by lodging a caution with
71the Registrar forbidding the registration of dispositions of the land.
On the application of any person interested, the Registrar may take
72
steps to remove the caution, but it is not clear at any stage on what 
grounds he is to make his decision. According to general principles of
66. Ibid., s.23(3)(c).
67. Registered Land Act 19^3* s.11(3).
68. Ibid., s.30(d).
69. Ibid., s.*f6 (l)(c). If the right of occupation may be determined 
in this way, then it provides very poor protection for the right­
holder.
7§. Ibid., s.1#0(l).
71. Ibid., s.131(l)(b).
72. Ibid., s.133(2).
property law, licences are personal transactions and do not create
proprietary interests in land, A licence is defined in the Registered
Land Act 19^3 as Ma permission given by the proprietor of land ...
which allows the licensee to do some act in relation to the land ...
73which would otherwise be a t r e s p a s s , a  definition which implies 
that a licensee can have no more than a personal action against the 
licensor. However such an interpretation is untenable in view of a 
subsequent section of the Act which provides that a licence relating 
to the use or enjoyment of land is ineffective against a bona fide 
purchaser for valuable consideration unless the licensee has pro-
7*f
tected his interest by lodging a caution. This provision clearly
indicates that in some circumstances a duly protected licence may be
effective against a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration of
the land to which the licence relates, though it is far from certain
in what circumstances this will be the case. Perhaps, as in England,
the courts will recognise licences by estoppel as capable of creating
75
proprietary interests m  land.
In this part of the chapter an attempt has been made to consider 
the difficult question of customary rights. It has been seen that 
customary rights survive, in one form or another, in even the most 
developed areas of Kenya and therefore pose a problem for the land 
adjudication authorities who have the choice of either ignoring them 
or recognising them and ensuring their protection. The former course 
of action works hardship on the rightholders, runs counter to the
73* Ibid., s.3.
74. Ibid., s.100(2).
73» The way in which the courts handle disputes arising out of 
customary rights of occupation is discussed infra, pp. 190 
et seq.
declared aim of land adjudication, namely the recording of existing 
rights, and is likely to result in a large number of disputes being 
brought before the committee or, subsequently, the courts. In practice, 
however, it is this course of action that is generally adopted by the 
land adjudication authorities, who are content simply to ascertain the 
owner of a given piece of land and to enter his name on the record.
Even if they were prepared to recognise rights not amounting to owner­
ship, they would be confronted with two major difficulties. In the 
first place, they would be obliged to define carefully all such rights 
and to devise suitable means of securing their protection on the 
register. As the foregoing discussion of family interests has shown, 
this is by no means an easy task. None of the more obvious devices 
are free from difficulty and, besides, the more effectively a pro­
prietary interest is protected, the harder it becomes for the land­
owner to deal with his land, a dilemma, of course, which faces all 
systems of property law. However, even if a satisfactory way of 
protecting customary rights could be found, a second and more practical 
difficulty arises. The adjudicating authorities have neither the 
skills nor, probably, the time necessary to undertake this task. The 
committee members and the recording officer are usually people of 
limited education, as ill-equipped as any layman to handle sophisticated
legal concepts and keen to complete the whole adjudication process as 
76soon as possible. Thus it is that land adjudication often has the
76. Thus, one writer reports from Kisii that land adjudication
committees were required to act too hastily, with the result that 
”... many customary rights are inevitably ignored.” R.J.A.
Wilson, ”The economic implications of land registration in Kenya's 
smallholder areas,” University of Nairobi, Institute for Develop­
ment Studies, Staff Paper No.91 (unpublished), February 19711 p*8.
effect of conferring on some people more extensive rights than they 
formerly enjoyed, while depriving others of their customary rights.
(c) Absentees.
77An additional problem faces the land adjudication authorities 
where a person with customary land rights is absent at the time of 
land adjudication, especially if that person enjoys rights which should 
be recognised as ownership. Although the concept of absolute ownership 
is alien to customary law, it is clear that if one individual is to be 
registered as absolute owner, it should be the household head and in 
practice this is what generally occurs; indeed it sometimes appears as 
though the identification of the household head and the entry of his 
name in the adjudication record as absolute owner is the sole aim of 
the adjudication programme. However, even this limited aim is dif­
ficult to achieve where people are absent at the time of land adjudi­
cation. This problem existed in a particularly acute form during land 
consolidation in the Central Province at a time when a large number of 
Kikuyu was either in detention or fighting in the forests. While many 
of them had relatives at home who protected their interests, not all 
relatives could be relied upon and it seems clear than many absentees
rpO
lost their land. The problem has also arisen in Nyanza Province
77• Adjudication officers interviewed by the present writer were 
unanimous about the gravity of this problem.
78. See p . 167 infra.
because a large proportion of active male Luo is away at any one time,
working or looking for work in the towns; indeed the rate of Luo labour
79migration has always been high.
The present writer found one or two people in East Kadianga who 
had lost their land in this way. One man had been working during land 
adjudication in Kericho, a nearby town, only to return to find that 
all his land, inherited from his father, had been registered in the 
name of his unscrupulous brother. Although the two brothers continued 
for a few years to farm the land side by side, eventually a quarrel 
broke out and his brother told him to leave. He has been given tem­
porary accommodation by one of his mother's family and meanwhile 
bombards the district.administration with complaining letters. These 
have little effect, nor is it clear that legal action against his 
brother would be any more successful since the courts do not have the
power to rectify the land register where a first registration is in
. . 8% question.
In East Koguta several of the objections to the adjudication 
register were lodged by people who had been absent during the pre­
paration of the register and it seems likely that there are others 
who did not return in time to object. It is true that demarcation 
officers often attempt to contact absentees where appropriate, but 
these attempts are not always successful and even when they do succeed 
in inducing an absentee to return home at the first stage of the 
adjudication process, they will not necessarily ensure his presence at
79• In 1953 it was estimated that rather more than 50% of the adult 
male population of Central Nyanza District was working outside 
the district at any one time. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 
Annual District Reports for Central Nyanza District, 1953* p.1.
80. Registered Land Act 1963* s.1^3(1)• This topic is discussed at 
length in Ch.IV, infra.
the crucial time when the adjudication register is available for 
inspection and open to objections. Moreover although the adjudication
8committee is now required to safeguard the interests of absent persons,
it is hard to see what steps the most conscientious committee could take
(and many committees are less than conscientious) apart from contacting 
82the absentee. Certainly social pressure may be exerted on the person 
who is seen to be wrongfully laying claim to the absentee's land, but 
where this fails, land adjudication may have the effect of depriving
83
irrevocably the absentee of his rights.
(iv) The settlement of disputes.
(a) General.
It has been shown in the foregoing section that the preparation 
of the adjudication record poses serious problems for the adjudication 
authorities. Nevertheless it is not this aspect of their duties, 
important as it is, which receives the greatest publicity. Much of 
their time and energy is inevitably devoted to the settlement of 
disputes, a vitally important part of the land adjudication programme
81. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.20(c)^
g2» In this connection it is worth noting that the adjudication 
officer has the power to make a claim or otherwise act on 
behalf of a person who is absent if he considers it necessary 
to avoid injustice, ibid., s.11(c). It is doubtful whether 
this power is even used. There is no parallel protection for 
absentees in the Land Consolidation Act.
83- The locational chief informed the present writer that he was 
sometimes approached by people who alleged that they had been 
deprived of their land during their absence. If he was con­
vinced that their grievances were genuine, he would try and 
negotiate a compromise with the registered owners of the land 
in question.
and a subject of considerable controversy. It is hoped that the 
following account of the settlement of disputes in East Koguta may 
throw some light on the difficulties involved.
The number of land disputes in East Koguta was extremely large.
The adjudication committee dealt with 161 cases, the arbitration 
board heard *f1 complaints, the adjudication officer considered 131 
objections to the adjudication register and there were 13 appeals to 
the Minister from the adjudication officer's determinations. As East 
Koguta consists of some 1667 parcels, it would appear that about one 
tenth of the total number of parcels was the subject of a land dispute. 
This partly explains why land adjudication took such a long time, though 
there seems to have been an inexplicable delay of twenty months before 
the arbitration board set about hearing complaints made about committee 
decisions.
The present writer had access to reports of the proceedings at all 
four levels. Unfortunately, however, the reports are inadequate in 
many respects, especially the committee reports. Some, indeed, do 
little more than record the names of the parties and the outcome of the 
case. Where more information is provided, it is often difficult to 
disentangle the complex fact situations that arise and to assess the 
testimony of the claimants and their witnesses, a difficulty that is 
compounded by the tendency to refer to the same person by different 
names, to use the same name to refer to different people and to give 
a misleading view of family relationships by inaccurate translations 
into English. In many cases, however, it is possible to diseern the 
criteria on which'the various adjudicating bodies purport to rest their 
decisions and to identify the sort of situations that give rise to 
disputes. Moreover, fifty-six of the sixty informants in East Koguta
had been involved in at least one land dispute at the time of land 
adjudication and were able to give a vivid, if partial, view of the 
process at work.
(b) Procedure.
Surprisingly enough, there is no provision in the Land Adjudication 
Act 1968 setting out the procedure to be adopted by adjudication 
committees. They are merely required to "adjudicate upon and decide
84-in accordance with recognised customary law" any questions referred 
to them by the demarcation officer or the recording officer. Moreover,
85
the handbook issued by the government offers no guidance in this 
respect. No doubt it is felt that as the committees consist largely 
of clan elders and settle disputes in accordance with customary law, 
an informality of procedure such as is generally associated, with the 
administration of customary law is more appropriate than the formal 
system administered in the courts. In any case it is highly unlikely 
that committees would either be prepared or able to follow an elaborate 
set of rules of evidence and procedure. Nevertheless the hearings of 
the adjudication committee in East Koguta did follow a certain pattern.
On a day fixed in advance for the hearing of a dispute a fairly 
large crowd would gather on the disputed l^nd: the committee members
84. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.20(a).
85. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands and Settlement, The Land 
Adjudication Act. A Handbook for the Guidance of Officers of 
the Land Adjudication Department, (197®)-
and the recording officer, the contestants accompanied by their 
families and their witnesses and, finally, groups of curious by­
standers, grave elders, young mothers and wide-eyed children. The 
contestants would be known to most of those present, many of whom 
would have definite views as to the rights and wrongs of the case.
On only three occasions do the reports indicate how many committee 
members were present and on each occasion the number was in the mid­
twenties; however it is unlikely that the attendance was often as good 
as that, though the chairman, vice-chairman and a few other members 
seemed to form a nucleus which attended all hearings. The contestants
would usually attend in person and, where this was impossible, would
86ensure that a kinsman (or kinswoman) presented their case. Each 
contestant would bring two witnesses to support his claim.
One contestant would first present his case. The presentation 
would often be extremely discursive, recounting events alleged to 
have occurred in the distant past and alluding to persons long since 
dead. The contestant would then be questioned briefly by the other 
contestant and by members of the committee. His witnesses would then 
make short statements and would also undergo a brief cross-examination. 
The other contestant would then present his case and the same pro­
cedure would be followed. The committee would then confer and judg­
ment would be delivered by the chairman. He would invariably give
reasons for the decision which would, in the event of disagreement
87among the members, be a majority decision. The recording officer
86. Nevertheless there were six instances where only one contestant 
put in an appearance, judgment being given in his favour ex 
parte.
87. Unfortunately in only three instances were the voting figures 
recorded in the committee reports.
would be responsible for reporting the proceedings and formally 
recording the decision. Moreover it would be usual, where appro­
priate, to mark the newly-adjudicated boundary on the spot.
The reports obviously give an extremely abbreviated account of
what actually takes place. This is almost inevitable. Without a
tape-recorder and without a knowledge of shorthand the recording
officer must content himself with giving an accurate account, in
English, of the essentials of arguments, in Luo, that often appeared
to be unnecessarily repetitive and curiously irrelevant. Nevertheless
it is clear that a certain order is followed and has become familiar
to those involved. Since the proceedings are essentially inquisitorial
it is doubtful whether more formal rules of procedure would be either
88necessary or desirable. The absence of rules of evidence need 
hardly be regretted either, though it would be extremely interesting 
to know what considerations lead committee members to come to their 
decisions. Where, as is usually the case, a question of fact is in 
issue, it might be thought that the evidence of witnesses would be 
critically important. However, witnesses are notoriously unreliable; 
indeed witnessing may occur on an expressly reciprocal basis. This 
being the case, it is perhaps surprising that more use is not made
f
of customary oaths, in particular, the Mbira oath. Nevertheless 
everyone denied that they were ever used, though a member of the 
local arbitration board informed, the present writer that the board
88. Indeed all courts are required to decide civil cases, where one 
party or both parties are either subject to customary law or 
affected by it, "according to substantial justice without 
undue regard to technicalities of procedure and without undue 
delay." Judicature Act 1967* Cap.8 (1970), s.3(2).
8qmade use of them. In the absence of reliable witnesses, then, it 
seems that committee decisions may be heavily influenced by the views 
of members whose knowledge of the particular area or whose powers of 
argument enable them to dominate the deliberations.
(c) Analysis of disputes.
The publication of a notice establishing an adjudication section
operates to stay all civil proceedings concerning an interest in land
in that section. No such proceedings may be instituted save with the
99
consent of the adjudication officer and proceedings already
91instituted are to be discontinued unless he otherwise directs. A 
provision of this kind is clearly necessary since it would be most 
unsatisfactory if two bodies were simultaneously engaged in settling 
the same disputes. Such a possibility is still not wholly excluded
92
as a person may, for example, bring an action for criminal trespass 
and there is the danger that courts view on which party has the better 
right to possession of the land may conflict with the findings of the
89. The usual procedure seems to be that the two persons laying 
claim to the land in dispute are required to eat some of the 
soil and to utter a curse in some such form as: "May this soil 
kill me, if the land is not truly mine!" Some kinds of customary 
curse are used in District Magistrate's Courts. See, for 
example, John Oloo v. Erasto Oduor, High Court of Kenya at 
Kisumu, Miscellaneous Civil Application No.37 of 1972.
9©. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.30(l).
91. Ibid., s.30(2).
92. Land suits often appear under the guise of trespass actions or 
claims in respect of crops alleged to have been damaged or 
stolen. Indeed the local Resident Magistrate informed the 
present writer that owing to the notorious delay in the settle­
ment of land suits, it had become usual to bring trespass 
actions instead.
adjudication committee. This, in fact, occurs very rarely.
Where land has already been the subject of a land suit, the
adjudication committee holds itself bound by the decision of the court
and does not permit the matter to be re-opened. There appears to be
nothing in the law which requires the committee to adopt this view and
it is at least arguable that the strict application of the res
judicata principle is inappropriate in such circumstances. Court
93records, where they exist, are not consulted and much therefore 
depends on the memory of members present. It may be surmised that 
few will have any very accurate recollection of the identity of the 
parties to the original land suit or of the piece of land in dispute. 
Moreover, where the committee is not honest, the res judicata principle 
provides a convenient method of dismissing a case whose merits it is 
reluctant to consider. The operation of the principle in this context 
might therefore be inappropriate, though where the land has previously 
been the subject of dispute before the jokakwaro elders, it would seem 
reasonable to follow their decision, as is invariably done in practice.
However, in the vast majority of cases the committee does consider 
the merits and it is with these cases that the present discussion is 
concerned. The discussion relates to all four stages of the dispute 
settlement process, from the committee hearings to the appeals to the 
Minister, and an attempt will be made both to outline the general 
nature of the disputes that arise at the time of land adjudication and 
to identify the principles in accordance with which the adjudicating
93• Magistrates have admitted to the present writer that, even 
where records exist, it is hard to apply the res judicata 
principle in land suits since the parties to the second suit 
are usually different and since the plaintiff may assert 
that he is laying claim to a slightly different piece of 
land, an assertion which, in the absence of accurate maps, 
it is extremely difficult to contravert.
bodies purport to reach their decisions. It is also interesting to 
consider the degree to which such principles conform to the customary 
law governing land disputes and to the expectations of the disputants 
themselves.
The disputes that arise at the time of land adjudication fall 
loosely into two categories, boundary disputes and ownership disputes. 
Boundary disputes, which form the larger category, are generally the 
most bitterly contested. The parties are, in the nature of things, 
close neighbours and they are often closely related as well. Family 
disputes are common, particularly between brothers and between cousins, 
but where the parties are-not related, the effect of a dispute is to 
reinforce family and clan solidarity. Thus a number of boundary 
disputes in East Koguta had more than a merely individual or local 
significance; they concerned the determination of the boundary between 
the Koguta and Ramogi clans, an issue which seemed deeply to affect 
most people in the sub-location causing both clans to mobilise all 
their resources in an effort to secure decisions in their favour.
Thus the concept of "clan land" or "family land" may still remain 
real even where the powers of control over land traditionally 
exercised by the kinship group have largely disappeared.
Boundary disputes generally take one of two forms. Most commonly 
the dispute concerns a piece of land which adjoins the farms of the 
two claimants. If the land shows signs of having been used or 
occupied by one of the claimants, it will of course be awarded to him,
94unless there is evidence that his occupation was secret and in bad 
faith. However, where there are no signs of individual use or
94. In particular, it is often alleged that a neighbour has extended 
his boundary overnight.
95occupation, as is usually the case, other factors may be taken into 
account, factors which many an English lawyer would consider incon­
clusive but which have their roots in customary land tenure. For 
example, the disputed land may be awarded to one party on the ground 
that it faces his "gate"; as it was the custom of the Luo farmer to 
cultivate and develop the land which lay in front of his house, land 
which lay across his natural line of advance (and not, at the same 
time, across his neighbour's natural line of advance) would be 
awarded to him. Another important consideration would be the identity 
of the other people whose land abutted on the land in dispute; if they 
were all related to one of the parties, the land would be awarded to 
that party on the grounds that he was "surrounded by his own people," 
grounds which seem to imply an acknowledgement that he and his people 
would have been justified to regard the land as theirs to deal with 
as and when they wished.
Where these kinds of evidence were absent, the vacant land would 
usually be divided equally between the parties. In no case was the 
land held to be entirely free from private rights and the county
96
council recorded as the owner.
The second kind of boundary dispute does not concern vacant land
but the distribution of land on the death of the household head. Most
commonly the parties would be brothers, but one or two cases raised
97the question of land rights enjoyed by levirs. All such disputes
95. It may be used for general grazing and is known as alap.
96. Although the Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.23(2)(d) makes
provision for such a course of action, it is rarely adopted.
97. On the death of her husband a woman may enter into a leviratic
union with a brother or other close relative of his. Children
of the union are deemed, for the purposes of inheritance, to 
be the deceased's children.
purported to be decided in accordance with customary law. Thus in
98
Guya Okite v. Opere Okoth it appeared that on the death of Guya's 
father his mother entered into a leviratic union with Opere; Opere 
came to live with her, cultivated her late husband's land and built 
a house on it. At the time of land adjudication a dispute arose 
with regard to this land between Guya on the one hand and Opere and 
Opere's son by a former wife on the other. The dispute was decided 
in Guya's favour by the adjudication committee, by the arbitration 
board and by the adjudication officer, and though the appeal to the 
Minister had not yet been heard, the present writer was able to see 
a memorandum advising the Minister to dismiss the appeal in the 
following words:
The estate of the deceased was passed on to his 
children and wife. The respondent, as the son 
of Okite, the deceased, and Mrs Okite who was 
remarried by Opere Okoth is [sic] according to
customary law, the inheritor and owner of the
land in dispute. The appellents have therefore 
no grounds for claim over this land. 99
Thus customary law was followed in as much as Guya will no doubt be
registered as absolute owner of the land. However, not only will
Opere have no charge on the land for the value of the improvements 
effected by him, but he will almost certainly not enjoy the security 
of tenure which he would have enjoyed under customary law, though his 
position would in practice be improved if part of the land were 
awarded to Guya's mother.
98. East Koguta Adjudication Committee Case no.119; Nyanza Province 
Arbitration Board Case no.22/69/70; Objection to East Koguta 
Adjudication Register no.56; Appeals to the Minister no. 8 of 
1972.
99. Appeal to the Minister no. 8 of 1972, memorandum on the case file.
89.
Ownership disputes, the second category of dispute, provide
further illustrations of the inflexible all-or-nothing approach
exemplified by the decision in this case and of the injustice that
such an approach can work. They are loosely termed ownership disputes
here because that is how they are seen by the various adjudication
authorities; in a dispute between A and B, either A is to be adjudged
absolute owner and B to have no rights or vice versa; the possibility
of some middle way is not acknowledged. Such an approach ignores the
variety of interests in land that may co-exist both under customary
1t#law and under a system of registration of title. It has the effect
of altering the substantive rights of those concerned, something which
has already been seen to be a general characteristic of the land
, . .. 101 adjudication process.
Ownership disputes generally arise between people who are com­
parative strangers to one another, that is, they are neither relatives 
nor neighbours. Such disputes usually fall into one of two categories, 
the one concerning absentees and the other concerning jodak. The 
former, and more common, type of dispute might arise in the following 
way. After occupying a piece of land for a certain period of time,
A may go away leaving the land unoccupied. In the meantime B may 
occupy the land and continue in occupation until the time of land 
adjudication, when a dispute may arise as to who has the better right 
to be registered as absolute owner. Clearly no problem exists if it
100. "Committees have also been prone to neglect interests in land
which amount to less than ownership despite every effort made to 
safeguard them under the law." Lawrance Mission Report, para.
163. This cautiously-worded comment applies equally to other 
levels of the dispute settlement process.
1*1. Supra, pp. 63 et seq.
can be established that A intended permanently to abandon the land 
and to relinquish all rights over it, but the situation is seldom as 
straightforward as that. The question then arises whether B may 
acquire by adverse possession a good title to the land as against A.
The answer seems to be clear that he may not.
102Not only does the Limitation of Actions Act 1968 not apply
to actions to recover possession of Trust Land, but it is clearly
not intended to affect the traditional position in the Trust Lands
that customary law alone should govern land held on customary land 
1§3
tenure. Moreover, there seems to be little doubt about the position
under customary law. One authority has stated categorically that as a
rule customary tenure knows nothing in the nature of a prescriptive 
104claim to land, noting, however, that "... long and undisturbed
possession of a piece of land by another has often been taken to be
,,103 
Ler."
106 which
1 5strong presumptive evidence of abandonment by the owner  Tew
people would question this statement of the position, 
certainly coincides with the present writer's findings. The courts,
however, have often declined to follow customary law in this matter,
holding that it is contrary to the general principles of equity on
102. Cap.22 (1970)i s.^2(c). Furthermore, s.M(a)(v) of the Act 
provides that the Act does not enable a person to acquire any 
title to land vested in a county council (other than land 
vested in it by the Registered Land Act 19^3i s.120(8)).
103« In Michael Qjode and another v. Dickson Opiyo, High Court of 
Kenya at Kisii, Civil Appeal No.1 of 1971 (unreported), it was 
held that the Limitation of Actions Act 1968 applied to land 
held under customary law and that the appellants' claim to land 
occupied for 27 years by the respondent was statute-barred. Of 
the many cases on the subject, this is the only one where this 
point of view has been adopted.
10^ f• T.O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (Manchester 
University Press,1956), p.166.
105. Ibid., p.167.
106. For a full review of the authorities on this topic, see L.L. Katto, 
"Has customary law in English - speaking Africa recognised long 
possession of land as a basis of title?", 1 E.A.L.J. 2^ 3«
1§7that it is repugnant to justice or morality. The practice of the
courts is not consistent and it is virtually impossible to discover
the principles that govern their decisions beyond a vague desire to
”do justice”. Although in one case^^ the Court of Review held that
the presumption of abandonment did not apply where the parties were
brothers, in the majority of cases the courts favour the person in
109actual occupation regardless of the relevant customary law. In
one case the same court saw fit to divide the disputed land between 
110the two claimants and m  yet another it awarded all the land to
111the party who had been m  possession for a long period of time.
Sometimes the court attempts to reconcile the demands of justice
with customary law by deeming the absentee to have permanently
abandoned the land, but it is not clear whether it is a rebuttable
presumption or a presumption that the passage of a certain length of
time makes absolute. All that can be said with any certainty is
that the trend of decisions in the higher courts is in favour of the
person in actual occupation. A typical illustration is afforded by
the following statement from a recent case: ”It is well recognised
that failure to assert a title to land as against a person in
possession over a number of years leads to the extinguishment of the
title of the original owner on the grounds that the court will not
112help those who sleep on their rights.” It is, however, open to
1*7. Some support for this view is afforded by the Judicature Act 
1967, s.3 (1) and (2).
1§8. Ondiba Omwamba v. Osoro Qmwamba (1960), 8 C.R.R.1.
109* See e.g., Simeon Munyae and another v. Mangoka Kilili and another
(1962)7 10 C.R.R.5.
110. Saulo Khaemba v. Wakhina Khwatenge (1953)? 1 C.R.R.3«
111. Ogere Obiero v. Obwoyo Amolo (195*0? 2 C.R.R. 10.
112. Nyachero s/o Odigo v. Nelson Ongudu, High Court of Kenya at 
Kisumu, Civil Appeal No.6# of 1968 (unreported), per Bennett, J.
doubt whether the lower courts adopt the same point of view and even
whether the decisions of the higher courts are actually followed on 
113the ground; it might be that the victorious party will regard the
court order as a kind of bargaining counter to be used in the elders'
deliberations that come later and that finally adjust the parties1
rights inter se.
The adjudication authorities, like the higher courts, tend to
ignore customary law and to favour the person in actual occupation as
against the absentee, where a long, period of time has passed without
11*fany complaint by the latter. It is never made clear what exactly
constitutes effective occupation; certainly evidence of cultivation
and fencing is sufficient to support a claim and proof that a claimant
has regularly entered on the land to cut trees or even that many of
his family are buried there may also suffice. Nor is it clear how
long a period must have elapsed, most of the reports referring vaguely
115to the claimant's long use of the land. Nor do the reports always 
distinguish cases where a person has simply abandoned his land tempor­
arily and cases where he actually allows another person to use his 
land. Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly a large number of disputes 
of this kind. Sometimes the land is divided between the two claimants
as in one case where it was found that though the land belonged to
116
one party, the other had been living there for forty-five years.
113. See L.L. Katto, op. cit., p.237*
11*f. The chairman of the East Koguta Adjudication Committee confirmed 
that this was the committee's policy.
113. Twenty years is the shortest period that is specifically mentioned 
in the reports.
116. Bogo Achacha v. Agai Deta, East Koguta Adjudication Committee 
case No.3^-
However in most cases all the land is awarded to the person in 
occupation.
The second type of ownership dispute has certain similarities
with the type just discussed and is best illustrated by a consideration
117of the position of the jadak. It would frequently occur among the
Luo that a farmer would be asked by a stranger (that is, someone
outside his patrilineage) to allow him the use of a piece of land
in return for certain services of a modest, rather ritual nature.
The stranger would thus be a jadak, enjoying considerable security
of tenure, though he could never alienate the land nor would it
necessarily pass to his family on his death. However long he and
his family used the land, they would always be regarded as outsiders,
there by consent and incapable of ever acquiring full rights over the
land. This is broadly the position under customary law and the
present research indicated that it remains the position today.
However, on the relatively few occasions on which the courts
have had to deal with a dispute between a jadak and his host family,
they have usually awarded the land to the jadak. In some cases this
has meant that the court has merely confirmed the right of the jadak
118
to occupy the land for an indefinite period. Thus in one case the 
host wished to use the land cultivated by his jadak and although the 
court granted a declaration that he (the host) was the owner of the 
land, it also ordered him to allow the defendant (the jadak) to 
continue using the land for purposes of cultivation ”... so long as 
the defendant remained obedient as a tenant-at-will of the plaintiff."
117. See supra, p. 46-^7f for a brief description of the jadak 
institution.
118. Ondoyi Oyugi v. Okwanyo Owako, Resident Magistrate’s Court at 
Kisumu, Land Appeal Case No.32 of 1969 (unreported). The use 
of the term "tenant-at-will" is not very appropriate.
119Similarly in another case where a jadak had been in occupation for
seventeen years and had recently begun to plant trees (a step that
traditionally required his host's consent), the court held that such
conduct did not entitle the applicant to evict him and added that
while the "reversionary title" remained vested in the applicant, the
respondent and, after him, his heir were entitled to continue to
occupy the land "in accordance with the principles of customary law".
Although it is arguable that such decisions give the jadak greater
rights as against his host than he would have enjoyed under customary
law, some decisions have the effect of totally extinguishing the host's 
120rights. A fortiori the courts will be inclined to favour someone
who has been occupying a piece of land over a long period, having
originally been granted the use of land by a member of the same
partrilineage and not by a person towards whom he stands in a jadak
121relationship. Thus in one case the appellants (who were not jpdak) 
had been in possession of land for thirty-eight years, but the 
respondent claimed that his uncle had granted them merely the right 
to use the land. Although the court appears to have accepted the 
respondent's story, the appeal was nevertheless allowed on the grounds
119* John Abuom v . QgwayO Okelo (1955)? 3 C.R.R. 1.
1 2 i. See, for example, Cornel Nyambuo v. Henry Onyango, Resident 
Magistrate's Court at Kisumu, Land Appeal Case No.31 of 197* 
(unreported), where the jadak's family had been in continuous 
occupation for seventy years. See also Cngudi Ojow and Bengo 
Ochume v. Amwom Atito, Resident Magistrate's court at Kisumu, 
Land Appeal Case No.^ of 19&7 (unreported), where the elders 
had previously held that the host was entitled to enter upon 
and cultivate land occupied by a jadak from another location. 
The jadak was awarded the land in both cases.
121. Atieno Wavumbe and Ogala Atieno v. Pitalis Mbiji, High Court of 
Kenya at Kisumu, Appeal Case No. 36 of 197® (unreported). A 
similar principle was enunciated in Erasto Angieno v. Sospiter 
Achieng et al., High Court of Kenya at Kisumu, Appeal Case 
No.67 of 1968 (unreported).
of natural justice which required that many years uninterrupted 
occupation of land conferred a prescriptive title on the person in 
occupation.
The problem, of course, arises in an acute form at the time of
land adjudication. It is well known, for example, that many ahoi
(the Kikuyu equivalent of the jo dak) became landless during land
consolidation in the Central Province and it seems to have become
the policy of the authorities to prevent similar injustice occurring
elsewhere. In practice this has meant that the person in actual
occupation of the land, whether as a jadak. or not, is judged to be
122the owner of the land and registered as such. In fact jodak do
not appear to have been very common on the Nyabondo plateau and
only one case involving a jadak occurred in East Koguta. In this 
123case the jadak had been granted the use of a piece of land about 
thirty years previously and at the time of land adjudication a 
dispute arose between him and the son of the original grantor. The 
adjudication committee, the arbitration board and the adjudication 
officer all awarded the land to the jadak even though he had bought 
land elsewhere in East Koguta and so would not have been made landless 
by an adverse decision. An award of this kind is contrary to 
customary law and may be unjust to the grantor and his family, but 
in no case have the adjudication authorities taken a middle course 
and attempted to make some adjustment between the two parties, say, 
by charging the land with the payment of a certain sum by way of
122. This was confirmed by everyone questioned on the matter including 
the locational chief and various officers of the Land 
Adjudication Department.
123* Samuel Owuor Odawo v. Daniel Otieno, Nyanza Province Arbitration 
Board Case No.2i/69/7®; Objection to East Koguta Adjudication 
Register No .16. It was impossible to locate the Adjudication 
Committee Report.
,..124compensation.
Where someone has granted the use of land to a member of his own
patrilineage, the grantee is not a jadak and the adjudication
authorities are certain to settle any dispute with the grantor in
the grantee's favour, at least where he can prove that he has occupied
the land for a sufficiently long period of time. A number of disputes
of this kind arose in East Koguta, the grantees usually having been in
125
occupation of the disputed land for upwards of twenty years.
Inevitably a certain amount of resentment is felt by the family of the 
grantor who may have allowed the use of his land as an act of generosity, 
always intending to take it back when the growth of his family made it 
necessary. As in the case of the jadak, it is a pity that a way of 
reconciling the interests of the two parties has not been devised.
A brief attempt has been made in this part of the chapter to 
consider the sort of disputes that arise at the time of land adjudica­
tion and to identify the principles which appear to determine the way 
in which they are settled. Broadly speaking the disputes are of a 
traditional nature, such as have always absorbed a large proportion of 
the courts' time, and fall generally into one of two categories, 
loosely termed here boundary disputes (the larger category) and 
ownership disputes. It has been shown that while boundary disputes 
tend to be settled in accordance with customary law, ownership dis­
putes have not. Both the courts and the adjudication authorities 
stress the importance of long-term occupation and have demonstrated a
124. In English law, a proprietary estoppel might arise in similar 
situations; see, e.g., Inwards v. Baker, [1963] 2 Q.B.29-
123. In one or two cases the grantors have asserted that the grantees 
have only been in occupation for a couple of years, but the 
adjudication authorities have not accepted their version of 
facts.
readiness to award land to the person who has occupied land for a long 
time, even though the owner under customary law has never intended to 
relinquish his rights over the land and even though the person in 
occupation is aware of this. Land adjudication has the effect of 
depriving people of rights to which they were entitled under customary 
law and it will continue to have that effect as long as the preparation 
of the adjudication record is seen to involve merely the determination 
of ownership.
(d) Complaints, objections and appeals.
Any person named in or affected by a decision of the committee
who considers the decision to be incorrect may, within fourteen days,
126complain to the executive officer of the committee who is required
127to refer the complaint to the-Provincial arbitration board for hearing.
The arbitration board consists of not less than five persons appointed
by the adjudication officer from a panel appointed by the Provincial
Commissioner and consisting of not less than six and not more than
1 28twenty-five perso'ns resident within the district; the board itself
129elects one of its members to be chairman. The boards generally 
consist of former court elders, civil servants and councillors, though 
there are also some younger members; a conscious effort is made to 
ensure that members have little or no direct connection with the
126. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s .2 1 ( 3 ) .  
127- Ibid., s s .2 1 (4 )  and 22.
128. Ibid., s.7(1).
129. Ibid., s.8(2).
adjudication area in question. While this is designed t» secure
impartiality, it may also lead them to rely excessively on committee
members who attend their meetings. While no informant ever accused
the board of corruption, many criticised it for working too closely
with these committee members and tending to confirm a committee
decision without seriously considering the merits of the case.
However, this view is not really borne out by what happened in
East Koguta. Although the adjudication committee heard some 161 cases,
only forty-one complaints were referred to the board. In twenty-five
instances the committee decision was confirmed, in thirteen cases it
130was overruled and in three cases it was varied. The board adopts 
a procedure similar to that adopted by the committee and the principles 
on which it acts are also similar. The highly unsatisfactory nature of 
the reports makes it impossible to generalise about the grounds on 
which a board may overrule a committee decision, though it seems as 
though in most cases the board is merely taking a different view of 
the facts.
No provision is made for the hearing of any complaints about the 
board's decisions as such. However, the results of these decisions 
are entered in the adjudication record and when this record is com­
plete, it is displayed together with the demarcation map (collectively
131they are known as the adjudication register) at a convenient place
132
for purposes of inspection. The adjudication officer is required to 
give notice that the register has been completed and may be inspected
130. Minutes of the meetings of the Nyanza Province Arbitration Board.
131. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.24.
132. Ibid., s.23(b).
133during a period of sixty days. Within this period any person named 
in or affected by the register who considers it to be incorrect or 
incomplete in any respect may object to the adjudication officer in 
writing, saying in what respect he considers it incorrect or incomplete.
The adjudication officer is then required to determine such objection
135after making any further inquiries that he thinks fit and to alter
136the register in conformity with his determinations. He has very
broad powers with regard to the whole process of adjudication; he may
administer oaths and issue summonses and is empowered to determine any
question that needs to be determined in connection with claims made 
137under the Act. While his powers are much broader than those enjoyed
under the Land Consolidation Act, it is not clear that he has the power
to alter the completed register of his own motion where no objection has
138
been made, nor does it seem desirable that he should have such power.
He is certainly empowered to make a claim or otherwise act on behalf of 
a person who is absent or under a disability if he considers it
139necessary to avoid injustice, but the use of this discretion is 
dangerously uncontrolled and should surely be restricted to those 
special situations.
133. Ibid., s.25(c).
13^. Ibid., s.26(1).
135. Ibid., s.26(2).
136. Ibid., s.27(1).
137. Ibid., s.10(1).
138. The Lawrance Mission recommended that he should; Lawrance Mission 
Report, para.15^- However, the powers of the adjudication officer 
under the Mission's draft Land Adjudication Bill, broader though 
they are than the powers granted under the Act, do not appear to 
include the power to intervene in the adjudication process in
• this way.
139* Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.11(c).
The exact nature of the objection stage is far from clear and, in
particular, it is difficult to know on what grounds an objection to
140the register should be taken, the words of the Act being capable of
various interpretations. A narrow interpretation would restrict the
scope of the section to petty clerical errors (mis-spellings and the
like) and, more important, to situations where the person recorded as
owner in the adjudication record is not the person determined to be the
owner in the course of the preceding adjudication process. If, for
example, the arbitration board has awarded land to X but for some
reason Y's name is entered on the adjudication record as the owner of
that land, it is desirable that X should have the opportunity to object
to the entry. Similarly, if A and B have been adjudicated co-proprietors
of a certain piece of land but only A's name appears on the adjudication
record, B should have the right to object. In both instances the
1*f1record is clearly either incorrect or incomplete, incorrect in the 
sense that it does not correspond with what had previously been deter­
mined. This is a narrow interpretation of the section, but a plausible 
one.
An alternative approach is to see the adjudication officer as 
an appellate authority and to allow objections to the record to be 
made on the grounds that the arbitration board erred in reaching the 
conclusions it reached and that therefore the record is "incorrect".
1*tO. "Any person named in or affected by the adjudication register 
who considers it to be incorrect or incomplete in any respect 
may ... object to the adjudication officer in writing ..."; 
Ibid., s.26(1).
S.3#(1) of the draft Land Adjudication Bill proposed in the 
Lawrance Mission Report, Appendix E, used the words "inaccurate 
or incomplete." It is not clear why "inaccurate" was changed 
to "incorrect", though it is arguable that the use of the 
former word would have definitely supported this narrow inter­
pretation and that the change of words was not intended to 
effect any substantial change in the meaning of the section.
If this interpretation is right, there exists, in effect, a three­
tiered system of appeal after the committee has made its original 
decision. A person affected by the decision may appeal to the 
arbitration board (though it is called a complaint), thence to the 
Minister (here it is called an appeal).
A third and extremely broad approach is to see the objection 
stage as providing an opportunity for all persons affected by the 
register to voice their grievances, not only those who claim that 
the record does not correspond with what has previously been deter­
mined, not only those who wish to appeal against the decision of the 
arbitration board, but everyone, whether they have been involved in 
a dispute at an earlier stage of the adjudication process or not.
The adoption of such an approach has serious implications. It enables 
a person to bypass both the committee and the board; indeed these two 
institutions would become otiose if aggrieved persons refused to 
object to the original determination until the register had been com­
pleted and the objection stage reached. This would obviously be an 
absurd situation. Nevertheless it is this third approach which the 
authorities appear to have adopted.
All adjudication officers with whom the present writer talked 
agreed that they would hear all objections and that they would be 
perfectly prepared to settle land disputes that had not previously 
come before either the adjudication committee or the arbitration 
board. Evidence from East Koguta confirms that this is in fact 
the case, though there the approach of the adjudication officer or 
officers was not consistent. Of the 131 objections lodged, eighty-two
1^2. The adjudication officer refused to entertain twenty-two of the 
eighty-two objections on the grounds that the issue had not 
previously been considered by either the committee or the board. 
It is not at all clear how he distinguished these objections 
from the remaining sixty which he did entertain.
represented land disputes that had been heard neither by the committee
nor by the board and a further seventeen represented land disputes that
had been heard by the committee alone; in only twenty-eight instances
1^3had both the committee and the board heard the dispute. Virtually 
all the objections raised disputed issues, only three or four objections 
being wholly uncontroversial; these were applications by a household 
head to have a piece of land registered in the name of one family 
member rather than another. .
In other areas a large proportion of objections concern sales of
land that have occurred during land adjudication and are applications 
by purchasers to have the record altered in their favour. Even appli­
cations of this kind may be vigorously contested, especially where only 
part of the purchase price has been paid. However, the strange thing
in East Koguta is that no such application was made. A period of
six years elapsed between the start of land adjudication and the 
hearing of the first objections and it is obvious that during this
period many people who were recorded as the owners of land sold a
iMfpart or all of their land and also that many died. Thus from the 
start the land register is inaccurate and fails to represent the true
state of affairs on the ground.
In East Koguta the objections raised the same kind of issues that 
were raised before the committee and the board; the adjudication officer 
was settling boundary disputes and ownership disputes, he heard the 
same kind of evidence and he applied the same kind of principles.
1^3* Of the remaining four objections, two had been withdrawn apd two 
had not been determined at the time of the research; it was 
therefore impossible to tell whether they concerned disputes 
already adjudicated upon by the committee and the board, or not.
iMf. The present writer encountered four such cases, but there must
have been many more. The failure to register sales and successions
where the land has already been registered is a problem which is
fully discussed in Ch. V, infra.
Since most of the contested issues were questions of fact and since the
evidence of the two parties and their witnesses was usually totally
contradictory, he may inevitably have been obliged to rely on the views
of the more articulate committee members and have been reluctant to
1^5upset committee findings without overwhelmingly good cause. Certainly
1^ -6the figures for East Koguta would support such an interpretation.
Where the issues have not been previously the subject of a committee 
decision, the adjudication officer may again be forced to rely heavily
1^5• In Guya Okite v. Opere Okoth, Appeal to the Minister no.8 of 1972, 
one of the grounds of appeal was that the adjudication officer 
had sat with the committee which had already rejected the 
appellant's claim. It did not seem likely that this ground would 
find favour with the Minister. See supra, p. 88.
1^ -6. TABLE 1. Outcome of objections heard by the adjudication officer 
where the issues had already been the subject of a decision by the 
committee or the board.
Action of 
adjudication 
officer
Cases heard by both the Committee 
and the Board Cases heard
by
Committee
alone
Total
Where board con­
firmed Committee 
decision
Where board over­
ruled Committee 
decision
Upheld
Committee
decision
17 5 16 38
Overruled
Committee
decision
2 1 7
Total 19 9 17 ^5
Source: Objections to the East Koguta Adjudication Register,
Provincial Land Adjudication Department, Kisumu.
on the views of his staff and prominent locals. However, the procedure
before the adjudication officer appears to be such that gives enormous
advantage to the educated and the articulate, to those capable of
1^7
presenting their case in a concise and reasoned fashion. Unlike the 
protracted, informal procedure of the adjudication committee and the 
arbitration board, proceedings before the adjudication officer are short 
and relatively formal; they may not involve a visit to the land in 
dispute and throughout they are rigidly controlled by the adjudication 
officer, a busy man, impatient of discursiveness and intolerant of 
irrelevance. He is, in effect, exercising a judicial function, oaths 
are administered and th6 atmosphere resembles that of a court. An 
area is cleared around the desk where the adjudication officer and his 
staff are sitting; the crowds that attend these occasions are required 
to be silent; parties and witnesses are summoned, cross-examined and 
dismissed; the adjudication officer confers with his staff and others 
(the committee chairman, perhaps, and the local sub-chief), summons 
the parties again, gives his decision, dismisses them and, after 
making any necessary announcements,, closes the meeting. The whole 
procedure stands in marked contrast with the way in which disputes are 
settled under customary law and by the adjudication committees and sug­
gests an inconsistency of approach on the part of the authorities to 
the whole process of land adjudication.
Section 32 of the draft Land Adjudication Bill proposed by the 
Lawrance Mission provided that, after the determination of all
1^7- This discussion is based on the.present writer's experience of 
two sessions in the adjoining location; it is impossible to say 
how far this experience is typical.
1*f8. Lawrance Mission Report, Appendix E.
objections, the Minister or any person aggrieved by any entry in the
Adjudication Record might apply to the High Court for its revision in
such manner as might be presented. It seems that this provision was
1^9designed to enable the High Court to revise a first registration.
It would appear, however, that an amendment of section 1^3 of the 
Registered Land Act 1963 would be necessary to have this effect and 
that if such amendment were made, no such provision would be needed 
in the Land Adjudication Act 1968. The real interest of this pro­
vision is that it would have enabled an aggrieved person to appeal from 
the adjudication officer to the High Court, removing matters for the 
first time from the control of the administration. However, the Bill 
was amended in this regard and it was finally provided that any person 
aggrieved by the determination of an objection may within sixty days 
appeal to the Minister. He must deliver to the Minister an appeal in 
writing specifying the grounds of appeal and he must send a copy of 
the appeal to the Director of Land Adjudication. The Minister's order 
is final.
If the amendment was made in the expectation that the Minister 
would be able to deal with appeals more expeditiously than the High 
Court, it is doubtful whether events have justified such an expectation. 
The increase in the number of appeals has been remarkable: in 1971 
there were 2#, in 1972 there were 100, in 1973 there were 278 and in 
197^ there were 25^. At the time of the research (November 197^) 
only twelve appeals had been heard. As the Minister is unwilling to
1^ 9- Ibid., para. 176.
150.Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.29(l).
delegate his power to hear appeals from the determinations of
adjudication officers, the backlog of appeals is bound to increase at
a colossal rate. This may have very serious consequences.
On the one hand it may have the effect of postponing the opening
of the land register. This is what seems to have happened in East
Koguta where the adjudication officer finished hearing objections in
October 1971- Subsequently thirteen people appealed to the Minister
151against the determination of the adjudication officer, but only three
of these appeals had been heard at the end of 197^» it was commonly
felt in East Koguta that the long delay in completing the adjudication
process and opening the land register was due to the existence of
these outstanding appeals. People who were not affected by the appeals
and who may not have been involved in a land dispute at any stage
resented having to wait indefinitely until they reaped the benefits of
land adjudication, until they could get their land certificates and
apply for development loans.
However, there is no reason why this highly unsatisfactory
152
situation should arise. The Land Adjudication Act 1968 requires 
the Director of Land Adjudication to certify that the adjudication 
register has become final subject to the outstanding appeals and to
forward it to the Chief Land Registrar together with a list of the
153appeals. The Land Registry then draws up a land register m
151. This figure comes from a letter, dated August 17th 1973? from 
the Land Adjudication Officer for Nyanza Province to the Director 
of Land Adjudication, LND/ADJ/2V131* However the register of 
appeals to the Minister records only five appeals from East Koguta.
The reason for this discrepancy is not clear. One reliable 
informant who had led a deputation to the Minister to protest 
about the progress of land adjudication in East Koguta thought 
that the other appeals had simply been brushed away."
152. S.27(3)(b).
153. Ibid., s.27(3)(c).
accordance with the adjudication register and where land is affected
by an appeal, it is required to register a restriction expressed to
endure until the determination of the appeal, the register to be
15**altered m  accordance with the determination, if necessary. In 
view of the long delay in the hearing of appeals it is obviously 
desirable that this procedure be adopted. Dealings with the land 
affected by the appeal will be virtually impossible pending its 
determination, but at least the owners of land not so affected will 
be able to enjoy the full advantages of land registration.
An interesting problem arises where a land register is opened
but, for one reason or another, no restriction is entered against
the land affected by an appeal. In Jesii Bitsushe Maruti v. J.A.
155Mudiambia and the Attorney-General it appeared that a land dispute 
had arisen between the plaintiff and a certain Barasa Tavashi and 
that the plaintiff had succeeded at all stages of the adjudication 
process. Finally Barasa appealed to the Minister who allowed the 
appeal, awarding all the disputed land to Barasa. However eleven 
months elapsed before the Chief Land Registrar received the Minister's 
order and in the meantime the land register had been opened and the 
plaintiff registered as proprietor of the land in question and issued 
with a land certificate. No restriction was entered against his 
title in the first instance, but on receiving the Minister's order 
the Chief Land Registrar first directed the district land registrar 
(the first defendant) to register a restriction and shortly after­
wards directed him to delete the plaintiff's name and insert the 
defendant's name in the register. The plaintiff then applied to the
15**. Ibid., s.28.
155* High Court of Kenya at Kisumu, Kakamega Civil Case No.lOof 1973 
(unreported).
court for a declaration that he was the legal owner of the land and that 
the alteration of the register was illegal. For reasons which do not 
concern the present discussion the court ordered that the suit be stayed 
pending the hearing of an appeal, on a different, but related matter, by 
the Court of Appeal. The court, nevertheless, discussed the merits of 
the application.^^
The main stumbling-block for the defence lies in the provision of
157the Registered Land Act 19&3 which restricts the power of the 
Registrar* to rectify the register to cases of errors or omissions not 
materially affecting the interests of any proprietor. Although the 
existence of this provision does not appear to have been recognised 
either by counsel or by the court, it seriously weakens the defence's 
case. The argument in court tended to centre on the interpretation of 
another provision of the Registered Land Act 19&3 which empowers the 
court to order rectification where it is satisfied that any registra­
tion (other than a first registration) has been obtained, made or
158omitted by fraud or mistake. It was argued for the defence that
the action of the land registrar in amending the land register in
accordance with the Minister's order was all part of the process of
first registration and therefore no question of rectifying a first
registration arose. This is a highly artificial line of argument
and one which it is hard to reconcile with the Act's provision that
the date of first registration is the date on which the land first
159came on to the land register. It was argued in the alternative
156. The present writer was able to discuss the case with the judge,
Mr. J. Platt. Both this interview and the report of the case
made it clear what his view of the legal issues was.
157- S.1**2(1); there are other unimportant occasions on which he 
may rectify the register, but they are not relevant here.
158. Ibid., s.l43(l). The implications of this provision are discussed
at length infra, ch.IV.
that even if this was a case of first registration, section 1^3(1) of 
the Registered Land Act 19^3 conflicted with the provisions of the 
Land Adjudication Act 1968^ ^  in this respect and should be held to 
have been amended pro tanto by implication. It is doubtful, however, 
whether there is such a conflict. A restriction which appears on the 
register on the day it is opened forms part of the first registration and 
any subsequent amendment of the register in accordance with the restric­
tion is not an amendment of first registration so much as a fulfilment 
of its terms.
If, as is submitted here, the plaintiff must be successful as the
law stands at present, it is not clear what remedy is open to Barasa
Tavashi, the man to whom the Minister awarded the land. He is not-
entitled to be indemnified by the Government, since such a right is
specifically denied to persons suffering damage by reason of a mistake
161or omission in a first registration. He may bring an action in
tort against the Government alleging breach of statutory duty or
negligence on the part of its servants, but such proceedings are
attended with difficulty. The very real possibility that he will have
no effective means of redress suggests that the courts should be empow-
162ered to rectify a first registration.
The reports of the few hearings of appeals that have taken place 
give some insight into the procedure that is followed and the principles 
that are acted upon by the Minister, and it is appropriate to close 
this part of the chapter with a description of these hearings. It 
seems that it is usual for the Minister to visit the area where the 
land in dispute is situated, the hearing taking place in the office of
160. S.28.
161. Registered Land Act 19^3> s.lMf(l)(b).
162. The issues mentioned in this paragraph are discussed at length 
in Ch. IV, infra.
local District or Provincial Commissioner. He sits with a number 
of important members of the local administration together with repre­
sentatives of the department of land adjudication5 apart from the land 
adjudication officer who determined the objection there may be noone 
among his advisers with first-hand knowledge of the dispute. He is 
exercising a quasi-judicial function and the procedure which he follows 
is similar to that followed by the adjudication officer; it is formal 
and brisk. Before the Minister hears an appeal, he will have been 
efficiently briefed by an official in the Ministry who will have 
prepared a summary of the issues and may even have recommended what 
decision should be taken.
It is impossible to gauge the extent to which the Minister relies 
on the views of this official or his advisers at the meeting. It was 
only possible to examine the files of nine appeals and in many instances 
the grounds for his decision were obscure. In one case1^  his only 
intervention was to ask the parties (who were brothers) whether they 
both loved their father, before dismissing the appeal. He dismissed 
six of the nine appeals and allowed three. In one^^ of these three 
cases he followed the committee decision, overruling the decision of 
the adjudication officer and the board; no reasons appeared on the file.
y\ gnj
In the second case, he awarded the land to the appellant contrary 
to the decisions of both the committee and the board and the adjudica­
tion officer; his reasons were vague and unconvincing. It was delay
in communicating his order to the Chief Land Registrar that ultimately
166resulted in the High Court action discussed above. In this third
163. Appeal to the Minister No.19 of 1972.
164. Appeal to the Minister No.4 of 1971*
165. Appeal to the Minister No.9 of 1971-
166. See Jesii Bitsushe Maruti v. J.A. Mudiambia and the Attorney- 
General, Supra, p.107.
167case, the respondent claimed to have bought the appellant's land
before land adjudication and produced receipts purportedly signed by
the appellant as evidence that he had paid the purchase-price. In
spite of a well-reasoned memorandum from a Ministry official advising
him to dismiss the appeal, the Minister seems to have become incensed
against the respondent, criticising him for behaving in an ungrateful
168manner and, more seriously, accusing him of forging the receipts.
In the end, he awarded the land to the appellant.
In conclusion, it may be doubted whether any useful purpose is
served by providing for an appeal from the adjudication officer to
169the Minister. It is an expensive and relatively complicated pro­
cedure which might discourage a poor, illiterate farmer from lodging 
an appeal. It involves immense delays both in the hearing of the 
appeal and, it seems, in the implementing of the Minister's decision. 
Hie appeals invariably raise questions of fact and there is no reason 
to believe that the Minister is more competent to unravel a complex 
situation and evaluate impartially the parties' versions of that 
situation than the adjudication officer or the arbitration board; 
indeed it seems likely that in many cases he will rely heavily on the
advice of the adjudication officer. Little would be lost if the
adjudication officer's determination of objections was final, subject 
to no appeal. Adjudication officers have a reputation for fairness 
and the fact that they may be required to continue adjudication work 
in the same area may deter them from acting in a corrupt or arbitrary 
manner.
167. Appeal to the Minister No.7 of 1971- The proceedings were 
described in the Sunday Post, February 2nd, 1971-
168. The receipts were later sent to handwriting experts in Nairobi 
who pronounced them to be genuine.
169• The fee is 100 shillings; see infra, p. 121, n.182.
(c) Critique of the system.
It is a striking feature of the land adjudication process that
throughout it is conducted by administrative bodies and officials and
that even though important questions regarding individual property
rights have to be settled, the courts have no role to play at any 
170
stage. The use of local committees to assist the adjudication 
department at most stages of its work is particularly interesting 
and has undoubted advantages. Committee members are not paid and 
this obviously reduces the cost of the adjudication programme. More­
over, unlike the courts, the committees can be expected to settle 
disputes relatively quickly; after all, distances are small and it 
is the committee which moves from one land dispute to another rather 
than requiring all disputes to be heard in a single place. The 
atmosphere that surrounds committee hearings is appropriately informal
and the members speak the same language and share the same history as
171those who attend the hearings. If the courts were to replace the
committees at this stage, many of these advantages would be lost. The
courts would apply the same legal principles as the committees, but as
most disputes raise questions of fact rather than questions of law,
the committee might well prove a more suitable forum for their settle- 
172
ment.
170. Similarly the land control system is administered without any 
reference to the courts; see infra, ch.VII. The Registered 
Land Act s.150(2)(a) provides for an appeal from the
Chief Land Registrar to the High Court in certain circumstances, 
but this possibility is not widely appreciated and is rarely 
exploited.
171- Addressing a meeting of Wakamba, the Hon. J.H. Angaine, M.P., 
Minister of Lands and Settlement, assured his audience that the 
committees would be appointed by the people themselves ”... so 
that any blame arising later on should be upon your own people". 
Speech reported in the East Africa Standard, November 11th, 19^7*
172. Much of what is said in this paragraph about adjudication committees 
could apply equally well to arbitration boards.
However, the committee system also has its drawbacks and one of
these springs from a feature which is in some ways its greatest
strength, namely, the fact that its members live in the area and know
it well. As each committee member is at once a member of a family,
a lineage, a clan and a tribe, the danger of bias is very strong.
This bias manifests itself most clearly in areas where persons from
other tribes have established rights like the Kikuyu among the Masai
173m  Kajiado District or the Kipsigis among the Masai m  Narok 
174District; m  both districts the Masai committees may refuse to
recognise the non-Masai settlors. The problem arises at a more
local level where a dispute arises over the boundary between two
clans and one of these clans enjoys a majority on the committee, as
in fact occurred in East Koguta. There the committee was especially
reconstituted for the hearing of the inter-clan disputes to ensure
equal representation of the two clans, but this did not prevent
charges of bias being made; the settlement of these disputes caused
great resentment and in at least one instance resulted in the lodging
of an appeal with the Minister. The same kind of problem is likely
to arise in all disputes that come before the committee; it is
inevitable that many members will either come from the same lineage
or family as one of the parties or will be connected with a party by
175marriage or some long-standing tradition of mutual aid. The
173- For a discussion of this situation see the Lawrance Mission 
Report, paras. 161-162.
174. See Republic of Kenya, National Assembly Debates, 19&8, vol.
15, col.457j where a Kipsigis M.P. voiced his concern that his 
fellow-tribesmen might be compelled to leave Narok District 
after land adjudication.
175. A detailed examination of this subject would have demanded a 
much longer period of fieldwork. That it would prove a 
rewarding and fascinating study is shown by J. Glazier, op. cit.
provision in the Land Adjudication Act 1968*^ requiring that a 
member with any interest in the claim before the committee should 
disclose his interest and should not participate in the discussion 
or the vote would be practically impossible to enforce. It would 
be fairly rare, indeed, that a member did not have some interest 
in the determination of a claim,
A further danger that besets the committee system is that some 
of its members may use their position to take bribes and the position 
becomes particularly serious where it is the more prominent members, 
like the chairman and the vice-chairman, who are susceptible to this 
kind of pressure. This is what is alleged to have occurred in East 
Koguta. There have been letters to the Press and deputations to 
the Minister and the local M.P. protesting about the working of the 
East Koguta Adjudication Committee and most informants, committee
177members, disputants and outsiders alike, have given the same picture.
A number of members resigned early on in disgust at the proceedings of 
the committee. Even if only a small proportion of members is corrupt, 
but these members happen to be the more influential members, those 
who because of education or through force of personality tend to 
dominate committee deliberations and those whose assiduous attendance 
in the field makes them indispensable to officers of the land adjudica­
tion department, then the possibility of injustice being done is very 
great. This possibility becomes a certainty, if they secure the 
cooperation of these officers.
176. S.8(1).
177- A number of people aggrieved by committee decisions in threatening 
violence against the committee chairman, who is now apparently 
reluctant to go out at night. Not long before a demarcation 
officer had been killed during fieldwork in a neighbouring 
district; see East Africa Standard, December 1#th, 1971-
The most common instance of corruption occurs where the recording 
officer, the committee chairman and a number of committee members 
arrive to settle a land dispute. Traditionally, perhaps, it would have 
been usual for the parties to provide food and drink on such occasions. 
Today it seems that Mfood-moneyM is often expected to be provided as 
committee members may fear that the food will be poisoned. Even where 
food is accepted, the respective offerings of the two parties will be 
jealously compared and if the chairman is corrupt, he may make it known 
that a further contribution in cash or in kind will favour the party's 
cause. In some cases a Dutch auction will take place, often under cover 
of night, the land being awarded to the highest bidder. Several 
informants testified that committee decisions were sometimes altered 
overnight and this would explain why some people claimed to have won 
their cases, whereas the committee reports stated that they had lost. 
Where bribery is as widespread as it is alleged to have been in East 
Koguta, it is the honest, the poor and the ignorant that suffer.
It is true, of course, that a person aggrieved by the committee 
decision may appeal to the arbitration board and that at a later stage 
he has the opportunity of objecting to the adjudication register, but 
it is doubtful whether this machinery provides an effective safeguard 
against the dangers of a biased or corrupt committee. Certainly at 
these levels the possibility of bias is largely eliminated and even 
though bribery may occur, it is rarely suggested that it does. Never­
theless it is almost inevitable that both the board and the adjudication 
officer should rely heavily on the views of prominent committee members, 
who, after all, are much more closely acquainted with the area. Apart 
from this, the whole procedure for making complaints and lodging 
objections tends necessarily to favour the literate, the rich and those
familiar with bureaucratic ways. The fact that all landowners are 
summoned to sign the adjudication register may in many cases ensure 
that a landowner is not unjustly deprived of a whole plot. However, 
not all landowners hear of the publication of the register and not 
all obey the summonses which are served on them.
If the appeals procedures are not sufficient to counter the 
dangers of a biased or corrupt committee, perhaps the use of committees 
ought to be discontinued and all the present functions of the committee 
should devolve on the adjudication officer. This has, in fact, already 
happened to some extent where the adjudication officer is prepared to 
entertain objections raising questions which have not previously been 
before either the committee or the board. Indeed in East Koguta the 
number of committee cases (161) did not greatly exceed the number of 
objections (131)• If the adjudication officer were required to be the 
principal adjudicating authority, he could still have the power to 
appoint a consultative committee of local people to advise him. This 
is an attractive solution, but it would place a heavy load on the 
adjudication officer and consequently slow down the pace of land 
adjudication; moreover it is arguable that the committee system is so 
well established in Kenya that any attempt to deprive the committees
178of their powers would be politically difficult.
It may be possible to reform the present committee system in 
various ways. It is often suggested, for example, that committee 
members should, in view of their onerous duties, be paid. Perhaps 
the payment of an allowance would encourage regular attendance and
178. Lawrance Mission Report, para.165.
perhaps, though this is dubious, it would reduce the incidence of bribery.
It seems certain, in any case, that any possibility of payment by the
Government of an allowance to committee members is ruled out by the
colossal increase in the cost of the land adjudication programme that it 
179would entail. It would therefore be wiser to devise ways of reducing 
the work of committees. This work may be considerable, particularly in 
a sub-location the size of East Koguta, where there were over 1,6f§ plots 
to be entered on the adjudication record and 161 disputes to be settled. 
For the conscientious member this will have amounted to several years 
continuous work, long distances to be travelled on foot and little 
thanks at the end. Surely it would have been more satisfactory to have 
divided up the sub-location into several sections, coinciding with 
kinship groups, where possible. The people within each section would 
first be encouraged to settle their own boundaries before the demarcation 
officer and the committee started work. If any dispute arose, it would 
be settled by a small committee elected by the people of that section 
with a right of appeal to the arbitration board. One advantage of this 
system would be its speed, committees having relatively few disputes 
to settle and not being obliged to travel long distances. Moreover 
the likelihood of corruption would be reduced; committee members would 
be able to eat at home and might be deterred from taking bribes by the 
knowledge that they had to make their lives within the community. Such 
committees would also enjoy a kind of traditional legitimacy, since they 
would consist of members of the local kinship group, whereas committees 
constituted on a sub-locational basis consist largely of members who 
settle disputes in areas where, under customary law, they would have no 
role as land allocators.
179. Ibid., para.170.
A disadvantage of the proposed system is that the position of 
the outsider becomes very precarious. However the rights of the man 
from outside the dominant kinship group may be protected if the 
committee is chaired by a trained member of the land adjudication 
department. At present, the recording officer acts as secretary to 
the committee and, though he has no vote, he may influence its 
deliberations. However, in practice, he is usually young, with little 
or no secondary education and moie likely himself to be overborne by 
the more prominent committee members. If the committee had a salaried 
chairman whose training enabled him to advise it on questions of 
adjudication policy and on points of law, some of the deficiencies 
of the committee system, which have cast a shadow on its undoubted 
achievements, would surely disappear.
3. Conclusions.
There can be little doubt that the land adjudication programme 
is generally popular. Much of the earlier resentment disappeared 
when the consolidation of holdings was undertaken on a voluntary 
basis. Even people who are strongly critical of the way in which 
the programme was conducted in East Koguta have no doubt about the 
merits of the programme as such. Its obvious results can be seen in 
the way the landscape has been transformed into a patchwork quilt of 
fields surrounded by high sisal hedges and it seems certain that 
most people consider that its purpose is to provide security of 
tenure, putting an end to boundary disputes and enabling them to 
raise loans. They do not understand the implications of a system of 
registration of title, nor has there been much attempt to enlighten 
them. As far as they are concerned, dealings with land and the allocation
and the inheritance of land continue to be governed by customary law.
It will be argued later^^ that a failure of communication of this 
kind will eventually frustrate the purposes of the programme and will 
lead to a situation where land adjudication has to be started all 
over again.
Whether the people concerned understand the full implications of 
the programme or not, they appreciate the fact that land rights are 
being recorded publicly and that that record is, for all practical 
purposes, final. It is all the more unfortunate that so much injustice 
may occur in the course of the adjudication process, but the experience 
of East Koguta, whether typical of other areas of Kenya or not, indicates 
that, though the purpose of land adjudication is to ascertain, confirm 
and record existing rights, some people may gain rights which they did 
not previously enjoy, while others may be deprived of rights which 
they did. In an area like East Koguta, where the number of disputes 
was considerable and where the whole adjudication process took over 
ten years, leaving a legacy of bitterness and resentment, questions 
inevitably arise regarding the manner in which land adjudication was 
conducted and indeed the advisability of starting it at all in an area 
which is not highly developed.
An attempt has been made in this chapter to answer some of those 
questions. It has been seen that most disputes can be loosely cate­
gorised as either boundary disputes or ownership disputes. The former 
type of dispute typically arises where there is an area of land 
adjoining two or more farms which either is unused or is used in a 
general way by an uncertain number of people. The adjudication
180. Ch. V, infra.
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authorities tend to divide such land between the adjoining farmers,
thus conferring on them rights which they did not previously enjoy.
Eowever, it is arguable, at least where the area involved is not small,
that such land should be registered in the name of the county council
or, if a clan or lineage can prove that its members enjoyed the right
under customary law to use and settle on the land, in the name of such
clan or lineage. Such a step would at least have the merit of confirm-
181ing existing rights and the Land Adjudication Act 1968 expressly 
provides for such a possibility.
Ownership disputes, on the other hand, tend to arise because 
customary institutions survive which it is difficult to fit into the 
statutory system. If a jadak is registered as the owner of a piece 
of land rather than his benefactor, or a widow rather than her eldest 
son, or a person in occupation rather an absentee claimant, some 
people are gaining rights at the expense of others. It should, how­
ever, be possible to avoid this kind of result.
One of the answers to these problems is to delay land adjudication 
until an area is really ready for it. Few boundary disputes will 
arise in an area where all the land has been enclosed. Few ownership 
disputes will arise in an area where land rights have become completely 
individualised and the customary rights of the kinship groups have 
disappeared together with customary institutions (e.g. leviratic 
unions, jadak relationships). The enclosure of land and the individual­
isation of land tenure are part of the same process, a process which 
can be seen at work in most agricultural areas of Kenya. However, the 
government is unlikely to defer the implementation of the land
181. S.23(2)(b) and (d). The possibility of registering land in the 
name of a group is discussed infra. Ch.III.
adjudication programme in a given district until the process is completed 
there. To prevent injustice, then, land adjudication must be conducted 
in a much more careful manner. Much more use must be made of the pro­
visions of the Land Adjudication Act 1968 in an effort to ensure that 
all existing rights are protected. It is certainly not easy to define 
these rights accurately, but land adjudication must be seen to be more 
than merely determining a certain individual to be the owner of a piece 
of land. The rights of kinship groups and rights not amounting to 
ownership can and should be protected if injustice is to be avoided.
Even a more sophisticated approach to the preparation of the 
adjudication record will not completely eliminate injustice, unless 
those institutions responsible for settling disputes carry out their 
duties in a fair and efficient manner. It has been suggested in this 
chapter that this is not always the case and that the odds are weighted 
heavily against the poor, the uneducated and those unfamiliar with 
bureaucratic ways. It is not simply that committee members may be 
biased or corrupt, nor simply that the arbitration board, the adjudica­
tion officer and the Minister may tend to rely on the opinions of the
more prominent members, it is also that at all stages of the dispute
182settlement process calls are being made on skills (and funds) which 
most ordinary people lack. A lot depends on knowing ones rights and 
being able to prosecute them effectively. Even if the adjudication 
committee does enjoy some traditional legitimacy, it is operating
182. By virtue of L.N. No.1^3 of 1972, ss.^(2) and 7 and Sched.2, the 
fee for bringing a case before the committee is fifteen shillings, 
the fee for making a complaint to the board is thirty shillings, 
the fee for making an objection to the adjudication register is 
fifty shillings and the fee for appealing to the Minister is 
one hundred shillings.
within a system that has no roots in traditional life, a system where 
summonses have to be answered, where appeals have to be made in writing 
and within strict time limits, where the concise and articulate presenta­
tion of a case is required.
Land adjudication is usually carried out more swiftly and more 
painlessly than was the case in East Koguta. Nevertheless the experience 
of that sub-location does highlight a number of problems that have 
occurred and will occur elsewhere, albeit on a smaller scale. The dis­
cussion in this chapter has also introduced a number of themes that will 
be taken up later in this study. If land adjudication were carried out 
more carefully, much subsequent litigation would be unnecessary?^ If
an effort was made early on to explain the system of registration of
l8*ftitle, that system would be more effective than it is. Moreover,
it will be seen that just as the land adjudication process tends to
favour the educated and the rich, it is these people who also reap
185most of the benefits of land registration. Before discussing these 
issues, however, it is necessary briefly to consider the comparatively 
rare instances where land is not registered in the name of an individual, 
but in the name of a group.
183- See Ch. IV, infra. 
l8*f. See Ch. V, infra. 
183« See Ch. VI, infra.
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C H A P T E R III 
LAND ADJUDICATION: GROUP TITLE 
1. Introduction
It has been shown in the preceding chapter that difficulties 
may arise in determining who is to be recorded as the owner of a piece 
of land in areas where the individualisation of land tenure is incom­
plete, Where notions of "family land" or "clan land" remain strong
£
and the concept of the individual ownership of land i^ . alien, it may 
be wise to defer land adjudication unless it is possible to discover 
ways of protecting the interests of the family or clan. Only five 
persons can be registered as co-proprietors of a piece of land and 
even though they could be recorded as holding the land on trust for 
themselves and other members of the group, this would hardly represent 
the customary law position nor would it ensure that the land was dealt 
with in accordance with customary law. It would be perhaps more sen­
sible to incorporate the kinship group, thus making it possible for 
members to determine the rules which would govern land dealings and 
land use, but it would hardly be appropriate to register kinship 
groups as companies or cooperative societies and until 1968 these were 
the only alternatives.
In some areas, however, the land adjudication authorities tended 
to ignore the legal niceties of corporate status and to register 
group land in the name of the clan or family or, a more sophisticated 
approach, in the name of the local county council to hold it on trust 
for the clan or family. This is what occurred on the Nyabondo Plateau,
especially where the siany was concerned. The siany, an area of poor 
land in the middle of the plateau which gets very marshy during the 
rainy season, was and is used mainly for the purpose of grazing live­
stock. Before land consolidation it seems that anyone living on the 
plateau was entitled to graze his livestock on the siany, nor was any 
particular part of the siany appropriated to the use of any one family 
or clan, though obviously most people tended to use that part of the 
siany that lay closest to their farms. At the time of land adjudication, 
however, the siany was divided up among clans, families and individuals 
according to the wishes of those concerned. In some cases it was 
decided to divide the land among the heads of households. In others 
the family would prefer to keep the land as family land; thus members 
of the jok Abok, that is those who traced their ancestry in the male 
line back to Abok (he would be great-grandfather to most members), 
decided that their ninety-nine acre share of the siany should be 
registered in the name of the county council to hold on trust for them. 
Finally, in one case, a large area of siany (some 153 acres) was 
registered in the name of the county council, "reserved for the 
Kamnwa Clan, its heirs and successors".
Today most of the people concerned regret that family or clan 
grazing land was ever registered in the name of the county council 
and efforts are being made to have it divided among the members entitled. 
The reasons for this change of mind are various. In some cases people 
are afraid that the county council will take it away from them. In 
others the group members may wish to use the land for different pur­
poses, some for grazing cattle, others for cultivating sugar, and so 
on. Moreover, those enjoying rights in an area of the siany cannot, 
of course, get land certificates and cannot raise loans to promote its
1. It only occurred in East Kadianga.
development. Most important of all is that the farmers have by now 
acquired a sense of individual ownership of land which makes them 
reluctant to share the use of land with others. Indeed a kind of 
informal division of the Kamnwa clan lands and a demarcation of 
individual holdings took place some time ago, but it gave rise to so 
many disputes that the area is now having to be properly surveyed and 
adjudicated at the substantial cost of ^,000 shillings. It remains 
to be seen whether each farmer will do what he wants with his newly- 
demarcated area of siany. The siany is particularly suited to the 
block cultivation of a single crop, sugar or rice, perhaps, but in 
spite of pressure from agriculture officers and the better farmers 
very little measure of agreement had been achieved among clan or 
family members on this issue.
It is not particularly satisfactory that group lands, whether 
family lands or clan lands, should be registered in the name of a 
county council, but neither is it desirable that an area of land that 
could best be developed as a single entity should be divided into a 
large number of enclosed holdings. This is a dilemma which faces the 
authorities both in agricultural areas where block cultivation is 
necessary, and, more importantly, in pastoral areas, where the 
registration of individual titles to land would be patently absurd.
It is, however, a dilemma that lawyers can help to solve by devising 
a system whereby the group acquires a corporate personality, empower­
ing it to own land and to deal with that land, while the individual 
members continue to have rights and duties regarding the land, both 
inter se and vis-a-vis the group itself. Such an attempt was made 
by the enactment of the Land (Group Representatives) Act in 1968, a
2. Cap.287 (1970).
discussion of which forms the main part of the rest of this chapter.
2. The purpose of the Land (Group Representatives) Act
(i) The history of the Act.
The idea that group ranches should be established in the range 
areas of Kenya and, in particular, in Masailand is not, of course, a 
new one. However, it was not until after the report of the Lawrance 
Mission that a legal framework was devised, designed to facilitate 
their establishment and to bring them within the ambit of the land 
adjudication programme. Since then a concerted effort has been made 
to start group ranches throughout Masailand, first in Kajiado District 
and currently in Narok District where the present writer was able to 
do some fieldwork.
Whatever the reasons, it seems agreed that the colonial period 
saw little change in the life of the Masai. It is true that their 
freedom of movement may have been restricted by the establishment of 
tribal reserves and that inter-tribal clashes and cattle-stealing 
became less frequent as a result of the imposition of the pax 
Brittannica. However, the introduction of the cash economy and 
formal education never had the dramatic impact on the Masai that it 
had on the settled agricultural peoples of Kenya, particularly the 
Kikuyu. The colonial administration tended to criticise the Masai 
character for their failure to respond to all the new opportunities. 
Sometimes the tone of the colonial reports is sad as where one 
District Commissioner opened his annual report by stating nit is
customary for the writers of Annual Reports in the Masai Districts to
seek for signs of progress and to admit ruefully that there are 
3
few...I’ Sometimes the tone is more violent as where a District 
Commissioner quoted with complete approval an account of 1915 which 
talked about the ’’supineness” of the Masai, their ’’ingrained con- 
servativism” and their ’’useless, idle, vicious lives” before recommend-
b
ing ’’drastic, if not forcible measures”.
There was, however, little reason why a Masai should send his 
sons to school. The distance would be great and transport difficult 
to obtain. Moreover the sons would be needed to look after the cattle, 
nor was it obvious that education provided any advantages since most 
mission-educated boys returned to the traditional life anyway and soon 
forgot what rudiments of literacy and numeracy they had picked up at 
school. As for the opportunities offered by the cash economy, it seems 
clear that the colonial administration was more concerned with protect­
ing the interests of European beef farmers than promoting development 
among the Masai. Quarantine imposed to protect European-owned cattle 
from possible infection made it difficult for the Masai to sell meat 
to other Africans. The low price offered by the Kenya Meat Commission, 
the body responsible for canning meat, encouraged Masai to smuggle their 
cattle to Tanganyika where the price was twice as high. The Kenya Masai 
were prohibited from buying quality Boran stock at the Isiolo auctions. 
One writer concluded that ”... there is little doubt that the amount
of encouragement given to the tribe to become commercial pastoralists
•o
has been somewhat restricted by the tendency of those in authority to 
3. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Narok District Annual Reports,
19^8 , p.1.
k . Ibid., 19^, pp.2-3-
regard the cattle industry as an exclusive field for European enter-
5
prise."
Whatever the reason, at the end of the colonial period the vast 
majority of the Masai was leading a recognisably traditional way of 
life. As long as they paid their taxes and kept the peace, they were 
unlikely to be interfered with by the administration. Virtually 
untouched by Christianity and formal education and only peripherally 
involved in the cash economy, they continued to move with their herds 
across the great plains of southern Kenya from wet season grazing to 
dry season grazing and back again.
However, in the late fifties and early sixties one or two things 
occurred which forced the government to reappraise the situation and 
led many Masai to demand more active government intervention. In the 
first place, the Masai realised with increasing concern that more and 
more of their land, particularly land of high agricultural potential, 
was being settled by non-Masai. For many years people from other 
tribes, particularly Kikuyu, had come to live in Masailand; they had 
usually been accepted by the Masai who gave them land and often 
married their women. However, as land became extremely short in the 
Central Province and as Kikuyu began to realise the great potential 
of much of Masailand, the influx of Kikuyu increased considerably and 
began to cause conern. The second development that started in the 
mid-fifties was that some of the more educated Masai began to establish 
individual ranches. The first reported instances seem to have occurred
5. L. James, "The Kenya Masai: a nomadic people under modern 
administration!’ Africa, vol. XII, (1939), p« *f9, at p.71 •
in 1955 in the Trans-Mara area but thereafter there was a growing demand
for the enclosure and demarcation of individual ranches both in Kajiado
and Narok District, Thirdly, it was the terrible drought of 1960-1
combined with the absence of any significant effort on the part of the
government to alleviate the situation that led Masai to realise the
extent to which Masailand had been neglected.
After Kenya became independent, the Masai were able to channel
their grievances through their elected representatives and to exert
pressure on a government publicly dedicated to the development of
rural Kenya. The former laisser-fsore attitude to Masailand was no
longer possible. Some sort of government intervention was necessary
on a major scale, since the situation there was grave. If Kikuyu
and other agricultural people continued to occupy the best agricultural
lands, while the more "progressive” Masai continued to enclose the
7
best grazing land to form individual ranches, the point would soon be 
reached where tens of thousands of Masai with their herds wouH be 
forced into the dryest, least fertile areas, areas totally incapable 
of supporting them. Not only would the government of Kenya have an 
interest in preventing this occurring, but it also has an interest in 
developing the range areas of Masailand by providing services and 
generally trying to raise Masai standards of cattle-keeping.
As the purpose of land adjudication is to give security of tenure 
and thus to promote development by providing both the incentive to 
invest and the opportunity to raise credit, it is natural that the
6. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Narok District Annual Reports, 
1956, p.21.
7. At the time of the Lawrance Mission eighty-two individual ranches 
in Kajiado District had already been approved by the County 
Council, the average size being 1,63§ acres. It is estimated 
that if the total acreage of Masai land was divided, the average 
acreage per adult male Masai would be about two hundred. See 
Lawrance Mission Report,;para. 103.
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Lawrance Mission should have considered extending the adjudication
programme to Masailand. After rehearsing a number of the arguments
already mentioned regarding the need for government intervention and
after noting that the registration of group ranches is a prerequisite
to the loan of money for range development, the Mission recommended
that land adjudication should be sta3^ ^  in Masailand and that group
ranches and, where appropriate, individual ranches should be registered.
In accordance with this recommendation, the draft Land Adjudication Bill
proposed by the Mission and subsequently enacted in an amended form
contains provisions requiring a group to be recorded as the owner of
land, where that group has, under recognised customary law, exercised
9
rights in or over land which should be recognised as ownership.
The Bill also provided that if the number of members of the group
10did not exceed ten, all their names should be recorded, but that if
it did exceed ten or if the majority of the members so requested, the
names of not more than ten members should be recorded as group repre- 
12sentatives, who were given the exclusive right of dealing with the
land and were deemed to have all the rights and powers of an individual 
13owner. Nothing more was said about groups or group representatives,
8. Ibid., para. 106.
9. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.23(2)(b). This follows, fairly 
closely, the wording of the Land Adjudication Bill, s.26(l)(a), 
to be found in the Lawrance Mission Report, Appendix E.
10. Lawrance Mission Report, Appendix E, Land Adjudication Bill, 
s.26(3)(a).
11. Ibid., s.26(3)(b).
12. Ibid., s.27.
13. Ibid., s.26(3)(b).
though it was proposed to amend the Registered Land Act 19&3 in order 
to deal with the appointment, removal and replacement of representa­
tives. However,none of these provisions was included in the final Land 
Adjudication Act, though the reasons for this are not clear. Perhaps 
it was felt that the subject of group representatives raised a com­
plexity of issues that could not simply be dealt with by adding a 
section or two to a bill concerned with land adjudication; a separate 
Act was required. So, the Land (Group Representatives) Bill was 
drafted and enacted together with the Land Adjudication Bill, both 
Acts coming into operation on June 28th, 1968.
(ii) The provisions of the Act.
Where during land adjudication a group has been recorded as the
owner of land, the adjudication officer is required to cause the group
to be advised to apply for group representatives to be incorporated under
the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968 and to notify the Registrar
13of Group Representatives that the group has been so advised. The
registrar then convenes a meeting of the members to adopt a constitution,
to elect not more than ten and not less than three group representatives
and to elect persons to be officers of the group in accordance with the
16constitution. The elected representatives must then apply to be
17incorporated. As a body corporate, they are registered as the pro-
1*+. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.23(3) (a).
13. Ibid., s.23(3)(c).
16. Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968, s .5(1).
17. Ibid., s.7(l)- The incorporation provisions are similar to those 
contained in the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act 1923? Cap.286.
18 19prietors of the land; they have perpetual succession, the power to
sue and be sued in their corporate name and the power to acquire, hold,
charge and dispose of property of any kind, and to borrow money with or
20without giving security. They are required, however, to exercise
their powers on behalf and for the collective benefit of all the
members of the group, and fully and effectively to consult the other
21members of the group on such exercise.
22Provision is also made for the replacement of group representatives, 
and group representatives are empowered to apply to the registrar for his
consent for the amendment of the name, constitution or rules of the
23 . 2*group, or for the dissolution of the incorporated group representatives.
25
Provision is also made for group meetings,* though no business is to be
transacted at a meeting unless at least sixty per cent of the members
26 27
are present. The groups are required to keep registers of members
28and books of account, and accounts must be rendered to the members at 
29
least once a year.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Minister is specifically 
empowered to make regulations prescribing provisions which must be
18. Registered Land Act
19. Land (Group Represe
2®. Ibid. , s.8(1).
21. Ibid. , s.8(2).
22. Ibid. , s.9»
CM Ibid. , s.13(l)(a).
.
-3"CM Ibid. , s.13(1)(b).
25. Ibid. , s.15»
26. Ibid. , s.15(6).
27. Ibid. , s.17(1)
.
COCM Ibid. , s.18.
29. Ibid. , S.19(1).
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contained in the constitution of a group or provisions which are
deemed to he part of that constitution or provisions which are deemed
30to be part of that constitution unless specifically excluded. In
the exercise of these powers the Minister made an Order known as the
31Land (Group Representatives) (Prescribed Provisions) Order 1969) 
which prescribes in considerable detail the provisions which must 
form part, or are deemed to form part of every constitution.
Reference will be made to the more important provisions in the course 
of this chapter.
This, in outline, is the system for the establishment of group 
ranches that was introduced in 1968. The legal provisions are a lot 
more detailed and complex than the Lawrance Mission advised, but 
nevertheless the programme has been prosecuted with great vigour.
All Kajiado District has been adjudicated and a large number of group 
ranches set up and registered. Recently a start has been made in 
Narok District and it was there that the present writer was able to 
do some research, in an attempt to assess the extent to which the goals 
of the programme are being achieved and group ranches are actually 
working.
3. The Working of the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968.
(i) Introduction.
Narok is a small township situated about seventy miles due west
30. Ibid., s.31(2).
31. L.N. No.29k of 1969.
32of Nairobi. The car journey from Nairobi takes over two hours and 
at the time of the research about half the journey was on bad dirt 
roads, though it had long been proposed to build a tar road from the 
main Nairobi-Nakuru road to Narok. Quite a good dirt road also leads 
due north from Narok over the Man Escarpment to Nakurn some ninety 
miles away. However it is a fairly remote spot, poorly served by 
public transport. Most government departments have offices in Narok; 
there are schools there, there is a District Magistrate's court, there 
is a club. Narok District is very large and the quality of the land 
varies enormously. Going north from Narok, the road climbs steadily 
for thirty-five miles up to the top of the Mau Escarpment. The 
higher the land, the greater the incidence of rainfall. These are 
the best areas of Narok District, suitable not only for grazing pur­
poses, but also for the cultivation of wheat. Yet these areas are
33neither highly populated nor fully developed. Wheat cultivation is
being undertaken on an increasing scale by non-Masai (since Masai
have always spurned the settled agricultural way of life) who lease
3k
large tracts of land from the Masai "owners". On the other hand,
as one goes souHiof Narok, one descends to less watered areas where 
cultivation is impossible and grazing poor. Except for the Loita 
Hills, the arid plains extend from the Masai Mara Game Reserve in 
the south-west to the soda-lake at Magadi in the south-east.
32. See map, supra, p. 23-
33. According to a recent report there are some hectares
of high-potential land in Narok district, much of it under­
utilised. International Labour Office, Employmentsincomes 
and equality: A strategy for increasing productive employment 
in Kenya (I.L.O., Geneva, 1972), p.172. —— —
3k. It seems that the annual rent per acre is fifty shillings, 
while the value of the wheat that could be harvested from a 
single acre is 1,^ f00 shillings. Still it seems that the Masai 
landlord is very content with this unlooked-for and unearned 
income.
Land adjudication started in Narok District in February 1969 and 
by March 197^ no less than seventeen adjudication sections had been 
completed, a total area of some 339,000 hectares. The fact that all 
these sections each consist principally of a single group ranch 
accounts for the speed with which the adjudication programme has 
advanced. Acute problems are clearly going to arise when the pro­
gramme is extended to the rich wheatlands of the north, currently 
"leased” by Masai to non-Masai, but this stage had not been reached 
when the present writer was in Narok. In addition to looking at 
records and interviewing officers in Narok, it was possible to visit 
two of the group ranches and to talk to representatives of these 
ranches. One of these ranches was the Olopito group ranch, situated 
just north of Narok, in Olopito adjudication section, the first section 
to be completed in the district (October 1970). The ranch comprises 
6,280 hectares, the total area of the section being 6,366 hectaresj 
the remaining 286 hectares consist of twelve individual farms, 
some of which are little more than subsistence plots, though some 
are quite sizeable ranches. The other ranch visited was the 
Umashariani group ranch, situated just east of Narok and sharing a 
border with Olopito. The adjudication section of which it forms 
part together with two other group ranches and some fifty tiny plots 
near the township boundary, was declared in July 197* and completed 
in June 1972. The Ilmashariani group ranch comprises ^,992 hectares.
It seems likely that the experience of these two ranches is fairly 
typical; indeed available records regarding other group ranches 
indicate that this is so. Nevertheless, the conclusions reached in 
the course of this chapter can only be regarded as tentative. Time 
did not allow the present writer to carry out as much fieldwork as he
would have liked. Moreover, it is much too early to be able to make 
any definitive evaluation of the way in which the Land (Group 
Representatives) Act 1968 is working in Narok District. Research on 
group ranches has, however, been carried out in Kajiado District, 
where the system has been in operation for a slightly longer period 
of time, and reference to this research will be made in the course 
of this chapter.
(ii) The establishment of group ranches.
The principal unit of cattle management among the pastoral Masai
is the Kraal camp, consisting of several independent polygynous
families joined together by a common interest in the economic
33exploitation of their immediate vicinity. In such camps there 
is no formal system of leadership and members may always leave one 
camp and apply to join another. A group of Kraal camps tends to 
gather around a dry-season water supply. Such a group is known as 
an enkutoto, a "settlement association", and is a fairly stable 
unit. In parts of Masailand there is a seasonal migration of some 
fifteen or twenty miles between dry and wet season pastures; in 
other parts there is no migration at all, the cattle being driven 
further and further to pasture throughout the dry season. These 
"settlement associations" (inkutot) are the smallest formal political
33- The information contained in this paragraph comes from 
A.H. Jacobs, "The pastoral Masai of Kenya", unpublished 
report submitted to the Ministry of Overseas Development, 
London, 1963*
segments of the Masai people, seen by themselves and others as a 
separate corporate entity with its own kind of government, its own 
machinery for dispute settlement and its own customary rights of 
priority to certain lands and sources of water. Attempts to organise 
grazing blocks on clan lines have failed in the past because clan 
systems cut across the boundaries of sub-tribe, of enkutoto, of 
Kraal camp. Clearly it is the enkutoto that must be used as the 
basis for any range development programme; indeed one student of 
the Masai recommended the incorporation of each enkutoto, the vest­
ing of the legal title to the land in the enkutoto, each individual
36or family becoming a shareholder.
When group ranches were established in Kajiado District,
however, they were not based on traditional units and boundaries,
even though the work "enkutoto" was sometimes used to refer to a 
37group ranch. As a result, there is little sense of solidarity 
among members, for within any given group ranch there may exist 
a number of corporate and often conflicting units. Moreover there 
will be little respect for ranch boundaries which cross traditional 
migration routes. Similarly in Narok District no attempt has been 
made to base group ranches on traditional units, even though some 
lip-service to the idea is paid. The land adjudication authorities 
seem to establish group ranches where convenient boundaries 
(particularly rivers) already exist;ranchers using land on both 
sides of a projected boundary are required to elect for one group 
ranch or the other. Sometimes the boundary coincides exactly
36. A.H. Jacobs, op. cit., p.83.
37- H.G.B. Hedlmnd, "The impact of group ranches on a pastoral 
society", University of Nairobi, Institute for Development 
Studies, Staff Paper No.1f§, June 1971 (unpublished), p.3«
with the boundary between two sections of the particular sub-tribe, 
but such a neat solution is rare. When the Ilmashariani group ranch 
was being established, a certain river appeared to mark a clear 
boundary between the Ilmashariani section and the Siabei section. 
However the Siabei people had been in the habit of crossing the 
river during the wet season to graze their cattle on the disputed 
land and to use the cattle dip built there by the local council 
for general use. When the Siabei people objected to the Ilmashariani
38
adjudication register, the adjudication officer admitted that a 
Masai from one section was customarily free to move and graze his 
cattle within the area of the same sub-tribe, but he confirmed the 
inclusion of the land within the Ilmashariani group ranch on the 
grounds that the Ilmashariani had used the land all the year round, 
whereas the Siabei had used it only seasonally. No mention of a 
right of way to the cattle dip was made.
This example illustrates, on a large scale, the sort of problems 
that the fixing of ranch boundaries can raise. The Siabei people 
have lost a valuable right of grazing which they have been exercising 
for many years without any trouble. In the future they may continue 
to graze their herds on the disputed land, ignoring ranch boundaries. 
On the other hand, they may be prevented from doing so by the 
Ilmashariani with a resulting increase in bad feeling and violence 
between sections that formerly co-existed amicably. This sort of 
problem will arise anywhere where a ranch boundary conflicts with 
customary grazing patterns.
38. Siabei v. Ilmashariani Ranches, Objection to the Ilmashariani 
Adjudication Register, No.2. An appeal to the Minister 
(No.82 of 1972) had been lodged but it had not been heard 
at the time of the research.
Just as the group ranches are not based on traditional grazing 
units, so also the body responsible for running a group ranch has no 
traditional legitimacy whatever. Indeed the whole notion of adminis­
tration by a board of elected representatives is utterly alien to the 
Masai way of life. No real elections are held, of course. A meeting 
of members is simply convened and someone suggests a name. Members 
will shout their agreement and someone else will suggest a name. The 
process continues in this way until ten representatives have been 
"elected". Each of the main family groups is represented, usually 
by its head or one of its older members. Group representatives are 
rarely young and rarely educated. Of the ten Olopito group represent­
atives, four were of the ilterito age-set, senior elders aged between 
forty-eight and sixty-two, four were of the ilnyankusi age-set, junior 
elders aged between thirty-eight and forty-eight, and two were of 
the Ilkololiki age-set, senior warriors aged between twenty-six and 
thirty-eight. The chairman and vice-chairman are senior elders and 
the secretary and treasurer are both junior elders. Only one repre­
sentative speaks English; most of the representatives, indeed most 
of the group members, are illiterate. Such young, educated people 
that may stay in the area are seldom elected to be representatives.
Group representatives seem to have little sense of collective 
responsibility. Although they are required fully and effectively to
consult the other members of the group on the exercise of their 
39powers, group ranch meetings are uncommon; there was no record of
39- Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968, s.8(2). Section 15(2) 
of this Act requires that general meetings of the group be 
held annually. It is doubtful whether this requirement is 
often observed.
a single meeting of the Ilmashariani group ranch and only one meeting 
of the Olopito group ranch had been recorded if one excludes those
meetings specifically convened to deal with the dispute with the
ZfQ
Murua people. Meetings of representatives appear to be equally 
uncommon; indeed some representatives seem to take decisions affect­
ing their ranch without consulting their colleagues. For example, 
one representative had, on his own account, given a valuable charcoal- 
burning contract to an outsider and pocketed the proceeds himself. 
Another representative admitted giving his consent to outsiders who 
wished to reside on the ranch. In spite of all the powers conferred 
on the group representatives and the duties required of them, as a 
body they hardly exist; as individuals, they may be able effectively 
to promote their own interests and those of their families, but as 
an instrument to ensure the successful establishment and smooth 
running of group ranches, they have not yet proved their worth.
The group representatives also constitute the adjudication 
committee for the particular adjudication section and it is they who 
decide questions of ranch membership. At the time of land adjudication 
a register of members is drawn up and it is the duty of the group to 
maintain this register. The register, however, does not contain 
the names of everyone entitled to live on the ranch; in practice it 
only contains the names of adult, married males. Moreover the names 
of males who subsequently come of age and marry are not entered on the 
register. When a member dies, his adult sons will take his place; if 
he leaves only minor sons, they will be registered in his place and
This dispute is discussed infra, pp. |^Z|g et_ seq.
*f1. Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968, s.17(l)«
the name of their guardian noted. Perhaps it is felt that the register 
would become unworkable if the names of all members were entered on it; 
on the other hand, the passage of time is going to make it harder for 
the families of persons who are not registered to prove their right 
to reside on the ranch. Arguably, therefore, the names of all married 
men should be entered on the register. In Narok District the average 
number of members of group ranches is about a hundred; in Olopito it 
was seventy-eight and in Ilmashariani it was 97* By multiplying the 
number of members by five it is possible to get a rough idea of the 
total population of a ranch.
There is nothing in the law to prevent a person becoming a 
member of more than one ranch, though this practice is discouraged 
by the Registrar of Group Representatives and in the two ranches 
studied the present writer only encountered one case where this had
bz
occurred. Moreover, while there is nothing to stop a group ranch 
member acquiring an individual ranch, it is extremely rare for an 
individual ranch owner to be allowed to join a group ranch. Thus in 
Olopito only two members had farms elsewhere, the ranch chairman and 
the ranch secretary. The vast majority of members depend for their 
entire livelihood on the cattle which they keep and graze on the 
group ranch.
The question as to who is entitled to join a group ranch is 
therefore a vitally important one and one which has caused consider­
able controversy both at the time of land adjudication and after it 
has been completed. As in agricultural areas, it is the rights of
kZ. Thus in Risa Ole Mpusia v. Ilmashariani Group, Objection to the 
Ilmashariani Adjudication Register No.7» an application by the 
Mpusia family to join the Ilmashariani group ranch was dismissed 
on the grounds that they were already registered members of the 
neighbouring Morijo Narok group ranch.
the outsider who has resided in the area for some time that have given 
rise to disputes; indeed most adjudication disputes in Narok District 
are of this kind. Although it is difficult to isolate the principles 
according to which such disputes are settled, a few generalisations 
can be made. An example will illustrate the sort of issues that
b3arise.
A certain Samarua applied to join the Olopito group ranch. He 
had been invited a long time ago to come and stay in the area by a 
person who has recently been registered as a member of the group,and 
that person wished him to stay. The adjudication committee rejected 
his claim for membership on the grounds that he had been born elsewhere 
and had land elsewhere. The arbitration board upheld his appeal on 
the grounds that, though he had land elsewhere, his long residence 
at Olopito gave him the right to stay. However the adjudication 
officer upheld the objection of the Olopito group on the grounds 
that Samarua had land elsewhere, and he pointed out that the Masai 
custom of inviting friends to cone and stay with them was inappropriate 
in the context of a group ranch and should be discouraged. There are 
many cases of this kind which illustrate that proof of long residence 
in the area does not by itself entitle a person to become a member 
of a group ranch. Nor is it enough to show that a Masai of the area 
had invited him to stay with him and still wished him to stay. He 
must prove that he or his family before him had been accepted by the 
group as a whole, something which is unlikely to occur if he has land 
elsewhere. A fortiori a claim to membership can never succeed where
b3. Samarua Ole Nkuruna v. Olopito Group, Olopito adjudication 
committee case No.1 and Rift Valley Provincial arbitration 
board case No.1; Olopito Group v. Samarua Ole Nkuruna, 
Objection to the Olopito Adjudication Register, No.8.
the claimant has neither been accepted by the group nor invited by
Id-one of its members, however long he has resided in the area.
This kind of dispute provides a further illustration of the 
difficulties of reconciling the establishment of group ranches with 
Masai custom. On the one hand, it is unjust if the acceptee of a 
Masai family should be denied full membership of a group ranch, 
especially if he has lived there for sometime and has nowhere else 
to go. On the other hand, the members of a group ranch have an 
interest in limiting the number of persons with grazing rights and 
denying such rights to acc.eptees of any individual. As a way out 
of this dilemma, acceptees are, in some cases, given "rights of 
occupation" at the time of land adjudication. This appears to 
mean that while they are not full members of the group, they are 
not trespassers either. They are entitled to remain on the ranch 
and graze their cattle there. The exact nature of this right of 
occupation is not clear; in particular, it is not obvious whether it 
can be terminated by the acceptor, the group or the group representa­
tives, nor whether it extends to the acceptee's family, passing to 
his sons on his death.
The establishment of group ranches has not put an end to the 
Masai custom of inviting friends and relations (particularly sons- 
in-law) to come and settle. This is one of the main problems that
kb. In Michael Muturi v. Nkairamiram Group, Objection to the
Nkairamiram Adjudication Register, the adjudication officer
put the point forcefully when he dismissed the objection of 
Muturi, a Kikuyu, "...whether one lived in a place is 
immaterial because he could have done it illegally. He 
therefore had no traditional land rights since he did not 
qualify so through the customary rituals, thus becoming 
an acceptee of a Masai family." However the systematic dev­
elopment of a defined area may entitle a person to be registered 
as the owner of an individual plot.
face group ranches and no attempt has yet been made to solve it. 
Presumably the group will have to devise regulations limiting the 
rights of members to "accept1' outsiders and defining the status of 
acceptees. Whether such regulations could ever be effectively enforced 
is a doubtful question. Certainly attempts to get rid of trespassers 
have not proved very successful; for example, there are still living 
at Olopito several families whose claims to be entitled to stay there 
were dismissed at the time of land adjudication. Although they have 
land elsewhere and move their cattle away during the dry season, they 
still wish to stay at Olopito. Due to their constant mobility it is 
hard for the police or the Assistant-Registrar of Group Representatives 
to locate them and even if they are ever bought to court, the sort of 
fine imposed is unlikely to deter them from trespassing on Olopito 
Ranch in the future. With the presence of large number of acceptees 
and trespassers on the group ranches it is hardly surprising to find 
the chairman of one group ranch complaining that members' cattle on 
the ranch were outnumbered by those of non-members.
A final problem to be considered in connection with ranch 
membership concerns the nature of the individual member's rights.
The legal title to the land is vested in the incorporated group
46representatives and as no trust exists, it would seem that the 
members have no proprietary interest in the land, but that their
45. At present the position is governed by a provision deemed to 
be contained in the Constitution of every group which states 
that every member shall be entitled to permit any other person 
to reside with him on the group land unless a majority of the 
group representatives decide otherwise; Land (Group Representa­
tives) (Prescribed Provisions) Order 1969? Sched.2.
46. Registered Land Act 1963? s.11(2A), proviso.
rights and duties, together with those of the incorporated group
representatives, would be governed by the provisions of the Land
(Group Representatives) Act 1968, by the group's constitution and by
47rules adopted by the group. It is not easy to understand the legal 
significance of the provision deemed to be contained in the constitu­
tion of every group to the effect that every member shall be deemed
48to share in the ownership of the group land in undivided shares.
The force of the words "be deemed to" is not clear. Since the
members are neither legal nor (in the absence of a trust) equitable
owners of the group land, there seems little point in deeming them
to be so. In practical terms, moreover, it can hardly have been
envisaged ihat a member should have the right to demand partition of
the group land. Certainly a member is entitled to reside on the
ranch, to use the land and all the ranch facilities and to attend and
49vote at all general meetings of the group. However, he has no 
interest in the land such as he could dispose of by will or inter 
vivos, and if he and his family decided permanently to leave the 
ranch, he would not be entitled to any compensation unless the 
group's rules or constitution made provision for such payment.
Of more immediate importance is the question whether a member 
may be expelled from a group ranch and, if so, in what circumstances 
and by what procedure. On the one hand, it could be argued that if 
a member constantly breaks group rules and constantly defies the 
group authorities, expulsion from the group would be the only
47. See the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968, s.12.
48. Land (Group Representatives) (Prescribed Provisions) Order 
1969, Sched.2.
49. Ibid.
effective sanction. On the other hand, expulsion from the group 
would, in all probability, leave the expelled member and his family 
without any form of livelihood, since the whole of Masailand will 
be adjudicated in the near future and no other group ranch is likely 
to accept him as a member. The effects of the exercise of a power 
of expulsion are so drastic that if such power is to be given to 
the group or its representatives, it must be hedged about with 
controls to prevent victimisation and other forms of abuse.
The law on this point is most unsatisfactory and in need of 
clarification. Although the group constitutions contain provisions 
concerning the admission of persons to membership of the group, they 
are curiously silent about the termination of membership. However, 
the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968 does contain a provision, 
tucked away towards the end together with miscellaneous general 
provisions, to the following effect;
Where a question arises whether a particular 
person is a member of the group, a certificate 
signed by a majority of the group representatives 
shall be conclusive of the question:
Provided that a person who is aggrieved by the 
issue of such a certificate may apply to a District 
Magistrate's Court having jurisdiction in the area 
to determine the question, and in such case the 
determination of the court shall be conclusive. 50
This is a curious provision, open to a number of interpretations.
In the first place, the section could be construed to apply only where
50. Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968, s.28.
1^7-
a question arises whether a particular person is registered as a
member of the group. The group is required to keep a register of 
51
members and it is the responsibility of the group secretary to 
52
maintain it. This register is based on the adjudication register 
and if any doubt were to arise as to whether the name of any person 
appeared on the register or not, it is reasonable that a procedure 
should be provided for the settlement of the question and that a 
person aggrieved by the issue of the certificate should be able to 
apply to the court; without the possibility of applying to the court, 
there would be a considerable risk that the group representatives might 
wrongfully add names to, or delete names from, the register. This 
restrictive interpretation of section 28 is favoured by its position 
at the end of the Act, which suggests that the legislature did not 
intend thereby to confer any wide powers on the group representatives, 
but simply to provide a procedure for verifying the contents of the 
register*
However, taken by themselves, the words can bear a much broader 
interpretation. They could mean that a certificate signed by a 
majority of the group representatives is conclusive of the question 
whether a particular person is a member of a group, regardless of 
whether his name appears on the register and, it seems, regardless 
of whether he has been admitted to membership of the group in
51. Ibid., s.17(1)-
52. Land (Group Representatives)(Prescribed Provisions) Order 19^9i 
Sched.2. A copy of the register is also lodged with the 
Registrar of Group Representatives.
accordance with the constitution. On this interpretation, if a
majority of the group representatives agrees, it may admit and,
53more important, expel members. A member who feels he has been
wrongfully expelled may, of course, apply to the District
Magistrate's Court, but it is far from clear what principles would
5lf
govern the determination of an issue of this kind. In spite of 
the objections to the broader interpretation of section 28, it is 
this interpretation which has been followed by all those concerned, 
though the question has not yet been resolved by the courts.
A difficult situation has arisen at Olopito because some forty- 
eight persons from a neighbouring area (Murua) were registered as 
members on the understanding that when that area was adjudicated 
and another ranch established, Olopito members would be invited 
to join that ranch, thus continuing a tradition of good relations 
and reciprocity between the two peoples. However when the Murua 
group ranch was established, Olopito members were not registered 
as members though a number of non-Murua people were. Bad feeling 
has now arisen between the Olopito and Murua peoples, but the 
Murua refuse to leave Olopito or to have their names deleted from 
the Olopito register. Consequently the majority of the Olopito 
group representatives signed a section 28 certificate purporting to
53« An argument against this interpretation is that a conflict 
of this kind may arise. According to the Land (Group 
Representatives) (Prescribed Provisions) Order 1969? Sched.2, 
a person not recorded in the adjudication register as a 
member of the group may be admitted to membership if the Group 
Representatives all agree and their decision is confirmed at 
the Group's annual general meeting. This provision in the 
Group's constitution limiting the ways in which a person may 
be admitted to membership of a group would lose much of its 
point, if the decision of a majority of group representatives 
sufficed to make a person a member.
5*U In particular,once it has been established that the majority of 
the group representatives has indeed decided that a certain
person is or is not a member, it may be wondered whether the 
court may, in its absolute discretion, reach a contrary con­
clusion.
terminate the membership of the Murua people. At the time of the 
research both parties had started to take legal action.
The scale of this dispute was considerable, involving repeated 
efforts by Members of Parliament to reconcile the two peoples, but 
section 28 certificates have also been used in an attempt to expel 
individuals and their families. In one instance, a person had been 
registered as the member of a group in accordance with the decision 
of the arbitration board which was upheld by the adjudication officer. 
The group continued to resent his inclusion in the register and the 
group representatives decided to sign a section 28 certificate 
expelling him. If such a certificate has this effect, as on the 
wide interpretation of the section it should have, it would operate 
to undermine the whole adjudication process.
Perhaps, in the last resort, it does not matter very much at- 
present which view of the law is taken. In the last example, the 
unwelcome member was subject to constant threats and harassment 
but he nevertheless insisted on his right to stay on the ranch. 
Similarly the Murua people, over 200 strong, had no intention of 
giving up what they saw as their right to stay on Olopito. It is 
highly unlikely that a court decision favouring the broader inter­
pretation of section 28 would induce either an unwelcome individual 
or the Murua people to move away, any more than a decision favouring 
a narrow interpretation would lead to their being welcomed by the 
majority of members. These are areas where respect for court 
decisions is slender and their enforcement problematical. The 
settlement of disputes of this kind will eventually depend on the 
use of force or on agreement between the parties, rather than on 
the niceties of statutory interpretation.
(iii) Socio-economic developments in group ranches.
It has been suggested in the previous section that group ranches 
are generally not based on any traditional unit; their boundaries do 
not coincide with those of the Masai settlement-associations, the 
inkutot, nor does their system of authority have anything in common 
with the traditional decision-making processes of the Masai. The 
ideology behind the establishment of group ranches is a modern one, 
based on a firm belief in the importance of development. The con­
cept of the group ranch introduces alien notions of land tenure, 
boundaries which create distinctions between members and non­
members, between owners and trespassers, obscuring the position of 
acceptees. The running of the group ranch calls for the adoption 
of unfamiliar procedures based on election, representation, 
delegation and the majority vote. Nevertheless group ranches 
could succeed in creating a sense of identity and purpose and in 
replacing traditional institutions, if they were seen to bring 
economic advantages. Unless they do this, they will merely remain 
a legal concept; they will never become a reality. The present 
section is devoted to a consideration of the ways in which group 
ranches have developed since their establishment. Although the 
present writer is not an economist and although he had not enough 
information to reach any definitive conclusions, nevertheless he 
was able to learn enough, particularly from interviews, to risk 
making some general predictions about the future of group ranches.
Many group ranches are from the start not viable, economic 
propositions. A study of the Kaputiei Masai group ranches in 
Kajiado District found that only one group ranch, Poka group ranch,
55was ecologically viable as a self-contained unit. It is likely
that in Narok District there are also many ranches which are not
ecologically viable and it is certain that most ranches are over- 
56stocked. Thus it is estimated that if the continuous grazing 
57system is used at Olopito (as it is, at present), the ranch can
support 93^ stock units whereas, according to the Group ranch
stock census of September 1973? there were 1,66^ stock units on
the ranch at that time. Olopito is one of the more favoured group 
58ranches, yet of its 6,565 hectares only some 3i^55 hectares can
be used for grazing.
A possible solution to this problem would be to reduce the
number of cattle on the ranch. However, all cattle are individually 
59owned ' and individuals will fight any attempt to reduce their herd. 
Although the group ranches have adopted rules providing for the 
opening of a stock register and the issuing of grazing quotas, no 
attempt has been made to enforce them. It is clear that the devel­
opment of group ranches will not get off the ground until some 
acceptable system for the culling of cattle is devised. Meanwhile 
cattle-owners continue to graze their cattle outside the boundaries 
of their ranch. Sometimes, it is true, this can be accounted for
55. J.M. Halderman, MAn analysis of continual semi-nomadism on the 
Kaputiei Maasai group ranches: sociological and ecological
factors.” University of Nairobi, Institute for Development
Studies, Working Paper No.78, March 1972 (unpublished),p.29-
56. The problem is aggravated by the presence of acceptees and 
trespassers with their herds.
57• An attempt to introduce a deferred grazing system has recently 
been made. Rotational grazing systems are difficult to enforce; 
besides they require good shepheids and the presence of water 
in both areas.
58. The discrepancy at Ilmashariani group ranch was even greater.
59• There is no such thing as a group herd, nor has any attempt
been made to induce individuals to pool their herds.
as a survival of that traditional spirit of reciprocity that often
60existed between small groups. Usually, however, it is that there
61is just not enough grazing on the ranch. Even the members of the
Poka group ranch, a ranch which showed, more than any other, that the
settlement and development of the Masai was possible, reverted to
62
semi-nomadism during the 197®-1971 drought.
One of the arguments in favour of the establishment of group 
ranches was that it would facilitate the provision of services since 
Masai would be settled within a clearly defined area and would be 
able to make their wishes known through their representatives. It 
was also hoped that the groups themselves would have an incentive to 
increase ranch facilities. In fact there is not much evidence of 
■this sort of development. One or two ranches have built dips and 
some have dug boreholes; these kinds of services are welcomed, 
though it should be remembered that they tend to lead to an increase 
in the number of cattle supported on the ranch. The lack of capital 
severely limits what the ranches can do. For example, on Olopito 
there is no group marketing cooperative and the only capital the 
group has been able to raise has been by taking one steer from each 
family within the group, selling the steers and putting the proceeds
60. Friends or relations may deliberately join different ranches 
as a form of insurance. If the rains fail in their area, they 
may not fail in the area where they have reciprocal rights.
61. In Narok District, Masai tend to migrate with their herds from 
the barely viable areas south of Narok to the north or to 
Transmara. It is also regrettably common for people to come 
down from the north in the rainy season to the saltlicks 
around Narok and to return home in the dry season leaving 
little grass behind them. This information was provided in
an interview with the Range Officer of Narok District, October
1fth, 197*U
62. Halderman, op. cit., p.2*f.
into the group bank account. The Agricultural Finance Corporation has 
given no loans to the group ranches in Narok District for ranching
63
purposes, nor have the commercial banks; yet group ranches were 
established in the belief that loans would more easily be made 
available.
Although little development seems to have occurred on the group 
ranches of Narok District, at the time of the research Phase II of 
the Livestock Development Programme run by U.S.I.D.A. and S.I.D.A. 
and financed by a loan from the World Bank was about to be imple­
mented. This programme could clearly have an important effect on 
the future of the group ranches, but at present it is only the 
individual farms of Narok District that show much sign of develop­
ment. Whether they have wheat farms or cattle ranches, these 
farmers have little difficulty raising loans and evidence of their 
prosperity abounds. It is hardly surprising that they should have
attracted the envy of members of group ranches who see that any
attempt to start commercial farming on the ranch would be frust­
rated by the traditionalism of most of their fellow members. It 
is this sort of attitude that may spell the final doom of the 
group ranches.
An officer of the Olopito group ranch apparently fenced six 
hundred acres of the group ranch and attempted to start his own
farm on group land. Although he was ordered to pull down his fence,
he was not without sympathy on the ranch. One informant, another
63. Loans were advanced for the cultivation of wheat on a couple 
of group ranches, but although the crop was moderately 
successful, the experiment was not popular with cattle- 
owners and is unlikely to be tried again.
officer of the ranch, predicted that the Olopito group would be 
dissolved in the near future and the land divided into individual 
wheat holdings. Indeed at a committee meeting of the Ilmashariani 
group ranch, some of the members expressed their desire that the 
group be dissolved and the land divided into individual plots.
They were told by the Assistant Registrar of Group Representatives 
that such a course of action was impossible and he is right in the 
sense that no disposition of any of the group land may be made
6k
without his approval and that of all the group representatives. 
Nevertheless these examples indicate a certain malaise on the part 
of just those people on whom the success of the group ranches 
largely depends.
k . Conclusions.
The Kenya government is committed to extending the land 
adjudication programme to all parts of Kenya and it was just because 
the registration of individual title is inappropriate in certain 
areas that the Land Adjudication Act 1968 made it possible for 
groups to be recorded as the owners of land and that the Land 
(Group Representatives) Act 1968 was passed to enable the incor­
poration of group representatives and the vesting of the registered
6k, Land (Group Representatives) (Prescribed Provisions) Order 
1969, Sched.2. At a general meeting of the Olopito group 
ranch it was decided that each member would be allocated 
two acres on which to build his boma and cultivate a 
subsistence plot.
title to the land in them as a corporate body. This procedure may 
be adopted both in pastoral and in agricultural areas, for the word 
’•group” is defined as ”a tribe, clan, section, family or other group 
of persons whose land under recognised customary law belongs com­
munally to the persons who are for the time being members of the 
65group...'! In fact the procedure has been adopted m  certain 
agricultural areas where the individualisation of land tenure is 
not complete and the concept of clan land or family land remains 
strong. The present writer has no information about the working 
of the system in these areas, but it seems doubtful whether it is 
likely to be very successful. Experience on Nyabondo plateau and 
even in some group ranches shows that where land has not been 
registered in the names of individuals but in the name of a group, 
not much time will elapse before members of the group demand that 
it be divided among them. Very often the demand will come initially 
from the more progressive farmers who feel that the development of 
the land is being held up by their more "conservative” fellow- 
members. On Nyabondo, however, all the members were in favour of 
splitting up the group land. No doubt it made it easier to raise 
loans, but perhaps they just wanted a piece of land to call their 
own.
In view of the fact that in agricultural areas, at least, 
group members are unlikely to be satisfied with group registration 
for very long, the wisdom of registering group title in the first 
place may be doubted and in any case the cumbersome procedure laid 
down in the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968 seems singularly
65. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.2.
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inappropriate. It would surely be simpler, as the Lawrance Mission 
originally envisaged, to register group land in the name of the group. 
Hie difficulty, of course, is that the group is not incorporated and 
therefore cannot hold land, but this difficulty would be avoided if 
the group land was registered in the name of the head of the group,
but that it was noted on the register that the land was group land
66and appropriate restrictions were entered accordingly.
The procedure laid down in the Land (Group Representatives) Act
1968 is much more appropriate in the range areas where ranches
containing hundreds of people are to be established. It has been
67
seen earlier in this chapter that there were two factors that 
made the extension of the land adjudication programme to the 
pastoral areas and, in particular, to Masailand a matter of urgent 
necessity. One was the fear that if the enclosure of agricultural 
land by non-Masai and the enclosure of individual ranches by Masai 
were allowed to continue unchecked, the vast mass of Masai cattle- 
herders would soon be relegated to areas where water was scarce and 
rainfall unreliable. Secondly, the government hoped to settle the 
Masai in order to facilitate the control of stock disease and the 
provision of facilities of all kinds; most important of all, it was 
clear that international loans for the development of Masailand would 
only be forthcoming if the Masai were settled on group ranches.
66. The Malawi Registered Land Act 1967, Cap.58:01 <1968), s.121(1) 
provides that where land is family land, it is to be registered 
in the name of the head of the family to hold it "as family 
representative". Not much is known about how the Malawi 
system operates in practice, though one authoritative source 
reports that "... land has been registered only in the names
of families which naturally means but little dealing".
Simpson (1976), op. cit., p.458.
67. Supra, pp. 128 et_ seq.
Insofaras these goals have been achieved, the group ranch 
programme has been generally appreciated by the Masai. They welcome 
the construction of cattle-dips and boreholes and they are particular­
ly glad that what they see as the invasion of Masailand by non-Masai 
has to some extent been stopped. Nevertheless they regard the group 
ranches as essentially artificial creations, which indeed they are. 
They are not based on traditional units, nor does the way in which 
ranches are organised and run have anything in common with traditional 
decision-making processes. Insofaras the government has attempted to 
use legislation to bring about social change, it seems totally to 
have failed. The settlement of the Masai has not occurred; they 
continue their semi-nomadic existence in search of pasture regardless 
of ranch boundaries. The spirit of reciprocity that traditionally 
existed between certain groups is still strong today and leads, where 
groups ranches have been established, to the problem of "acceptees”. 
Most Masai would have been content with the re-establishment of a 
Masai Reserve where non-Masai would be unable to acquire any per­
manent rights and with a significant increase in the provision of 
cattle-dips, boreholes and veterinary services. The group ranches 
do not respond to any perceived needs of the Masai.
The ranches could succeed in achieving a sense of solidarity, a 
sense of shared purpose among their members, if they could justify 
their existence on economic grounds. If they were the focus of 
intensive development programmes, if they could raise loans and if 
their officers and representatives combined to promote development 
on a group basis rather than on the basis of families, Kraal camps 
or any other traditional groupings, perhaps a sense of group identity
could be created. This has not occurred so far. Ranches show 
few signs of development, they have generally not been successful 
in raising loans and those members who could play a major part 
in getting ranches to work, are instead pressing for their dis­
solution.
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C H A P T E R  IV 
THE CHALLENGE OF FIRST REGISTRATION
1. Introduction
It had always been hoped that land registration would put an 
end to the bitter and expensive litigation which plagued certain 
areas of Kenya during the fifties. It was naturally in the more 
prosperous and more populated areas that disputes would arise; 
bitter and often bloody conflicts would occur over a patch of vacant 
land and the money spent on court fees and advocate's fees seldom 
bore any relation to the value of the land in dispute. Sometimes 
the disputes would concern the rights of the occupier of a piece of 
land to stay there, but more frequently they would be boundary dis­
putes arising, typically, where two farms were separated by land 
which had previously been unclaimed. The nature of these disputes 
has been touched upon in chapter two and here it suffices to note 
that land registration ought to put an end to them.
It is a great credit to the way in which land adjudication has 
been carried out that one kind of dispute rarely occurs today, namely, 
the boundary dispute. The boundaries determined at the time of land 
adjudication are generally accepted (if sometimes reluctantly) and 
the fact that a sisal hedge, or some other kind of boundary is 
planted at the same time and a demarcation map drawn up makes it 
unlikely that a dispute will ever break out again.
Disputes, of course, do occur either where no clear boundary has
ever existed or where some person has deliberately destroyed a
boundary and, possibly, built another. In the former case, it may
have happened that a person registered part of his neighbour's land
in his own name during his neighbour's absence and deliberately
refrained from putting up boundaries in order to avoid raising
suspicion. This should not occur if the boundaries have been pro-
perly demarcated in accordance with the Land Adjudication Act 1968.
Where a boundary has been destroyed or moved, the Land Registrar
may be required to determine its true position exercising powers
■3
conferred on him by the Registered Land Act 19&3* With the help of 
the registry map, the local inhabitants and officials, and evidence 
on the ground, he seldom has any difficulty in deciding such dis­
putes. Whilst it is a statutory offence to interfere with boundary 
k
features, prosecutions under this section are infrequent.
Boundary disputes, however, are extremely rare today and it is 
certainly one of the undoubted achievements of the land adjudication 
and registration programme to have put an end to them. When inform­
ants were invited to comment generally on the programme, they almost 
invariably isolated the absence of boundary disputes as its main 
virtue and sharply contrasted the peaceful state of things today 
with the bitter feuds that troubled the area fifteen or twenty years
1. The information contained in this paragraph comes from an 
interview which the writer had with the Land Registrar 
(Inspector) for Nyanza Province on August 28th, 1973- He 
is responsible for deciding boundary disputes referred to 
him by the District Land Registrars.
2. s.19(a).
3. s.21(2).
Jf. Ibid., s.2^(1).
ago. As they would say, nowadays there is no noise, hapana kelele; 
there is no war, no killing.
On the other hand, a different kind of dispute is becoming 
increasingly frequent, a kind of dispute which has its roots in 
inadequate adjudication. These are not disputes about boundaries, 
but disputes about ownership and lesser interests in the land. Such 
disputes are occurring particularly in the Central Province, where 
land consolidation and registration first started and where it was
conducted hastily and at a time when many people were absent. This
5
is illustrated by the table below. Two situations, in particular,
5. TABLE 2. Civil cases filed in the Resident Magistrate’s 
Court, Muranga.
Year 1966 1967 1968 1969 197t 1971 1972 1973
19^
months
Disputes arising out 
of agreements to sell 
land:
3 8 6 12 30 33 3b 13
Disputes arising out 
of first registration:
2 6 16 21 2b 2b 10
Other land disputes: 1 1 3 5 1 11 9 13 3
Total Land cases: 1 6 11 17 29 62 66 73 26
Total Civil cases: 17 28 22 3b *f1 119 116 106 bS
Source: Register of Civil cases, Resident Magistrate's Court,
Muranga.
For figures relating to land cases in the High Court at Nyeri, see 
Ch.VII, p.379. The writer did no research in the third district of 
Central Province, Kiambu district, but it appears that the number of 
land disputes (mainly involving first registration) is increasing at 
an astronomical rate. Interview with Senior Resident Magistrate 
for Kiambu, July 25th, 1973*
can be identified which recur frequently in the law reports. In one 
situation, a person will claim that the registered proprietor was 
wrongfully registered as the proprietor of a piece of land; he will 
claim that the land is his, but that, owing to his absence at the 
time of adjudication or owing to irregular adjudication procedures, 
he has now been deprived of it. The second situation, which is much 
more common, arises where it is agreed within a particular family at 
the time of adjudication that a certain person be registered as the
| proprietor of a piece of land, but it is allegedly understood that
| he will recognise and protect the customary rights of his kinsmen in
j  the land. Thus if the adjudication authorities refuse to record
i
I holdings below a certain acreage, brothers might agree to pooltheir 
holdings and register the single plot in the name of the eldest.
Alternatively, if the authorities are reluctant to allow any one
I
I
| person to own more than one plot, the owner of several plots may 
be obliged to register all but one of them in the names of his kins­
men. It is not difficult to see how disputes may arise subsequently, 
and it is important to note that a thorough adjudication procedure 
which took into account the lesser interests of relatives and others 
would largely prevent the situation occurring where today, as we 
shall see, the court records abound in family disputes of a most 
virulent nature.
Once the appeals machinery laid down in the Land Adjudication 
Act 1968 has been exhausted, then disputes of the kind described 
in the preceding paragraph will have to be brought before the courts,
6. This aspect has been discussed in Ch.II. supra, pp. 63 et seq.
either the High Court or the Resident Magistrate’s court, according
7
to the value of the land m  dispute. Such disputes not only 
frequently involve tangled fact-situations but also raise difficult 
questions of law.^
2. Rectification of the register.
In most registration systems it is provided that the register 
may be rectified where an entry in the register has been obtained by 
fraud or mistake, but that it shall not be rectified so as to affect
the title of the proprietor in possession unless he was aware of or
9
contributed to such fraud or mistake. Such a provision is to be
10found in the Registered Land Act 1963 with one important exception; 
the first registration cannot be cancelled or amended. The relevant 
section reads:
1^3(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, 
the court may order rectification of the register 
by directing that any registration be cancelled 
or amended where it is satisfied that any 
registration (other than a first registration) 
has been obtained, made or omitted by fraud or 
mistake.11
7. Registered Land Act 1963* s.139(1)•
8. One Resident Magistrate tries to persuade the parties to such 
disputes to settle out of court and then judgment will be entered 
by consent. This course is eminently sensible given the nature 
of the dispute and often succeeds. In one case, each party
selected 3 elders and the 6 elders sat under the chairmanship of
the chief as a kind of arbitration tribunal.
9. See e.g. the English Land Registration Act 1925? s.82(1)and(3)(a).
10. Registered Land Act 1963? s.1^3* This section closely resembled
the Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance 1939,s.89, which 
it replaced.
11. Section 1^3(2) contains a similar provision to section 82(3)(a) of 
the English Land Registration Act 1923? protecting the innocent 
proprietor in possession.
Moreover it is expressly provided that a person suffering damage by
reason of any mistake or omission in the register which cannot be
rectified under the Act, other than a mistake or omission in a first
12registration, shall be entitled to be indemnified.
The potentially harsh effects of such provisions were clearly
demonstrated early on in the famous case, The District Commissioner,
13Kiambu v. R and others. Ex Parte Ethan N.jau. Acting under the 
Native Land Tenure Rules 1956, the local committee had allocated one 
plot to Njau and one plot to a certain Munge. A certificate of 
allocation was issued to Njau, but then Munge complained about the 
allocation to the committee which purported to reverse its previous 
decision i.e.it purported to give Njau's plot to Munge and vice 
versa. The register was then drawn up. Before the register was 
confirmed, Njau complained and his complaint was treated as an 
objection and rejected by the committee. The committee then con­
firmed the register and Njau applied for an order of mandamus 
directing the appellant to register him as proprietor of the plot 
in question. The Supreme Court made the order sought on the grounds 
that the committee had acted ultra vires in reversing its original 
decision and re-allocating the plot to Munge.
12. Registered Land Act 1963? s.lMf(l)(b) It is interesting to 
note that under the Land Registration (Special Areas)
Ordinance 1959? s.90(l)(b), this exception is omitted; thus, 
until the Registered Land Act 1963 came into force, a person 
whose land had been registered by fraud or mistake in the 
name of another, could claim an indemnity from the government, 
even though tie register could not be rectified in his favour.
13. [1960] E.A.109 (C.A.).
On appeal, the court agreed that the committee had acted ultra
vires and that the registration officer had been under a duty to
register the original certificate. However, between the time of the
application and that of the hearing the Native Lands Registration
Ordinance 1959 had been passed, which transferred the control and
custody of the register from the appellant to the registrar appointed
under that Ordinance. An order of mandamus could not be made against
the appellant as he no longer had the power to carry it out, nor
could it be made against the registrar as he was neither a party to
the proceedings nor was he ’’the successor of the District Commissioner
1 L\.
within the meaning of the authorities on that subject.” So the
appeal was allowed. However the court made it quite clear that, even
if the registrar had been party to the proceedings, no order could
have been made, because section 89(l)(a) of the Ordinance specifically
excluded first registration from the courts' powers to rectify the 
15register. The register had become ”a register of title with 
particular protection for those who had ’first registration’.
16Interference with those registrations is completely forbidden...’!
"... such an order would offend against the letter and policy of the
17Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959?•••" The court, moreover,
14. [196®] E.A. 109? at p.129? per Gould, J.A. The court succeeded in
distinguishing R. v. Hanley Revising Barrister, [1912] 3 K.B. 318 
from the present case.
13. One writer holds that the court would probably have issued mandamus 
if there had been no change of office and that it could in any 
case have simply declared the entry in the register to be void. 
However, he seems to have ignored the existence of section 89(1)(a) 
of the Native Lands Registration Ordinance, 1959» See P.J. Bayne, 
"Government liability for torts by public officials," 6 E.A.L.J. 
2^3? at p.244.
16. The District Commissioner, Kiambu v. R and others, Ex Parte Ethan 
Njau, [1960] E.A. 109, at p.128.
17« Ibid., at p.129-
felt that no great injustice was being done since Njau still had a 
plot and could in any case claim an indemnity from the government. 
Others, as will be seen, were to be much less fortunately placed.
The reasons for thus excluding first registration from the
general rules governing rectification and indemnity are largely
political and must be sought in the history of land consolidation
and registration and, in particular, in its origins in the Central
Province. When land consolidation started there in the mid-fifties,
the State of Emergency was still in force and large numbers of
Kikuyu, were absent, either in detention or in the forests. The
land rights of absentees were often not protected, indeed land
consolidation was often used as a way of rewarding loyalists at
18the expense of such absentees. Consequently many Kikuyu claimed 
that they had been wrongfully deprived of their lands.
However, it was felt that if they were allowed to challenge 
first registration, the readjudication of land titles on a large 
scale would be necessary, the work of several years on consolidation 
would be seriously undermined and, most important of all, perhaps, 
old political animosities would be revived at a time when the official 
emphasis was on reconciliation, stability and unity. It was also 
possible and more sensible to compensate those who had lost their 
land by giving them plots on the newly-established settlement 
schemes.
These arguments have lost a lot of their force today and cer­
tainly cannot apply to the vast areas of land outside the Central 
Province which have been registered since the end of the State of
18. See p.2 8 supra.
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Emergency. Within the Central Province itself there does remain a cer­
tain legacy of bitterness and resentment which is often voiced through
19unofficial organisations, but it seems that most people have
accepted, if sometimes reluctantly, the situation as it is. The
Lawrance Mission recommended that sections 143 and 144 of the Registered
Land Act 1963 be amended to enable the review of first registration
20subject to the leave of the High Court, but this recommendation 
was not put into effect. This is unfortunate. As suggested above, 
the original arguments in favour of preventing the challenge of first 
registration have less force today and the effect of prohibiting 
rectification of the register in such cases is not to prevent parties 
bringing their disputes before the courts, but rather to make it more 
difficult for the courts to do justice and to compel advocates to 
discover other means of furthering their clients' interests. The 
next three sections of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion 
of the various means which have been employed to this end. It will be 
seen that the courts dislike the limitation on their powers to order 
rectification imposed by section 143(1) and have generally cooperated 
with attempts to mitigate the harsh consequences of this provision.
19. Thus, a group of people calling themselves Mihiriga Kenda was 
reported as collecting contributions in Muranga district for 
the purpose of suing the government for compensation for the 
lands lost during the Mau Mau struggle. Sunday Nation, February 
1ith, 1974, p.3» Similarly, it seems that some years ago a 
body styled "The Land Reconsolidation Committee" was campaigning 
in Nyeri district on behalf of former detainees who had allegedly 
been deprived of their lands. Lawrance Mission Report, para.273»
20. Ibid., para. 274.
3. Proceedings against public officers.
Since it is impossible for the courts to order rectification of
the register where first registration has been obtained by fraud or
mistake, persons who feel that land adjudication has deprived them
of their land may choose alternatively to bring proceedings in tort
against the government or its officers and claim damages for the
loss which they have suffered. In fact, this course of action has
been taken only rarely, but its possibilities and limitations ought
to be outlined here, especially in view of the decision in Kimani
21
v. Attorney-General.
Briefly the facts in that case were these. During land adjud­
ication the plaintiff had had his name entered in the Record of 
Existing Rights (later replaced by an Adjudication Register) as 
the proprietor of a certain plot; his name was subsequently removed 
irregularly from the register by government officials and the name 
of one Bari substituted for it. At first, the plaintiff applied for 
an order of mandamus, but this was refused as being the wrong remedy,
presumably for the same reasons as those given in The District
22Commissioner, Kiambu v. R.and others, Ex Parte Ethan Njau. He 
then brought an action against the Attorney-General for damages, 
contending that the government was liable for the torts of its 
servants, and he succeeded.
21. [19693 E.A.29. The detailed discussion of this case in Bayne,
op.cit. 1 has been most helpful. Appeal from the High Court 
decision was made on the question of the assessment of 
damages and the appeal was allowed, Kimani v. Attorney- 
General, [1969] E.A.302 (C.A.). As it appears that it was 
the Attorney-General who was appealing against the award, it is 
unclear why the title of the case is reported in this way.
22. Supra.
The defence denied that the plaintiff ever had a cause of action
in law, but this contention was vigorously repudiated by the court.
Rejecting the theory that there is a law of torts, but no law of tort,
Trevelyan, J. relied on the broad principle enunciated by Sir John
23
Holt in Ashby v. White to the effect that if a plaintiff has a 
right he must of necessity have the means to vindicate it and a 
remedy if he is injured in the enjoyment or exercise of it. There 
was no doubt that Kimani had a right to have his name on the register 
as the owner of the land and the law would be shirking its responsibil­
ities if it could provide no remedy to vindicate this right. Moreover, 
the court maintained that even if the government servants concerned 
had not acted deliberately and maliciously with the intention unlaw­
fully to injure the plaintiff, they had no doubt been negligent, for 
a "duty situation" existed and in breach of that duty they had caused 
the plaintiff to suffer loss. The judgment is short and the ratio 
hard to identify exactly, the judge summing up his discussion with 
the words, "Look at it how you will, the plaintiff had a cause of
2k
action sounding in damages for the undoubted wrongs done to him."
A detailed treatment of the judgment is unnecessary here, since 
the case was clearly decided per incuriam. For the Native Lands 
Registration Ordinance 1959 provided:
Neither the Registrar, the Deputy Registrar nor 
any Assistant Registrar nor any officer shall be 
liable to any action, suit or proceeding for or 
in respect of any act or matter in good faith done 
or omitted to be done in exercise or supposed
23. (1703), 2 Ld. Raym.938; 92 E.R. 126.
2k, [19693 E.A. 29, at p.32, per Trevelyan, J.
exercise of the powers given by this Ordinance „  
or by any rules or regulations made thereunder.
Thus no officer could, in the absence of bad faith, have been made
26liable in Kimani v. Attorney-General. and neither could the
government by reason of the following section of the Government
27Proceedings Act 1956:
Any written law which negatives or limits the 
amount of the Liability of any Government depart­
ment or officer of the Government in respect of 
any tort committed by that department or officer 
shall, in the case of proceedings against the 
Government under this section in respect of a 
tort committed by the department or officer, 
apply in relation to the Government as it would 
have applied in relation to the department or 
officer if the proceedings against the Govern­
ment had been proceedings against that depart­
ment or officer.
No reference to these provisions is made in the judgment, but they 
would almost certainly have given the government a complete defence
25- s.97- The position is much the same today. The Land Adjudication 
Act 1968, s . j h  provides:
"Any officer appointed under this Act, and any other 
person appointed for the purpose of adjudication 
proceedings under this Act, shall not be liable to 
any action, suit or proceedings for or in respect of 
any act or matter in good faith done or omitted to be 
done in exercise or supposed exercise of the powers 
given by this Act or any regulations made under it.”
It would seem, however, that Land Registrars are no longer protected 
in this way. The draft Registered Land Bill contained a similar 
provision which was, however, omitted in the final version for no 
apparent reason.
26. Supra.
27- Cap.*40, (1970), s.*4(*f).
to Kimani’s suit.
28In a later case, Odhiambo v. Otieno and another, an action was
brought against the Attorney-General, the second defendant, on the
grounds that the Government was liable for torts allegedly committed
by members of the Land arbitration board and the court held that
29section of the Land Adjudication Act 1968 provided a complete 
defence; strangely enough the court made no reference to section M*f) 
of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 but merely found that the 
protection afforded to persons appointed for the purposes of adjudi­
cation proceedings should be extended to the Government. The facts 
of this case do not emerge very clearly from the judgment, but it 
appears that the land adjudication committee ruled against the plain­
tiff in a land dispute and in consequence he appealed to the arbitra­
tion board. His appeal was never heard either because the executive 
officer never forwarded the complaint to the board or because the 
board neglected to take action on the complaint when it was forwarded. 
In any case it is clear from the foregoing argument that neither the 
executive officer nor the members of the board nor the Government 
could be liable for any actions in good faith done or omitted to be 
done.
Even if the board members had not acted in good faith, it is 
by no means certain that the Government would be liable for torts 
committed by them. In the first place, no proceedings lie against
28. [197*0 E.A.116 (High Court of Kenya). For unknown reasons the
case has also been reported as Odhiambo v. Odenyo and another, 
[1975] E.A.*fl6 (High Court of Kenya), The reports are virtually 
identical.
29. See supra, p.170.
the Government in respect of acts done or omitted to be done by any
person discharging responsibilities of a judicial nature vested in 
30
him. In Odhiambo v. Otieno and another the court held that this
provision afforded protection to the Government, as the board was
31discharging responsibilities of a quasi-judicial nature. The use 
of the word "quasi-judicial” is hardly helpful in this context, but 
the question whether the board's functions are judicial or not is
difficult to answer. Problems surrounding the definition of
"judicial" have arisen in other areas of law, but there have been 
very few cases on this provision in Kenya or on its equivalent in 
English law. There are certainly important differences of function 
and procedure between the adjudication committees and arbitration 
boards on the one hand and the courts on the other. The duty of both 
the committee and the board is to determine land rights. Proceedings 
before them are inquisitorial and conducted with a minimum of form­
ality; there are no rules of evidence, there is no plaintiff and no 
defendant. Moreover the arbitration board is not, strictly speaking, 
an appellate authority; it merely hears "complaints" which are 
"referred" to it and these complaints may be made by aiy person 
affected by a committee decision, whether he appeared before the 
committee or not. No question of locus standi seems to arise, since
it is not difficult to prove that one has been suitably affected.
Another argument against the view that the board's functions are 
judicial is furnished by section 12(2) of the Land Adjudication Act
30. Government Proceedings Act 1956, s.4(3), based on the English 
Crown Proceedings Act 19^7? s.2(5)«
31. [1974] E.A. 116, at p.120; the court seems to have held that 
this provision would also have protected persons discharging 
the responsibilities, but this is clearly wrong.
1968 which provides that a proceeding before the adjudication officer
is a judicial proceeding for the purpose of certain Chapters of the 
32
Penal Code, The apparent implication is that proceedings before
adjudication officers are not judicial proceedings for any other
purposes and that proceedings before committees and arbitration
boards are not judicial proceedings for any purpose at all.
On the other hand, the boards and the committees are carrying
out the classic judicial function, the determination of questions
33
of law or fact by reference to pre-existing rules. In one case, 
it has been held that the mere fact that a body has no administrative 
duties but simply hears and determines appeals, does not prevent 
its functions being essentially administrative, looked at in the 
light of the overall framework and purpose of the statute. The 
body in that case was a Board of Review which heard appeals against 
penalties imposed by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue and, unlike 
the bodies set up under the Land Adjudication Act 1968, it con­
stituted a small part of an undeniably administrative undertaking 
(i.e. the assessment of tax liability) and its task resembled that 
of a reviewing authority rather than that of an appellate authority 
is that the defendant in the proceedings would always be the body 
which made the disputed decision.
On the whole, the present writer would incline to the view that 
adjudication committees and arbitration boards are discharging
32. Cap.63, (1970), chs.xi -and XVIII. Gh.XI deals with perjury
and other offences relating to the administration of justice 
and Chapter XVIII deals with defamation.
33» Ranaweera v. Ramachandran, [1970] A.C. 962 (P.C.).
174.
34
judicial responsibilities and that the Government is thus protected
by section 4(5) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956. Nevertheless,
35
even if this view is mistaken, it has been suggested that the
36
Government might be protected by section 4(6) of that Act which 
restricts its liability in tort to cases where the officer has been 
directly or indirectly appointed by the Government and paid wholly 
out of the Consolidated Fund, Both committee members and board 
members are*however, indirectly appointed by the Government, the 
former by the adjudication officer and the latter by the Provincial 
Commissioner. Members of neither body are paid, but insofaras 
board members may be able to recover expenses, these are paid out 
of the Consolidated Fund. Therefore, it is hard to see how this 
section could protect the Government in this context.
37To sum up this section, Knimani v. Attorney-General has shown 
that the courts may be prepared to take a broad approach to the 
question of what constitutes a tort. Nevertheless officers involved 
in the adjudication process will not be personally liable unless they 
have not acted in good faith. Even if they have not acted in good 
faith, the Government will not be liable for their torts unless they 
were neither discharging nor purporting to discharge judicial respon­
sibilities. Moreover both the Government and the officer can call in 
aid the protection afforded by the Public Officers Protection Ordinance
381910, s.2(l)(a), whereby proceedings must be commenced within six
34. As are adjudication officers, at least when they are hearing 
objections.
35. Odhiambo v. Otieno and another, [1974] E.A. 116, at p.120.
36. This section is based on the English Crown Proceedings Act 
1947, s.2(6).
37. Supra.
38. Cap.186.
months of the act complained of. For all these reasons, a person 
aggrieved by the way in which land adjudication has been carried out 
would seldom be advised to take proceedings in tort against the 
Government or its officers. It need hardly be added that political 
considerations, more than mere legal difficulties, would be likely 
in any case to discourage such a course of action.
f^. Declarations of trusts.
It is clear that in only a small number of instances will it
be appropriate for a person aggrieved by the loss of his land during
adjudication to take proceedings against the government or its
servants. Even where officials involved in the adjudication process
have carried out their duties conscientiously, it is still possible
for injustice to occur and, as the register cannot generally be
39rectified in respect of first registration, other stratagems must 
be devised.
In a few cases, of course, the courts completely ignore this 
prohibition and m  one case the court, finding that the defendant 
had obtained first registration by fraud, ordered him to vacate the 
land and the register to be rectified accordingly on the principle
39. Registered Land Act 1963 j s. 1^3(1 )i discussed supra at p. 163<.
kO. E.g. Kabugu Solomon v. Mwangi Solomon, High Court of Kenya at
Nyeri, Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1969 (unreported).
A-1. Njachi Kingathia v. Kingathia Wanjan, High Court of Kenya at
Nyeri, Civil Case No.33 of 1968 (unreported).
that "fraud vitiates everything". On the whole, however, both courts 
and advocates are well aware of the prohibition against amending or 
cancelling first registrations.
At the same time the courts have tended to interpret rather
liberally their power to rectify the register on second registration.
Two cases will illustrate this tendency which, though springing from
an admirable desire to do justice, sometimes contravenes both the
l±2
letter and spirit of section 1^3(1)• In one case, due to the 
difficulty of getting more than one of his plots registered in his 
name, the plaintiff had registered his second plot in the name of 
Gathogo Jakumu, though he intended that the land should remain his 
own. Unfortunately he had three sons of that name and one of them 
fraudulently had the name on the register changed to Gathogo Jakumu 
Gathaburo (his own name) followed by his identity card number; he 
then obtained a certificate of title and required the plaintiff 
(his father) to vacate the land. Two questions arose: was the 
change of name a second registration? If so, how should the register 
be rectified? The court decided that it was a second registration 
and that, as it had been obtained by fraud, the register should be 
rectified by inserting the plaintiff's name in place of the defend­
ant's. Though obviously just in the extremely peculiar circum­
stances of the case, it may be doubted whether the court had the 
power to introduce a completely new name; the usual course indeed 
would be to merely cancel the fraudulently obtained registration, 
leaving the first registration intact. In view of the fact that the
k2m Jakumu Kinoe v. Gathogo s/o Jakumu Kinoe, High Court of Kenya 
at Nyeri, Civil Case No.33 of 1972 (unreported).
Registrar had failed to delete the original registration and to insert
the number 2 in the entry column, it is open to doubt whether the
fraudulent entry did constitute a second registration.
43
The decision in the second case was more questionable. The 
three plaintiffs and the first defendant were brothers who had jointly 
purchased a piece of land, each contributing equally to the purchase- 
price. The land was subsequently registered in the name of the first 
defendant alone who later transferred an undivided share in the 
property to his son, the second defendant. The plaintiffs sought an 
order registering them as proprietors in common with the first 
defendant of the land in question. They were successful and the 
court ordered rectification of the register. The decision is worth 
questioning on two points. In the first place, second registration 
can only be cancelled or amended under section 143(1) if it has been 
"obtained, made or omitted by fraud or mistake" and it was far from 
clear that it had in fact been made by fraud; certainly the court 
stated that the transfer of an undivided share had been carried out 
"with the sole purpose of depriving the plaintiffs [of] their share 
of the land", but no effort was made to explain the nature of the 
plaintiffs' rights, if any. However, even if the second registration 
had been obtained by fraud, then the court had the power to cancel it 
and restore the status quo ante; it surely had no power to add the 
names of the three plaintiffs to the first registration. The 
presence of a fraudulently obtained second registration cannot give the 
court power to amend the first registration.
43. Rungoyo Wanyoya and two others v. Samuel Gichango and another,
High Court of Kenya at Nyeri, Civil Case No.747 of 1971
(unreported).
In both these cases, the effect of rectification was that persons 
who had not been adjudicated owners of a particular piece of land 
during land adjudication became registered as owners of the land by 
order of court, and this is precisely what the exception to the court's 
power under section 143(1) was designed to prevent. Moreover it is a 
pity that in neither case was the possibility of the existence of a 
trust raised, a device which, as we shall shortly see has often found 
favour with courts faced by similar situations.
Under the Registered Land Act 19^3 particulars of trusts are not
44to be entered on the register, nor are any persons dealing with the
43land deemed to be affected by notice of such trust. Moreover no 
disposition by a trustee to a bona fide purchaser for valuable con- 
i sideration shall be defeasible by reason of the fact that it amounted
46to a breach of trust. These principles are common to most registra­
tion systems and they have provided the courts with a useful way of 
avoiding the harsh consequences of the section 143(1) prohibition. If 
the courts are able to declare that the registered proprietor of 
certain land holds it as a trustee, they will be able to restrain 
him from disposing of the land or evicting the beneficial owners in 
breach of trust, and indeed to order him to transfer the land to them 
if such are the terms of the trust.
44. S.126(1). The registered proprietor may be noted in the register 
as holding the land "as trustee".
45. Ibid., S.126(3)* The position is slightly absurd where the pro­
prietor is registered as holding the land "as trustee".
46. Ibid., S.39(2). One of the persons responsible for the drafting
of the Registered Land Act 1963 has recently recommended that,
whenever the Registrar becomes aware that any registered interest 
is affected by a trust, he should be empowered to protect such 
interest in such manner as he sees fit. While admitting that it 
is generally undesirable to expect the Registrar to police the 
interests of beneficiaries, the writer feels that such a step may 
be necessary in an unsophisticated community with little access to 
professional advice. See S. Rowton Simpson (1976), op.cit.,
pp.580 - 1.
Before considering the circumstances in which the courts have
tended to declare trusts, it is necessary to inquire whether such
declarations of trust require the consent of the land control board
l+n
in accordance with the Land Control Act 19^7? which provides that 
"... the sale, transfer, ... or other disposal of or dealing with 
any agricultural land which is situated within a land control area.*, 
is void for all purposes..." without that consent. The question 
whether a declaration of trust was a dealing with land within this 
section was raised in Githuchi Farmers Co. Ltd. v. Gichamba and
48
another. In this case, the defendants together with some fifty
other persons formed an organisation for the purpose of purchasing
some land. The land was purchased and registered in the names of
six of the members upon the ’’express agreement and understanding”
that they should hold the land on trust for the entire group pending
its incorporation as a limited company. The plaintiff company now
claimed (a) a declaration that the land was held by the registered
owners on trust and (b) an order that the defendants (two of the
registered owners) should sign all the documents required to transfer
the land to the company. The latter claim was not pressed in court.
The court considered that the whole case rested on the proper
49
interpretation of the Land Control Act 1967 in the event held
that the declaration of a trust was a ’’dealing with land” within that 
section and that the ’’express agreement and understanding” was void,
47. Cap.302 (1968) s.6 (1). The working of this Act is discussed 
exhaustively infra. Ch. VII.
48. [1973] E.A. 8.
49. S.6(1), supra.
as no application had been made to the appropriate board within three 
5#
months. Unfortunately the judgment is not a model of clarity.
After referring briefly to authorities cited in argument, Harris, J„
continued, "... I cannot treat these judgments as supporting the
proposition that the land control legislation does not apply to
transactions effecting the vesting of trust property by trustees
51in the cestuis que trustent [sic]". Later he quoted from the
Land Control Act 1967 and commented, "It is apparent therefore that
the Act contemplates a very wide measure of control of dealings
in land. Can it be said that any exception is intended in favour
52of transactions effected by way of the creation of trusts?"
However, these statements are not wholly to the point. The consent 
of the land control board may indeed be necessary where the registered 
proprietor of land conveys that land to trustees to hold on trust or 
where the trustees vest land in the beneficiaries in accordance with 
the terms of the trust; in both cases there is a "transfer of land" 
within section 6(1), in both cases (to use English legal terminology) 
there is a conveyance of the legal estate. However a mere declaration 
of trust involves no transfer, no conveyance of the legal estate.
From the facts as found by the court, it seems clear that the land was 
purchased (presumably with the consent of the land control board) and 
registered in the names of the six members as trustees for their co­
purchasers. There is nothing in the land control legislation to
50. Ibid., S.6(2).
51. C1973] E.A. 8, at p.10.
52. Ibid.
prevent the court from declaring that they hold the land on trust and
53from ordering that an inhibition be registered in appropriate terms.
One consideration that led the court to make the decision it did 
was its fear that otherwise ”... the creation of trusts [would] pro­
vide so effective a means of circumventing the widely drawn prohibition 
regarding sales, transfers, leases, exchanges and partitions as to
5^defeat almost completely the purpose of the Act.” As we have seen, 
the mere declaration of a trust could not provide such a means, but 
the vesting of the land in the beneficiaries in execution of the 
trust would indeed be a way of circumventing the Act, if it were not 
held to be a transfer or a dealing with land. However it clearly 
is a dealing in land and hence caught by the Act.
It has been necessary to make these few points about the Land 
Control Act 1967 this stage, because, as will shortly be seen, 
the courts seldom hesitate to declare trusts, where justice so 
demands, or to order the vesting of the trust property in the bene­
ficiaries, and in neither instance have they ever felt constrained 
by the land control legislation. This is strange especially since 
they not infrequently order specific performance of agreements to 
sell land ’’subject to obtaining the land control board’s consent”.
The sort of trusts with which this chapter is concerned are not 
express trusts. Written evidence of an intention to create a trust 
seldom exists and, although oral evidence is sometimes submitted to 
the courts, in the vast majority of cases they simply infer the 
existence of a trust from the relationship of the parties and the 
surrounding circumstances. Sometimes it is called a ’’customary trust”, 
based as it is on customary rules of inheritance and land-holding.
53. The courts have such powers by virtue of the Registered Land Act 
1963, s.128(1).
5*+. [1973] E.A. 8 , at p.10.
55Sometimes it is called a "constructive trust"j and although the courts 
rarely refer to authorities from other jurisdictions, their approach 
resembles that of Lord Denning who sees the constructive trust as 
"an equitable remedy by which the court can enable an aggrieved party
56
to obtain restitution."
57The following case is typical both in its fact situation and m  
its outcome. The land in suit had belonged to the plaintiff's father, 
who died in 1921, leaving a widow and one son (the plaintiff) aged 
fifteen years. According to the customary law of the deceased, the 
deceased's brother (the defendant) married the deceased's widow and 
came to live with her on the deceased's land. The plaintiff and 
the defendant lived amicably together, cultivating different portions 
of the land, until 1955 when the plaintiff was arrested and detained. 
During land adjudication the land was registered in the defendant's 
name so that he could look after it in the plaintiff's absence. After 
the plaintiff's release, things continued much as before until 1971 
when the defendant required the plaintiff to vacate the land. The 
plaintiff applied to the court for a declaration that the defendant 
held the whole plot on trust for him and his application was success­
ful. The court first had to adjudicate the rights of the parties 
under customary law and it decided that the plaintiff, as the only
55- The courts are empowered to apply equitable principles by virtue 
of the Registered Land Act 19&3? s.163* which extends and 
applies to Kenya the common law of England, as modified by the 
doctrines of equity, "subject to the provisions of this Act 
and save as may be provided by any written law for the time 
being in force".
56. Hussey v. Palmer, [1972] 3 All E.R. (C.A.), at p.7^7-
57* Mungora tfamathai v. Muroti Mugweru, High Court of Kenya at Nyeri, 
Civil Case No. 56 of 1972 (unreported).
son, was entitled to inherit all his father's land according to Kikuyu 
custom. Secondly, the court held that, in view of the plaintiff's 
rights under customary law, the defendant held the land as construc­
tive trustee for him; he was indeed a trustee cie son tort for 
"... although not a trustee at the time when he became registered as
proprietorj[he] did acts characteristic of the office of trustee, in
58that he intermeddled with the property of another...".
Section 1^3(1) was not mentioned in this case, but it has often 
been raised in argument in other similar cases, without success, 
however. The courts have not felt that the section prevents them 
declaring trusts or making orders directing the trustees to transfer 
the land in suit to the cestuis que trust. Indeed the trust is 
generally recognised as a useful device for avoiding the harsh con­
sequences that flow from the impossibility of rectifying the register 
in the case of first registration. This attitude is well illustrated
by the letter written by the Chief Land Registrar to the Resident
59Magistrate at Muranga in respect of a decision in which the magis­
trate had ordered rectification of the register in the plaintiff's 
favour. After first regretting that it would be unable to rectify 
the register as it was a first registration, the Chief Land Registrar 
continued:
If I may suggest a way out of this difficulty, in
my opinion, would be [sic] to make an Order ordering
the registered owner personally to execute a
58. Ibid., at p.3» per Bennett, J.
59. Muchunu Mbaria v. Michael Ithebu Mbaria, Resident Magistrate's
Court at Muranga, Civil Case No.19 of 1970 (unreported).
transfer ... and transfer the property in question to 
the decree holder. This indirect method achieves the 
same results without infringing upon the provisions 
of the Act. Alternatively the Court may declare the 
Defendant to be a "trustee" and as such order him to 
transfer the property to the Plaintiff. 60
In the vast majority of cases, the parties are closely related and
a customary trust situation is immediately apparent; thus a brother
61will hold land on trust for his younger brother, or an uncle for his
62infant nephew. In some cases, however, it may be more difficult to 
establish the existence of a customary trust, particularly where more 
complicated questions of customary law are involved. Thus in
63
Ernest Kinyanjui Kimani v. Muiru Gikanga and another, questions 
arose whether it would be consistent for a muhoi to give assistance 
in land disputes and whether the outright gift of land requires any 
ceremony in Kikuyu customary law. The court held that as the law on 
these questions was neither documented nor notorious, it must be 
proved by the person relying on it and this the plaintiff (who 
claimed that a customary trust existed) had failed to do.
60. Letter, dated 20/2/71, from the Chief Land Registrar to the 
Resident Magistrate, Muranga, filed with the case file of 
Muchunu Mbaria v. Michael Ithebu Mbaria, supra.
61. E.g. Joseph Gathogo Gathagu v. Njuguna Gathagu, High Court
of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Appeal No.35 of 1973 (unreported)
and Gathekia s/o Mbote v. Muiruri s/o Mbote, High Court of 
Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Appeal No.52 of 1972 (unreported).
62. E.g. James N. Njaga v. Kahungu Kimamu, High Court of Kenya at
Nairobi, Civil Case No.1^72 of 1971 £unreported)and Kamau Mukono 
v. Julius Kamau Nganga, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil 
Case No.1762 of 1973(unreported).
63. [1965] E.A. 735 (C.A.). As the Resident Magistrate's Courts, 
the High Courts and the Court of Appeal are largely staffed 
by expatriates, very little customary law is "notorious" and, 
until recently, very little was documented; this could make 
things hard for the person relying on customary law and lead to 
unjust results, as in this instance where the case of the plain­
tiff/appellant would seem unanswerable to anyone with an ele­
mentary knowledge of customary law.
Where there is no customary trust situation, the courts may be 
more reluctant to imply the existence of a trust. This reluctance
6bwas neatly illustrated in Kariuki Thuku v. Adriano Ngure, where
the plaintiff claimed shares in two plots of land from the defendant,
his brother. The first plot had been inherited by them from their
father and registered in the defendant's name alone; the second
plot had been bought by them jointly from a third party (before land
adjudication) and also registered in the defendant's name alone.
With regard to the first plot, the court held that section 1^3(1)
of the Registered Land Act 19^3 did not preclude the court from
determining whether or not the plaintiff had an equitable interest
in the land and it declared that the defendant held half the plot
on trust for the plaintiff. However, the plaintiff's claim to
part of the second plot failed "... since the defendant was the
first registered proprietor of the land and it is therefore not
open to the court to order rectification of the register, having
65regard to section 143(1)...". Seeing that it is a well-established
principle of English law that, where a conveyance is taken in the
name of only one of several purchasers, he holds the legal title
on trust for the purchasers in proportion to their contributions
66to the purchase-price, it is difficult to see why the court felt 
unable to declare a trust in respect of the second plot of land.
6b. High Court of Kenya at Nyeri, Civil Case No.35 of 1968 (unreported).
65. Ibid., at p.^, per Bennett, J.
66. Wray v. Steele (1814), 2 V. & B. 388.
Clearly section 1^3(1) should have been no more of an obstacle than 
it was in respect of the inherited land.
The reluctance of the courts to declare trusts is perhaps more 
easy to justify where the situation does not give rise to a fiduciary 
relationship between the parties. To take a simple example, suppose 
that A, during B ’s absence during land adjudication, fraudulently gets 
himself registered as the proprietor of B's land. In most instances, 
as has been seen, A and B will be closely related and there has been 
a customary trust situation which has enabled the courts to declare 
that A holds the land on trust for B. If, however, A and B are com­
plete strangers and no customary trust arises, can the courts still 
declare a trust? Unfortunately, decisions on this point are few
and in any case it is not always obvious from the case-files whether
67
the parties are related or not. Nevertheless, cases of this kind
are bound to arise in the future and it is interesting to speculate
on the possible attitudes of the courts.
The views of both the Chief Land Registrar and the Attorney-
General favour the adoption of a very liberal approach to the question.
68In one Practice Note the Chief Land Registrar, after regretting 
that section 1^3(1) of the Registered Land Act often prevented the 
courts doing justice by rectifying the register on first registration, 
stated that M... a Court would be well within its powers and within 
the spirit of the Act to make an order in personam directing^for 
instance, A (the registered proprietor tainted with fraud) to transfer
67. Thus in Ikonya Kanjuki v. Ikonya Mwai, High Court of Kenya at
Nairobi, Civil Case No.2100 of 1973 (unreported), ex parte
judgment was given for the plaintiff who simply alleged that 
during land adjudication the defendant had fraudulently reg­
istered his (the plaintiff’s land) in his own name and who 
prayed for a declaration that the defendant held the land on 
trust for him.
68. 8 E.A.L.J. 68. In effect this is a direction to district land 
registrars to accept for registration court orders of the kind 
indicated.
69the parcel to B.M From a second Practice Note it appears that the 
Attorney-General agreed with the sentiments of the Chief Land 
Registrar and recommended that first the Court should declare that A 
holds the property as a trustee for B and order A to transfer that 
property to B and then, if A fails to obey the Order, the Court should, 
on B's application, authorise someone to execute the transfer on A's 
behalf.
These Practice Notes, though devoid of legal effect, are bound
to influence the attitudes of the courts and it is significant that
they are couched in the broadest terms, encouraging the courts to
declare trusts wherever first registration is obtained by fraud
regardless of the relationship of the parties involved. The views
which they express have been strongly criticised by the profession
and one High Court judge felt that they amounted to ’’driving a
70coach and horses through the trust concept”.
In the majority of the cases of the kind discussed above, where 
the parties are brothers or close relatives, it is not clear whether 
the trust declared is an implied trust or a constructive trust, that 
is, whether the court finds an intention to create a trust or whether 
it imposes a trust regardless of the owner's intention. In this 
context the distinction is not important, but it is necessary to know 
what conditions need to be fulfilled for the court to impose a trust 
in order to be able to predict its response to a case where the parties
69. 8 E.A.L.J. 69.
70. Interview with Platt, J., judge of the High Court of Kenya at 
Kisumu, October 5th, 1973*
are not related. Is the constructive trust a substantive institution
or a remedy? In England, the traditional view is that it is a sub-
71stantive institution. A number of attempts has been made to 
classify the various situations in which a constructive trust may 
be imposed and while it is generally agreed that the list of situa­
tions is by no means closed, one factor is common to them all, namely,
72
the existence of a fiduciary relationship. In America, on the other
hand, the constructive trust is regarded as a remedy to prevent the
unjust enrichment of one person at the expense of another. The
adoption of this view, which is favoured both by Waters and Lord 
73
Denning and underlies the recommendations of the Practice Notes, 
would certainly enable the courts to declare trusts where no fiduci­
ary relationship existed but where title to property had been 
acquired by fraud.
The adoption of the approach of the English law would mean that 
a fiduciary relationship would have to be proved and, whatever a 
fiduciary relationship may signify, it certainly would not include 
situations where the owner of property does not consent to its 
passing to the defendant. In such a case no constructive trust would 
arise, nor, of course, would the right to trace the property. The 
different approach of the English law can probably be explained in 
terms of the former division of legal and equitable jurisdiction 
and it could certainly be argued that the courts in Kenya ought to
71. The case for regarding the constructive trust as a remedy is 
argued in some detail in D.W.M. Waters, The Constructive Trust 
(London, 1964), Ch.1.
72. See e.g. Re Biss, [1903] 2 Ch.40.
73. See supra, p. 182.
accept the alternative view of the constructive trust as an equitable 
remedy. Nevertheless, since a large proportion of the judges and 
advocates in Kenya has been trained at the English bar, this is
74unlikely to occur in the near future.
This part of the present chapter has demonstrated the ways in 
which the courts are willing to use their equitable jurisdiction to 
do justice in cases where rectification of the register is impossible 
under section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963- The extent to 
which they will use the constructive trust in cases where no fiduciary 
relationship exists is still in doubt, since in the vast amount of 
litigation over first registration that has arisen in recent years 
the parties are almost invariably closely related. Since the use of 
this device has largely frustrated the purpose of the legislature in 
prohibiting the rectification of the register on first registration, 
it is unlikely that to allow rectification in such cases would lead 
to an appreciable increase in litigation.
A more important point needs to be made. When the courts hear 
the sort of cases discussed in this part and declare trusts or refuse 
to declare them as the case may be, they are in affect acting as 
adjudication authorities and making decisions that should ideally 
have been made at the time of land adjudication. Cases like
74. In the case of Marie Ayoub and others v. Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd., and another, [1965^ E.A. 619 (P.O.), Lord Guest, 
considering the question whether a trust existed, quoted with 
approval certain passages from nineteenth century authorities 
and concluded from them: MThe courts will not imply a trust
in order to give effect to the intention of the parties. The 
intention of the parties to create a trust must be clearly 
determined before a trust will be implied." Ibid., at p.623.
It is sad to see his words quoted unquestioningly and his narrow 
approach adopted by magistrates adjudicating on customary trust 
situations, as occurred, for instance, in Kiona Kihumba and 
others v. R. Kireri, Resident Magistrate’s Court at Muranga, 
Civil Case No.30 of 1971 (unreported).
75Ernest Kinyanjui Kimani v. Muim Gikanga and another show that the
adjudication of customary land rights is usually not best done by
the higher courts. If the adjudication authorities were doing their 
76
work properly, few disputes about first registration should ever 
reach the courts and the courts would not be obliged to play a role 
for which they are not wholly suited,
5. Rights of occupation.
(i) Introduction.
It has been demonstrated in the previous section that, where a 
person, A, has been registered as the proprietor of a piece of land, 
the courts may in appropriate cases declare that he holds all or part 
of the land on trust for B. This usually occurs where A and B are 
closely related and a customary trust situation exists; B's claim 
is based on his right to own the land according to customary law. 
Obviously some knowledge of the local customary law is required of 
the courts, but in practice certain types of situation tend to recur. 
Particularly common is the case where a father dies leaving sons 
and the land is later registered either in the name of his brother 
(if the sons are young) or in the name of the eldest son (if the other 
are young) or occasionally in the name of the widow. In such cases,
75* Supra.
76. Suggestions in this regard are made in Ch.II, supra.
the courts are willing to give effect to customary law (under which a 
man's land is inherited by his sons) by declaring that the registered 
owner holds all or part of the land on trust for the sons who have 
not been registered.
However it sometimes occurs that these unregistered sons do 
not claim ownership of the land in question, but merely assert a 
right to occupy it according to customary law. There is no denial 
of title here but simply the demand that the law protects their 
occupation. As this demand will only be made when their alleged 
rights of occupation are challenged by the registered owner, the 
few cases on this topic illustrate the bitter conflicts over land 
that continue to poison family relationships.
77One typical oase of this nature is Obiero v. Opiyo and others. 
The plaintiff was the widow of a certain Opiyo and the defendants 
were the sons of her co-wives. In 1968 the plaintiff was registered 
as the owner of a piece of land and in 1970 she brought an action 
against the defendants claiming damages for trespass and a perpetual 
injunction restraining them from continuing or repeating such acts of 
trespass. Unfortunately the judgment is short and one could wish 
for a more detailed account of the facts. Nevertheless the main 
issues are clear.
The defendants based their defence on two grounds. First they 
claimed that they were the owners of the land under customary law, 
that they had cultivated it from time immemorial and that the plain­
tiff had obtained registration by fraud. The court held, however,
77- [1972] E.A. 227.
that even if registration had been obtained by fraud (which it doubted), 
her title was indefeasible by virtue of section 1^3 (1) of the 
Registered Land Act 19&3? since this was a first registration.
The defendants claimed in the alternative that they had the 
right to occupy the land at customary law and that this right survived 
the registration of the plaintiff as absolute proprietor. The court 
rejected these contentions in the following words:
I am not satisfied on the evidence that the 
defendants ever had any rights to the land under 
customary law, but even if they had, I am of the 
opinion that these rights would have been extin­
guished when the plaintiff became the registered 
proprietor. S.28 of the Registered Land Act con­
fers upon the registered proprietor a title 
"free from all other interests and claims what­
soever” subject to the leases, charges and 
encumbrances shown in the register and such 
overriding interests as are not required to be 
noted in the register.... Rights arising under 
customary law are not among the interests listed 
in s.30 of the Act as overriding interests.78
In view of the finding that the defendants never had any rights to
the land under customary law, these statements are obiter, but they
merit consideration if only because they have been followed in later 
79cases. The last sentence of the passage quoted above, in particular, 
oversimplifies the actual legal position in that it fails to distinguish 
three categories of rights: (1) rights of occupation under customary law
78. Ibid., at p.228, per Bennett, J.
79- E.g. Esiroyo v. Esiroyo and another, [19733 E.A. 388, discussed 
infra, p.
recorded in the adjudication register, (2) rights of occupation under 
customary law not recorded in the adjudication register, and (3) rights 
of occupation recognised by the Registered Land Act 19&3- These must 
now be discussed in turn.
(ii) Rights of occupation under customary law recorded 
in the adjudication register.
During the process of land adjudication an adjudication record
is drawn up and it is expressly provided that where a person or a
group is entitled to a right of occupation "whether by virtue of
recognised customary law or otherwise", such a right should be
80entered on the record. It is further provided that a right of
occupation under customary law recorded in the adjudication register
shall be deemed to be a tenancy from year to year.^ A tenancy from
32year to year is a periodic tenancy; and a periodic tenancy is an
83 84overriding interest and, though incapable of registration, it
85may be protected by a caution. In short, a right of occupation 
under African customary law recorded in the adjudication record _is 
an overriding interest incapable of registration in the land register.
80. Land Adjudication Act 1968, ss.23(2)(e) and 23(3)(c). Virtually 
identical provisions are to be found in the Land Consolidation 
Act (Cap.283)» s.13(2)(b) and s.24(1).
81. Registered Land Act 19&3» s.11(3).
82. Ibid., s.3«
83. Ibid., s.30(d).
84. Ibid., s.46(2).
85. Ibid., s.131(1).
The land register is, of course, prepared from the adjudication
register and it is provided that everyone shown in the adjudication
register as being entitled to the benefit of any interest, lease,
right of occupation, charge or other encumbrance affecting the land
86shall be registered as being so entitled. However, it is not clear
what it means to say that a right of occupation recorded in the
adjudication register shall be registered, when, in fact, as has been
shown, no such right arising under customary law is registerable. It
might simply refer to rights which do not arise under customary law,
but it is hard to see what rights this category would include. On
the other hand, it might simply mean that such rights should be
protected on the register, for example, by the entering of a restric- 
87tion, but this interpretation stretches unreasonably the meaning 
of the words "shall be registered". The question is not one of merely 
academic importance. If a person claimed that his right of occupa­
tion had been recorded in the adjudication register, it would be hard 
for him to prove his claim unless the registrar had entered a restric­
tion at the time of first registration, and this occurs rarely, if 
ever. Otherwise he would be obliged to produce the adjudication 
register, which (if discoverable at all) would probably have been 
gathering dust for some years in a cellar in Nairobi. This also
86. Ibid., s.11(2).
87- Curiously enough, section 13(2)(c) of the Land Consolidation 
Act (Cap.283) provides for the recording of "any restriction 
on the power of the landowner or of any such personCi.e. a 
person entitled to a lesser interest in the land] to deal 
with the land or his interest, lease, right of occupation, 
charge or encumbrance", while the Land Adjudication Act 1968 
contains no such provision. The reason is not clear.
casts an unreasonable burden on the prospective purchaser.
As a right of occupation under customary law recorded in the
adjudication register is deemed to be a tenancy from year to year, it
88
is presumably terminable by either party at a year's notice. This
may be fair where the person in occupation is a customary tenant e.g.
a muhoi or a jadak; it is manifestly unfair where the person in
occupation is a close relative e.g. a widowed mother or an unmarried
sister of the registered owner. Thus even if the defendants in Obiero 
89v. Opiyo and others had succeeded in proving a right of occupation
under customary law and had established that the right was recorded
in the adjudication register, their step-mother (the plaintiff) could
still have given them a year's notice terminating their right. Whether
rights of occupation under customary law should be recorded in the
adjudication register and whether, if so, they should be registrable
90or overriding interests are questions to be discussed later; but 
really nothing is gained by deeming them to be tenancies from year to 
year and accordingly section 11(3) of the Registered Land Act 19&3 
should be repealed.
(iii) Rights of occupation under customary law not recorded 
in the adjudication register.
It seems, however, that the defendants in Obiero v. Opiyo and
88. Registered Land Act 19^3i s.1f6(l)(c); even the period of notice 
is not certain, since it is not wholly clear that the deemed 
periodic tenancy is aperiodic tenancy "created" by this subsection, 
not what the period of a periodic tenancy should be where no rent 
is payable.
89. Supra.
90. Infra, p.206 et seq.
91others were claiming rights of occupation under customary law not
recorded in the adjudication register. Such a claim must surely
fail. Since the recording officer is required to record such rights
92
where he is satisfied that they exist, it can reasonably be infer-
93red that unrecorded rights are extinguished. After all, it is the 
policy of land registration to replace customary rights by rights 
recognised by the Registered Land Act 1963 ard, subject to the pro­
visions of that Act, to vest in the registered proprietor the
9*f
absolute ownership of the land and to confer on him an indefeasible 
title. 95
(iv) Rights of occupation under the Registered Land Act 1963*
Opiyo and his brothers could have claimed that their rights of
occupation did not derive frora customary law but from the provisions of
the Registered Land Act 1963* Three possibilities arise. They could
claim to be licensees; they could claim to be in adverse possession;
they could rely on section 30(g) of the Act. In the first place, they
96could claim to have a licence to be on the land. A licence is defined 
Ma permission given by the proprietor of land... which allows the
91. Supra.
92. Land Adjudication Act 1968, s.23(2)(e).
93. This view seems to be supported by the decision in Esiroyo v.
Esiroyo and another, [19733 E.A. 388, discussed infra, p. 203.
9^. Registered Land Act 1963» s.27(a).
93- Ibid., s.28.
96. In the event, this claim would also have failed, as they had been
cultivating the land without the plaintiff's consent.
licensee to do some act in relation to the land.*, which would other-
97 98wise be a trespass...". It is not capable of registration, although
99a licensee may protect his interest by lodging a caution; if no
caution has been lodged, the licence is ineffective against the bona
100fide purchaser for valuable consideration. It is not therefore
an overriding interest.
Hie estoppel licence, in particular, may well provide a defence
to a trespass action in the sorts of situation under discussion.
Where, for example, the registered proprietor allows his widowed
mother or his sister or his son or even a stranger to cultivate a
certain piece of land and to build a house thereon, may he subsequently
101sue for possession of the land? In English Law, a long line of cases 
has established that where a licensor makes a representation which 
causes the licensee to act to his detriment, an estoppel arises in 
the licensee's favour and the licensor will be unable to eject him 
inconsistently with the representation. So the courts might, in the 
exercise of their equitable jurisdiction, prevent the registered pro­
prietor from ejecting persons whom he had allowed to cultivate and 
build on his land. The court has a variety of remedies at its dis­
posal; it may award monetary compensation or it may allow the licensee
97. Registered Land Act 1963) s.3.
•
00o^ Ibid., s.1lt(l).
99. Ibid., s.13l(l)(b).
100. Ibid., s.100(2).
1010 In the present context, good illustrations are provided by 
Inwards v. Baker, [19633 2 Q.B. 29) Plimmer v. Wellington 
Corporation (188*0, 9 App. Cas. 699 and Ives (E.R.) Investment, 
Ltd., v. High, [19673 2 Q.B. 379-
to stay on the land for as long as he likes and in one much criticised 
102case it ordered a conveyance of the land to the licensee. No 
discussion of the problems associated with estoppel licenses is 
necessary here. It suffices to note that, in the many cases that 
arise where the registered proprietor ejects his relatives or brings 
a trespass action against them, the estoppel licence would often be 
a strong weapon in the defence’s armoury.
If, on the other hand, the relatives are, like Opiyo and his 
brothers, in occupation without the registered proprietor's consent, 
they may nevertheless succeed in a claim based on adverse possession. 
In practice, this is unlikely to occur very frequently as holdings 
are small and farmers traditionally sensitive to any encroachments 
on their boundaries; however some discussion of this topic is appro­
priate at this stage.
The Limitation of Actions Act 1968, based largely on the English 
Limitation Act 1939) provides that, in the case of registered land,
the title of the registered proprietor is not extinguished after
103twelve years' adverse possession, ^ but is held by him on trust for
10*fthe adverse possessor. Moreover, rights acquired or in the process 
of being acquired under the Limitation of Actions Act 1968 are over-
102. Dillwyn v.Llewellyn (1862), k De G.F. & J. 317*
103* S.7 provides that actions to recover land are barred at the end 
of twelve years. A similar provision was previously found in 
the Limitation Act 19*1-8) Cap.11 (19^8), s.1f. The provisions 
regarding limitation to be found in the Land Registration 
(Special Areas) Ordinance 1939) Part VIII are generally sim­
pler and more appropriate than the Limitation of Actions Act 
1968. See the Lawrance Mission Report, para. 272.
10*f. Limitation of Actions Act 1968, s.37«
105riding interests. As intimated above, cases on the adverse
possession of land registered under the Registered Land Act 1963 
are very rare, but one case merits discussion, as it raises an 
interesting question as to the moment from which time begins to 
run. Unfortunately the facts are rather obscure and some aspects
of the judgment questionable, although the outcome was fair.
106In Hosea v. N.jiru and others , the plaintiff's father had 
"bought" the land in dispute from the first defendant's uncle in 
1920 and had lived there with the plaintiff without interruption 
ever since; the last instalment of the purchase price was paid in 
June 1957- However the redemption of clan lands ^as allowed at the 
time of land consolidation and the Unit Committee accordingly 
awarded it to the first defendant in June 1958 making it clear in 
a document of that date that no action in trespass should be 
brought against the plaintiff until the defendant had repaid the 
purchase price plus a sum by way of compensation for improvements.
The land was sold almost immediately to the second defendant and 
the land was registered in his name in November 1959; this was the 
first registration. The first and second defendants both knew 
about the arrangement and admitted that no money had ever been 
refunded. Conceding that first registration could not be rectified, 
the plaintiff applied under section 38(1) of the Limitation of Actions
105- Registered Land Act 19^3? s.30(f). 
106. [197W E.A. 526.
Act 1968 for an order registering him as the proprietor in place of 
the second defendant. His application was successful.
An important question that arose was from what time did the 
limitation period begin to run. The court answered this question as 
follows:
Although an agreement to redeem can be inferred 
from the "redemption” document, it is not an 
acknowledgement by the plaintiff of the title of 
the first defendant. The date on which a right 
of action accrued is not therefore affected by 
it.
The possession of the plaintiff is not referable 
to the decision of the Unit Committee because the 
land was never redeemed by the first defendant.
The plaintiff continued to possess a.s purchaser.
His possession became adverse on 22nd June 1957* 
the date on which the last payment of the purchase 
price was made. A right of action accrued to 
the first defendant on that date.107•
It is not clear why the learned judge held that the plaintiff’s 
possession became adverse in June 1957* Th.e case illustrates the 
difficulty of defining ownership in customary law. It would seem, 
however, that on payment of the last instalment (if not before) the 
plaintiff became the owner of the land and that there could be no 
question of his possession being adverse until the ownership became 
vested in someone else, as occurred in November 1959» 0n the other 
hand, the nature of a so-called "redeemable sale" might be such that 
the defendant or his family would continue to be regarded as owners
107* Ibid., p.530? per Simpson, J.
201.
and the plaintiff would have a mere licence terminable on refund of 
the amounts paid; but in this case the date of June 1957 is equally 
irrelevant.
However, the interesting point is whether there can be adverse 
possession before land is registered, i.e. while it is still subject 
to customary law, and if so, whether registration operates to inter­
rupt the limitation period. The defendant contended that the notion 
of a prescriptive title was unknown to customary law and that there­
fore there could be no adverse possession until after registration.
The court felt unable to discuss this contention as no evidence of 
customary law had been adduced, yet the point at issue is important.
In English law, anyone who is registered as first proprietor holds
subject to rights already acquired by adverse possession whether or
108not he is aware of them, and this seems to be the view taken by the
court in the case under discussion. The crucial difference, however,
is that in England the Limitation Acts apply both to registered and
unregistered land; the mere fact of registration should not alter the
substantive law applicable. In Kenya this is not the case. As has
109been argued in chapter II, prescriptive title is virtually unknown 
in African customary law and where courts and adjudication committees 
award unregistered land, as they often do, to someone who has been 
in possession of it for a long time, it is always on general grounds
108. Chowood Ltd. v. Lyall (2), [1950] 1 Ch. 426, affirmed [195®] 
2 Ch. 156.
109. Supra, pp.90 et seq.
of fairness; no reference is ever made to any Limitation Act, no
particular length of period is ever laid down, nor is it ever proved
that the possession has been adverse in the sense known to English 
110law. If this argument is valid, and it certainly accords with
the general policy of land adjudication, then the limitation period
will only start to run at the moment of registration. In Hosea v.
111N.jiru and others, the period would have run from November 1959
and this might well have affected the outcome of the case. In Obiero
112v. Opiyo and others, the defendants had been in occupation of the 
land "since time immemorial", but the plaintiff's claim could not be 
barred because she had only been registered as proprietor in 1968 
i.e. two years before bringing proceedings.
There is a third way in which the rights of a person in actual 
occupation of land may be protected by the Registered Land Act 1963; 
they may constitute an overriding interest within section 3®(g) of 
the Act. By virtue of this section, overriding interests include 
"the rights of a person in possession or actual occupation of land 
to which he is entitled in right only of such possession or occupa­
tion, save where inquiry is made of such person and the rights are 
not disclosed." This is a rather obscurely worded provision, though
it seems it was intended to have the same effect as the parallel
113provision in the English Land Registration Act 1925? itself a
110. See e.g. Leigh v. Jack (1879)? 5 Ex.D. 264; Wallis's Cayton 
Bay Holiday Camp Ltd., v. Shell Mex and B.P. Ltd, [1975]Q»B.94.
111. Supra.
112. Supra.
113- S.70(1)(g). One of the people responsible for the drafting of 
the Registered Land Act 1963 admits that this provision is not 
easy to understand and explains that this is why the Malawi 
Registered Land Act 1967? s.27(f)? reverts to the English 
wording. Simpson (1976),op. cit., p.500.
provision which, is not free from difficulty. The question which arises
here is whether section 30(g) includes the customary rights of a person
in actual occupation of the land. The Chief Land Registrar clearly
thinks that it does; he holds that "subsection (g) means someone living
on the land and having a right, usually based on customary law, to live 
114there". As examples, he cites the customary rights of widows and
ahoi.
However, although the interpretation of this subsection has yet
to come before the courts, there are powerful arguments against this
view. The Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance 1959? s.40(f),
had expressly included a "right of occupation under native law and
custom" as an overriding interest. It was, however, considered
115"inadvisable to repeat" this subsection in the Registered Land
Act 1963? its place being taken by section 11(3) of that Act according
to which a right of occupation under African customary law recorded
in the adjudication register is deemed to be a tenancy from year to
116year i.e. an overriding interest within section 30(d). The
inference to be drawn is clear. Customary rights of occupation not
recorded in the adjudication register are extinguished; they do not 
survive as overriding interests.
If section 30(g) does not include the customary rights of those 
in actual occupation (which have either been extinguished or are
114. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands and Settlement, The 
Registered Land Act 1963. A Handbook fbr the guidance of Land 
Registrars (June 1969) ? p.1^1
115. Simpson, op. cit., p.483.
116. See supra p. 193.
protected by section 30(d), the question arises as to what sort of
rights it is designed to protect. According to one writer it is
117simply concerned with the rights of the occupation tenant. This 
would presumably include a tenant's option to renew the lease or 
to purchase the reversion, though arguably this category of over­
riding interests ought to be restricted to contractual rights of 
118occupation. It is, however, open to the Kenyan courts to inter­
pret the sub-section to include the equitable rights of the person 
in actual occupation. This could have very serious consequences.
If a "customary trust" (of the sort discussed at length in part k 
of this chapter)- existed, the rights of the beneficiary in actual
occupation of the land would be enforceable against a purchaser
119of the registered title. This would complicate conveyancing 
and would seriously undermine the worth of a registered title as 
a security for loans. As yet, however, the courts in Kenya have 
not been called upon to interpret section 30(g)*
(v) Conclusions: Methods of protecting rights of occupation 
under customary law.
It has been the argument of this section of the chapter that 
it is important to distinguish rights of occupation under customary
117. Simpson, o£. cit., p.^98. It is arguable, however, that the 
enforceability of such rights depends entirely on whether the 
lease itself is enforceable against a purchaser, either because 
it is an overriding interest within section 30(d) or because 
(being registrable) it is registered.
118. This has been proposed by the Law Commission, Working Paper No. 
37 (1971), p.60.
119. The English Court of Appeal adopted this interpretation of the
jband Registration Act 1923? s.7§(l)(g), in Hodgson v. Marks,
L19713 Ch.892.  “- -----
law recorded in the adjudication register, rights of occupation under
customary not so recorded and rights of occupation under the Registered
Land Act 1963* It was a pity that the court in Obiero v. Opiyo and 
120others did not make these distinctions, but as the defendants 
claimed rights of occupation under customary law and the court found 
these claims baseless, any discussion of the law was unnecessary. This 
case was shortly followed, however, by a similar case where the court 
did admit the defendants' claim to customary rights of occupation,
but again the discussion was disappointingly jejune.
121Esiroyo v. Esiroyo and another concerns a long-standing 
quarrel between a man (the plaintiff) and two of his sons (the 
defendants). The plaintiff, a person of a moody and truculent dis­
position, lived with his family on a twenty-two acre plot of land, 
some ten acres of which the two defendants had been cultivating for 
some years before the present proceedings were brought. After 
family rows, the plaintiff had on a number of occasions entered on 
the land occupied by the defendants and caused wilful damage to their 
crops and personal possessions; in consequence, the sons had reported 
his behaviour to the police and he had been tried and sent to prison. 
The plaintiff now brought an action for trespass against the defend­
ants and a perpetual injunction to restrain them from continuing or 
repeating their acts of trespass. The court gave judgment for the 
plaintiff on the grounds that, although the defendants had rights of
120. Supra.
121. [1973] E.A. 388.
occupation under customary law, he was the registered owner of the 
whole plot and that such rights of occupation were not overriding
122interests; a passage from the judgment in Obiero v. Opiyo and another 
was quoted and the reasoning in that case approved and followed.
Again it was a pity that the court did not see fit to analyse 
rights of occupation a little more precisely, especially in view of 
the harsh consequences of the decision; the defendants and their 
families were rendered homeless, without means of support and owing 
four thousand shillings in damages plus costs. Clearly if the 
defendants had appreciated the true meaning of land registration and 
had understood that it was not merely a device for preventing 
boundary disputes, they would no doubt have taken steps to protect 
their interests at the time of land adjudication. Granted the 
injustice of the result in this case, two questions arise: can the 
court in such circumstances do anything for the defendants when 
faced by the argument that the plaintiff is the registered proprietor 
and that his title is indefeasible and free of all encumbrances? 
Secondly, how should the adjudication machinery be altered so that 
the interests of people like the Esiroyo sons are adequately protected?
Various answers to the first question have been canvassed in the 
course of this chapter. If the defendants are on the land as con­
tractual licensees, they may be able to restrain revocation of the 
licence in breach of contract. If they cultivate and build on the 
land in reliance on the licensor’s representation that they will be
122. Supra.
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allowed to stay indefinitely, an estoppel may arise which will prevent
the licensor acting inconsistently with his representation. By far
the most common defence argument, however, is that the plaintiff (the
registered proprietor) holds the land or part of it on trust for the
defendants. Such claims, based on customary law, have tended to 
123succeed and there is little doubt that the Esiroyo sons would 
have been successful, if they had held that they were entitled 
beneficially to the ten acres which they occupied. If this is the 
case, the ironic conclusion is reached that they would have done 
better to claim beneficial ownership under a customary trust rather 
than a mere right of occupation at customary law.
The second question, as to how customary rights of occupation 
should be protected at the time of land adjudication, is difficult 
to answer. Part of the difficulty, already discussed in Chapter 
two, stems from the virtual impossibility of finding in the Registered 
Land Act 19&3 exact equivalents for customary land rights; thus the 
rights of ahoi, widows, unmarried daughters and unmarried sons have 
little in common although they can be loosely subsumed under the 
name "rights of occupation", but they have nothing in common with 
the tenancies from year to year (or any other tenancies) which they 
are deemed to be, if recorded in the adjudication register. Most 
of the difficulty, however, lies in the conflicting objectives of 
land registration. The government favours the registration of 
individual title on the English model, but at the -same time expects
123- See supra, pp.173 et seq.
proprietors to honour their customary obligations. It is necessary 
to protect all interests in a given piece of land, but at the same 
time the register should not be cluttered up with entries nor should 
the task of the prospective purchaser be made unduly onerous.
Supposing that customary rights of occupation should survive 
registration and should be protected, three possibilities arise.
In the first place, they could be made registrable as encumbrances; 
this would clutter up the register unjustifiably and be generally 
impracticable. Secondly, they could simply be protected by a restri­
ction entered on the register by the Registrar, not unlike licences; 
this would recognise their rights and would operate to prevent 
dealings inconsistent with them. If no restriction was entered, 
the purchaser would know that he took fre^ of any such rights. In 
the same way, the interests of the beneficiaries under a customary 
trust could be protected. Thirdly, customary rights of occupation 
could be made overriding interests i.e. a special category of their 
own, not (as today) as periodic tenancies. No entry on the register 
would be necessary. It is thus the simplest of the three methods, 
although it suffers from one drawback: it requires the purchaser 
to make a thorough inspection of the land. Of course, in view of 
the possibility of the existence of overriding interests at present 
listed in section 30 of the Registered Land Act 19^3* the prudent 
purchaser will always inspect the land; however a glance through 
the list suffices to show the extreme unlikelihood of any such 
interests existing, while plots of registered land not subject to 
customary rights of occupation would be few and far between. Thus 
the addition of such rights to the list of overriding interests 
would enormously increase the purchaser's task.
All three methods, however, are subject to one major objection, 
springing from the uncertainty of customary law. Even supposing that 
a prospective purchaser became aware of the possible existence of a 
customary right of occupation, either by consulting the register or 
by inspecting the land, it is difficult to see how he could learn the 
exact nature and extent of such a right. It would be clearly imposs­
ible for the adjudication authorities to record the details of each 
customary right of occupation, interesting as such records would be 
from an anthropological viewpoint, but at the same time no person 
is likely to buy land subject to an overriding interest of whose 
nature and extent he is uncertain. In this way, anyone entitled to 
such a right would be in a position effectively to prevent the land 
being sold. The land would become inalienable.
In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that customary rights
of occupation should not survive land registration. After all, it
is the purpose of the programme that customary land law with all
its uncertainties and complexities should be extinguished and be
replaced by a system whose concepts are familiar to the courts and
the legal profession and which confers on the proprietor a negotiable
title free from traditional constraints. This would, moreover,
facilitate the task of the purchaser and although it might have
harsh consequences in occasional cases like Esiroyo v. Esiroyo and 
12^another, the courts have shown that by a flexible use of the 
trust concept such consequences may often be avoided. If this
12*t. Supra.
recommendation were accepted, appropriate amendments would have to 
be made to section 23(2)(e) of the Land Adjudication Act 1968 and 
section 11(2) of the Registered Land Act 1963?and section 11(3) of 
the latter Act would have to be repealed. The right of occupation 
would cease to exist as a distinct legal entity.
*f. Conclusions.
One of the purposes of the land adjudication programme was to put 
an end to the land disputes that had plagued certain areas of Kenya 
for some time and it is perhaps the greatest achievement of the pro­
gramme that disputes of that kind, i.e. boundary disputes, have vir­
tually disappeared. However, a new type of dispute has emerged,
i.e. disputes about first registration. Whereas the previous dis­
putes concerned boundaries between clans and families, disputes 
about first registration arise between close relatives, brother 
brings an action against brother and father against son. They are 
becoming increasingly numerous, particularly in the Central Province, 
and it will be interesting to see whether this occurs in other areas 
of Kenya as the adjudication programme gathers momentum. Given the 
circumstances in which land consolidation was carried out in the 
Central Province at a period of high absenteeism and political 
bitterness, it would be surprising if the litigation that ensued 
were closely parallelled in any other area. On the other hand, 
inasmuchas the litigation springs from the persistence of customary 
notions of land tenure, it is more likely to occur in those areas
where modernising influences have as yet hardly made their mark and 
where the individualisation of land tenure, discussed in Chapter II, 
has hardly started.
Those aggrieved by first registration are prevented by section 
1^3(1) o f the Registered Land Act 19&3 fr°m obtaining rectification 
of the register and the main body of this chapter has been concerned 
with the alternative courses of action open to them. It has been 
shown that it would seldom be legally advisable to take proceedings 
in tort against the Government or its officers, let alone the political 
unwisdom of such a step. On the other hand, the courts have been 
willing to impose constructive trusts in situations where something 
analogous to a trust existed in customary law. In such cases, the 
parties are invariably related and it has yet to be seen whether the 
courts will extend the application of the constructive trust to 
cases where the parties are not closely related, but where one party 
has unjustly enriched himself at the expense of the other. Finally, 
claims to rights of occupation under customary law and under the 
Registered Land Act 19&3 have been examined and the circumstances 
outlined in which such claims would succeed.
Two inescapable conclusions emerge. In-ftie first place, if 
land adjudication had been carried out more competently and, in 
particular, with more regard for the opportunities afforded by the 
register, e.g. the entering of restrictions and the registration of 
lesser interests, then a lot of this litigation would never have 
arisen. In many cases the courts are effectively readjudicating land 
rights and this is a role for which their ignorance of customary law 
and of local history ill equips them. Secondly, it is high time that
rectification of the register in respect of first registration was made 
possible. The prohibition has not prevented litigation, litigation on 
a large scale illustrating bitter family tensions, but it has sometimes 
prevented the courts from doing justice and sometimes obliged them, in 
the interests of justice, to stretch legal categories in a questionable 
way. The courts would not be placed in this dilemma, if they were 
empowered to order rectification of the register on first registration 
on the proof of fraud or mistake.
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C H A P T E R  V 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REGISTER
1. Introduction
In Chapters II and III the main problems encountered during land 
adjudication were described and analysed and it was found that they 
sprang in part from the inherent difficulty of translating customary 
interests in land into the framework of the new system based on 
registration of title and in part from deficiencies in the adjudica­
tion process. In the event, some people benefitted from land 
adjudication in that they acquired interests in land to which they 
were not previously entitled, while others, on the other hand, lost 
interests which they had enjoyed under customary law. Persons in 
the latter category have, since registration, made a variety of 
attempts , successful and unsuccessful, to recover the interests 
in land of which they had seemingly been deprived and those attempts 
were discussed in chapter IV.
It would be rather cavalier to write off these problems as the 
growing pains of the new system, but it could nevertheless be argued 
that with time disputes about first registration will die out and 
people will resign themselves to the new state of affairs. The 
problems arising from land adjudication are only temporary, the 
argument goes, whereas the benefits of registration are permanent 
and indisputable. The former uncertainties of customary law have 
disappeared, to be replaced by a system where title is secure,
where transactions are secure and where rights in land are easy to 
define. These are three direct consequences of any system of regis­
tration of title and important consequences they are. The title of 
the registered proprietor is, generally speaking, unimpeachable and 
no person dealing with him is concerned to go behind the register; 
customary procedures for transferring interests in land have been 
superseded and customary restraints on alienation have no legal 
effect. Whereas the nature of rights conferred by customary deal­
ings was often obscure e.g. the rights of widows, ahoi or parties to 
a "redeemable sale", rights arising under the Registered Land Act 
1963 are relatively easy to define both by reference to the Act it­
self and to the large body of case law to be derived from other 
jurisdictions where registration of title pertains.
These advantages are obvious but they depend f>r their realisation 
on one crucial factor: the registration system must be effective i.e. 
its nature must be understood and its virtues appreciated by at 
least a majority of the registered proprietors. If registered pro­
prietors see registration as simply a means of preventing further 
boundary disputes and continue to deal with their land according to
customary law and not according to the Registered Land Act 1963? the
1
system is not being effective and to state that such dealings are 
without legal validity, though true, is poor consolation.
This chapter, then, is about the effectiveness of registration 
of title in two areas of Kenya and casts serious doubts on the 
wisdom of imposing on alien cultures systems of law based on Western
1. Throughout this chapter the word "dealings" will be used to
include both dispositions and transmissions, in accordance with 
the definition in the Registered Land Act 1963* s.3*
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models. The next section will be concerned with dispositions of 
registered land and the following section with successions. In both 
sections the discussion will concentrate on two related issues, the 
degree to which dealings are registered and the degree to which 
customary law still governs land matters. The section on succession 
will be much the longer owing to the large amount of accessible 
material on that topic.
2. Dispositions of registered Land.
The Registered Land Act 19&3 provides that no land, lease or 
charge shall be capable of being disposed of except in accordance 
with the Act and that every attempt to dispose of them in any other 
way "shall be ineffectual to create, extinguish, transfer, vary or
2
effect any estate, right or interest in the land, lease or charge".
3
Moreover it is provided that -transfers of land and the creation of
leases for specified periods exceeding two years require to be 
Zf
registered. Similar provisions will be found in any jurisdiction 
where a system of registration of title exists, but it can be 
assumed that the vast majority of the people living within any such 
jurisdiction is ignorant of their existence and has little idea of 
the difference between registered and unregistered land. Neverthe­
less the system works because people tend to rely on their legal
2. S.38(1).
3. Ibid., s.85(1) and (2).
A. Ibid., s.A-7*
advisers in conveyancing matters and because the legal profession co­
operates with the system. In Kenya, on the other hand, the legal 
profession is small.and concentrated in the big cities and there is 
no tradition of employing experts to handle land dispositions on 
one's behalf. Therefore it would not be surprising to find that, 
even though the system of registered conveyancing under the Registered 
Land Act 19&3 i-s almost as simple as it could be, dispositions take 
place off the register. While it is virtually impossible in the nature 
of things to obtain exact details of the number and nature of such 
dispositions, the research of the present writer shows that this is 
indeed the case.
To start with it will be convenient to look at sales and leases 
of land. Sometimes the whole of a piece of land is sold or leased; 
sometimes only a part of the land is sold or leased and the rest is 
retained the proprietor. In the two East Kadianga adjudication 
sections studied, Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro, nine sales of 
whole plots and twenty sales of parts had been registered since the 
registers were opened on January 21st 196^ and April 1st 1966 res­
pectively. No leases were registered. During the same period there 
were at least nine unregistered transfers of whole plots and at least 
four unregistered transfers of parts. No unregistered leases were
5. In 1967, J-T. Fleming, a government officer, investigated the 
working of the land registration system in a number of sub­
locations and, in particular, examined the problem under dis­
cussion. His report, An Analysis and Review of the Kenya 
Land Reform Programme, 196&"*1968, though extremely interesting, 
was never published and is difficult to come by. His con­
clusions on the effectiveness of the land registers are in 
substantial agreement with those of the present writer.
6. At the time of the research, i.e. August 1973.
discovered. In short, there were twenty-nine registered sales of land 
and at least thirteen unregistered sales; it is of course possible,
though unlikely, that there were many more than thirteen.
In Gathinja, since the register was opened on October 15th 1963
there had been eleven registered sales of whole plots and at least
two unregistered sales of whole plots; no leases or sales of parts
were registered. Nevertheless land is occasionally rented out on
tenancies that resemble periodic tenancies and as such are not cap-
7
able of registration. Thus in one case an area of low-lying land 
was let out at a rent of twenty shillings per six: month season to 
someone who wanted to grow arrowroot. Much more interesting is the 
survival of the customary institution commonly known as the 
"redeemable sale." Such"sales" are never registered; in fact their 
very existence is often shrouded in secrecy. The present writer 
came across five instances and it is likely that others exist. They 
tend to arise where the proprietor of land needs a lump sum of 
money, be it for school fees or a bus fare. He will therefore 
allow someone to cultivate a piece of his land in return for this 
sum (usually of the order of a few hundred shillings i.e. not much 
in an area where an acre of good land may fetch several thousand 
shillings) on the understanding that the land will be "redeemed"
g
on repayment of the sum. It is difficult to fit this kind of 
institution into the framework of the Registered Land Act 1963 and
7. Registered Land Act 1963j s.^6(2).
8. In one instance, two ahoi rendered landless by land adjudication
were cultivating half an acre each on such terms.
questions as to whether the provider of the lump sum is a purchaser, 
a tenant, a chargee or a licensee and as to whether his interest is 
registrable are difficult to answer. It is probable that in the 
absence of registration the courts would hold him to be a licensee, 
although customary law, which in practice governs these transactions, 
would afford him greater protection.
While sales and leases of land remain comparatively infrequent, 
voluntary transfers of land are extremely common. Registered gifts 
of land are few. In East Kadianga, two gifts were registered; in one 
instance a large landowner decided to give part of his land to a son; 
in the other instance, it was really a sale of land, but called a 
gift by the parties in the hope of avoiding registration fees. In 
Gathinja, two gifts were also registered; in one instance again a 
father gave a plot to one of his sons; the other instance throws 
an interesting light on what occurred at the time of land adjudica­
tion. After land had been consolidated, a certain man emerged as 
the owner of several plots, but as the practice was that no person 
should be registered as the proprietor of more than two plots, he 
was obliged to register one of his plots in the name of a friend. 
After registration, the friend gave the plot back. Where a person 
had more than 2 plots, he would generally register the extra plots 
in the names of his wives or sons; if one were unaware of this 
practice, a glance at the register might give one the impression 
that land consolidation had been carried out more thoroughly than 
was in fact the case.
The question of unregistered gifts of land is a difficult one. 
Under both Luo and Kikuyu customary law, when a man married or
reached a certain age, his father or the head of the household would
allocate him a piece of land which he could cultivate and where he
could build his house. While in practice this "gift" of land was
seldom revoked, nevertheless the son remained subject to his father's
authority and his powers of dealing with the land were restricted
accordingly. As land continues to be the main source of wealth, it
is hardly surprising that this custom has survived and that plots
are subdivided on the ground between the registered proprietor and
his married sons. The incidence of these informal subdivisions and
the degree to which they have adverse economic consequences are
9
questions to be discussed later. Suffice to say here that they are 
extremely common.
While it is desirable that such subdivisions be registered, 
they do not constitute such a threat to the register as do unreg­
istered siles, leases and successions. Although the sons in such 
cases have no legal title to the land they have been given and may 
indeed be evicted, the register still reflects what is occurring on 
the ground and can still be relied upon by, say, a prospective 
purchaser. It is where a registered proprietor sells land off the 
register or where a succession to his land remains unregistered, 
that the main problems will occur.
Even though dispositions of land continue to reflect the per­
sistence of customary law, the control over land exercised by trad­
itional authorities has almost died out in both the areas studied.
9. Infra., pp. et_ seq.
Certainly a man may consult with his brother before distributing or 
selling his land, but the general supervisory powers of the clan 
elders have not survived. Registered proprietors (no doubt over­
emphasising the efficacy of the land certificates which they treasure 
so much) are fully conscious of their power to deal with their land 
as they like and even if customary considerations govern the way in 
which they deal with it, they do not recognise the right of anyone 
to control the manner in which they exercise this power. In only 
one instance, in East Kadianga, did the present writer find a per­
son who had consulted the jokakwaro elders about the sale of his 
land. The role of the elders, even in land matters, had long been 
on the decline before land adjudication and it is unlikely that the 
registration of individual titles to land did much to hasten this 
decline.
Finally, it is necessary to consider why proprietors are not
registering their dispositions. In one case, the seller let the
purchaser into possession of his land, grabbed the purchase-money,
rushed off to the nearest town to lead a life of debauchery and
has not been heard of since. As the transfer forms have to be
signed by the vendor, the sale cannot be registered unless, of
course, the purchaser obtains a court order. At a more general
level, unregistered dispositions do occur even where the parties
have some awareness of the necessity of registration. Secret
"sales" may occur where the land control board has refused or is
10likely to refuse its consent. A father may refuse to register
10. For the working of the land control boards, see infra, Ch.VII.
gifts of land to his sons on the grounds that it is not theirs until 
after his death. A seller may be reluctant to register the sale until 
all the instalments of the purchase price have been paid.
Such cases are not common, however. The main reason (and further 
support for this view will be forthcoming in the next section of this 
chapter) why people do not register their dispositions is that they 
do not appreciate the necessity of doing so. They may feel that they 
ought to register their dispositions but they do not understand the 
nature of the registration system nor the legal consequences of non­
registration. The land registry may be far away, money will have to 
be found for transport expenses and registration fees, problems may 
arise with registry staff who may be rude or corrupt. There is little 
inducement to register, particularly where the parties are friends or 
relatives. Meanwhile the land register becomes increasingly less 
reliable.
2. Successions to registered land.
(i) Unregistered successions:
It must be admitted that the total number of sales and leases 
in the two field-areas is extremely small and the fact that a pro­
portion of them is not registered might be regarded as a matter of 
no great consequence. It is when successions to registered land are 
examined that the true gravity of the situation becomes apparent.
The existence of the problem was fully recognised a long time ago
and in 19&3 a government officer is found writing that "after about
four years of full registration in Kiambu district, over 3»000 titles
11are still registered in the names of deceased persons". If this 
was the case in Kiambu district, a district which on most criteria 
would rank as the most advanced district to be found in the Special 
Areas, the situation elsewhere must give considerable cause for con­
cern. The present research confirms that this is so. In Kabete-
Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro, sections which contained at the time of
12
registration a total of 621 parcels of land, only one succession 
had been registered since the registers had been opened some 9^ years 
and 7'2 years (respectively) previous to the research. In Gathinja, 
which contained 3^7 parcels of land at the time of registration, only 
nine successions had been registered since the register had been 
opened some twelve years previously.
While it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of unregis­
tered successions in any district, both my interpreters were well 
acquainted with the field-areas and were able to inform me which 
registered proprietors had died. The figures that follow, then, 
are fairly accurate, though they may slightly under-estimate the 
number of unregistered successions; even as it is, the picture is 
clear. In East Kadianga, there were at least twenty-eight unreg­
istered successions, i.e. not more than 3**$ of successions were
11. F.D. Homan, "Succession to Registered Land in the African areas 
of Kenya", J.L.A.O., Vol II, No.1, (January 1963) P«^9 Fliedner 
reported in similar terms that "... nur ein Verschwindend Kleiner 
Prozentsatz der Erbf&lle tlberhaupt in Land register beriicksichtigt 
ist". H. Fliedner (19&5)? op. cit., p.69.
12. This succession, moreover, was only registered because the heir 
wanted subsequently to sell a part of the land.
registered. In Gathinja, there were at least thirty-three unregistered 
successions, i.e. not more than 21.4$ of successions were registered.
As in the case of dispositions, the proportion of successions registered 
in Gathinja is rather larger than that in East Kadianga. This is hardly 
surprising; in terms of wealth, education and agricultural development 
Gathinja is much more advanced than East Kadianga. What is surprising 
is that the number of unregistered successions is so high in what is 
one of the more favoured sub-locations of Kenya. A clue to the reason 
for this state of affairs may lie in the complicated procedure laid 
down in the Registered Land Act 19&3 f°r the ascertainment of heirs 
and the registration of successions.
(ii) Succession under the Registered Land Act 1963s
The two main features of the provisions laid down in this Act
13governing intestate succession are, first, the complexity of the 
procedure involved and, second, the retention of customary law. It 
is the former which it is necessary to examine at this stage. Upon 
being informed of the death of a proprietor intestate, the Registrar
14must satisfy himself both of the death of the proprietor and that 
the proprietor was subject to African customary law; a certificate 
signed by an administrative officer is conclusive evidence on the
15latter point. The Registrar then applies to the District
13. Testate succession is discussed infra., pp. 250 seq.
14. Registered Land Act 1963i s.120(2). False reports of deaths are 
sometimes made with a view to getting hold of the "deceased’s” 
land.
15. Ibid., s.120(1)
Magistrate's court for the determination of the heirs. The court
sends the certificate of succession containing details of the heirs
and their shares to the Registrar who makes the appropriate entries 
16in the Register.
The first problem is that very few deaths are ever reported to
tie land Registrar. The registration of deaths is compulsory today
throughout all Kenya. It was made compulsory in Kisumu district
17in 1968 and in Muranga district in 1969. Deputy-Registrars of
18births and cfeaths are appointed for the rural areas; they may be 
chiefs or primary-school headmasters or registrars of local hospitals, 
though often private individuals of some standing in the locality may 
be appointed. When the Depuly-Registrar is not a government employee, 
he is entitled to remuneration at the rate of fifty cents per death 
reported. Cases have arisen where Depuiy-Registrars have reported 
deaths which have not occurred, thus increasing their income. Gen­
erally speaking, however, the number of deaths reported represents 
only a small fraction of the number of deaths that has occurred.
The present writer encountered a number of instances where, even though 
the kinsmen of a person who had recently died had applied to the chief 
for a burial permit, the death had never been reported to the Registrar
16. Ibid., s.120(3)* By virtue of the Magistrate's Courts Act 19&7j 
Cap.10(1968), s.10(1)(a), the District Magistrate’s court has 
jurisdiction in succession matters.
17. L.N. 7 of 1968 and L.N. 30 of 1969. The Minister declared these 
districts registration areas by virtue of powers conferred on him 
by the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1928, Cap.149 (19^7)? 
s.15(2).
18. The information in this paragraph is largely derived from interviews 
with the Registrars of Births and Deaths at Kisumu and Muranga.
of Births and Deaths. More important from the point of view of the 
present study is the fact that there seems to be no liaison between 
the Registrars of Births and Deaths or administrative officers on the 
one hand and the land registrars on the other. The land registrar, 
therefore, will only learn of the death of a registered proprietor, 
where one of the deceased's Kinsmen sees fit to inform him. This is 
unlikely to occur where there is no dispute about the succession, 
but the complicated and lengthy procedure involved no doubt deters 
people from registering successions and encourages them to settle 
their disputes in other nays.
Parties instituting succession proceedings must first produce 
a death certificate; such a certificate costs ten shillings and is 
obtainable only in Nairobi. A long and expensive bus-trip may be 
necessary. Even when this obstacle has been overcome, the parties 
may well have to wait a few years before the proceedings are finalised, 
even if they are unanimous about the way in which the land should be 
distributed. The land registrar may delay applying to the court for 
a certificate of succession. On receiving the application, the court 
will generally then attempt to obtain a list of the deceased's 
relatives from the appropriate administrative officer and will then 
summon them all to appear on a certain day. The court's decision, 
which in the vast majority of cases merely records the unanimous 
decision of the deceased's family, is then forwarded to the land 
registrar. He may then make appropriate entries on the register, 
but if subdivision of the land is required, it will first be neces­
sary to obtain the consent of the land control board. The whole pro­
cess can take a long time and at every stage of the process fees are
payable. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that few successions are 
registered.
It is outside the scope of this study to make detailed recommenda­
tions as to how the present procedure should be altered. Nevertheless 
a few suggestions may be hazarded. Clearly the death-reporting system 
needs to be decentralised. Chiefs and sub-chiefs should be under a 
duty to report deaths to the local Registrar and if this would add 
excessively to their responsibilities, then a deputy-registrar attached 
to the chief's office should be appointed on a full-time basis. His
19duties would be to register births, deaths and, possibly, marriages.
He would issue death certificates and maintain an active liaison with
the district land registrar. He should be well-acquainted with the
area where he is employed.
The procedure for the determination of heirs could be shortened
by excluding the courts. Disputes about successions to registered
land are extremely rare; for example, of the 88 succession cases
20decided in 1973 by the Kiharu District Magistrate's court, not a 
single one was contested; the family had agreed on how the deceased's 
land was to be distributed and the magistrate merely recorded its 
decision. Even if disputes do occur, it is doubtful whether the court 
is the best forum for their settlement. If, then, the courts are 
excluded from the process, the land registrar would simply ask the
19. If the Law of Matrimony Bill is ever enacted, he could act as 
assistant district registrar.
20. The jurisdiction of this court extends over five locations in 
Muranga district, including Gathinja sub-location.
local chief (or, possibly, the deputy-registrar of births and deaths) 
to summon the deceased's family and anyone else interested in his land 
and to get them to agree on the way in which this land should be dis­
tributed. The chief would then send a copy of the decision to the land 
registrar who would make appropriate entries in the register. This 
procedure would be quick, simple and cheap. It is modelled on the 
practice of the Public Trustee when dealing with estates of Africans.
The Public Trustee may administer estates nor exceeding 10,000
21
shillings in value without reference to any court and he may, where
the value of the estate does not exceed 4,000 shillings, issue a
certificate of summary administration on the application of any person
22to whom Probate or Letters of Administration may be granted. Where
the value of the estate exceeds 10,0f0 shillings, he must apply to the
23High Court for letters of administration. When the administration 
of a certain estate has been undertaken, the following procedure is 
adopted. The office of the Public Trustee requests the local adminis­
trative officer to submit a list of the deceased's property and its 
value together with a list of the deceased's relatives and dependants 
and an account of the various proportions in which they have agreed 
that the property be divided. In the present writer's experience, 
this system works very well and disputes are extremely rare. Seeing 
that succession both to land and to other kinds of property is governed 
by the same law i.e. customary law, the question naturally arises why 
the administration of the land of a deceased person and the determina-
21. Public Trustee Act 1923? Cap.168(1968), 8.4(4)(i), as amended 
by the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1969? No.10 
of 1969? s.2 and sched.
22. Ibid., s.4(4)(ii).
23. Ibid., s.4(3).
tion of the heirs to his land should be divorced from the administration 
of his other property. Surely a uniform procedure is necessary. The 
Law of Succession Act 1972 makes an attempt to provide such a procedure, 
but simultaneously renders its success highly unlikely by abolishing 
customary law. The nature of this serious step will be examined in 
the following section.
(iii) Succession under the Law of Succession Act 1972:
On March 17th, 1967, a Commission was appointed to consider the law 
of succession as it then existed in Kenya and ”to make recommendations 
for a new law providing a comprehensive and, so far as may be practic­
able, uniform code applicable to all persons in Kenya”. In the course 
of the following sixteen months the Commission (most of whose members 
were not Africans) sent out questionnaires, invited memoranda from
members of the public and held public meetings in most of the import-
25anttowns.. Its recommendations were embodied in a report submitted
to the President in August 1968 together with a draft Bill, the Law
of Succession Bill. This Bill was subsequently amended in several
26
ways after a number of lively debates in the National Assembly and 
was eventually enacted, in its amended form, on November 13th 1972.
24. No. 14 of 1972.
23. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission on the Law of Succ­
ession (1968). Hereafter cited as the Succession Report.
26. The National Assembly, in particular, rejected the proposal
that illegitimate children should be treated in the same way 
as legitimate children. Republic of Kenya, National Assembly 
Debates, 1970, vol.21, cols. 1931-1963, 2001 - 2043, 2078 - 
2099.
The Law of Succession Act 1972 has still not come into operation, 
largely, it appears, due to the need to train the large number of 
officers required, especially in the office of the Public Trustee, if 
the implementation of the Act's provisions is to be effective. How­
ever, as it is the government's intention that it be brought into 
operation as soon as possible, it is necessary to examine its pro­
visions in some detail, especially those concerning the devolution 
of the estates of Africans dying intestate. The Act provides a
uniform code applicable to all persons in Kenya. Consequently all
27Acts which formerly governed succession have been repealed; part­
icularly important, in the present context, is the deletion of
28sections 12f and 121 of the Registered Land Act 19&3* When the
Law of Succession Act 1972 comes into operation, intestate succession
to registered land, and indeed to all other kinds of property, will
cease to be governed by customary law. The provisions regarding
intestate succession are contained in Part V of the Law of Succession
Act 1972. Here an attempt is made to create, with the exception of
29certain kinds of property m  certain areas, a universal code of 
intestate succession; it is hardly surprising, therefore, that its 
provisions are highly controversial. However, it will be best first 
to outline these provisions before subjecting them to critical 
scrutiny.
Where an intestate dies leaving one spouse and a child or
27. Law of Succession Act 1972, s.99 and Sched.8.
28. Ibid., s.100 and Sched.9- 
29* See infra p. 240.
children, the surviving spouse is entitled to all the deceased’s per­
sonal and household effects absolutely and to a life interest in the
30whole residue of the net intestate estate with power of appointment
31to the surviving child or children; any child may apply to the court
32if he considers the power to have been improperly used or withheld,
and the court may in its discretion award the applicant a share of 
33the capital. On the death or, in the case of a widow, the remar­
riage of the surviving spouse* the estate (subject to any appointment
34or award made) is to be divided equally among the surviving children.
The Commission adopted the principle of the discretionary trust as
35
being less rigid, "more akin to customary law" and more appropriate 
to the economic circumstances of Kenya than the fixed-shares system 
characteristic of Islamic law and followed by the Indian Succession 
Act.
Where an intestate dies leaving a spouse but no children, the 
spouse is entitled to the deceased’s personal and household effects,
the first ten thousand shillings out of the residue of the net
36intestate estate and a life interest in the remainder. Upon the 
determination of the life interest, that is - on the death or, in 
the case of a widow, the remarriage of the spouse, the property
3§. Law of Succession Act 1972, s.35(l). References in the text 
to the Act in this subsection are references to the Law of 
Succession Act.
31. Ibid., s.35(2).
32. Ibid., s.35(3).
33. Ibid., s.33(4).
3k , Ibid., s.35(5). The principle of substitution applies, ibid., 
s.*f1 and account is taken of previous benefits, ibid., s.42.
35. Succession Report, para.131-
36. Law of Succession Act 1972, s .3 6 (1 ) .
subject to such interest passes to the deceased's relatives in a
37stated order of priority.
Where an intestate leaves no spouse or children, his estate
38passes to his relatives in the same stated order of priority. Where
an intestate leaves a child or children but no spouse, his estate
devolves upon the surviving child, if there is only one, or is equally
39divided among the surviving children.
Where an intestate was polygamous, his estate is first divided 
equally among the houses of his wives according to the number of 
children in each house, also adding any surviving wife as an add-
40itional unit to the number of children; thereafter distribution
within each house takes effect in the accordance with the various
4l
principles outlined above.
This, then, is a brief summary of the basic rules governing
intestate succession under the Act, although it should be noted that
the court has a discretion to order provision to be made for certain
categories of dependants not adequately provided for under these 
42rules. Next it is necessary to consider the extent to which these 
provisions can be reconciled with the customary law of succession 
and indeed with the expressed goals cf the commission.
37- Ibid., s.36(3 ). 
38. Ibid., s.39(1). 
39- Ibid., s.38.
40. Ibid., s.40(l).
41. Ibid., s.40(2).
42. Ibid., ss.26-3O.
The Commission helpfully outlined the general policy considerations
that guided it in framing its recommendations and these provide us
with one criterion for measuring the success of the Act. One particular
policy consideration is repeatedly emphasised, namely that "the new
b3
law should generally be compatible with the African way of life" and 
that any changes recommended "should generally be understood by and
bbacceptable to the people" and "should offend as little as possible
b5
their respective beliefs". Given that these were the principles 
governing the Commission's deliberations, it would be surprising to 
find any serious incompatibility between the Act and African customary 
law. Nevertheless this incompatibility exists and indeed gravely 
threatens the successful working of the Act.
The Commission has summarised what it sees as the general char-
b 6
acteristics of customary law. Sons only can inherit, wives and 
daughters are excluded, distribution in a polygamous household is 
according to houses regardless of the number of children in each 
house, the administrative successor has a wide discretion to vary 
shares and account is taken of lifetime distribution. The Comm­
ission had to devise a way of reconciling these features of customary 
law with the needs of contemporary Kenya. However, while the Comm­
ission did take customary ideas into account in its definition of
b? bS"dependant" and in its provisions regarding lifetime distribution,
b j . Succession Report, para.11. 
bb. Ibid., para.14. 
b5» Ibid., para.12. 
b6. Ibid., para.128.
b7. Law of Succession Act 1972, s.29(a) and (b). 
k8. Ibid., s.te(a).
the Act does not embody many of the features of customary law. It is 
proposed to discuss these features in turn and even though the dis­
cussion will be about succession to property generally, it should be 
remembered that land is still the prime source of wealth for the
majority of Africans in Kenya today.
The rights of inheritance of women under customary law are very 
restricted. An intestate's property, and his land, in particular, 
passes to his sons and, if he has no sons, to his nearest male
relatives (i.e. father, brothers, nephews). While unmarried daughters
and unmarried sisters will generally have, for example, the right to 
cultivate a piece of land during their lifetimes, the patrilineal 
system of inheritance ensures that property, particularly land, 
does not pass out of the clan. When a woman marries, it is the 
duty of her husband and his family to provide for her; she does not
expect to inherit any property from her family. However, it was
b9the policy of the Commission that distinctions based on sex or
marital status should have no place in the new law. Under the Act
50
all children take equally regardless of sex. Even though, as the 
Commission points out, the surviving spouse may be expected to exercise 
the power of appointment in favour of the more needy children to the 
exclusion, for instance, of married daughters, benefits derived from 
such an appointment are taken into account on the termination ofthe
51
life interest when the remaining property is divided among the children.
49. Succession Report, para.138.
3t. Law of Succession Act 1972, ss.33(5) and 38. 
51. Ibid., s.42(b).
Where the intestate leaves no surviving spouse or children, his estate
devolves on his father or, if he is dead, on his mother or, if she is
52dead, on his brothers and sisters, and so on. Seeing that under 
customary law neither daughters, nor sisters, nor mothers had signi­
ficant rights of inheritance, these are important changes indeed.
Even more drastic is the change in the position of the widow. 
While under customary law her husband's property would pass to his 
nearest male relatives together with an obligation to support the 
deceased's widow, her position under the Act is the same as that of 
a widower except that her life interest terminates on her remarriage, 
as would her rights under customary law. Her entitlement to the
first ten thousand shillings of her husband's estate in the event of
53
his leaving no children will mean in practice that she will usually 
inherit his whole estate, estates of more than ten thousand shillings 
not being very common. The deceased's land will therefore pass out 
of his clan. Even where he leaves a surviving child or children,
54his widow is entitled to a life interest in the whole estate with
55
a power of appointment to the children, a position which she would 
never enjoy under customary law. For even if the Commission was 
correct in holding that the principle of the discretionary trust to 
be "akin to customary law", the customary "trustee" is almost always 
the deceased's eldest son (the muramati of the Kikuyu) or, where 
that son is too young, his nearest male relative. Moreover the
32. Ibid., s.39(1).
33. Ibid., s.36(1)(b).
34. Ibid., s.35(1)(b). 
33. Ibid., s.33(2).
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customary "trust” has little in common with the trusts that will arise
under the Act. These trusts will normally be managed by the Public
Trustee where the value of the estate does not exceed ten thousand 
56shillings. Where its value exceeds this sum, the trustees will
57normally be the surviving spouse and at least one other person.
58
Their powers and duties are defined by the Trustee Act 1929 and 
where part of the estate consists of land, it will be held on a 
trust for sale in accordance with the provisions of the Trusts of 
Land Act 19^1.^ This raises a further problem. It is obviously 
absurd to expect a widow (or widower), who will usually be old and 
often illiterate, to appreciate the nature of her statutory duties 
and it is equally unrealistic to expect her to employ professional 
advisers. Many people in the rural areas have little idea of what 
an advocate is. Besides,advocates are people of the town, their 
ways are different and they cost money. Their fees will usually 
bear small relation, to the value of the estate which may simply 
consist of two or three acres of coffee plantation. Nevertheless, 
without professional advice no widow will know that she has a 
power of appointment and no child will know that he is entitled to 
object to the way in which this power is exercised.
The third major break with customary law is the Act's treat­
ment of polygamous households. It is a characteristic of the 
customary law of succession that each house shares equally in the
36. The Law of Succession Act 1972 has left unchanged the powers 
of the Public Trustee to administer such estates under the 
Public Trustee Act 1925? s.M4) (i).
57* Law of Succession Act 1972, s.38.
38. Cap.167.
39- Cap.290.
estate regardless of the number of children in each house. The
Commission, understandably, found this custom inequitable and the 
60Act provides that the number of persons within each house be 
the major consideration when the estate of a polygamist comes to be 
distributed.
Finally, there are a number of traditional institutions which 
it will be impossible to fit within the framework of the Act. The 
present writer encountered two such institutions in the course of 
his research. In the first place, it has been the custom among the 
Kikuyu for a childless woman of property to "marry" a younger
61
woman. The latter will be encouraged to bear children, indeed 
the older woman may select suitable lovers for her, and these 
children will inherit the older woman's property in the same way 
as if she was their father. A certain amount of secrecy seems to 
surround such marriages, but it is likely that they are becoming 
increasingly rarer; only two instances came to light during field­
work in Gathinja sub-location. Another custom, and one which is a
62long way from dying out, is the leviratic union. When a man dies, 
it is the custom for his widow to enter into a union with his brother 
or some other close male relative. This man will then come to live 
on the deceased's farm and the children of this leviratic union 
will be deemed, for succession and other purposes, to be the
60. S.k0(1).
61. Such a marriage, often called a "ghost marriage", certainly 
used to exist among the Luo also; see G. Wilson, op. cit., 
p.123- The present writer came across no instances.
62. This institution is discussed in G. Wilson, op. cit., pp.109 
et seq and pp. 126 ert seq.
deceased's children. This institution, which has been described as 
"derogating from the dignity and status to which woman are entitled, 
is common among the Luo and certain other tribes.
While it could be argued that customary institutions of this kind 
are of marginal and declining importance, the customary rules of 
inheritance regarding the rights of widows, the rights of women gen­
erally and the rights of houses (where the deceased was polygamous) 
are clearly still of central significance. If these rules continue 
today to govern succession, then the changes wrought by the Law of 
Succession Act 1972 are very radical indeed and hardly likely to 
prove acceptable to the majority of Africans in Kenya. Before 
reflecting on the consequences of such a situation, however, it is 
necessary to consider the extent to which the customary law of 
succession still operates in the way described above and the extent 
to which it has adapted to the new political, social and economic 
climate of the last twenty years. If the ghost marriage and the 
leviratic marriage survive today merely as curiosities of interest 
to old-fashioned anthropologists, can it also be said that the new 
educational and employment opportunities that exist for women today 
have resulted in changes in the woman's status and, in particular, 
in her right to own and inherit property? The answer is that such 
changes have occurred, but that they have affected only a small 
but growing, minority of the population. The schoolmistress, the 
nurse and, that symbol of the emancipated female, the office
63. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission on the Law of
Marriage and Divorce (1968), para.5^ -. The Commission probably 
exaggerates the widow's lack of freeiom of choice in such cases.
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secretary still expect property to devoid according to customary law;
they may feel free to dispose of their salaries as they like, but
bridewealth will have been paid on the occasion of their marriages
and they will not generally expect to inherit property from their
parents, and land least of all.
In the course of fieldwork in Gathinja and East Kadianga the
present writer examined the files of the *t32 succession cases that
were filed in the Kiharu District Magistrate's court between 1960
and 1973> together with the files of the k$ succession cases that
were filed in the Nyando District Magistrate's court between 1969
and 1973. These researches point overwhelmingly to the conclusion
that succession to registered land continues to be governed by the
6krules of customary law outlined above. Certainly the deceased's 
widow, and occasionally, perhaps, an unmarried daughter, may be 
registered as the owner of part or all of his land; but the land 
will continue to be regarded as family or clan land and on her
death will generally revert to the deceased's nearest male relatives.
65
Thus, where a man dies intestate leaving a widow and no children, 
the widow is likely to be registered as the owner of the land in 
preference, say, to the deceased's father, the danger being that if 
the latter were registered as owner, on his death the land in question 
would be divided between the widow and her brothers-in-law; there is 
no doubt that these brotheis-in-law or their families will eventually 
inherit the land on the widow's death in preference to her family.
6k. Supra, p. 232.
63. This situation actually occurred in the Kiharu African Court, 
Succession Case No.3® of 1966 (unreported).
In not a single case did a married daughter or a married sister
inherit land, although in one instance a daughter who had been divorced
was allowed a share of her father's land where she had been living,
but on the understanding that the matter would be "reviewed" if she
66ever returned to her husband. The inheritance of land remains 
strictly patrilineal; the land is subdivided among the deceased's 
sons, the rule of substitution applying where a son has predeceased 
his father leaving sons of his own.
The clan elders often play an important role in getting the 
various parties to reach agreement before appearing before the 
District Magistrate. In some cases the District Magistrate rejects
the agreed decision of the parties, though this is rare. In one
67
case, the elders had allocated the deceased's land according to 
houses; thus the two sons of one house received half the land while 
the only son of the other house received the other half. The District 
Magistrate refused to accept this division. He was of the opinion 
that "if this custom is applied strictly, it would be contrary to
68natural justice and equity and therefore it should be superseded".
The land was accordingly divided equally among the three sons. This 
is a solitary instance, however; all informants approved the principle 
of division according to houses and the practice of the courts also 
conforms with this principle.
66. Kiharu District Magistrate's Court, Succession Case No.12 of 
1971 (unreported).
67. Kiharu District Magistrate's Court, Succession Case No.35 of 
1970 (unreported).
68. This, presumably, is a vague reference to section 3(2) of the 
Judicature Act 1967 which provides that "the courts shall be 
guided by African customary law in civil cases..., so far as
it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and morality...".
There is no indication, then, that the customary law regarding 
succession to land has altered much during recent years in spite of 
registration of title and the enormous increase in commercial farming, 
nor is there any reason to suppose that it has altered with regard to 
other traditional types of property like cattle or livestock. Succe­
ssion to modern kinds of property is discussed below; here it suffices 
to emphasise once more that it is land and, to a lesser extent, 
animals that constitute the main source of wealth for the vast maj­
ority of Kenyan Africans.
The Law of Succession Act 1972 does not incorporate any of the 
major principles which currently govern succession to the estates of 
Africans who die intestate and this refusal to compromise with 
customary law may well prove fatal to the successful operation of 
the Act. However, there is an interesting and important exception 
to the universal code of intestate succession laid down in the Act; 
customary law will continue to apply to certain kinds of property in 
certain areas. Section 32(1) of the Act provides:
The provisions of this Part [i.e. the Part dealing 
with intestacy] shall not apply to -
(a) agricultural land and crops thereon; or
(b) livestock,
situated in such areas as the Attorney-General may, 
by notice in the Gazette, specify.
The areas suggested by the Commission are the vast but thinly pop­
ulated areas of northern and southern Kenya, inhabited largely by
69nomadic pastoral tribes. It is envisaged, however, that the universal 
law of intestacy will be applied in due course to these areas as well. 
The reasoning behind this provision is interesting and is spelt
70
out m  some detail m  the Report. Basically, however, there are two
considerations which influenced the Commission in recommending this
exception to the universal law of intestacy. In the first place, it
was felt that the people of certain areas were not yet ready for such
a universal law, that "... a new law in those areas might be completely
71incompatible with the people’s way of life." Secondly, it was argued 
that while customary law catered satisfactorily for certain kinds of 
property, succession to so-called "modern" kinds of property would 
have to be governed by the universal law in those areas gazetted by 
the Attorney-General as well as elsewhere. A detailed examination of 
these two arguments will, it is submitted, highlight the basic weak­
nesses in the Act's attempt to create a universal law of intestacy.
The Act is clearly not an example of progammatic legislation, 
that is, it is not intended merely to represent an ideal to which the 
practice of Kenyans should aspire. It is intended to become effective 
at once and to be enforced from the day on which it comes into oper­
ation. It is for this reason that the Commission decided to except 
from its provisions on intestacy certain areas where enforcement would 
be difficult, for "it would be futile to recommend a law which is apt
69. Succession Report, para.7^- Little land has been registered 
in these areas as yet.
70. Ibid., paras. 58-7^- 
71- Ibid., para. 7*+•
to be hated, ignored or even not understood by any large percentage
72
of the population". If, however, such broad grounds are proposed 
for excepting an area from the universal law, it is surprising that 
the Commission merely envisaged excepting the pastoral areas of
73Kenya. It has already been suggested that the universal law is 
wholly incompatible with customary law and that it is highly unlikely 
to be followed even in the populous, developed agricultural areas of 
central and western Kenya. Many of its provisions will not be pro­
perly understood and those which are understood are likely to be 
7bignored. It is extremely difficult to enforce a law of succession 
against the wishes of the people concerned. The very minimum require­
ment would be an efficient system of death-reporting; indeed this 
would be necessary for the successful operation of the whole Act 
including the provisions regarding testate succession and the admin­
istration of estates. The local government officers have an important 
part to play in the implementation of the Act's provisions; it is 
their duty to see to the protection of the deceased's property, to 
ascertain the identity of those people who might have an interest 
in his property and to advise prospective administrators as to their 
responsibilities and the necessary formalities to be observed. 
Decentralisation is clearly a sensible policy, though it may be 
doubted whether sub-chiefs will find the time or the energy to carry
72. Ibid., para.61.
73- Supra, p.
7b, Whenever the present writer mentioned its provisions regarding 
the inheritance rights of women to people met in the course of 
fieldwork, they would burst out laughing and would shake their 
heads knowingly, assuring him that that would never happen in 
their part of Kenya.
out their new duties. The point is that even if they do, the Act
will still remain a dead letter unless the cooperation of the people
involved is also secured.
In the second argument advanced to justify the exception to the
universal law of intestacy, the Commission drew a distinction between
traditional kinds of property for which customary law was felt to
cater adequately (e.g. unregistered land and livestock) and modern
kinds of property, like registered land, stocks and shares, motorcars
and bank accounts to which it was considered appropriate that the
75universal law should apply. It is doubtful whether this is a very 
useful distinction to make. The customary law relating to the trans­
mission of land works equally well whether the land is registered or 
not. Moreover, customary law as a whole has proved extremely flex­
ible over the last seventy years; institutions which have lost their 
relevance have been discarded, while those which still perform a 
necessary function have survived. The customary law of succession 
has also adapted to the changing needs of society in order to cater 
for the modern kinds of property which feature in many Kenyan homes 
today and in order to reflect new ideas about the status of women.
A glance at the files of the Public Trustee shows that little
difficulty has been experienced in applying customary law, in a
76
suitably modified form, to modern kinds of property. The system 
appears to work efficiently, but at present the estates of relatively
75• Succession Report, paras. 72 and 7b,
76. Most of the information that follows in derived from the files 
of the Officers of the Public Trustee at Nairobi, Kisumu and 
Mombasa, together with interviews with the Assistant Public 
Trustees at those offices.
few Africans are handled by the Public Trustee, largely because the 
majority of African estates consist ibr the most part of land and 
land is excluded from the jurisdiction of the Public Trustee by 
section 2A of the Public Trustee Act 1925 (as amended) which pro­
vides:
Nothing in this Act shall confer on the Public Trus­
tee or his agents any powers in respect of -
(a) the estate of an African, living among the 
members of any African tribe or community 
in accordance with their customary mode 
of life, who has no property purporting to 
belong to him as an individual; or
(b) land registered under the Land Adjudication 
Act or the Land Consolidation Act.
The reason for the second exception, of course, was that succession 
to registered land was governed by sections 120 and 121 of the 
Registered Land Act 1963- However now that these sections have 
been deleted by virtue of section 100 of the Law of Succession 
Act 1972, some amendment to the Public Trustee Act will presumably 
be necessary to enable the Public Trustee to deal with registered 
land in the same way as any other property.
Nevertheless, the number of the estates handled by the Public
2h5.
Trustee is continually rising and the reasons for this are suggested
77• TABLE 3. Estates handled by the
Public Trustee.
C
er
ti
fi
ca
te
s
of
Su
mm
ar
y 
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
vo lA VOA OA VOOJ -dOJ -dOJ -dOJ COT- Ar~ 20
i—ia (\J VO OO 00 O O -d N ATS P 0 A ON OJ 00 00 OJ vo ON A0 O A VO A A vo ON ON 0 ON OP EH v~ V"
3rO•HPi-P Pica cd•H X VO A VO NT“ A A vo ON VO
p 0 -d A A A -d -d OJ -d -d ACO(D
P Picd cdp  0 VO OJ Q IN IN IN- 00 00 ONra -h A O -d ON -d A ON V- -d INW Pi -d VO A -d vo ON CO 0 ON ONp V<>:
1—1cd A OJ O V co IN O OJ —^ ONPi p -d IN IN O A vo ON V OJ0 0 A vo VO O- 00 *— O OJ A A
V T~ \- V V
pPi
0T3 PiPi 0t=5 IA 00 -d* OJ vo OJ vo 0 OJ NPCQ O A A A A A A -d vo -d A
0
Pcdp  gCQ cdW 0 OJ -d vo ON OJ A -d OJ ON OJ•H ON A A VO OJ -d A IN 00Pi -d VO VO vo 00 V O OJ OJPi v~ T~ v- T~ *-
h CNJ A -d A vo IN CO ON O V-cd VO VO vo VO vo vo vo VO IN- IN0 ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON>H r- v~ r~ V V- T” V—
Re
pu
bl
ic
 
of 
Ke
ny
a,
 
An
nu
al
 
Re
po
rt
 
of 
th
e 
Re
gi
st
ra
r-
Ge
ne
ra
l 
(1
97
1)
i 
Ap
pe
nd
ix
 
XX
V 
(P
ub
li
c 
Tr
us
te
e,
 
es
ta
te
s 
un
de
rt
ak
en
 
an
d 
ad
mi
ni
st
er
ed
,)
.
by the Registrar-General:
The steady increase in current work reflects 
changing social conditions, particularly the 
continued toll of lives in motor-car accidents 
which results in payments of large sums by 
insurance companies by way of compensation, 
and also the increased use of life insurance 
by individuals and payment of death grants or 
gratuities by employers, all of which result 
in comparatively large sums of money coming 
into what otherwise have been very small 
estates. 78
In view of the foregoing comment it is hardly surprising that the 
average age of those whose estates are administered by the Public 
Trustee is depressingly low and that hence there is often a large 
number of minor beneficiaries. Where a sum of money is awarded to 
a minor, it is usually given in practice to the relative responsible 
for his education, the relative being exhorted by the Public Trustee 
to carry out his responsibilities conscientiously. Occasionally the 
Public Trustee will open a bank account in the minor's name on which 
his "guardian" can draw provided that the cheque is signed by a 
specified third party. Only where the sum awarded to the minor 
exceeds 10,000 shillings will a trust be created.
As far as it is possible to generalise from the files of the 
Public Trustee, it seems fairly clear that the rules which govern 
succession to land and other traditional kinds of property are not 
being applied where the distribution of cash is concerned. More
78. Ibid., p.
regard is had to need as opposed to status. Where the families are 
large, often fairly complicated calculations are made in order to 
achieve a fair result. Where the deceased has left a widow, she 
will never get less than any one of her children and frequently she 
will get more than the total of her children's shares. Where there 
are two widows, their shares will be identical. Where there are 
children, they will generally take equally regardless of sex; how­
ever, economic need is relevant and a child who is still at school 
is likely to get a larger share, while a daughter who is married may 
be given nothing. Where the deceased was a polygamist, his estate 
will be distributed in as fair a way as possible; it will rarely be 
distributed according to houses. Finally, widowed mothers are often 
given a small share in the estate.
It is hard to provide typical examples of the ways in which these
estates are distributed, partly because a son or a widow may be given
a disproportionately large share on the understanding that he or she
will pay school-fees for the younger children or provide bridewealth
for the unmarried daughters. Nevertheless a few examples will show
how far succession to bank-balances and similar property differs
79from succession to land. In one case, a Mkamba, killed in a road 
accident, left a life insurance policy worth *K),000 shillings. His 
family consisted of a mother, a widow, a small daughter and two 
brothers; it was unanimously decided that % of his estate should 
be held on trust for his daughter, 20^ should be given to his wife
79* Office of the Public Trustee at Nairobi, Administration Cause 
No.82 of 1971 (unreported).
and 30$ to his mother, A sizeable Luo estate consisting mainly of
80
shares and damages awarded under the Fatal Accidents Act 19^6»
was distributed as follows: 15$ to each of his two widows, 15$ to
each of his two sons, 10$ to each of his three youngest daughters,
5$ each to his mother and his eldest daughter (aged 16).^ Where
a Kikuyu man had died, his widow was given 6Q$ of his estate and
his three sons and one daughter 10$ each; his two adult daughters
82received nothing, presumably as they were married. These 
examples illustrate the ways in which customary law has adapted to 
modern kinds of property. While no clear rules have emerged, one 
can discern a tendency to recognise the rights of women, a tendency 
which is largely absent where succession to land is concerned. At 
the same time, it should be remembered that those who own modern 
kinds of property, those who insure their lives and become entitled 
to gratuities and pensions, are the very people one would expect to 
have more ’'modern" ideas on the status of women.
Two arguments have been put forward in the preceding pages.
In the first place, it has been argued that the law of intestacy 
embodied in the Law of Succession Act 1972 is, at least in its more 
important aspects, hard to reconcile with the customary law of succ­
ession and that therefore the likelihood of its being observed on 
the ground is doubtful. Secondly, it has been argued that the
80. Cap. 32.
81. Office of the Public Trustee at Mombasa, Administration Cause 
No.2 of 1972 (unreported).
82. Office of the Public Trustee at Mombasa, Administration Cause 
N o . o f  1972 (unreported).
Commission was mistaken in holding that "... it is difficult to apply 
the customary laws to the modern property like houses, modern furniture, 
etc. nor to property that cannot pass without proof of title such as 
registered land, bank accounts and deposits, stocks and shares,
Q 7
insurance policies, motor vehicles, etc.” The files of the District 
Magistrate's Courts show that disputes about succession to registered 
land rarely arise and the files of the Public Trustee show that 
families find no difficulty determining the distribution of modern 
kinds of property.
If these arguments are valid, then there appears to be only one 
solution. It is necessary to postpone the introduction of the univer­
sal law of intestacy until such time as the people are ready for it 
and meanwhile to allow the various customary and religious laws to 
continue to govern intestate succession. Such a suggestion was put 
to the Commission, but it was unfortunately dismissed without any
84argument except a vague reference to "the best interests of Kenya."
Part II of the Act, dealing with testate succession, and Part III of 
the Act, dealing with provision for dependants, could be brought into 
operation forthwith, whereas Part V, dealing with intestate succession, 
would only be brought into operation when it was likely to prove 
enforceable and acceptable to the majority of Kenyans, though the 
possibility of its successive application to appropriate areas could 
also be considered. The effect of the acceptance of this recommenda­
tion would be to enable someone to opt out of his personal law by
83- Succession Report, para.36. 
84. Ibid., para.64.
making a will, contrary to the policy of the Act which will enable 
someone to opt out of its provisions regarding intestacy by making 
a will declaring that he wishes the devolution of his property to be 
governed by his personal law. It would, however, be desirable to 
apply Part IV of the Act, dealing with provision for dependants, in 
those cases where the relevant customary or religious law of intes­
tacy fails to provide for dependants.
On the whole the present writer shares the aims of the Commi­
ssion. It is desirable that there should be a single law for all 
Kenyans. The continued existence of a multiplicity of tribal and 
religious laws certainly militates against the development of a 
national identity. However, it is one of the themes of this thesis 
that modernisers of every kind and legislators in particular tend 
to underestimate the strength of customary law and to exaggerate 
the power of legislation as an instrument of social engineering.
The most perfectly drafted statute embodying the noblest ideals 
of the government will be of absolutely no effect unless it resp­
onds to the needs of the people, unless its legitimacy is recognised 
at grass-roots level. However national unity may be achieved, it 
is certainly not by imposing a uniform law of succession based
largely on Western values and ideas upon heterogeneous peoples
85
committed to their own law and culture.
(iv) Testate succession:
So far the discussion has concentrated on intestate succession
8.5 • It is hardly surprising that the most hostile reaction to the 
Commission's proposals came from the Moslem community.
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which continues, in the case of African estates, to be governed by 
customary law, although this will cease to be the position when the 
Law of Succession Act 1972 comes into operation. It was argued in 
the last section that customary law catered satisfactorily for all 
kinds of property, both traditional and modern, and that the pro­
cedures currently employed by the Public Trustee for the ascertain­
ment of heirs were sensible and fair. In this section, it is pro­
posed to examine testate succession, to consider the sorts of wills
made by Africans and the various laws that govern them.
86
The Africans’ Wills Act 1961 applied certain provisions of
87the Indian Succession Act 1865 relating to wills, codicils and 
probate to wills made by Africans. Previously any wills made by 
Africans had been governed by customary law and the effect of the 
1961 Act was to enable an African to opt out of the customary 
system. Under customary law wills were (and still are) upheld
only to the extent that their provisions did not depart unduly from
88the law relating to intestacy; therefore if an African wishes, 
for example, to leave all his property away from his family, the 
Africans’ Wills Act 1961 enables him to do so, although it is
89
expressly provided that nothing in the Act shall authorise a 
testator to bequeath property which he could not have alienated 
inter vivos or deprive any person of any right of maintenance to
86. Cap.169, s.5 and Sched.2.
87* This Act was applied to Kenya by Art. 11(b) of the East Africa
Order in Council 1897» As amended from time to time, it 
continues to govern succession to the estates of Europeans 
and certain other groups in Kenya.
88. This point is elaborated infra, pp. 253 se£, where it
will be argued that it is rather misleading to talk about 
’’wills” under customary law.
89* S.^.(a) and (c).
which such person would otherwise have been entitled. Subject to these
limitations the Act gave Africans complete freedom of testation.
The Commission found that very few people in the rural areas
availed themselves of this opportunity to dispose of their property 
90
as they please, but the evidence shows that it is not only in the 
rural areas, but in Nairobi itself that the Africans* Wills Act 1961 
has proved a dead letter. The present writer looked through the 
Probate and Administration files in the High Court Registry in 
Nairobi and found that in the last four years, 1971-197^? only two 
African wills were admitted to probate, one of which was the will of 
the famous Kenyan politician of the twenties, Harry Thuku. The prin­
cipal reason suggested to the Commission for this state of affairs
91was that "ordinary people have no knowledge of their legal rights"
and the Commission accordingly recommended that the Government take
steps to publicise a person's right to make a will, the advantages of
92making a will and the necessary formalities to be observed. Even 
if the Government took such steps, however, it is doubtful if there 
would be a dramatic increase in the making of wills under the Africans' 
Wills Act 1961 as long as traditional constraints remain as strong 
as they are.
However, it has long been the custom for a person to make known 
his wishes regarding the disposal of his property on his death. This 
may be done in writing, although it is much more usual to give oral 
instructions. The use of writing appears to be on the increase, at
9P- Succession Report, para.79*
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
any rate in Gathinja sub-location. Oral instructions may be postponed
till the person feels he is about to die, whereas if someone puts his
instructions in writing, he can die without having made them known to
anyone. In many instances the present writer was aware of a certain
secretiveness about testamentary intentions coupled often with a
malicious pleasure in playing one relative off against another. This
usually occurs where a person has no spouse or children; he may then
invite his nephews to compete for the inheritance.
Where a person has expressed his wishes as to the way in which
his property should devolve upon his death, the courts will usually
give effect to these wishes, whether made orally or in writing, as
long as the proposed course of devolution does not seriously depart
from that which would have been followed if no such wishes had been
93expressed. Thus, in one case, a widow died leaving two married
daughters. The deceased had expressed the wish that the land (which
was registered in her name) should pass to her husband's great-
nephew, rather than his nephew, and the court gave effect to her wish.
9k
Similarly in another case a man had died leaving two sons; it was 
held, however, that his land should only pass to one of his sons, 
the other son having been effectively disinherited by his father's 
deathbed curse, "Cursed is he who will call Irungu my sonj" It will 
be noted that in both these examples the land remained within the 
patrilineage. Where, however, a person expresses the wish that his
93* Kiharu African Court, Succession Case No. 6 of 19&3 (unreported). 
9k. Kiharu African Court, Succession Case No.13 of 1965 (unreported).
land should pass out of his patrilineage, it is unlikely that effect
95
will be given to his wish. In one case, for example, a bachelor 
had asked that his registered land should pass to his sister's son 
who had looked after him in his old age; his request, which, of course, 
ran counter to customary law, was ignored and the land was given to 
his brother. Except in cases of this nature, however, the courts 
will generally give effect to the deceased's wishes whether he 
expressed them orally or in writing.
This approach has given rise to a problem which is illustrated 
96
by the following case. The main part of the deceased's estate 
consisted of a sum of 17*000 shillings which he had received as
compensation after being the victim of a motor accident. After the
accident he had committed to writing his wishes concerning the 
distribution of his property after his death and in this document
which was in Kikuyu he had made no reference to one of his two wives
who had left him some eight years previously, though they had never 
been customarily divorced. The question arose as to whether this 
wife and the deceased's children by her were entitled to share in 
his estate. The Public Trustee argued that, as the written document 
was neither signed nor attested in accordance with the provisions of 
the Indian Succession Act 1869* there was no valid will in existence 
and that therefore the estate should be administered according to 
the relevant customary law of intestacy, i.e. shared between the 
two houses. However the clan elders insisted on following the terms
99- Kiharu District Magistrate's Court, Succession Case No.1. of 
1969 (unreported).
96. Office of the Public Trustee at Nairobi, Administration Cause 
No.28 of 1968.
of the written document; their view was forwarded to the Public 
Trustee by the local District Officer who wrote that "the Kikuyu 
customary law of succession is that any statement recorded from 
any person at the time of death and whether or not signed, cannot
97be ignored". In the event, all the interested parties were 
gathered together and were persuaded of the rightness of the 
Public Trustee's approach; the deceased's estate was divided 
equally between -the two houses (regardless of the number of child­
ren in each house).
In this instance, of course, there was no proper legal argu­
ment; the debate was carried on by correspondence and the Public 
Trustee's policy of getting every interested party to agree to 
the final outcome was evidently successful. In at least two cases,
however, the same point of law has arisen before the High Court.
98In one case the owner of a piece of registered land had 
died and the local District Magistrate, assuming that he had died 
intestate, had proceeded to ascertain his heirs in accordance with 
section 120 of the Registered Land Act 1963* The land was even­
tually awarded to the deceased's three nephews, the second, third 
and fourth respondents. However the appellant claimed that the 
deceased had allowed him to use and occupy the land in dispute 
for the previous ten years, had expressed publicly his wish that 
he (the appellant) should inherit the land on his death and had
97. Ibid.
98. Kiboko v. Assistant Land Registrar and others, [19733 E.A. 
29§.
256.
deposited the title deeds [i.e. the land certificate] with him. The 
appeal was allowed and the case remitted to the District Magistrate's 
Court for a rehearing on the ground that no evidence had been recorded 
either way by the District Magistrate on the question whether the 
deceased died intestate. At the same time, however, the court expressed 
its view that what it called the deceased's "oral will" was of no
effect, since the Indian Succession Act 1865, which requires all wills
99 ^to be in writing, applied to all wills made by Africans after 1961.
This statement of the law was approved and followed in a more recent 
100case i but in neither case were the issues at stake clearly raised.
It is respectfully submitted that the Public Trustee and the
High Court were wrong to take this view of the effect of the
Africans' Wills Act 1961. That Act was passed merely to enable
Africans to opt out of their personal law; it was not intended to
101 •affect customary law. * Similarly an African can opt out of his
102personal law by marrying under the Marriage Act 19®2, but his 
power to do this does not affect the validity of customary marriages. 
Those responsible for the introduction of the Africans' Wills Act 
1961 no doubt envisaged, and correctly, that the estates of the vast 
majority of Africans would continue to be governed by the customary
99. S.5«.
100. Kahunyo Waweru v. Mwangi Waweru, High Court of Kenya at 
Nairobi, Civil Appeal No.140 of 1972 (unreported).
101. Indeed S.4. of the Act provides that nothing in the Act 
"shall ... (e) ... invalidate any such [i.e. testamentary] 
disposition which would otherwise have been valid." This 
would seem to save wills which are valid according to 
customary law.
102. Cap.15®.
law of succession, but they felt that there might exist a small, but 
increasingly larger group of propertied Africans who would like to 
avail themselves of the advantages of making a will under the Indian 
Succession Act 1865) the advantages of certainty and of freedom of 
testation. Therefore when the Africans' Wills Act 1961 provides 
that certain provisions of the Indian Act shall apply to wills made 
by Africans, the word "wills" should be interpreted to mean "wills 
valid under the Indian Succession Act 1865". Thus if an African had 
made a written will which had been duly signed and attested, the 
High Court would grant probate of the will. If, however, he had 
executed a document but had failed to comply with the necessary 
formalities, then there would be no "will" in existence and customary 
law would apply.
The Public Trustee and the High Court seem to have interpreted 
the word "wills" to mean "expressions of intention as to the dis­
tribution of property on death" and have held that if such expres­
sions of intention do not comply with the necessary formalities, 
they are to be wholly ignored. If this view is correct, then the 
consequences are extremely serious. In succession cases heard by 
District Magistrates daily in courts throughout the country the 
informally expressed intentions of the deceased are regarded as 
having a major, if not decisive, bearing on the outcome. In close- 
knit, largely illiterate societies it is inappropriate to seek any 
clear distinction between testate and intestate succession. Never­
theless, in the sense that most Africans make known their wishes 
about the devolution of their property before they die and, in the 
case of land, often long before their death, in that sense most
258.
Africans die testate and it would create grave discontent in the 
countryside if the courts ignored the deceased's wishes on the 
grounds that they did not comply with the necessary formalities.
It can hardly have been the intention of the Africans' Wills Act 
1981 to undermine customary law in this way. It is to be hoped 
that the Court of Appeal will see fit to overrule the decisions 
of the High Court on this question.
This issue will cease to have any importance when the Law of 
Succession Act 1972 comes into operation. The Act provides a 
uniform code of testate succession. Generally speaking, the cust­
omary law of succession will no longer exist and no possibility
of opting out of one system into another can arise. However the 
103Act does empower a testator to declare by his will that succe­
ssion to his estate shall be governed by any law he chooses. This 
provision is designed to enable any person to opt out of the uni­
versal law of intestacy which, as has been seen, embodies few of 
the features of customary law. Presumably an African who chooses 
to avail himself of this opportunity will declare that he wishes 
his property to devolve according to his personal law and in that 
case the courts might again be faced with the question whether to 
admit informal expressions of intention. Again it is submitted 
that they should.
10^
The Law of Succession Act 1972 makes a further concession to 
African custom and conditions in the rural areas by allowing a
103. S.5(1).
10^. Ibid., s.8.
form of oral will. This is an imaginative step and enables effect
to be given to the deathbed declarations of intent so common in
traditional society. Owing to the notorious difficulty of proving
an oral will, the Act requires that it be made before two or more
105competent witnesses and provides that it shall not be valid
unless the testator dies within a period of three months from the
date of making the will."^’ Moreover, no oral will is valid if,
and so far as it is contrary to any written will which the testator
107
has made, whether before or after the date of such oral will; 
nor may an oral will revoke a written will.^^ The Commission’s 
justification for this rather surprising provision is that ”... it 
would be unwise to allow an oral declaration before death to defeat
109the written intentions over which a person probably had much thought."
However, it would seem to the present writer that the possibility, or
even the fact, of insufficient thought hardly constitutes a convinc­
ing reason for defeating the express intentions of a testator.
The rules laid down in the Law of Succession Act 1972 regarding 
capacity, formalities for written wills, revocation, alteration, revival 
and construction are largely based on the equivalent provisions in 
the Indian Succession Act 1865* which in turn are derived from English 
law. Even if the right of Africans to make wills is publicised 
through the media, at meetings and in other ways, and even if simple
105. Ibid., s.9(l)(a)«
106. Ibid., s.9(l)(b).
107. Ibid., s.9(2).
108. Ibid., s.18(2).
109« Succession Report, para.98.
forms of wills were made available at local centres of administration, 
it is extremely unlikely that many Africans will adopt the practice of 
making formal written wills, at least in the foreseeable future.
The discussion of testate succession in this section has high­
lighted two themes which recur throughout the thesis. In the first 
place, customary law will continue to operate in African societies 
for as long as it succeeds in catering adequately for their needs; 
when their needs change, customary law must adapt or disappear. 
Secondly, legislation designed to replace customary law is likely 
to prove ineffective to the extent that it does not respond to these 
needs. It is true that the very existence of a law on the statute- 
book may alter the nature of these needs, but the process is in any 
case a slow one and meanwhile the law remains a dead letter. Africans 
continue to express informally their wishes regarding the devolution 
of their property; these wishes are almost always observed except in 
those rare cases where they depart seriously from customary law, and 
disputes are exceedingly rare. The advent of new kinds of property 
has made no difference to this practice. There is little to induce 
an African to make a formal will. It is true that by doing so he 
could leave his property away from his customary heirs, but it is 
almost literally unthinkable that he should do so. The idea that 
land, in particular, should remain in the family is still very strong 
and it will continue to be so as long as African societies remain 
stable and closeknit, tied to particular localities and bound by 
complex kinship networks. The total failure of the Africans' Wills 
Act 1961 shows that it responded to no real needs, but as it merely 
offered Africans the opportunity of opting out of their personal
law, its failure was of no great moment; African estates continued 
to be governed by customary law. It is equally unlikely that Africans 
will start making formal wills when the Law of Succession Act 1972 
comes into operation (although the provisions regarding oral wills 
will save many deathbed declarations), but the consequences of not 
doing so will be more serious; their estates will be governed, not 
by customary law, but by the intestacy provisions of the Act, pro­
visions which themselves respond to no real needs and are likely 
for that reason to prove ineffective.
k. Conclusions.
Registration of title to land may serve many purposes, political, 
social and economic and it may equally be judged according to a var­
iety of criteria, but it has always been held to have two direct con­
sequences, security of title and security of transactions. The two 
consequences are obviously linked; generally speaking the registered 
proprietor is secure and no one dealing with him need look behind the 
register. Where security of title and security of transactions do 
not exist, it is a sign that the registration system has collapsed. 
This threatens to occur in Kenya.
A large part of this chapter has been devoted to the question of 
succession; although the discussion has covered succession generally, 
it always has to be borne in mind that land forms the larger part of 
most African estates. The reasons for this extended treatment are 
two. In the first place, the present writer's fieldwork has shown
that the number of successions to registered land that have not been 
registered is increasing at an alarming rate and it is likely that the 
situation is considerably worse in areas which are less advanced than 
his field-areas. It has been necessary, therefore, to consider the 
procedure for registering successions in an attempt to discover whether 
an improved procedure might result in a larger proportion of successions 
being registered.
At present it is extremely rare for Africans to make wills under 
the Africans' Wills Act 1961. In this sense virtually all Africans 
die intestate, although most make it known during their lifetime how 
they wish their property to devolve on their death and although these 
wishes are almost invariably respected. Estates of Africans dying 
intestate are at present governed by customary law, though the pro­
cedures vary according to the kind of property. Succession to reg­
istered land is governed by sections 120 and 121 of the Registered 
Land Act 1965* Where the deceased leaves shares, for example, or 
life insurance or a bank account, the estate will generally be admin­
istered by the Public Trustee, though he may issue a certificate of 
summary administration where the value of the estate does not exceed 
*f,000 shillings. Succession to other kinds of property, like cattle 
and household effects, is determined informally, within the family, 
and no special procedure is involved; in practice succession to 
registered land is often determined in the same way. Two questions 
arise. Firstly, is the present way of determining the heirs to 
registered land satisfactory? Secondly, is it desirable to treat 
succession to different kinds of property in different ways?
It is essential that any procedure which depends for its success
on the cooperation of the people themselves must be both simple and
110cheap. It has been argued that the present procedure governing
registered land is both cumbersome and expensive and that these
factors are partly responsible for the small number of registered
successions. On the other hand, the procedure adopted by the
Public Trustee which relies largely on the assistance of the local
administrative officer and requires no more of those interested in
an estate than that they communicate to the officer their decision
as to its distribution, appears to work very well; it is true that
111it is not particularly cheap, but the scale of charges could 
easily be altered, if necessary.
Granted, then, that the procedure followed by the Public 
Trustee is preferable and that the ascertainment of heirs should 
be carried out without recourse to the courts except in those rare 
cases where one party refuses to accept a decision or where the 
value of the estate (not including registered land) exceeds 10,000 
shillings, the question arises as to whether the land registrar 
should deal with succession to registered land in the same way as 
the Public Trustee deals with succession to other types of pro­
perty or whether there should be a single system for all kinds of 
property administered by the Public Trustee. In the interests of 
simplification and uniformity the latter course would be preferable. 
This course would enormously increase the work of the Public Trustee 
and its task would be further complicated by the fact that the 
customary law governing succession to registered land is different 
from that governing succession to other types of property. At the
110. Supra, pp.223 et seq.
111. The Public Trustee takes 10$ of the first *t,000 shillings and 
5$ of the remainder of the estate.
same time, the work of the courts and the land registrars would he 
significantly reduced. While it is outside the scope of this thesis 
to make detailed recommendations as to the working of the proposed 
system, it is clear that a substantial degree of decentralisation 
would be desirable plus effective liaison between the relevant 
officials. Deputy-Registrars of Deaths in the rural areas could 
perhaps be appointed agents of the Public Trustee and could be made 
responsible for assembling the deceased's relatives and procuring 
their agreement as to the distribution of his estate. The Public 
Trustee would then be obliged to forward to the land registrar the 
certificate of succession to any registered land which the deceased 
may have owned. The Commission on the Law of Succession, of 
course, recommended the adoption of a uniform procedure for the 
ascertainment of heirs, regardless of the kind of property con­
cerned, and its recommendations in this respect are welcome, even 
though it made little attempt to work out the implications of its 
recommendations and even though it was seemingly unaware of the 
enormous increase in the work of the Public Trustee that they 
entailed.
The second reason for discussing succession in such detail 
was the hope that the discussion would prove the continuing strength 
and adaptability of customary law and underline the doubtful wisdom 
of passing laws which fail to recognise this fact. Thus the 
Africans' Wills Act 19&1, which was designed to enable Africans to 
opt out of their personal law of succession by making a will in 
accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act 1865, 
is bound to remain a dead letter as long as the customary law 
governing the distribution of estates commands widespread support
and continues to give effect, within certain well-defined limits, to 
the wishes of the deceased. Similarly the Law of Succession Act 1972, 
although providing a uniform and uncomplicated procedure for the 
ascertainment of heirs, has introduced a law of intestacy so at 
variance with customary law that the chances of its being enforced 
in the foreseeable future are not very high. In the absence of 
powerful enforcement machinery on a scale quite impossible in the 
present circumstances of Kenya, no law can be effective without the 
cooperation and understanding of the people affected.
These arguments apply with equal force to the land adjudication 
and registration programme. Constraints on the alienation of land 
certainly used to exist under customary law, although they had 
largely disappeared before land adjudication started, at least in 
the present writer's field areas. Even if they did exist at the 
time of land adjudication, there is no reason to suppose that they 
would not survive registration. The mere fact of registration is 
unlikely to have any effect on customary law. Customary controls 
will continue to be exercised; customary dealings like the "redeem­
able sale" or the "muhoi tenancy" will continue to flourish; cust­
omary rules and procedures for the determination of heirs will con­
tinue to govern succession to land. Only if people understand the 
meaning of registration of title and are prepared to cooperate with 
the system, will customary law die out and the new system become 
effective.
It is extremely difficult to generalise about what people 
understand by registration but the following conclusions can be 
drawn from the research in the field. A small minority of people
understands the full implications of the system. These people recognise 
the necessity of registering dealings in registered land and are also 
likely to appreciate the advantages of charging their land by way of 
security for a loan. These are also the sort of people who tend to 
buy land and this fact may account for the relatively large number of 
sales which is registered. The majority of people, however, has little 
idea of the nature of registration. They would see the adjudication 
process partly as a means of determining boundaries and thus prevent­
ing future disputes and partly as a way of ensuring, by consolidation 
or exchange of fragments, that holdings were economically viable. They 
do not appreciate that registration of title introduces a new system 
of conveyancing. This would not be so serious if advocates were 
employed, but this is seldom done, partly because of the time and 
expense involved and partly because the advocate is an unfamiliar 
figure in most rural areas.
The large and growing number of unregistered dealings should be 
a matter of considerable concern. In both field-areas the present 
writer came across a few plots which had been the subject of two 
unregistered dealings. A glimpse of the chaos that could ultimately 
ensue is afforded by the following example. P owned plot A and 
subsequently bought plot B from V. P died leaving two sons and a 
widow who married a distant kinsman of P. The widow is young and 
children are likely to be born of the leviratic "marriage". Neither 
the sale nor the succession was registered. It is not difficult to 
imagine the sort of dispute that may arise in thirty years time.
It is true that no difficult points of law are likely to arise, but 
the fact situations are going to be extremely tangled, extremely 
reminiscent of the disputes settled in the course of land adjudica­
tion; there will be the usual conflicting accounts of what the dis-
putants' grandfathers said and did, when they said and did it and 
what pieces of land were involved. As in the case of adjudication 
disputes, there will be little difficulty applying the law once the 
facts are established, but the point to be stressed here is that 
this is just the sort of dispute that should not arise where reg­
istration of title is effective and that, as the land registers 
increasingly fail to record the true state of things on the ground, 
the courts will be increasingly called upon to settle disputes of
this kind. In effect, they will be re-adjudicating titles to land.
112
Fleming's report fully appreciated the danger that land 
would have to be re-adjudicated on a large scale, if the number of 
unregistered dealings was allowed to continue unchecked. However, 
even where his recommendations have been implemented, they have had 
but a marginal effect. Efforts have been made, for example, to 
educate the public in the significance of land registration. Pro­
minently featured on the walls of most land registries is a large 
cartoon (in Kiswahili) illustrating the story of the purchaser who 
failed to register his sale. The story is entitled, "Hilishamba 
ni lako?" "Is this plot of land yours?" and the moral is obvious. 
It is no doubt understood by many of those who visit the land 
registries and are capable of reading Swahili. Attempts by chiefs 
at their meetings to publicise the nature of land registration 
reach a wider audience, but their impact is minimal. There is 
simply no incentive for people to register successions to land,
112. Fleming, op. cit.
nor even sales, at least where the parties are known to each other.
113The Land Control Act 1967 makes it an offence to carry out
acts in furtherance of controlled transactions (successions involving
subdivision and sales are both controlled transactions) which have
become void for want of the land control board's consent. Moreover
the Registered Land Act 19^3 empowers land registrars to summon
people .. to appear and give any information or explanation res- 
11*fpecting land,...". and also to compel registration of instruments
115registrable under the Act. Fleming feels that greater use of
the powers conferred by these statutory provisions would encourage
people to register their dealings and the government seems to 
116
endorse this view. Political and moral scruples might well 
militate against such a course of action, but it would in any case 
be certain to prove an ineffective way of dealing with the problem, 
as it depends on the land control board or the land registrar becom­
ing aware of an unregistered dealing. This is very unlikely to 
occur and, given the large areas in which any land registrar or 
land control board has to operate, even a highly conscientious 
use of their powers to check unregistered dealings is bound to have 
but a marginal effect.
To sum up, there are no ways in which unregistered dealings 
(especially successions) on a large scale can be prevented. Chiefs
113. S.22. This Act is discussed at length infra, Ch. VII.
11*f. S.8 (b).
113. Ibid., s.VlO). It is an offence not to comply with orders 
made under this section, ibid., s.ifl(2).
116. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands and Settlement, The 
Registered Land Act 19&3* A Handbook for the guidance of 
land registrars (June 19^9)? P«55»
and sub-chiefs can publicise the nature of registration at their 
meetings and it is to be hoped that the new generation of landowners, 
more educated than their fathers, will begin to appreciate the vir­
tues of the system. However, it is the opinion of the present writer 
that unregistered dealings will continue to occur on a large scale 
and that the register will increasingly fail to reflect the true 
state of things on the ground. Disputes will become more frequent 
and the courts will be faced with the task of repeating the process 
of land adjudication. If these prophesies are correct, then the 
wisdom of the whole registration programme is called into question.
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C H A P T E R  VI 
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE LAND REFORM PROGRAMME
1. Introduction
This study has so far been concerned with the processes of 
land adjudication and land registration and with the problems that 
have arisen in the course of these processes. It has been demon­
strated that faulty adjudication may cause grave injustice and that 
the courts are being faced with an increasingly large number of dis­
putes relating to first registration, disputes which they are not 
ideally qualified to settle. It has also been argued that the 
introduction of the system of registration of title among people 
who are both ignorant of its rationale and unaccustomed to taking 
professional advice on land matters has resulted in the majority of 
dealings taking place off the register which thus becomes increasingly 
unreliable. These are serious problems which have been insufficiently 
appreciated, partly because they are regarded as temporary, the 
"growing pains" of the system which will disappear as the adjudication 
machinery becomes more efficient and landowners more sophisticated, 
and partly because the justification of the land reform programme has 
almost invariably been argued in economic terms, the economic benefits 
of the programme having seldom been doubted. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to consider the extent to which the land reform pro­
gramme has promoted economic development in the rural areas. How­
ever, while it is clear that any discussion of the programme which
ignored this question would be incomplete, it must be admitted at 
the outset that the present writer is not a trained economist. Any 
conclusions reached will necessarily be highly tentative.
The economic benefits which are claimed to be the result of the 
programme seem to fall into two categories. In the first place it 
is argued that as landowners now enjoy security of tenure, they have 
an incentive to invest in their farms. Money that may previously 
have been spent on litigation over boundaries can now be more pro­
ductively employed in introducing new crops, purchasing new equip­
ment, hiring labour and generally developing their land. Farmers 
are more likely to make use of the agricultural extension services
and, most important of all, they may raise loans on the security of 
1
their land. The claim that registration of title leads to increased 
investment in the land has been made on numerous occasions and seems, 
indeed, to be the most important single consideration in the minds 
of the programme's proponents. The Swynnerton Plan had recommended 
that the African farmer be given an indefeasible title, thus provid­
ing him with an incentive to invest in his land and enabling him to
2
offer it as a security for loans. In a speech urging Kenyans to go 
back to the land President Kenyatta took the same view:
In order to use our land efficiently and 
effectively, we must arrange that each 
farmer is sure of his land rights. We 
must also ensure that each farmer has 
the kind of security that would enable
1. The British Government made its offer to help finance the land 
reform programme conditional on the Kenya Government's ability 
to obtain funds for agricultural credit and to provide the 
necessary advisory services. See Lawrance Mission Report, 
para. K^)^ .
2. See supra, p. 30*
him to have access to necessary credit and 
loans ... Our manifesto called for encourage­
ment of land consolidation and registration of 
land titles in order to facilitate these
measures.3
The enthusiasm of the government for the land reform programme seems
to be based on similar premises. In 1963 the official view was that
"consolidation and registration will make farm credit and modern
methods of agriculture possible and should expand employment much
more rapidly than settlement can, by bringing more land into pro- 
Zf
ductive use" and this view was reiterated in somewhat more general 
terms several years later when it was proposed that increased 
emphasis be given to the land adjudication and registration pro­
gramme, "for the completion of this procedure is felt to be an 
important pre-condition for rapid agricultural development."^
It is the purpose of the second part of this chapter to question 
some of the assumptions on which such bland statements of principle 
seem to be based and in particular to look at the role which credit 
plays in the registered areas. It should however be mentioned here 
that there can be no necessary connection between registration of 
title and economic development. Any development which has occurred 
will at best be an indirect consequence of registration. Moreover 
it is difficult to attribute such development to any single factor.
In the last fifteen years there has been an enormous expansion in 
many fields, in communications, in education, in the provision of
3. Kenyatta, Harambeei (Nairobi, Oxford University Press,
1964), p.6#.
4. Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper No.10 of 1963i African 
Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya, s.102.
3. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan, 1970-74, s.88.
agricultural extension services and so forth. With so many obviously 
relevant variables to take into account, it is clearly impossible to 
isolate a single factor as being responsible for whatever development 
that has been achieved.
The second kind of economic benefit which is credited to the land 
reform programme relates to the pattern of land holding. Both the 
fragmentation and the uneconomic parcellation of landholdings have an 
adverse effect on agricultural productivity. Although these two pro- 
blems are related, it is important to distinguish them at the outset. 
Fragmentation exists where a single farm consists of a number of sep­
arate parcels of land, often scattered over a large area. Where frag­
mentation is prevalent in a certain area, it may be possible to 
aggregate the fragments and then redistribute the land so that the 
holding of each person falls together as one parcel of better size 
and shape. This process is known as land consolidation and is of
course an important part of the land adjudication programme, though
7
now the emphasis is on voluntary consolidation. Parcellation, on the 
other hand, refers to the process whereby a holding formerly operated 
by one farmer is split into a number of holdings operated by different 
farmers. In the areas under investigation, where the average size of 
holdings was small, parcellation would generally have an adverse effect 
on agricultural productivity. In the third part of this chaper it will 
be necessary to consider the extent to which the land reform programme 
has succeeded in eradicating these two problems.
6. These definitions are largely taken from the Lawrance Mission 
Report, paras. 21-22.
7- See supra, p. 57.
Finally, in the fourth part of this chapter, an attempt will be 
made to analyse the social changes that are occurring in rural Kenya 
today and to assess how far these changes have been accelerated by 
the land reform programme. In the second and third parts of the 
chapter it will have been seen that new institutions have been created 
and new opportunities provided. The question naturally arises whether 
it is possible to make any generalisations about the people who exploit 
these institutions and take these opportunities. It will be suggested 
that socio-economic relationships are developing in the same way in 
both field-areas and that it is possible to identify signs of increas­
ing stratification on socio-economic lines.
2. The development of holdings : the role of credit.
(i) General:
There can be no doubt that a considerable degree of agricultural 
development has occurred since land registration in both the areas 
studied. In both areas more land has been brought into cultivation, 
cash-crops have been grown on an ever-increasing scale and farming 
methods have improved. Unfortunately it is impossible to substantiate 
this rise in agricultural productivity as those records that do exist 
make no attempt to distinguish the performance of individual sub­
locations. Thus it is reported that for Muranga district as a whole 
the average return per grower from coffee was £1591.5 in 1973 compared
o
with £K26.3 in 1972. Such figures tell us very little. It would
8. Republic of Kenya, Muranga District Annual Report, 1973* P«33»
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be much more helpful to have a large number of studies of particular 
farmers, which examine their various sources of income, their expenses 
and the ways in which they dispose of their surplus. In the absence 
of case studies of this kind and in the absence of detailed agricul­
tural records it is hard to prove that agricultural development has 
occurred in the two areas under study. Certain indicators do exist 
however.
In Gathinja sub-location coffee started to be grown by three 
enterprising farmers in 1951. In 1958 a coffee cooperative was 
established in the neighbouring sub-location and a coffee factory 
was built there; in 1972/3 the turnover of this cooperative, the 
Kahuhia Cooperative Society, was 3>652,523^05 sh.^ The enormous 
increase in the cultivation of coffee can also be inferred from 
information provided by respondents. In the normal way, they would 
be expected to be vague about the exact year in which they started 
growing coffee. However it is possible to find out who was growing 
coffee at the time of land consolidation since it was government 
policy that coffee-growers should not be moved from their coffee 
plantations. Of the seventy-four landowners questioned twenty-five 
had their land consolidated around their coffee plantations and this 
fact would indicate that approximately one third of the total number 
of farmers was growing coffee at the time of land consolidation. How­
ever at the time of the research sixty-four out of these seventy-four 
farmers were growing coffee, a highly successful crop which may give 
growers a net profit of 3?000 sh. per acre. Work has now started on
9. Ibid., p.36.
the construction of a coffee factory within Gathinja sub-location itself.
Agricultural development in Kabete-Obuya and in Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro 
has been much less dramatic. There is still a considerable amount of 
subsistence farming. Farmers who produce more than they need will sell 
their surplus maize and vegetables in the local markets as they have 
done for many years. However there are indications that cash-cropping 
in an organised way only started in the middle sixties at least so far 
as the marketing of coffee and milk is concerned. Of the sixty-eight 
farmers interviewed only one had started growing coffee before 
the year in which Kenya became independent and land adjudication started 
in East Kadianga; today fourteen of these farmers are growing coffee 
and a cooperative society has been started. Moreover it was not until 
1966 that the first grade cow was introduced in this area. Now eight 
farmers have grade cattle and in spite of the occasional death of a 
cow many farmers seem keen to purchase such cattle, milk being seen as 
a profitable source of income. At the time of the research a Dairy 
Farmers’ Cooperative Society was in the process of being established.
In spite of the absence of any official evidence tracing the 
growth of agricultural productivity in the two areas under discussion, 
there can be little doubt that development has occurred and this view 
has been confirmed in numerous interviews with farmers and officials.
The question then arises as to the extent to which this development 
can be attributed to the land reform programme and in particular as 
to the role of credit in promoting development. As it has always 
been one of the programme’s main justifications that a land owner 
would be able to raise loans on the security on his registered title, 
it is now opportune to consider the loans which have been raised,
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the identity of the borrowers and the purposes for which they are used,
10
The table below establishes one highly important point: it is 
only a fairly small minority of landowners that raise money by charging 
their lands. In Gathinja only thirty-one owners out of a total of 330 
have charged their lands and in Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keya-Ogoro only 
fifty-two out of a total of more than 620. In several cases owners had 
charged their lands on more than one occasion and one Gathinja land­
owner had charged his land no less than eight times. Since the Regis-
11tered Land Act 19&3 provides a simple procedure for the registration 
of charges as well as defining in some detail the various powers, rights
10. TABLE k . Breakdown of land charges.
Kabete-Obuya & 
Kamnwa-Keya-OgoroGathinj aDistrict
ARC TotalOther Other TotalAgency
NOT
_ *
Total
Source: Gathinja, Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keya-Ogoro land
registers. (A.F.C. = Agricultural Finance Corporation).
* The absence of figures for these years is almost certainly 
due to delays in the processing of applications.
11. Ss. 65-8*f.
and duties of both the chargor and the chargee and since farmers are 
well aware of the possibility of raising loans on the security of their 
lands, it is prima facie surprising that less than a tenth of them have 
done so. In an attempt to answer this question, it will be convenient 
to distinguish loans provided by the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
and those provided by other agencies, in particular by the commercial 
banks. It will be argued that it is the policies of the lending insti­
tutions rather than any ignorance on the part of the farmer that accounts 
for the small number of loans that has been granted.
(ii) Agricultural Finance Corporation loans.
Loans have been made available to African farmers from official
sources from the early fifties but only on a very small scale, at
least until recently. The Lawrance Mission traced the history of the
various credit programmes and concluded that ”... since the Swynnerton
Plan began to be implemented in 193^ only modest sums have been advanced
to African farmers from official sources for development (other than the
tea development programme), although credit to follow up the land tenure
reforms was one of the principal elements of the transformation envisaged 
12in the Plan.” The availability of agricultural credit has somewhat
improved since the Agricultural Finance Corporation has started to 
13operate. This corporation, which was established in 1963) i-s today
12. Lawrance Mission Report, para. *f21.
13. It was established by the Agricultural Credit (Amendment) Act 
1963) No.27 of 1963) s.*t. The Agricultural Credit Act was 
repealed and replaced by the Agricultural Finance Corporation 
Act 1969, Cap. 323 (1970).
by far the most important source of agricultural credit, as can be seen
in the figures in the table relating to Kabete-Obuya and in Kamnwa-Keyo-
Ogoro; these figures may, however, give a misleading impression since it
appears that loan applications made in Kisumu District between 196^ - and
1^-1969 were not processed until 1969 owing to lack of organisation.
15The sums advanced by the A.F.C. tend to be small, the average 
size of the forty-three loans advanced in Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo- 
Ogoro being 2,580 sh. Moreover, due to the necessity of ensuring that 
loans are spent on developing agriculture, it is rare for cash sums to 
be advanced to farmers; loans are short-term and made in kind, whether 
the farmer wants chickens or grade cattle, fencing or fertiliser. This 
policy is not very popular and indeed the rarity of A.F.C. loans in 
Gathinja is due in part to the availability of bank loans which are 
cash and which may be larger and more quickly processed than A.F.C. 
loans; moreover the work of the A.F.C. is clearly more limited in highly 
developed areas like Gathinja where farmers seek loans for non-agricultural 
investment. However, there are two situations in which the A.F.C. may 
grant cash loans. In the first place it may advance cash for the 
employment of labour, but only where this furthers the more efficient use 
of animals or equipment which have been provided on credit. Thus if the 
A.F.C. provide a grade cow worth, say, 1,000 shillings, it may also 
advance a cash loan of 500 shillings to enable the farmer to employ 
someone to fence the pasture and the total loan of 1,500 shillings 
would be charged on the land. Secondly the A.F.C. does occasionally
14. Information gathered from an interview with an official of the
Department of Agriculture, Kisumu District, on August 28th 1973-
15. Most of the information which follows was gathered from interviews
with A.F.C. officials both in Kisumu (August 28th 1973) and in
Muranga (June 1^th 197^)-
advance cash loans to enable individuals to purchase land, but the land 
must be at least ten acres in area and in practice the vast majority of 
such loans is made to cooperatives, partnerships and individuals purchas­
ing large farms in the former White Highlands. In such cases the loans 
will not exceed half the purchase price.
Although farmers often express their preference for cash loans, the 
A.F.C. nevertheless remains by far the most important source of agricul­
tural credit, particularly in the less developed areas, and it is 
interesting to consider who receives A.F.C. loans. Although all applica­
tions for loans are forwarded to Nairobi where they are considered 
individually, in practice most applications are successful. However, 
it is the Agricultural Officer in the field who is responsible for pro­
cessing these applications and forwarding them, often with comments, to 
Nairobi. It is therefore necessary to consider his role and the role 
of the agricultural extension services generally. The following dis­
cussion will concentrate on Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro, areas 
where A.F.C. loans are relatively numerous.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the extension services in 
the Nyando Division of Kisumu District is the very small number of 
staff involved. The Division consists of three locations (North, South
and West Nyakach) and is headed by an Assistant Agricultural Officer
16who is based in South Nyakach. Under him there is one Divisional 
Agricultural Assistant based in North Nyakach, three Agricultural 
Assistants specialising in home economics, animal husbandry and farm
16. Most of the information which follows is based on numerous dis­
cussions with the Assistant Agricultural Officer and some of his 
staff.
management, a further three Agricultural Assistants each assigned to one 
of the three locations and fifteen Junior Agricultural Assistants i.e. 
five per location. Thus the location of South Nyakach with a total pop­
ulation of around 42,000 and some 6,000 farms is served by six full­
time staff plus five officers who have to divide their activities 
between South Nyakach and the two other locations. Clearly the bulk of 
the work falls on the shoulders of the Junior Agricultural Assistants 
each of whom is allotted a definite area which might well contain more 
than 1,000 farms.
In such circumstances even the most conscientious Assistant could 
hardly be expected to visit each of the farmers in his area in the 
course of a year, let alone carry out any other of his duties like 
holding demonstrations, working out farm plans, processing loan applica­
tions and so forth. In practice, however, an Assistant makes little 
effort to visit all the farmers in his area; indeed thirty-one of the 
sixty-seven informants had never at any stage received a visit from 
the extension staff. This proportion is astonishing enough but due
17to a bias in the selection of informants it is likely to be an 
underestimate of the true situation. Indeed it is not the policy of 
the extension staff to visit all farmers; they only visit farmers who 
invite them. It appears, moreover, that it is the more educated land­
owners, the so-called ’’better farmers" who summon their assistance. It 
is thought that time is more profitably spent raising the productivity 
of cash-cropping farmers than introducing subsistence farmers to new 
crops and new methods. It is obviously difficult to prove that this
17- Thus only one-fifteenth of the landowners has received an A.F.C. 
loan whereas one-sixth of the informants has.
is the case especially as the staff appear to keep no record of visits 
which they have made, but a number of studies from other parts of Kenya 
reinforce the view that the extension services are favouring the more 
progressive farmers. One researcher working in the Central Province 
concludes his study: "... the diffusion of new agricultural technology 
seems to benefit those who are well-off already, a process which is 
reinforced by the de facto progressive farmer strategy followed by
iF
extension workers.” Similarly a detailed study of extension services 
in the Western Province reveals that 57% of the extension worker's 
time is spent with the top 10% of farmers and 6% of his time with the 
bottom *t7%«^
If it tends to be the better farmers who receive the most help 
from the extension services, it will similarly tend to be the same people 
who obtain A.F.C. loans. Of course, only a small proportion of those 
who receive help will also obtain loans and it is not surprising to 
discover that it is the more educated farmers, those who appreciated 
the possibilities of agricultural development even during the colonial 
period, to whom agricultural credit is channelled. Of the forty farmers 
who had obtained A.F.C. loans in Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro ten 
were interviewed. Three of these had been among the earliest supporters 
of land consolidation and registration and had subsequently been appointed 
officers of the consolidation committees. The fourth informant is an 
employee of the Land Adjudication Department. The fifth is a chief and 
the sixth an ex-chief of the colonial era. The seventh is a substantial
18. J. Ascroft and others, "Does extension create poverty in Kenya?", 
1972 East Africa Journal, vol.9 no.3? P«28, at p.32.
19- D.K. Leonard, "The social structure of the agricultural extension 
services in the Western Province of Kenya", University of Nairobi, 
Institute fo r  Development Studies, Discussion Paper No.126 (unpub­
lished), January 1972, p.^ +.
farmer of the area and the eighth the nephew of a Cabinet Minister. The
remaining two might be called ordinary farmers, though they both have
other sources of income. Two of the ten interviewees had obtained two
A.F.C. loans each and a further two were in the process of applying for
second loans. The general impression is that loans tend to be advanced
to the most successful members of the community, whether success is
measured in terms of political or economic achievement. Indeed one
A.F.C. official agreed that preference was given to those with off-the-
farm incomes, though stressing that the best security was the farming
activity of the borrower.
Studies done in other parts of Kenya present a similar picture.
One researcher Working in Nyeri District concludes that "most of those
20
able to raise loans are those with outside sources of finance." Judith 
Heyer who has written extensively on smallholder agriculture in Kenya, 
summed up the selection criteria as follows:
The criteria in use at the moment appear to be some 
notion of creditworthiness, some notion as to the 
viability of the investment, and some ability to 
provide security. Loans are more likely to be given 
to people with regular off-farm incomes; they are more 
likely to be given to people with established reputa­
tions as good farmers and as men of integrity; they 
are more likely to be given to people who have ample 
resources to carry investments through. The criteria 
clearly favour the farmers who are relatively well- 
off, the farmers who only farm part-time, the farmers 
who have adequate resources already.21
20. M. Ali, "Political implications of land registration: a case- 
study from Nyeri District in Kenya", University College, Dar-es- 
Salaam, unpublished dissertation, 1970, p«36.
21. J. Heyer, "Smallholder credit in Kenya agriculture", University 
of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies, Working Paper 
No.85 (unpublished), February 1973? p.1#«
Neither writer distinguishes A.F.C. loans from loans from other sources, 
but it will be shown now that the policy of the commercial banks is no 
different from that of the A.F.C.
(iii) Bank loans.
22The table above showed that in Gathinja the vast majority of loans
secured on the land came from sources other than the A.F.C. and that in
Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro a substantial minority came from
such sources. Virtually all these loans were advanced by the commercial
banks i.e. Barclays Bank, the Standard Bank and, most important of all,
the Kenya Commercial Bank. Bank Loans are slightly larger on average
than A.F.C. loans, though only eleven of the sixty-six bank loans under
discussion exceeded 10,000 shillings and only three exceeded 20,000
shillings. As in the case of A.F.C. loans, it is important to consider
23
the criteria used by the banks in considering loan applications.
Bank loans are normally short-term, repayable over between three 
and five years at an interest rate of 10$; A.F.C. loans are repayable 
over a similar period of time depending on the use to which they are 
put, though they carry an interest rate of.only 8$. The banks favour 
farmers who already have an account with them and also those who have 
independent sources of income. Thus of the twelve secured bank loans 
granted in Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keya-Ogoro, two were given to a
22. Supra, p. 277.
23. The information which follows is based on interviews with the 
Loans Officer, Kenya Commercial Bank, Kisumu, with the Loans 
Officer, Standard Bank, Kisumu, and with the Manager, Kenya 
Commercial Bank, Muranga. The responses of all three informants 
were virtually identical.
magistrate, two to an Education Officer, one to a headmaster, one to a
settlement scheme officer, two to a pensioned ex-chief and ex-teacher,
to another magistrate, one to a Nairobi businessman and only two to
farmers without outside income. A similar picture emerges in Gathinja,
where only twenty-one farmers have ever received bank loans although
some have received as many as six bank loans on different occasions.
The present writer was able to interview eighteen of these farmers and
discovered that fifteen of these eighteen had alternative sources of
income, as teachers, shopkeepers, agricultural officers and clerks.
The banks are cbviously doing good business and it is hardily surprising
that the loan repayment record is impressive, the borrowers being gen-
24
erally men of substance, enjoying steady incomes.
Although the banks do not usually send valuers to assess the value 
of the land, they invariably require the borrower to charge his land 
in their favour and to deposit his land certificate with them. The 
banks are not very interested in the purpose for which a loan is 
required and, unlike the agricultural extension staff, they certainly 
carry out no follow-up to ensure that the purpose is effected. By 
interviewing the recipients of bank loans it was possible to ascertain 
the various ways in which such loans were used and in particular to 
assess the extent to which they have promoted agricultural development.
The answers to these questions are clear. In both field-areas 
bank loans are rarely invested in agriculture, they are invested off
24. This seems always to have been the case. Discussing bank loans 
to farmers up to the end of one writer concludes that
"probably a good many of the loans did not go to typical small 
farmers but to employers having a farm as a second source of 
income." J. Vasthoff, Small farm credit and development (Munich, 
Weltforum Verlag, 1968).
the farm and any beneficial effect such investment may have on agricul­
tural development will necessarily be indirect. Of the twelve secured 
bank-loans obtained by farmers in Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro 
it was only possible to discover how six were used. One was used to 
build a posho mill i.e. a mill for grinding maize into flour; one was 
used to buy a general goods shop in Sondu, a township nearby; two were 
used to buy plots of land on settlement schemes and two to buy property 
in Nairobi. None of the six loans were invested in agriculture.
In Gathinja the picture is slightly different. The role of the 
A.F.C. is not so significant here. Many farmers have bank accounts 
and naturally prefer to borrow money from their banks rather than apply 
to the A.F.C. where cash is rarely advanced and the procedures are 
more cumbersome. Moreover the presence nearby of an important town, 
Muranga, makes it unnecessary for farmers to rely on the A.F.C. for 
supplies of equipment, seed etc. Such considerations explain why 
Gathinja farmers who wish to invest in their land will naturally turn 
to the banks for credit. Nevertheless the present writer would estimate 
that approximately three-quarters of the bank loans secured on farms 
in Gathinja are used for non-agricultural purposes. It is difficult 
to get exact figures as some farmers have obtained several loans on 
various occasions and find it hard to apportion specific sums to specific 
purposes. Of the twenty-one farmers who had obtained bank loans secured 
on their farms it was possible to interview eighteen; twelve of these 
had obtained more than one bank-loan; five of them had obtained more 
than three. Only six of the eighteen farmers use their loans for 
agricultural purposes; these purposes would be various, though often 
connected with cattle-keeping, which requires the provision of water- 
tanks, fenced enclosures and cattle-houses. Eleven of the eighteen
farmers used their loans for non-agricultural purposes and it is import­
ant to note that most of the regular borrowers are to be found in this 
group. Here again purposes vary; many loans are used for building shops 
or houses, one loan was used to purchase a Peugeot motor-car to enable 
the borrower's brother to set up a taxi service and one loan was used 
to purchase shares in the British American Tobacco Company. The remain­
ing farmer used his loans for both agricultural and non-agricultural pun 
poses.
The role of the banks in the promotion of smallholder agriculture 
is small compared with that of the A.F.C., but in the last analysis the 
contribution of both the banks and the A.F.C. is peripheral partly due 
to their overriding concern with the credit-worthiness of applicants 
for loans. In the following section it is proposed to look a little 
more closely at the sort of security which an applicant might reasonably 
be expected to offer.
(iv) The nature of the security required.
Those who argue in favour of land registration that it enables 
the registered owner to raise loans on the security of his land, seem 
to imply two things. In the first place, they imply that a registered 
title does in practice constitute good security. This may generally 
be the case, but there is evidence to suggest that the banks are 
extremely reluctant to realise their security. They would often 
prefer to write off a debt rather than incur the odium to which the
25exercise of their statutory power of sale would expose them. 
The Lawrance Mission reported:
Although land titles are normally charged to secure the 
repayment of loans, the banks are generally very loaidi 
to sell a man's land in the event of a complete break­
down in repayment, and they have taken this action in
very few cases indeed. This reluctance is due partly 
to the difficulties of sale in such circumstances and 
to a- natural unwillingness to take any step which could 
seriously harm the bank's public image in the country­
side. In fact, the main motive in taking a charge on 
a borrower's land is to induce the farmer to take seri­
ously the commitments he has entered into through the 
knowledge that he could lose his land if he defaulted 
on repayment.26
In short, the power of sale is held as a threat over the chargor's
head, though it is but rarely exercised.
Secondly, they imply that some security must be provided by the 
borrower and that the only acceptable security is a charge on registered 
land. This is certainly the view held by the lending agencies con­
sidered so far. Both the A.F.C. and the banks require borrowers to
charge their land as security for the loans advanced and to hand over
27their land certificates. It is extremely rare for either the A.F.C. 
or the banks to advance loans to farmers in unregistered areas; thus 
in East Koguta, a large sub-location consisting today of over 1,600 
registered holdings, only four loans had been granted prior to land
25. Registered Land Act 1963i s.7^ (2)(b).
26. Lawrance Mission Report, para.
27. It is difficult to overstress the psychological importance of
land certificates, which are generally referred to as "title
deeds". Nearly a half of the landowners of Kabete-Obuya and
Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro have taken out land certificates which are
then jealously guarded. There seems no good reason for this,
although if affords a further illustration of that ignorance,
on the part of farmers, of the system of land registration
that was discussed in Ch. V, supra. Although the Registered
Land Act 1963? s.33(3) expressly provides that the chargor
should retain the land certificate, lending agencies insist 
on land certificates being deposited with them, no doubt with
a view to,impressing on the borrower the serious nature of his commitment.
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registration. This policy clearly retards agricultural development and
raises the question whether alternative kinds of security exist and
indeed whether loans might not in suitable instances be advanced on no
security whatever.^
It was probably the disastrous loans repayment record of the 
29
early sixties that caused official lending agencies to revise their 
selection criteria and to concentrate, as the banks have necessarily 
always done, on the credit-worthiness of applicants for loans. A 
registered title may not always constitute sufficient security; the 
A.F.C., like the banks, will prefer the applicant with an off-farm 
source of income. It is certainly questionable whether official lend­
ing agencies like the A.F.C. should consider credit-worthiness more 
important than need, but it does appear that the loans repayment 
record has improved. In the last five years there has been no occasion 
in Muranga district on which the A.F.C. has been obliged to sell a 
defaulter’s land, the mere advertisement of the sale sufficing to 
ensure full repayment of the outstanding debt. Similarly in Kisumu 
district the A.F.C. had never sold a defaulter's land, though at the 
time of the research there was talk of taking action against a few 
persistent defaulters. Bank-loans are also almost invariably repaid; 
a letter from a lawyer in the last resort can be relied upon to 
galvanise recalcitrant debtors into action. In the last eight years
28. Very occasionally the A.F.C. may grant a farmer a loan on 
condition that he gives the A.F.C. power of attorney to charge 
his land as soon as it is registered.
29. This change of policy particularly affected unregistered areas. 
"The Government is facing a serious problem of arrears in repay­
ments of loans not secured by title and will therefore give more 
emphasis to loans in areas where land consolidation and registra­
tion is complete. The World Bank has similarly made this a con­
dition of its pending loan for smallholder credit.” Republic
of Kenya, Development Plan, 1966-1970, p.1^0.
the Kenya Commercial Bank at Muranga has had farms sold on only two 
occasions.
The recent loans repayment record appears then to be very good and 
it may be wondered whether the lending agencies would have lost much 
money if they had not required borrowers to charge their land in their 
favour. Moreover the existence of other forms of security suggest that 
farmers could have access to credit even where their land is not regis­
tered. Two particular forms of security deserve brief mention.
In the first place, farmers may mortgage their chattels to lending
30agencies under the Chattels Transfer Act 1930. When the banks first
started advancing credit to smallholders, they were willing to accept
chattels as security for their loans. This is no longer the case. The
banks would often find it hard to recover their security in the case
of a borrower defaulting and today will generally only grant loans on
the security of a registered title to land. On the other hand, it
appears to be the general policy of the A.F.C. to insist on borrowers
31executing both a charge on their land and a chattels mortgage. More­
over it is interesting to note that while the A.F.C. at Muranga has 
never sold the land of defaulting borrowers, it has on a few occasions 
realised its chattel security. Farmers are perhaps less attached to 
their chattels and therefore their sale provokes less resentment. The 
chattels most commonly mortgaged are cattle and tractors, never house­
hold goods, and the precarious nature of such security is self-evident;
30. Cap.28.
31. The A.F.C. is not bound to do this; indeed the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation Act 19&9> S*'19(1) gives the Board a broad 
discretion as to the terms which it imposes on borrowers.
cattle may die, tractors may be neglected. Nevertheless, if extension 
workers provide an efficient follow-up service to ensure that loans are 
properly used, there is no reason why such chattels should not be accepted 
as good security for small loans and this would clearly be a desirable 
policy in unregistered areas.
An alternative and increasingly important way of securing loans 
is to require the borrower to issue an irrevocable letter of instruction 
to his employer or cooperative society authorising them to make repayments 
from his salary or his sales income. In cash-cropping areas there is a 
continuous increase in the number of cooperatives responsible for the 
processing and marketing of farm produce. Where such cooperatives are 
working efficiently, such letters of instruction should constitute 
adequate security and indeed the A.F.C. does occasionally advance loans 
in reliance on them. Again this would provide a suitable kind of 
security in unregistered areas. A significant development in recent 
years has been for the cooperatives themselves to give their members 
credit. For example, the Kahuhia Coffee Cooperative Society (of which 
all Gathinja coffee-growas are members) provides almost everything that 
its members might require for the development of their farms; it sells 
maize beans, seed and seedlings, fertiliser and so forth. The coopera­
tive is responsible for the processing and marketing of all the coffee 
and any debts owed by members are subtracted from their shares of the 
profits. Moreover recently the cooperative has started to advance cash 
loans to its members on similar security, the loans never exceeding 
one quarter of the average value of the borrower's coffee crop taken 
over the past three years. It looks as though this will prove to be a 
very important source of credit in the near future.
No attempt has been made in this section to make a complete survey 
of the ways in which lending agencies can secure their loans. Doubt 
has, however, been cast on the view that the availability of credit 
should depend on land registration. The WaGhagga of Tanganyika became 
highly efficient producers of coffee during the colonial period, even 
though their land was held under customary law, and examples of this kind 
can be multiplied all over Africa. If credit is necessary for develop­
ment and credit will not be advanced without security, then forms of 
security other than a registered title must have existed. Two alterna­
tive forms of security have been mentioned in this section and, although 
they would hardly be appropriate where large loans were required, they 
could both play a more important role both in registered and unregistered 
areas.
(v) Summary.
It has not been the intention of the present writer to provide a 
complete picture of the role of credit in smallholder agriculture in 
Kenya today, nor would it have been within his competence to do so. 
There are a large number of organisations operating within Kenya today 
which provide credit to farmers. They differ both in the criteria they 
use, in the kinds of security they require and in the results they 
achieve. A survey of their activities would need to be complemented 
by an analysis of farm budgets over a wide variety of areas. While a 
certain amount of work has been done in this field, largely sponsored 
by the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi,
it is certainly not within the scope of this study to make any generalisa­
tions about the role of credit in smallholder agriculture. The purpose of 
the foregoing pages has been limited and negative. An attempt has merely 
been made to question the generally accepted connection between registra­
tion of title and access to credit for agricultural investment. It has 
been argued that it is spurious to attribute much of the agricultural 
development that has occurred in Kenya's smallholder areas over the last 
ten years to the farmer's newly-acquired power to raise loans by charging 
his land.
In the first place, a mere glance at the land registers suffices to 
show how rare it is for farmers to charge their lands. It is not that 
farmers are ignorant of the possibility of raising loans on the security 
of their lands; on the contrary, it is that the supply of credit falls 
a long way short of the demand for it. The Lawrance Mission reported in 
1966:
During our tour of the country we were told with monotonous 
regularity that the people wanted land registration so 
they could go to the banks to obtain loans with which 
to develop their holdings... This belief, if sincerely 
held, must be based on a mistaken appreciation of the 
opportunities for obtaining credit. Even though the 
banks' programme has been as large as the Government's, 
it is nevertheless very small in terms of the numbers 
of farmers who have benefitted.32.
The same is true today.
Moreover, the evidence suggests that those loans which are being 
made available to farmers are frequently not invested in their farms;
32. Lawrance Mission Report, para.^31•
in particular, it has been shown that the considerable majority of bank 
loans in both field-areas is used for non-agricultural purposes. Even 
where the loans are used for agricultural purposes, as are A.F.C. loans, 
it might be argued that agricultural productivity would be more effectively 
promoted by channelling such loans to the poorer rather than the richer 
farmers; a government-subsidised loans system should take more account 
of the farmer's need for credit than of his creditworthiness. This 
would require a reversal of the present policy.
Thirdly, there is no reason why access to credit should necessarily 
depend on the borrower being able to charge his land as security for any 
loan. The policies of the lending agencies is crucial in this context 
but their extreme reluctance to sell the land of a persistent defaulter 
throws some doubt on the value of land as a security. Other forms of 
security do exist and may prove more effective; the irrevocable letter of 
instruction to a marketing cooperative may prove an appropriate alterna­
tive to the charge of land.
The argument in this chapter has, of course, proceeded on the
assumption that it is lack of credit that has retarded agricultural 
33development. However, it is worth noting that one writer with con­
siderable experience of smallholder agriculture in Kenya has seen fit 
to question this assumption. She concludes:
There is evidence from many parts of Kenya of the 
successful and widespread adoption of new practices, 
some of which involve substantial investment expendi­
tures, without the provision of credit, and there is
33« This assumption is shared by the Government of Kenya. "The
Government recognises that lack of agricultural credit has been 
an important constraint on agricultural development." Republic 
of Kenya, Development Plan, 1970-7^? s.1.38.
evidence.•• of plentiful supplies of rural savings.
It is certainly possible that the important require­
ments are the technical information, the extension 
advice, the farmer education, the availability of 
inputs, and other elements making for high returns 
to investments... It may well be that alternative 
measures to aid smallholders would represent more 
effective uses of scarce development resources than 
programmes of subsidised credit.
The considerable surpluses that are being generated in the rural areas
35are, it appears, being saved or invested in non-agricultural activities. 
This certainly seems to be the case in both the present writer's field- 
areas where agricultural officers estimated that less than ten per cent 
of farm profits were re-invested in the farms.
However, even assuming that the availability of credit is an impor­
tant precondition of agricultural development, it seems hard today to 
justify the land registration programme in terms of the amount of credit 
for agricultural investment that has been given to farmers on the security 
of their registered titles. Such little credit as has been available 
has not played the significant part in promoting rural development that 
was originally hoped. The Lawrance Mission reported that "the limited 
scale of credit available has hitherto meant that the greatest possible
'Z.C.
advantage has not been taken of the costly programme of land reform."
This understates the position. Insofaras one of the main justifications 
of land registration has always been the increased amount of credit for 
rural development that would become available, the wisdom of the whole 
"costly programme of land reform" is called into question. Any develop­
ment which has occurred in recent years may in part be attributable to
34. J. Heyer, op. cit., p.29»
35« Ibid., p.16.
36. Lawrance Mission Report, para. 421.
that security of title which is conferred by registration and which may
37provide an incentive to invest in the land, but very little is due 
to increased access to credit.
3« The pattern of holdings: the role of the land market.
(i) General.
It has always been hoped that the land reform programme would go 
a long way towards solving the twin problems of fragmentation and un­
economic parcellation. Discussing the widespread fragmentation of 
holdings that existed particularly in the Central Province of Kenya, 
the Working Party on African Land Tenure stated that ’’the whole pro­
gramme of land consolidation and registration is aimed at removing this
38serious obstacle to agricultural development.” While this may be a 
slight exaggeration, there is no doubt that the programme was expected 
to lead to the emergence of economically viable landholdings. The 
security of title conferred by land registration would create a land 
market enabling farmers owning unviable plots or unworkable fragments 
to sell them off to neighbours who would be in a position to develop 
them more effectively. The pattern of landholding would naturally be 
affected; holdings would become larger and consequently, it was argued, 
more productive. The promotion of agricultural development seemed to
37• One economist of considerable fieldwork experience in Kenya 
found no evidence that registration of title provided such an 
incentive. See R.J.A. Wilson, ’’Land Tenure and Economic 
Development: a study of the economic consequences of land regis­
tration in Kenya's smallholder areas." Unpublished paper given 
to the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, April 
1972.
38. Report of the Working Party on African Land Tenure, 1937-1938 
(1958), para.64.
be the main concern and little thought was given to the fate of those
who would become landless in the process. According to Swynnerton, as
a consequence of land registration "...energetic or rich Africans will
be able to acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less, creating a
landed and a landless class", a process which he calls "a normal step in
39the evolution of a country." It is the aim of this section to assess 
the extent to which the fragmentation and uneconomic parcellation of 
land have been checked by the land reform programme and in the last 
section of this chapter an attempt will be made to consider how far 
the sort of stratification along class lines predicted by Swynnerton has 
occurred in rural Kenya.
(ii) Fragmentation.
Programmes for the consolidation of fragmented holdings are among 
the least controversial of land reform programmes. There may, of 
course, be good agricultural reasons for land fragmentation; for 
example, it enables the farmer to spread the risk of crop failure and
4o
to exploit lands of different quality. Generally speaking, however, 
fragmentation hinders agricultural development. It inhibits a sound 
manuring policy. It makes it harder to plan farms effectively, to 
organise rotation and to make full use of modern equipnrent. A large 
amount of land is used for paths and boundaries and this in turn makes 
soil conservation more difficult. Farmers are obliged to waste time
39* R.J.M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African 
Agriculture in Kenya (1934), s.14.
40. This is particularly true of the hilly country of the Central 
Province. A farmer might have a snail banana plantation in the 
valley, a coffee shamba on the ridge and some rough pasture 
elsewhere.
walking to their scattered plots with the frequent result that the 
more distant ones tend to be neglected.
Fragmentation of holdings was common in many smallholder areas 
of Kenya but nowhere so widespread as in the Central Province. It is 
hard to give exact figures, but the average number of fragments owned 
by informants in Gathinja before land consolidation was nine, one 
informant owning thirty-four plots and another no less than fortyi 
After land consolidation sixty-one of the seventy-four informants 
owned only one farm-plot each; a further twelve owned two farm-plots 
each, five of which were situated in neighbouring sub-locations, and 
one informant owned three farm-plots. Land consolidation was very 
thoroughly carried out and its results are clearly visible today. It 
was only where further consolidation was practically impossible, as 
where a farmer’s coffee plantation was surrounded by the coffee plan­
tations of other farmers, that more than one plot would be registered 
in the name of the same person.
In Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro there was relatively little 
pressure on the land and the fragmentation of holdings was not a 
serious problem; the present writer came across no instance where one 
person had claimed to be entitled to more than three fragments. A 
compulsory consolidation policy was not introduced, although farmers 
were encouraged to exchange or sell off fragments. Of the sixty-eight 
farmers interviewed, some twenty-four had consolidated their farms, 
usually through informal exchanges within the clan. In a few cases 
consolidation was impossible either because the necessary people were 
absent or refused to cooperate, but in the majority of cases it was 
unnecessary. Where someone owned another plot in another sub-location, 
little attempt was made (as in Gathinja) to consolidate his land, but
only a handful of people found themselves in this position.
As land consolidation was successfully carried out in both field- 
areas, it is interesting to consider the extent to which re-fragmentation 
of holdings has occurred over the intervening period. Clearly it is 
likely to occur wherever land is sold or leased to someone who already 
owns or leases other land and therefore an analysis of the operation of 
the land market is necessary. As the land market is considerably more 
active in Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro than in Gathinja, the 
larger part of the discussion will concentrate on the former area.
Since land registration was completed in this area, ten transfers of 
whole plots had been registered at the time of the research, of which 
one was a gift (a father transferring a plot to his son) and nine were
sales. During the same period eighteen subdivisions of land were
registered, of which seventeen were made for valuable consideration and 
one in favour of the landowner's son. Strictly speaking, there are 
two stages involved; first the registered owner subdivides the land and 
new registers are opened in respect of each subdivision and then he
4-1transfers one of the newly-registered plots. In practice, the whole 
transaction is known as a subdivision and that term will be used here. 
Finally on two occasions the owner of a plot had conveyed it to himself
and another in undivided shares; however, as in both cases the aim was
to circumvent the rules prohibiting the uneconomic parcellation of land, 
they can both be treated as subdivisions for the purposes of the present 
discussion.
In addition to the ten registered transfers of whole plots and the 
twenty registered subdivisions, there took place a considerable number
41. Registered Land Act 19^3j ss.25(2) and 89*
of dealings off the register whose full extent it is impossible to
estimate with any certainty. The present writer encountered six cases
where whole plots had been sold and seven cases where subdivisions for
42
valuable consideration had occurred; in only a few of these cases had 
the parties any intention of registering the sale. A special effort was 
made to interview at least one of the parties to each of the forty-three 
transactions mentioned above and much of the information that follows 
derives from these interviews. An attempt was made to ascertain the 
reasons why people bought and sold land and to obtain an impression about 
the ways in which sales of land affected agricultural productivity.
There is no doubt that transfers of land are causing fragmentation. 
This is particularly obvious where a plot is subdivided and a part is 
transferred to another person. In such a case fragmentation automatic­
ally results where the transferee already owns land which is not con­
tiguous to the land transferred. In seventeen of the twenty-seven sub­
divisions investigated, the purchasers already owned land but in only 
one instance did a purchaser own land contiguous to the land purchased. 
In sixteen cases, therefore, the sub-division resulted in fragmentation 
of ownership; however it did not always result in fragmentation of use, 
since in five of the sixteen cases a father had bought the land for his 
son or sons to cultivate and set up house. In the remaining ten sub­
divisions the buyers owned no land of their own, although they may have
42. The problem of unregistered gifts of land is not discussed here.
It is extremely common for landowners to give land to their adult 
sons and this usually involves the subdivision of the family 
holding. Such subdivisions are rarely registered. This topic 
receives detailed treatment infra, pp. 304 _et seq.
had access to their fathers’ land, and therefore the subdivisions
resulted neither in fragmentation of ownership nor in fragmentation of
use. Indeed, three of the purchases were made by the same person and
consisted of contiguous parcels of land; thus a combination of owner-
4-3
ship had been effected de facto.
Where a whole plot is transferred, fragmentation of ownership will 
again result where the transferee already owns land which is not contig­
uous to the land transferred. In thirteen of the sixteen transfers 
investigated, the transferees already owned land but in only two cases 
was this land contiguous to the land transferred. Thus in the sub­
stantial majority of cases fragmentation of ownership has resulted, though 
not necessarily fragmentation of use; two of the transfers were cases 
where a father had given his son a fragment of land which that son was 
already developing and where he had built his home. In only three of 
the sixteen transfers investigated had the transferee previously owned 
no land of his own.
While the transfer of whole parcels of land will increase fragmenta­
tion of ownership to the extent that the transferees have other non- 
cont%uous land, it will of course reduce it insofaras the transferors 
will own fewer fragments. This is in fact what occurred in thirteen of 
the sixteen transfers; the transferors retained one or more parcels of 
land and the transfers had, from their point of view, resulted in less 
fragmentation of ownership. In the three remaining cases, the transfers 
had made the transferors landless.
43. Although the Registered Land Act 1963* s .25(1), provides for the 
combination of contiguous parcels in common ownership and their 
registration as a single parcel, the present writer never encoun­
tered an instance where this had occurred. Indeed there seems no 
good reason why the landowner should apply to the Registrar to take 
such steps.
There is little evidence, then, that transfers of whole plots result 
in increased fragmentation of ownership, since generally both transferor 
and transferee will have other land elsewhere. However, subdivisions are 
more common than transfers of whole plots and are likely to occur with 
increasing frequency in the future, and they do result in fragmentation 
of ownership in the majority of instances, though not necessarily in 
fragmentation of use. Even where fragmentation of use does occur, agri­
cultural productivity is not necessarily adversely affected. In the 
first place, where the purchaser of part of a plot already has land of 
his own, that land will seldom be far from the purchased land; of the 
sixteen subdivisions where purchasers already owned land, in nine 
instances that land was situated in the same adjudication section, in 
four instances in the same sub-location and in two instances in neigh­
bouring sub-locations. As far as distance is concerned, then, there is 
no reason why the purchased plots should be neglected. Secondly, the 
evidence suggests that the purchasers of plots tend to be wealthier and
44more progressive farmers than the vendors and while it is hard to 
generalise about the effect of a change of ownership on the development 
of a plot of land without knowing exactly how it was used before that 
change, one nevertheless gains the distinct impression that the change 
has been for the better. The purchaser would often have built a new 
house, erected fencing, planted cash-crops and employed labour to look 
after a farm which on the vendor's own admission had previously been 
unused or at least underdeveloped for one reason or another. It does
44. A more detailed examination of this evidence is carried out in 
the fourth section of this chapter, infra p.321.
happen, of course, that purchasers buy land as an investment or for their 
retirement and meanwhile neglect it, but such cases are rare in this area.
Where refragmentation is occurring, its effects may be aggravated by 
the customary rules of inheritance. According to these, if a person 
owned two plots of land of widely differing quality, it was only fair 
that his sons should each inherit a fraction of each plot. Over a couple 
of generations, of course, this practice would lead to a vast proliferation 
of smaller and smaller fragments and the complex pattern of landholding 
that had arisen in the Central Province by the mid-fifties. It is cer­
tainly too early to predict whether this will occur, but the indications 
are that it will not. One informant who owned two plots of land, one in 
a favoured position on the Nyabondo plateau and one in the dry, stony 
valley below, said that his sons would have to share each plot between 
them. This was, however, an isolated case. Land is no longer the sole 
or even the principal source of wealth in many families; it is likely in 
the future that the son who inherited the less fertile land would be 
compensated in other ways.
Finally it is necessary to say a few words about the situation in 
Gathinja. Here there is no danger of refragmentation. In the first 
place, there have been very few transfers of land; since land registra-
^5tion only thirteen transfers have been registered (an average of one 
a year) of which two were gifts. Secondly, they were all transfers of 
whole plots, the transferors always having some other land and the 
transferees usually having some. Finally, in four cases the transferee 
already owned land contiguous to the land transferred, while in seven 
cases the transferor lived in a distant location; in short, the overall
43. Only one unregistered outright sale was discovered.
pattern seems to be that Gathinja farmers are buying fragments of land 
in Gathinja sub-location from people who are residing and farming some 
distance away, presumably a desirable development.
To sum up this section it is suggested that the fragmentation of 
holdings is unlikely ever to become the problem it was in the Central 
Province in the mid-fifties. It is certainly likely to occur in those 
areas where the land market is active, but even there it will not 
necessarily have an adverse effect on the development of the land 
especially since it tends to be the better farmers who are accumulating 
fragments. Nevertheless, land consolidation ought to be seen as a con­
tinuous process and it ought to be the duty of agricultural officers 
in the field to encourage the exchange of fragments, where appropriate, 
in the same way that it is encouraged wherever land adjudication takes 
place.
(iii) Parcellation.
One cardinal principle governing land registration in Gathinja was 
that no person should be registered as the owner of more than one plot, 
though in a handful of cases an exception was made as further consolida­
tion proved impossible. One consequence of the strict application of 
this principle was that if a farmer wished to retain more than one of 
his fragments, he was obliged to have them registered in the names of 
other people. Most frequently he would have them registered in the names 
of his sons, but sometimes he would use his wife's name and very occasion­
ally the name of a friend on the understanding that he would later
reconvey it. More often the head of the household would agree to the 
consolidation of all his fragments into a single plot which would be 
registered in his name alone and which he would subsequently divide among 
his family. Indeed relatives would sometimes combine their plots and 
register them as a single holding in order to evade the original require­
ment that those owning less than a certain minimum acreage should live 
in villages away from their land. This requirement was eventually 
dropped and indeed it would have been impossible to enforce. The 
average size of registered plots in Gathinja was 2.02 acres sifter land 
consolidation and it remains the same today. Of the 328 plots in 
private ownership only three are more than ten acres in area while 
ninety-four are less than an acre. Needless to say, it is difficult 
to discover any undeveloped land. Land is in very short supply and 
consequently plots are farmed intensively. With the coffee boom one 
first-class farmer claimed that it was possible to make a net profit 
of 3,000 shillings per acre from coffee, but an income of this nature 
is no longer adequate today when, for example, the fees (including the 
cost of school uniform) for a good secondary school in the rural areas 
may approach 1,000 shillings a year. To meet this sort of commitment 
the small farmer requires alternative sources of income.
The picture becomes rather bleaker when one comes to consider the 
number of people who live on these tiny plots and who depend on them 
for the basic necessities of life. The survival of polygamy and of 
the customary law relating to the allocation and inheritance of land 
is likely to cause increasingly severe pressure on the land and this 
process will be accelerated as the familiar vicious circle begins to 
operate, farm profits declining as the number of people dependent on
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such profits increases, credit becoming harder to raise as plots become 
smaller and more congested.
Polygamy is rare in Gathinja today. Of the seventy-four informants 
only six had two wives and only one had three, none having more than 
three. Moreover they were all older men, many of them grandfathers 
several times over. Polygamy is clearly dying out in this area and 
while it is difficult to isolate any single reason for this, there can 
be no doubt that the early activity of the missions around Gathinja and, 
in particular, the early growth of mission schools have played an import­
ant part. While traditionally the head of the household would allocate 
land to each wife, the sons of each wife expecting to receive a share 
of their mother’s land, this had in fact occurred in only two cases.
In the other cases the landowner had refrained from subdividing his 
land according to houses, no doubt because subdivisions of this sort 
tend to reduce farm efficiency.
Even though polygamy may have died out in Gathinja, families con­
tinue to be large, the provision of health services in the rural areas 
being considerably more successful than the organisation of family 
planning programmes. Taking into account the fact that some of my 
informants or their sons had other holdings in Gathinja, information 
gathered by the present writer suggests that each plot is occupied by 
an average of eight persons. This figure includes men who have gone 
to work elsewhere but have left their families behind on the plot. It 
is true that a figure of this kind leaves a lot of questions unanswered, 
but it does give some indication of the congestion which has started to 
occur in this area. . One or two examples may serve to demonstrate the 
human reality that underlies this figure.
Thomas Kamau has two wives and at the time of land consolidation he 
had registered one of his plots in his own name and gone to live there 
with his younger wife; his other plot he had allotted to his first wife 
and it was registered in the name of his eldest son hy this wife, Jackson. 
Today this plot is occupied by Jackson, his mother, his wife and son, his 
two brothers (one of whom is married and has three sons and one daughter), 
his sister and her six illegitimate children (three male and three 
female). In all there are eighteen people living on the plot. However 
Jackson is relatively fortunate; he is employed as an agricultural 
officer and he has a shop in the village, bought largely with loans 
raised by charging his plot. Moreover the plot is nearly six acres large, 
a sizeable plot by Gathinja standards, and it is largely planted with 
coffee. The plot has not yet been subdivided on the ground between
bGJackson and his brothers, but it was made quite clear that it would 
eventually be subdivided between Jackson's sons and nephews, including 
his sister's illegitimate sons, in accordance with Kikuyu customary 
customary law. On the reasonable assumption that he is likely to have 
more sons and many more nephews, the conversion of a single prosperous 
coffee plantation into a large number of tiny parcels planted with food 
crops emerges as a real possibility.
Jackson was lucky in that he had off-the-farm sources of income 
and a relatively large plot of land. David Njoroge was less fortunate; 
although his holding is 3*9 acres, his income derives entirely from 
the profits he makes on his coffee and he has been blessed with an 
exceptionally large family. He has two wives, of whom one gave him
b6. One brother has regular employment, the other works as a casual 
labourer.
four sons and two daughters and the other four sons and four daughters. 
All his sons by his wife are married and have fathered seven grandsons; 
one of his duaghters (unmarried) has produced another grandson for him. 
The plot has been subdivided between the houses and each married son has 
been allotted his own piece of land where he lives with his family. None 
of the sons have regular jobs though some work as casual labourers on 
neighbouring farms. David Njoroge is likely to have many more grandsons 
with a claim to a share in the land and if it continues to be subdivided 
according to Kikuyu customary law and if they continue to take up 
residence on their parcels, it is not fanciful to imagine that, after 
the passing of a generation, David's coffee plantation will have been 
replaced by some twelve or fifteen quarter-of-an-acre plots each with 
a house and a few rows of maize.
No example could be wholly typical of the land situation in Gathinja 
today, but the cases of Jackson and David do illustrate the sort of 
problems that are beginning to appear and the sort of outcome that is 
likely to occur if solutions to these problems are not devised. The 
parcellation of land is attributable to the persistence of the customary 
law relating to the allocation and inheritance of land. According to 
Kikuyu customary law, when a man married, he would be allocated a piece 
of land by the mbari elders, though latterly by his father, where he 
would build his home and start farming on his own account. When a man 
died, such land as he had not distributed during his lifetime would be 
divided among his sons, account being taken of any such distribution.
His eldest son would generally be the Muramati, that is, the person 
charged with distributing the deceased's property and providing for his 
widow or widows and any unmarried daughters. Such a system worked well
as long as land was plentiful and crops were planted on an annual basis, 
but as pressure on the land increased and a more settled form of agricul­
ture was adopted, the system was bound to result in the division of land 
into smaller and smaller parcels.
While the existence of this problem has been appreciated for some
time, no effective solution has as yet been devised even though various
attempts have been made by statute t) regulate the parcellation of land.
One device has been to determine the minimum acreage required to make
a holding in a given area economically viable and to prohibit the
b7
registration of holdings which are smaller than this minimum. Thus 
the Land Control Act 19^7 provides that a land control board ought 
generally to refuse its consent to the division of land into two or 
more parcels where the division would be likely to reduce the product-
b8ivity of the land. The local agricultural officer, often himself 
a member of the board, will generally assess what the minimum acreage 
should be for that particular locality. This system has not proved 
very effective. In the first place, it is useless to set minimum 
acreages without taking into account the number of people who live on 
the land and depend on it for their livelihood. Secondly, the minimum 
acreages set in many areas, including the two field-areas, exceed 
(often by a considerable amount) the average size of holdings at the 
end of land registration. Thirdly, land control boards in practice 
tend to ignore such considerations; even where a board does refuse its
b7. This policy was recommended in the East Africa Royal Commission, 
1955-1955, Report (Cmd.9^75, 1955), Ch.23, para.29.
b8. S.9d)(b)(iv). For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see
infra - pp. 356 et seq. Where succession does not result in the 
division of the land into two or more parcels to be held under 
separate titles, the consent of the land control board is not 
required; ibid., s.6 (3 )(a).
consent to a subdivision, ways have been discovered to evade the con­
sequences of such refusal. Finally, it is extremely rare for subdivi­
sions to be brought before the land control boards. Where a person has 
agreed to subdivide his land and sell one part to another, the trans­
action is likely to be submitted to the local board for obvious reasons. 
However where a landowner divides his land among his sons and even where 
on the death of a landowner his sons divide his land, the parties involved 
will frequently have no interest either in applying to the land control 
board or in registering the subdivision. Since the Gathinja register 
was opened, only ten successions have been registered and no subdivisions 
at all. Yet the vast majority of plots support at least two households 
and in such cases some sort of informal subdivision has been made on 
the ground. This impression is confirmed by another researcher who has 
written that "an examination of the cultivated areas reveals the pre­
sence of traditional boundary marks indicating that illegal subdivision 
b-9is taking place." Indeed one writer discovered that many disputes
were arising in Kisii between farmers cultivating separately within a
single registered holding and, where the landowners worked away from
home, between their families, but that such disputes were rarely taken 
50to the courts. This situation does not appear, however, to have
arisen as yet in either of the field-areas investigated.
Another attempt to control land pareellation was made by the 
Registered Land Act 1963 which empowers the Minister of Lands and
b9. D.R.F. Taylor, "Agricultural change in Kikuyuland'* in Environment 
and land use in Africa , M.F. Thomas and G.W. Whittington (eds.), 
(Methuen, 19^9), p.4§0.
30. R.J.A. Wilson (1971), op. cit., p.7-
Settlement to prescribe for any registration section the maximum number
of persons who are allowed to be registered in the same register as 
51proprietors and provides that until he does so prescribe, no dealing
shall be registered which, if registered, would have the effect of
52
vesting any parcel of land in more than five proprietors. As the 
Minister does not seem to have taken advantage of his statutory powers, 
the effect of section 101 is to prevent the registration of more than 
five coproprietors. Of course this is partly a device to facilitate 
conveyancing and to ensure that the land registers are not cluttered 
up. However the fact that the Minister may prescribe different 
maximum numbers of coproprietors for different areas clearly indicates 
that this section was primarily designed to prevent the unending divi­
sion of land into smaller parcels. Moreover provision is made for the 
compensation of an heir who is prevented by this section from being 
registered as the coproprietor of land to which he is entitled under 
customary law. The court may order that such compensation be secured
53
by way of charge on the share of the person who has benefitted.
As a device for the prevention of land parcellation this has not 
proved very successful. In the first place, it is hardly a very sat­
isfactory solution that heirs should be compensated with other pro­
perty. More often than not the land will constitute the principal if 
not the only asset of the estate. The development of the land may suffer 
if the proprietors are obliged to find money to pay the heirs who have
51. S.1#l(3)(a).
52. Ibid., s.101(4).
33. Ibid., s.120(7)(a).
been excluded from a share of the land; if the land has already been 
charged with the payment of compensation, it is highly unlikely that 
any lending agencies will advance loans on the security of the land. 
Suing for the payment of compensation may be costly and complicated.
Secondly, equity provides a means of avoiding the implications 
of the rule that no more than five persons may be registered as the 
proprietors of any parcel of land. Where, for example, a man dies 
leaving eight sons all of whom are entitled to a share of his land 
under customary law, the court may simply direct that the five older 
sons be registered as co-proprietors holding the land on trust for 
themselves and their three younger brothers. This sort of device is
of course familiar in English law where since 1925 co-ownership has
54
given rise to a statutory trust for sale. Nevertheless it is slightly 
odd to find the Chief Land Registrar of Kenya recommending the use of 
this device and instructing district land registrars, in cases where
there are more than five heirs, to register the first five as trustees
55
and to enter a restriction on the title to that effect. Moreover,
where land is conveyed inter vivos to more than five persons, a trust
presumably arises.
It will be appreciated, however, that the main reason why section
101(4) of the Registered Land Act 19&3 ^as no  ^proved very effective
56
is that so few successions are ever registered. Perhaps the rule 
54. Law of Property Act 1925? s.34.
55• Republic of Kenya, Chief Land Registrar, Practice instruction, 
(March 13th 1973).
56. This problem is fully discussed in Chapter V, supra, pp. 221 
et seq.
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restricting the number of co-proprietors is partly responsible for this, 
though it does not seem very likely.
57Where the Law of Succession Act 1972 comes into operation, 
customary law will cease to apply to registered land unless the land­
owner makes a will expressing his desire that it should apply. Succe­
ssion to registered land will, like succession to all other forms of 
property, be governed by the Act. The Commission on the Law of Succe­
ssion felt that the new law of succession should "help the implementa­
tion of the land consolidation and registration programme, and prevent
58the uneconomic subdivision and fragmentation of land holdings.” In
fact the provisions of the Act do little to achieve these goals nor
indeed was it necessary that they should, given the existing provisions
of the Registered Land Act 1963 the Land Control Act 1967 discussed 
59above. It is true that, where the deceased leaves a widow and child­
ren, the widow may exercise her power to appointment in a way which 
ensures the preservation of the land as an economic unit, but this is 
very unlikely to occur, at any rate where land constitutes the major 
part of the deceased's estate.
Since attempts to prevent by statute the uneconomic parcellation 
of land have largely failed, it remains to consider the extent to 
which land registration has created a situation where the owners of 
plots that are not economically viable are prepared to sell them to 
bigger farmers in a position to develop them more effectively; after
57* For a detailed discussion of this Act see supra, pp. 228 et seq. 
58. Succession Report, para. 15- 
59* Supra, pp. 309 _et seq.
all, this was commonly seen to he the consequence of the establishment 
of a land market free from customary restrictions on alienation. In 
fact, the very opposite seems to be the case. As far as it is possible 
to generalise, it would appear that the smaller the amount of land which 
a person owns the more reluctant he becomes to sell it. In Gathinja, 
where the average size of holdings is about two acres and where there 
are very few holdings of more than ten acres, an average of one sale 
of land has occurred each year since land registration and in every 
case the seller owned other land, often in a distant location. Sales 
of land, both outright and redeemable, were much more common before 
land registration. It is arguable that in areas of intense pressure 
on the land, like Gathinja, the effect of the land reform programme 
has been to destroy the land market that existed by making it more 
difficult for potential sellers to find land in other districts where 
they can settle. While formerly a person might simply migrate to a 
neighbouring district where land was more plentiful and find some 
unoccupied land where he might settle, today he would be obliged to 
pay for such land. Moreover the districts where land is plentiful 
tend to be the less favoured agricultural areas where the soils are 
poor or the climate unsuitable or access to markets difficult, and 
they may require the adoption of different farming techniques. Never­
theless, farmers in Gathinja are very keen to buy land elsewhere and 
in the course of his interviews the present writer encountered four 
instances where farmers had succeeded in obtaining plots on settlement 
schemes and six instances where farmers had purchased land in other 
smallholder areas.
However the vast majority of landowners has only one piece of 
farmland. They can neither afford to buy more nor to sell what they
have, and so the parcellation of holdings continues. While parcellation 
has not yet reached catastrophic proportions, there are already signs 
of the way in which things are going to develop. Formerly, when a man 
married, he would be allocated a piece of land where he would build his 
house and start farming on his own account. Today residence patterns are 
beginning to change and it is becoming usual for married sons to live on 
their father's compound, thus saving valuable land. Even so, increasing 
numbers of coffee trees are being uprooted to make room for houses and 
for the food crops necessary to feed the increasing number of people 
dependent on the farm. Farmers are, of course, fully aware of the 
dangers of parcellation and, where possible, continue farming the land 
as a single unit, though informal boundaries will be made on the ground 
between the shares of the various households. If a landowner has other 
kinds of property, he will often leave his land to one son and share 
his other property among the rest; thus one farmer plans to give his 
farm to one son, his shop to another and his shares to another. If 
one son has a well-paid job off the farm, he may disclaim all rights 
of inheritance to the farm in favour of his less fortunate brothers.
In the majority of cases, however, neither the landowner nor his
sons have substantial sources of wealth off the farm and in such cases
the landowner regretfully admits the inevitability of parcellation.
Although it has been suggested that, where there is only one economic
60
unit, it should be inherited by only one heir, any such steps would 
be dangerous and ineffective. As long as land remains the main source 
of a man's wealth, his sons will continue to assert their traditional
60. See, for example, the Report by the sub-committee of the Kenya 
African Affairs Committee, "Land titles in native land units," 
1950 J.A.A., Vol II, No.2, p.19, at p.21.
rights of inheritance. Sorrenson writes that "if the landowners do try
to hand over their land to only one heir, without making alternative
provision for the others, they may find that they have another revolt
61
of the young, embittered men on their hands." A man is expected to 
provide land for all his sons and the consequences may indeed be grave 
if he fails in his duty. In one instance encountered by the present 
writer, where a father had died leaving his sons landless, they exacted 
a terrible punishment on him; they exhumed his corpse and burnt it, 
thus symbolically killing him a second time.
The foregoing discussion of parcellation has concentrated on
Gathinja sub-location where the problem is arising in a particularly
62
acute form. The various attempts to solve the problem by statute 
have been considered and particular attention has been given to the 
role of the land market as a regulatory device. The situation in 
Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro is not so critical, largely because 
pressure on the land is not so strong. At the time of land registra­
tion, the average size of holdings was about five acres. Families 
tend to be as large as in Gathinja and polygamy is more frequent. The 
land is not so intensively developed as in Gathinja and there is a 
certain amount of buying and selling of small parcels. Nevertheless 
it is probable that Gathinja's experience will be repeated here; the 
parcellation of holdings will increase and as the intensive develop­
ment of plots is undertaken to meet the new situation, so the land
61. M.P.K. Sorrenson, "Counter-revolution to Mau-Mau: land consolida­
tion in Kikuyuland 1952-1960," East African Institute of Social 
Research, unpublished paper, 1963? P-13-
62. It is estimated that in 1969 more than 50$ of registered small 
holdings in Kenya were less than two hectares and more than 80$ 
were less than five hectares: Statistical Abstract, 1970i table 
79 (a).
market will begin to stagnate. It seems that Gathinja on the one hand 
and Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro on the other are simply at 
different stages on a line of development along which most of the 
better agricultural areas are doomed to pass. This is the theme which 
the last section of this chapter will elaborate.
km Socio-economic change in rural society.
(i) General.
Swynnerton thought that one of the consequences of land registra­
tion would be the creation of a landed and a landless class in the 
63rural areas. Farms would become larger and better developed as the 
bigger farmers bought up the smaller farmers, the latter apparently 
finding work in the towns or as agricultural labourers. Perhaps some 
such development was envisaged as took place in England after the 
enclosures, when many small farmers sold up and migrated to the towns 
to join the labour force necessary to bring about the Industrial 
Revolution. Those who remained were compelled either to work on the 
larger farms that were emerging or to exploit the commercial opport­
unities that closer links between town and country had provided. The 
result was that differentiation on socio-economic lines because more 
marked.
63. See supra, p. 297.
318.
The situation in Kenya is obviously different. There is no 
Industrial Revolution nor is one ever likely to occur. Certainly the 
industrial sector of the economy is expanding, but the country has few 
raw materials and will always have to depend heavily on its agricultural 
sector. The ranks of the unemployed and the underemployed increase 
annually, the number of new employment opportunities being constantly 
exceeded by the number of new people looking for them. However, in 
spite of the inaccuracy of the parallel with post-enclosure England, 
it is interesting to trace the evolution of rural society over the 
past fifteen or twenty years and to test the correctness of Swynnerton's 
prediction. Ideally such a study should be undertaken by a person 
trained in anthropology and political science and should cover all 
aspects of the society's development. Nevertheless an examination of 
land tenure and land use does provide valuable insights into this 
question. It will now be possible to look in a new light at some of 
the economic issues raised earlier in this chapter, to bring together 
some themes outlined there and to hazard some generalisations about 
the future.
(ii) Exploitation of economic opportunities.
Long before independence, even before land consolidation was 
started in the Central Province, there had emerged a number of people 
in both field-areas who were extremely interested in developing their 
farms and making use of such agricultural services as existed during 
the colonial period. A variety of. reasons would explain why these
particular people took this interest; more often than not their fathers 
had distinguished themselves from their neighbours by their wealth or 
the favour they found with the administration or their industry or 
simply their luck. The sons of these fathers would have access to 
education where they would at least learn the rudiments of English, 
arithmetic and agricultural science. A very few might go on to higher 
education and jobs in town; the majority would remain in the rural 
areas where they were in a unique position to take advantage of all 
the opportunities that began to arise after the second world war.
These are the men who first enclosed their lands, who first experimented 
with coffee and other cash-crops, who first championed the land reform 
programme, who first started to accumulate land, who first enjoyed 
off-the-farm sources of income. It is hard to know how to categorise 
these men without distorting reality and it seems best, though not 
wholly satisfactory, to call them the "better farmers". This is the 
term to be used for the remainder of this chapter.
Just as it was the "better farmers" who responded most to the aid 
and advice provided by the agricultural services during the colonial 
period, so today it is they who benefit most from the agricultural 
services of independent Kenya. They invite extension workers to their 
farms and no doubt the latter enjoy the company of farmers to whom 
they can talk on fairly equal terms and who are likely to profit from 
their advice. The concentration of extension workers on the "better
6kfarmers" has already been discussed; suffice to add here that one
6k. Supra, p. 281.
report surveying all the existing literature on the subject holds that
63
"evidence from all over Kenya" confirms this view point.
It is the same farmers who tend to attract loans both from the
66
commercial banks and from government agencies. The subsidised loans 
system which the government operates through the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation tends to favour the better farmers in two ways. In the first 
place, it is the credit-worthiness of the applicant that is the prin­
cipal consideration rather than his need or the proprotionate increase 
in productivity that the loan; is likely to bring about. Secondly, 
loan applications require the cooperation and the support of the local 
agricultural officer who in turn is more likely to promote the interests 
of those whose farms he visits, whose farming methods he approves and 
whose education and know-how he shares. Similarly, the banks regard 
the credit-worthiness of the applicant for a loan as the prime criterion 
and tend in practice only to advance loans to people who enjoy off-the- 
farm incomes. These tend to be the better farmers, for they are the 
ones who have had access to an education which qualifies them for 
government posts and they are the ones whose farm profits enable them 
to invest in non-agricultural activities like shops, transport business 
and even residential property.
It is the same "better farmers" who have benefitted from the 
existence of a land market. This is particularly evident in areas 
where there is no great pressure on the land, like Kabete-Obuya and 
Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro. In these areas it seems that there were relatively
63. G.M. Ruigu and J. Ascroft, "Land policy and the small-scale 
farmer," University of Nairobi, Institute for Development 
Studies, Working Paper No.33 (unpublished), March 1972, p.2.
66. Credit is discussed more fully in part II of this Chapter, 
supra, pp. 27k et seq.
few land transactions before land registration, partly because there
existed "unowned land" in the neighbourhood where those with little
land to cultivate could settle and partly because traditional controls
on the alienation of land still operated to some extent. Nevertheless
sales of land did take place and with the approach of land consolidation
and registration some farmers exchanged plots and some bought plots.
These were always the "better farmers", that is, those who had some
understanding of the meaning of the land reform programme. This, at
least, is the impression given by the rather scanty information it was
67
possible to gather on sales of land before registration. Such a view 
is plausible when one remembers that at that stage it was only the 
"better farmers" who had access to cash in the necessary quantities.
In one of the six cases that it was possible to investigate such a 
farmer had, it seems, spent *f,000 shillings buying land around his 
farm; this is a relatively large sum even today, but in the late fifties 
it demonstrated considerable wealth on the part of the purchaser. Even 
more interesting is that in three cases richer farmers had advanced 
loans to their poorer neighbours, who had later transferred some of 
their land to the lender on finding themselves unable to repay. In 
this way those with a shrewder idea of the value of land were able to 
accumulate quite large tracts.
Even though today farmers are much more conscious of the value 
of land, sales of whole plots or of parts of plots are relatively 
common and it is interesting to consider the identity of the vendors
67- The accumulation of land by certain individuals was occurring in
Kikuyuland on a considerable scale long before the land consolida­
tion programme was implemented. Thus the Rev. L.J. Beecher is 
reported as saying that "the protection which the African needed 
was not so much from the alienation of his land to non-native 
peoples as protection from the gradual process of abuse whereby 
increasingly large tracts of land were becoming alienated into 
the lands of privileged and powerful fellow-Africans." Quoted 
in A. Phillips, Report on Native Tribunals (19^5)1 para. 1^3-
and purchasers and the reasons for their selling or buying. It was 
possible to investigate forty-one such sales in the area, of which 
twenty-eight were registered and thirteen unregistered. In thirty-six 
cases the purchasers had off-the-farm incomes and in two of the remain­
ing five cases the purchasers were wealthy farmers (one being the son 
of an ex-chief, the other the brother of a sub-chief); in only three 
cases were the purchasers what one might term ordinary farmers. These 
figures are striking when it is remembered that no more than a quarter
of the landowners in the area, at the most generous estimate, has or ,
68has ever had an off-the-farm income. Reasons for purchasing land 
vary. In many cases the purchasers feel they have insufficient land 
especially where they have a number of sons for whom they have to 
provide. Land may also be seen as a good investment, especially where 
the land is undeveloped and alternative channels of investment are 
few.
Wherever a land market exists, the same process seems to be 
occurring and inasmuchas land registration has stimulated the dev­
elopment of a land market, it has contributed to the pattern of land- 
holding which is emergirgin those areas. Discussing the refragmenta­
tion of holdings that is occurring in tie Nyeri District of Central 
Province, one writer stresses that "the circumstances are different
this time because it is the more prosperous farmers who now tend to
69have more than one unconnected piece of land in tie same area."
68. Twenty-five of the sixty-eight landowners interviewed fell into 
this category but the proportion this indicates grossly distorts 
the true situation since interviewees were selected partly on the 
grounds that they had charged or purchased land.
69. Ascroft, "The Tetu Extension Pilot Project", University of 
Nairobi, unpublished paper presented at the Workshop on strategies 
for improving rural welfare, May 31st 1971? p.21.
Another writer found that 70$ of the land in the Kiambu District of the
same province had been purchased by the present owners who tended to be
70young bureaucrats and traders.
If it is the richer farmers who tend to be buying land, the identity 
and motives of the vendors are no less clear. In Kabete-Obuya and 
Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro twenty-six sales of parts of plots were investigated.
In four cases the purchase-money was invested, twice in the purchase 
of a shop, twice in the purchase of oxen. In a further three cases the 
sellers owned large farms but had little or no family to work or inherit 
them. However, in nineteen of the twenty-six cases the sellers were 
poor people in need of an immediate cash sum. This was required for 
a variety of purposes, sometimes to pay hospital or school fees, some­
times to raise the necessary brideprice and sometimes simply to buy 
food. In none of the twenty-six cases did the sellers have off-the- 
farm sources of income.
When one comes to consider the fifteen sales of whole plots invest­
igated in the area, the picture is only slightly different. In the 
case of twelve of these sales, the sellers had land elsewhere and it 
is rather harder to disentangle their motives. Certainly six claimed, 
as their main reason, that they had sufficient land elsewhere and that 
the distances involved made it uneconomical to retain the plot they had 
sold. Seven others admitted that they had sold in order to raise some 
cash to meet some pressing demand (e.g. fees, brideprice). Of the 
three sellers who had been made landless, one had sold his plot in order 
to buy food and he had taken his wife and two children to live with his 
brother; the other two (one of whom had sold his plot to raise a bride-
70. J.G. Karuga, "Land transactions in Kiambu", University of Nairobi, 
Institute for Development Studies, Working Paper No.38 (unpublished), 
August 1972, p.19-
price) had also gone to live with their brothers. Only two of the 
fifteen sellers had off-the-farm incomes.
As far as one can judge, there has been an increase in the average 
number of sales per annum in Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro since 
the land registers were opened and this increase can be attributed, at 
least in part, to land registration. The effect of these s.ales has 
been that the richer farmers have accumulated land at the expense of 
the poorer farmers and it might be thought that in the course of time 
all the land would be owned by a small group of wealthy farmers, all 
those who had been made landless being obliged to seek work as farm 
labourers or in the towns. This, of course, is what Swynnerton pre­
dicted, but research in Gathinja suggests that the position is not 
quite so simple. In Gathinja there are virtually no sales of land at 
all and it is interesting to speculate why the land market in one field- 
area is fairly active while in the other much more developed area it 
has almost ceased to exist. The reply to this question proposes the 
theory that there is a line of development through which all the 
agricultural areas of Kenya pass and that Gathinja has simply reached 
a further stage than Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro; it is possible 
that in, say, fifteen years time the latter areas will have reached 
the same stage as Gathinja today.
The less pressure that exists on the land, the greater the increase 
in the number of sales after land registration; where there is some 
pressure on the land as in Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro, the 
land market will be less active. Where sales of land do occur, it 
will be the richer farmers who purchase land from the poorer farmers. 
However, unless they have plots elsewhere, the vendors will almost
invariably retain some land. They will subdivide their plots and sell 
off parts of them in order to raise some cash, but the smaller the plots 
that remain the more reluctant they are to sell. This stage has been 
reached in Gathinja where there is considerable pressure on the land; 
the plots are small and support an increasingly large number of people, 
but the prediction that farmers would sell up their small, uneconomic 
plots to their richer neighbours has not been fulfilled. Land sales 
are very rare and the pattern of holdings remains much as it was when 
the first registry map was drawn up. Insofaras the richer farmers 
accumulated land at the expense of the poorer, and evidence of this is 
strong though largely circumstantial, it was done in the years prior 
to land registration.
This section of the present chapter has attempted to show that 
there emerged during the post-war period a group of people, loosely 
called "better farmers", whose fathers had in many cases succeeded in 
exploiting the new opportunities offered by colonial rule. The "better 
farmers", it has been argued, manipulated to their own advantage the 
various institutions established both before and after independence 
to promote agricultural development. It is they who appreciated the 
nature of land consolidation and registration and the benefits likely 
to result from these policies; it is they who profit from the creation 
of a market in land; it is they who receive most help from the agricul­
tural extension services and it is they who attract credit from the 
various lending agencies. The process is cumulative; the rich become 
richer at an increasingly faster rate and the poor become poorer at 
a similar rate. In the following section the effect of this process 
on social structure is considered and some predictions as to possible 
future developments hazarded.
(iii) Changes in the social structure.
Hardly a day passes in Kenya without one newspaper or another
referring to the pitiful plight, of the landless on the one hand and
71the scandal of land accumulation on the other. While, however, it
has long been recommended that holdings above a certain size should be 
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prohibited and indeed a motion to that effect has been put before
73the National Assembly, no ceiling on landholdings has ever been 
imposed. It seems, though, that the outcry has generally been directed 
at the accumulation of land in the former White Highlands by prominent 
Kenyan politicians and civil servants; the fact that 300 acres was the 
land ceiling suggested in the debates on the Land Control Bill 1967 
would certainly indicate that this is the case. Nevertheless it is 
arguable that the accumulation of land throughout Kenya by national 
figures is parallelled by the accumulation of land in the former 
Special Areas by prominent figures of the locality and that develop­
ments in East Kadianga sublocation , for example, mirror, in micro­
cosm, developments in Kenya as a whole.
The gradual accumulation of land and other sources of wealth in 
the hands of a relatively small group of farmers in the two field- 
areas has been described in the previous section of this chapter. It 
has had two closely inter-related consequences. On the one hand, an 
increasing proportion of the "better farmers" work and sometimes live
71. The following extract is fairly typical. "It is being said that 
recently some dignitaries got together and decided to allocate the 
free land along the Ngong Hills. Some of those who were given land 
already own many acres; others have acquired a number of shambas 
all over the district. There are many genuine landless people at 
Ngong who need greater consideration whenever there is free land to 
be distributed to wananchi". Daily Nation, November 6th 1973*
72. See e.g. the Report by the subcommittee of the Kenya African Affairs 
Committee, "Land titles in native land units", 1950 -J.A.A.. Vol II, 
No.2, p.19 at p.21 and the East Africa Royal Commission, 1933-19331 
Report (Cmd.9^73, 1933), ch.23, para.33.
73. Republic of Kenya, National Assembly Debates, 19&7> Vol.11, col.
20. An amendment to the Land Control Bill 1967 to similar effect 
was equally unsuccessful; ibid., 1967-8 Vol.13i col.2763.
away from their land, leaving their families or employed labourers to 
look after their farms. On the other hand, the poorer farmers are find­
ing it increasingly difficult to support their growing families on their 
plots and while they will rarely be induced to sell their plots, more 
and more members of these families will be obliged to seek paid employ­
ment elsewhere. Some will go to try their luck in Nairobi or the nearby 
town* others will work as labourers on the farms of their richer neigh­
bours. Work on coffee plantations is only seasonal and it is particularly 
at picking time that labour is needed; at this time the men, women and 
children of the poorer families can earn enough to tide them over a few 
months.
Even in the early days of land consolidation it was envisaged that
the poorer farmers would provide a source of labour for the richer ones.
Discussing the abortive villagisation policy, one administrative officer
wrote that "the progressive farmer with an economic holding must sooner
rather than later return to live on his land... A small labour force
will be required by these farmers and this can best be provided by
7blocal villagers with little or no land of their own." While in 
Kabete-Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro the employment of labour is not very 
widespread, the evidence suggests that it is likely to increase as the 
richer farmers acquire more land and the poorer farmers find it harder 
to live off their farms. Of the sixty-eight landowners interviewed, 
twelve employed labour on a permanent basis, usually only one labourer
7b. O.E.B. Hughes, "Villages in the Kikuyu Country", J.A.A., Vol VII, 
No.^ (1933), p.170.
75but in one case as many as four. All twelve landowners would be 
immediately recognisable as forming the core of the group of "better 
farmers". Eleven of them have off-the-farm incomes and two of them 
live away from their farms. The labourers they employ are not land­
less, strictly speaking. They all have access to land in the neigh­
bourhood, but their plots are small enough or their families large 
enough to enable them to work elsewhere during the daytime; as far as 
could be ascertained, most (if not all) of the labourers went home at 
night.
The situation in Gathinja is fairly similar. Eight of the 
farmers interviewed employ labour on a permanent basis generally for 
the purpose of looking after grade cattle. All eight farmers have at 
least one off-the-farm source of income and two of them live away from 
their farms. Again the labourers are local people from families which 
do not own much land. The seasonal employment of labour, particularly 
at the time of coffee-picking, is much more widespread. No fewer 
than forty-eight of the seventy-four farmers interviewed employ labour 
at this time, sometimes as many as twenty workers. As the coffee- 
picking period is extremely short, the competition for labour is harsh. 
It is hard to assess the extent to which casual labour of this kind is 
paid in cash rather than organised between families on a reciprocal 
basis. Nevertheless, the person with little land is provided with the 
opportunity to earn money locally at certain times of the year, not 
only when coffee needs to be weeded or picked, but whenever one of his
75* The proportion of farmers who employ labour is, of course, much 
smaller than these figures suggest since the majority of the 
better farmers was interviewed. Certainly no more than twenty 
farmers in this field-area would employ labour on a permanent 
basis.
richer neighbours requires help on his farm. It is doubtful, however, 
whether this opportunity will continue to exist for very long. In areas, 
like Gathinja, where sales of land are rare, the size of holdings remains 
constant and consequently the better farmers are likely to need less 
labour as their families grow. This in turn will force the poorer farmers 
or their sons to leave the locality in search of work elsewhere, work 
which it is becoming increasingly difficult to find. These people may 
never return home; they may drift into one of the shanty-towns that 
have sprouted up around Nairobi and there they may succeed in eking out 
a marginal living. Although they may be entitled to a plot of land in 
their home areas, their links and their families' links with these areas 
become weaker. They are in a sense landless.
It is tempting to analyse in class terms the increasing stratifica­
tion of rural society that has been described in the course of this 
chapter. Certainly the group of "better farmers" could be identified 
as an embryonic rural middle class. It is in their hands that 
economic and political power in the rural areas is concentrated and, 
paradoxically, it is by virtue of their success in exploiting the new 
opportunities that they are allocated an important role in what remains 
of the traditional structure of society. One historian of Kenya 
writes: "Divisions based on the ownership of property began to emerge
in the fifties whenever the consolidation of land took place. Such 
economic divisions tended to overlap political divisions: official 
chiefs, for example, tended to become a propertied class." This 
is no doubt true, but today it is possible to find the opposite process 
occurring; persons who enjoy no traditional legitimacy but who have 
succeeded in Western terms will be accorded great respect by their
76. C. Gertzel, The politics of independent Kenya, 1963-8 (Nairobi, 
East Africa Publishing House and Heinemann, 1970), p.12.
kinship groups and consulted on all family matters. To put it crudely, 
they have a foot in both societies and are capable of manipulating both 
societies to their own ends. However, it is difficult to describe them 
as a class as long as traditional institutions and values survive and 
loyalty to the family, the clan and the tribe retains its present 
importance. Patron-client relationships based on locally circumscribed 
loyalties of this kind cut across the links derived from a shared socio­
economic situation which unite the "better farmers."
Lower down the scale it becomes more difficult to identify strata 
in rural society. On current trends it is possible to predict that the 
better farmers will expand their holdings and will employ as farm-labourers 
those who have been made landless as a result; even tenant-farming may 
become more common, though there is little sign of this at present. 
Differentiation on these lines has not yet occurred, but growing pres­
sure on the land is bound to lead to the emergence of a rural proletariat. 
Moreover, the interests of the poorer farmers are increasingly being 
articulated through the political process and while they may not yet 
perceive themselves as a class whose interests conflict with those of 
the "better farmers", the growing disparities of economic and political 
power will not long go unheeded. Leys puts the point well when he writes 
that "... a cumulative process of differential recruitment into the 
salaried and landownirg classes is at work whose consequences will be
77felt in the next generation much more keenly than they are now."
77« C. Leys, "Politics in Kenya: the Development of Peasant Society", 
University of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies, 
Discussion Paper No. 102 (unpublished), December 1970, p.23«
(iv) Some case studies.
The present writer has neither the skills nor the information to 
attempt an analysis in class terms of rural society in Kenya and the 
comments made in the previous section are highly tentative, being based 
on evidence which is necessarily incomplete. It is, however, unlikely 
that patterns of land holding and land use do not provide a fairly reliable 
indication of the way in which rural society is evolving and it is pro­
posed to close this chapter with a number of case-studies selected to 
illustrate the arguments that have been put forward in the course there­
of.
Peter Onyango is a vigorous, efficient-looking man in his mid­
sixties. He has a large, decently-furnished brick house on Nyabondo 
which is approached by a tree-lined path. His English is good and as 
he talks, he has a shrewd twinkle in his eye. His lucky day came fifty 
years ago when his uncle, the locational chief, was asked to nominate 
a young man to go to the provincial agricultural college. The chief 
nominated his nephew, Peter, then a youth who had recently completed 
his primary education. Peter studied agriculture for four years and 
in 1928 was employed by the government as an agricultural instructor.
After the war he devoted himself entirely to developing his farm which 
he gradually extended by judicious purchases and exchanges, apparently 
spending no less than ^,000 shillings on purchases of adjoining farms
rpO
at the time of land consolidation. He was the first farmer to grow 
coffee on the plateau and one of the earliest to espouse the land con­
solidation programme. The colonial government sent him to other parts
78. Today he has a twenty-seven acre farm, one of the largest in the
location.
of Kenya to see how the programme worked and he was appointed chairman 
of the first consolidation committee. It is alleged that he took bribes 
in any case, the first consolidation programme was not successful and 
Peter was not appointed chairman of the second committee which was 
established a few years later.
Today Peter is an important figure in the area. In 1951 he had 
been elected to the Local Native Council and he has remained a member 
of the council (now the Kisumu District Council) ever since. He is a 
member of the Provincial Arbitration Board and of the Nyando Divisional 
Land Control Board. He owns a posho mill (a mill for grinding maize) 
and recently obtained a loan of 20,000 shillings from the Industrial 
Development Corporation to build a new mill. It seems that he defaulted 
in his repayments and that the Corporation was only prevented from fore­
closing by the intervention of the local Member of Parliament, Peter's 
cousin. He employs two permanent workmen on his farm which is regarded 
as something of a showplace by the local agricultural officers and he 
recently obtained a loan for the growing of hybrid maize. His children 
have been well-educated and have good jobs in Nairobi.
Nevertheless Peter has by no means broken with traditional values; 
indeed his role within his clan is all the more important by virtue of 
his success in manipulating modern institutions. He has three wives 
and it is alleged that the Industrial Development■Corporation loan was 
spent partly in raising bridewealth for his third wife and partly in 
providing lavish entertainment at the wedding. He has divided his land 
between his three wives and his sons will inherit it according to houses 
as required by customary law, though he hopes itvill still be run as a 
single unit. He is probably the most influential elder of his Jokakwaro
and has recently been engaged in discussions with the other elders con­
cerning the future of the clan land on the siany. He favours the com­
munal cultivation of a cash crop, like sugar, rather than the division 
of the land into a mass of tiny family strips, as some advocate, and his 
view seems likely to prevail.
Peter’s biography is to some extent paralleled in that of Wilson
Njoroge, a Gathinja farmer, though in Gathinja modern institutions like
banks, cooperatives etc. play a much more important part in everyday
life and traditional values are correspondingly less widely respected;
indeed it is not uncommon to find people who are ignorant of the name
of their clan. Wilson is now fifty and lives on a ridge overlooking
79the village; his land stretches right down into the valley and he 
uses the lower part for grazing his grade cattle while cultivating 
coffee in the higher part near his house. His father was a relatively 
successful farmer and managed to send him and his brothers to the local 
missionary school. An apt pupil, Wilson went on to secondary school 
and thence to the Nyeri Teachers’ Training College. He then returned 
home to become headmaster of the local primary school.
He realised early on the value of land and began to buy fragments, 
keeping records and calling witnesses to guard against the possibility 
of future disputes. When, in 1951? the colonial government allowed the 
cultivation of coffee, Wilson was one of the first farmers to take 
advantage of this opportunity. He was an original committee member of 
the local coffee cooperative and later became treasurer of the District 
Cooperative Union. In addition to owning one of the largest and most
79* His farm is about twelve acres in area, a large farm for this 
district and he has another fragment of one acre nearby.
prosperous farms in the sub-location, he has bought a shop as well as 
shares in a tobacco company. He finances his various activities partly 
out of profits from the sale of his coffee and partly from bank loans.
He has two wives, having married a second time in the hope of getting 
a son, but the farm is run as a single unit. He employs five people 
on a permanent basis and a further half a dozen people at particular 
times of the year. Unlike Peter, Wilson takes no direct part in local 
politics, but both men would exert considerable influence over the 
opinions of their relations and neighbours and their support would be 
courted by aspiring Parliamentary candidates.
A final case-study will serve to illustrate the links that unite 
the local and the national scenes. Samson Mwangi is a brisk, business­
like man in his mid-sixties. Born in Gathinja he went to the local 
mission primary school where he was singled out by an English mission­
ary for help and encouragement. As a result he became the first boy 
from the northern part of the Central Province to go to the prestigious 
Alliance Secondary School in Nairobi. He later returned home and 
became the first African to teach at the local teachers’ training college. 
After spending many years as headmaster of the local primary school, he 
retired in order to devote himself to his business activities, although 
he still does some part-time teaching at the school.
He was his clan representative on the second consolidation committee 
of which he was the secretary. He has a six-acre coffee farm within the 
location and has bought a fifteen-acre farm on a nearby settlement scheme 
apparently the local chief proposed him for a plot on the scheme owing to 
the fact that he had several children but little land. He also owns a 
bar in his village and he bought a new Toyota van which he uses for
bringing goods from the nearby town. While he charged his land to the 
bank in order to raise money to purchase the bar, he also receives help 
from his sons. A relatively rich man, he was able to educate his three 
sons to a high level. One son works as a Community Development Officer; 
one son is managing-director of a para-statal corporation, owns many 
farms, has property interests in Nairobi and is a prominent figure 
throughout the country; the third son manages one of his brother’s farms, 
a carnation farm which exports to the United Kingdom. Samson is 
reluctant to say how he intends to leave his land, but it is clear that, 
though he is a wealthy man by local standards, his sons' business interests 
are of such a substantial nature that rights of inheritance to their 
father's land do not concern them very much.
There can be few family histories which illustrate so well the 
social changes that have occurred over the last fifty years. Samson's 
father was an ordinary farmer who died when Samson was a boy. Samson, 
through a combination of talent and good luck, achieved wealth and 
status within his local community. His sons have in turn surpassed his 
level of achievement; their interests extend beyond their native area 
and one, at least, is a national figure. Like Peter and Wilson, Samson 
exploited the opportunities that arose during the colonial period from 
the growth of education and the development of trade. Moreover it has 
been one of the arguments of this chapter that it is people like them 
who have manipulated to their own advantage the institutions that have 
become important since land registration, the land market, the credit 
facilities and the agricultural extension services. It is people like 
them who are gradually coming to constitute a class united by a common 
education, a common language (English), a common economic interest and 
a common political programme. Even though today links based on kinship
336.
and tribal loyalties remain strong, the growth of education combined with 
the increase in mobility, particularly the abandonment of their home 
areas by the richest and the poorest inhabitants, is likely to lead to 
the emergence of a class structure both in urban and rural society. Such 
a process may be inevitable but it has certainly been accelerated by the 
land registration programme.
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C H A P T E R  VII 
LARD CONTROL - A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
1. Introduction
A system of land control whereby no disposition of registered 
land would be valid without the consent of a certain official or body 
could be used as a device for forestalling or mitigating some of the 
less desirable effects of registration which have been discussed above. 
Thus the proprietor who obtained first registration by fraud could be 
restrained from disposing of the land against the wishes of his 
defrauded kinsmen. Moreover, both the process of refragmentation and 
the development of uneconomic pareellation could be checked by an 
effective system of land control. Finally, such a system could be 
used to prevent land accumulation and its counterpart, increasing 
landlessness.
The success of any ^ rstem of land control in achieving such goals 
will depend primarily on two factors: the grounds on which consent to 
any given transaction is refused and the sanctions available for ensur­
ing both that dispositions of registered land are controlled and that 
decisions of the controlling authority are observed. The importance 
of these two factors will become apparent when the present system of 
land control is examined. This system is based on the Land Control 
Act 1967i though the history of land control goes back much further; 
it is an interesting and chequered history which it would be helpful 
to outline before considering the system that exists today.
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It had long been recognised that some system of land control would 
be necessary if the benefits of land consolidation and registration were 
to be maintained. The East Africa Royal Commission recommended the 
establishment of such a system, giving its reasons in the following 
terms: ,!Elsewhere the individual ownership of land in peasant communi­
ties has sometimes led to the emergence of a chronic state of indebted­
ness, the continued fragmentation of holdings and the unproductive 
accumulation and holding of land by a few individuals in circumstances
of little alternative income-earning opportunity for those who have
1parted with their land.” Of the three reasons given by the Commission, 
only one is purely economic, namely the danger that the fruits of con­
solidation would not be reaped if uncontrolled re-fragmentation were 
allowed to occur. The two other reasons given, namely the connected 
dangers of peasant indebtedness and land accumulation, are primarily 
social in that their effect on the economic development of the land is 
not necessarily adverse. Unfortunately the Commission said little
about how these consequences were to be avoided and it was left to the
2
Working Party on African Land Tenure to make recommendations in this
regard and to draw up a bill which laid the foundations of the modern
system of land control. This Bill, which was enacted in 1939 as the
3
Land Control (Native Lands) Ordinance, was modelled on the Land Control
1. East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-1955, Report (Cmd.9^73, 1935), 
Ch.23, para.2 8 . These reasons are elaborated upon in paras. 29-
35.
2. Report of the Working Party on African Land Tenure, 1957-1958 
(1958).
3. No.28 of 1959. Renamed the Land Control (Special Areas) Ordinance 
by the Kenya (Land) Order in Council i960, L.N. No. 389 of i960.
S.21(1) and Sched.I.
ij.
Ordinance 1944, which had introduced a rather different system into the 
White Highlands some years previously.
While it had long been government policy to subject grants of land 
in the White Highlands to development conditions designed to discourage 
land speculation and ensure development, it was not until 1944 that a 
formal system of land control was established there. The Land Control 
Ordinance of that year was introduced partly to provide a more effective 
way of enforcing development conditions and partly to facilitate further 
European settlement by deterring land speculation and preventing the 
accumulation of large holdings. To achieve these various goals a single 
control board was established composed of the Commissioner for Lands, 
the Financial Secretary,, the Director of Agriculture and six other 
persons appointed by the majority of the European Elected Members of
the Legislative Council present and voting at a meeting convened for
5 • 6 the purpose. Most dealings in land required the consent of the Board
and without such consent any agreement to effect any such dealing was 
7
void. The Board was empowered to refuse its consent on four grounds, 
namely where it considered that the applicant already had sufficient 
land, or that the area of land was likely to prove uneconomic for the 
purpose for which it was intended, or that the terms and conditions of 
the sale were onerous, or that the proposed selling price or rent was
4. Cap. 150 (1948). The Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the 
Land Control Regulations 1961, L.N. No.1^2 of 1961, issued under 
the authority of the Kenya (Land) Order in Council 1960, s.l4(l)
(c). These regulations were in turn revoked by the Kenya (Land 
Control) (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 19^5i L.N. No.457 
of 1965 (as amended), which, together with Ch.XII, Part 5 of the 
Constitution, sought to unify the system of land control in Kenya; 
See infra, pp. 3^2 et seq.
5» Land Control Ordinance 1944, s.3(2).
6. Ibid., s.7(1).
7. Ibid., s.7(2).
objectionable. These provisions clearly constituted a serious invasion
of the doctrine of freedom of contract and it is interesting to note that
of the four grounds laid down only the second was designed to promote
economic development of the land in question. Moreover the Board was
empowered both to make the grant of its consent conditional on certain
9
kinds of development being undertaken and non-compliance with these
10.
conditions rendered the land liable to forfeiture.
However effective the system may have proved in the White Highlands,
it was clearly an inappropriate model to be adopted in the Native Lands
where conditions and needs were so drastically different. In fact, the
Bill drawn up by the Working Party bore little resemblance to the Land
Control Ordinance 1944 except insofaras it accepted the general principle
of control by statutory boards. Under the Land Control (Native Lands)
Ordinance 1959* the Minister for African Affairs was empowered to apply
12the Ordinance to any area of the Native Lands and the Provincial Comm­
issioner in any such area was empowered to divide the lands into divis- 
13ions in respect of which Divisional Native Land Control Boards would 
1 ij.
be set up; in this way and also by providing for a large number of
15
locally elected representatives to sit on the Boards, the Ordinance 
attempted to ensure the system's acceptability at grass-roots level.
8. Ibid., s.8(l)(b). The fourth ground was deleted by the Land
Control (Amendment) Ordinance, No.46 of 1950, s.2(a).
9. Ibid., s .8(1)(c ).
10. Ibid., s s.13i14.
11. In fact, the board very rarely rejected applications. For example,
in 1956 only 3 applications of a total of 1,141 were rejected and
in 1957 only 7 out of a total of 1414, Colony and Protectorate of
Kenya, Lands Department, Annual Reports, 1956-7-
12. s.3(1).
13. Ibid., s.3(2).
14. Ibid., s.4(l).
15. Ibid., s . 4 ( 1 ) (d ) .
Appeals against the decisions of the Divisional Boards lay to the District 
16Commissioner and thence to the Provincial Native Land Control Board
whose decision was final and conclusive and was not to he questioned in 
17any court. Thus, from the start, the land control system was charact­
erised by its decentralisation, its dependence on local representation 
and its exclusion of the courts, and these remain central features of 
the present system, as will be seen shortly.
Even though most dealings with land in any area to which the Ordinance 
had been applied required the Board’s consent, surprisingly little 
attempt was made to define the grounds on which the Boards should refuse 
their consent. Certainly the Provincial Boards were empowered to direct 
that a Divisional Board should not give its consent to any transaction 
whereby any separate parcel of land would be created which fell below 
the minimum area laid down for that division by the Provincial Board,18 
but uneconomic parcellation of land was only one of various dangers that 
had been foreseen and it is surprising that no provision was made to 
prevent the unsophisticated landowner selling his land to his wealthier
neighbours or to moneylenders, a problem which had deeply concerned both
19the East Africa Royal Commission and the Working Party. It is even 
more surprising that nothing specific was done about this problem in 
view of the Minister for African Affairs having stated in the Legisla-
16. Ibid., s.9.
17. Ibid., s.12(1).
18. Ibid., s.1l(l9(b).
19. The Working Party felt it was sufficient to give the Boards a 
very wide discretion which would enable them "to forbid, for 
instance, if they so wish, the alienation of land outside the 
tribe, clan or family group, and also to exercise some restraint 
over the newly emancipated landowner who wishes to sell his land 
to the detriment of his family”. Report of the Working Party on 
African Land Tenure 1957-8, (1958), para.101.
tive Council debates that the Bill had four objectives, to prevent,
firstly, uneconomic fragmentation, secondly, the accumulation of land
for speculative purposes, thirdly, widespread unproductive indebtedness
and, fourthly, transactions detrimental to the landowner’s family which
20may occur when he realises he has a negotiable asset.
21
The Land Control (Special Areas) Regulations 1961 repealed and 
replaced the Land Control (Special Areas) Ordinance 1959; this seems 
to have been a transitional step on the way to amalgamating the two 
systems of land control in Kenya. In any case, the Regulations intro­
duced no major changes and were themselves revoked and replaced by the
22
Kenya (Land Control) (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1963 which
23together with the Kenya Constitution formed the system of control until
1967- The 1963 Regulations were intended to deal with land control until
provision for a more appropriate system was made in accordance with the
Constitution. Although the discriminatory nomenclature of Special and
2k
Scheduled Areas had been jettisoned and although the two land control 
systems had apparently been integrated, the two areas continued to be 
treated differently in a number of respects. Particularly interesting 
are the different provisions relating to the grounds for refusal of con­
sent. In the former Scheduled Areas it was provided that a Board should
25not refuse consent save on agricultural or economic grounds; this
20. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council Debates, 1959, 
Vol. LXXX (pt.1), para. 1257-
21. L.N. No.1^7 of 1961. These Regulations were made under the authority
of the Kenya (Land) Order in Council i960, L.N. No. 589 of i960, 
s.l4(l)(c).
22. L.N. No.^57 of 1963* These Regulations were made under the authority
of the Kenya Order in Council 19^3» L.N. No.2^5 of 1963, s.11(l).
They also revoked the Land Control Regulations 1961 which until then 
had applied in the Scheduled Areas; see above note p.339*
23. The Kenya Independence Order in Council 1963? L.N. N0.718 of 1963?
introduced the Constitution of Kenya of which Chapter XII,Part 3
related to the control of transactions in agricultural land.
2k . Kenya (Amendment of Laws) Agriculture Regulations 1962, LN. No.352 of 
1962.
25* Constitution of Kenya 1963? s.219(l)? proviso.
provision reflected an important change of policy, since both under the
Land Control Ordinance ^ b b  and under the Land Control Regulations 1961
which replaced that Ordinance the Board was also empowered to refuse its
consent where the person seeking to acquire land already had sufficient
land and where the terms and conditions of the dealing were unduly 
26
onerous.
With regard to the former Special Areas, however, the Constitution
did not insist on purely economic criteria being applied by the Divisional
Boards which were empowered to grant or refuse consent in their absolute 
27
discretion; nevertheless it was provided that "a Divisional Board 
shall when appropriate, have regard to the effect which the grant or 
refusal of consent may have on the economic development of the land 
concerned or on the raising or lowering of the standards of good hus-
28bandry within the division...'1. Such a provision would suggest that 
it was the potential economic benefits to be gained that recommended 
the system of land control to the new government.
Whatever justification there may have been for maintaining the 
dual system, it was clear that it could not long survive the large- 
scale transfer of European-owned farms to individual Africans and 
African companies and the establishment of settlement schemes in the 
former Scheduled Areas. The 1963 Regulations finally expired in 1967^  
and were replaced by the Land Control Act 19^7 the effect of which was 
to impose a uniform system of land control throughout Kenya.
26. The Ordinance was concerned to protect both parties, but the 
Regulations only empowered the Board to refuse its consent where 
the terms were unduly onerous on the person acquiring the land,
Land Control Regulations 1961, s.11(b)(iii).
27. Constitution of Kenya 1963? s.219(l)«
28. Ibid., s.219(2).
29. The Kenya (Land Control) (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1963? 
as amended by L.N.323 of 1963? L.N. 578 of 1963 and L.N.712 of 1963?
were renewed by the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act 1965?
No.14 of 1963? s.6(7) and further renewed by the Constitution of 
Kenya (Amendment) Act 1966, N0.16 of1966, s.b and Sched 2.
The Act empowers the Minister of Lands and Settlement to apply the
Act to any area^ and to divide any such area into divisions. ^  He is
required to establish a land control board for every land control area
32or, where it is divided into divisions, for each division; thus the
principle of decentralisation, first proposed by the Working Party on
33African Land Tenure, has prevailed. Any transaction affecting
agricultural land within a land control area requires the consent of
the appropriate land control board and, unless that consent has been
34given, it is "void for all purposes."
This brief outline of the history of land control in Kenya has 
illustrated both the variety of aims that a control system can be 
designed to achieve and the variety of systems that can be established 
to achieve these aims. Any control system by its nature interferes 
with freedom of contract and has to be justified in terms of some 
more important objective, be it economic development or social justice. 
It is now proposed to examine the present Kenya land control system in 
some detail and to evaluate its success in terms of its own aims and 
its potential ability to deal with some of the problems discussed in 
the previous chapters.
30. S, 3
31- Ibid., S .4 .
32. Ibid., s.3-
33. Supra, p. 3^0.
34. Land Control Act 19^7? s.6(l)
2. The land control system today.
(i) Introduction.
Although regrettable delays in establishing land control boards 
have occurred, there can be little doubt today that the land control 
board is an established and well-known institution in most registered 
areas. Given its unquestioned importance, it is perhaps surprising that 
so little research has been undertaken on the working of the system.
The present writer has endeavoured to discover anything relevant that 
has been written and in some instances the law reports throw an interest­
ing light on some of the problems that have arisen in this connection, 
but generally he has had to rely heavily on his own fieldwork and, in 
particular, his experience of two land control boards, the Nyando board 
and the Kiharu board, both of whose sittings he has attended and whose 
members he has questioned.
The Nyando division and the Nyando land control board were estab- 
35lished in 1968. Previously land control in this area had been exer-
36
cised by the Kisumu Divisional Board, but as the registered areas of 
South Nyakach are situated a long way from Kisumu and as land adjudica­
tion had been proceeding fairly rapidly throughout the district, it was 
obviously desirable that a separate board be established for the south­
ern part of Kisumu district. Nevertheless, owing to delays in the
33- L.N. No.48 of 1968.
36. Established by L.N. No.321 of 1963; additional members were 
appointed by L.N. No.373 of 1963-
implementation of the land adjudication programme in North and South
37Nyakach, the business of the Nyando board is not very heavy, being 
confined (at the date of research) to applications from only 2 sub­
locations, namely Kajimbo and East Kadianga (which consists of three 
adjudication sections, Kabete-Obuya, Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro and Dianga 
East). The meetings of the board take place at the headquarters of 
the District Officer, no more than an hour's walk from the furthest
corners of the two sub-locations.
38 39The Kiharu Division and Divisional Board were originally
established in 1963 under the Kenya (Land Control) (Transitional
Provisions) Regulations 19&3 and both the Division and the Board were
f^Ore-established under the Land Control Act in 1967* Th-e board covers 
a vast area, composed of 3 locations; all the land in these locations 
has been registered, most of it a long time ago; the board is conseq­
uently extremely busy, as can be seen from the number of applications
kzmade in recent years. Here again the board meets at the headquarters 
of the District Officer which are situated at one end of the division, 
thus compelling some applicants to cover considerable distances; local 
communications are good, however, and there can be few farmers without 
convenient access to a bus route.
3?• In 197*? 33 applications were heard; in 19711 79; in 1972, 38.
Nyando land control board minutes, Land Registry, Kisumu. See
tables below p. 3&7»
38. L.N. No.713 of 1963.
39- L.N. No.71^ of 1963.
JfO. L.N. No.236 of 1967 and L.N. No. 287 of 1967.
^1. One of these locations, Weithaga location, contains Gathinja 
sub-location, one of the writer's research areas.
*t2. In 1971i there were 1,111 applications; in 1972, 771; in 1973i
1033* Register of Applications to the Kiharu board, Land Registry, 
Muranga. See tables below p. 367*
The present writer was given a friendly welcome by both boards and 
every effort was made to answer his questions and to explain to him the 
proceedings. He found no significant differences in the working of the 
two boards and though the discussion that follows will be largely based 
on his knowledge of the working of these boards, it is likely that any 
generalisations made could be fairly applied to the working of land 
control boards throughout the country.
(ii) Composition of the boards.
The question of composition is clearly a crucial one and one to 
which two fundamentally different approaches are possible. On the one 
hand, the boards could be modelled as far as possible on traditional 
institutions of an analogous nature; members would be drawn from the 
ranks of the local elders and would be distinguished by their knowledge 
of the area and the authority which they enjoyed within their clans. 
Provision could be made, as it was made in the Land Control (Native 
Lands) Ordinance 1959* for the election of the majority of board 
members; elections could perhaps be organised along the lines of the 
elections of land adjudication committee members. The Lawrance Mission 
certainly favoured the local election of the majority of board members 
and the arguments in favour of such a proposal are obvious; it would
43. S.4(1).
44. Lawrance Mission Report, para.292.
ensure that members were aware of local problems and responsive to 
local needs; the boards would enjoy a certain legitimacy which would 
in turn promote their effectiveness. On the other hand, reliance on 
traditional institutions can only be justified as long as they are 
required to carry out traditional functions, for the loyalty which 
they command may not survive a crucial change of role. In areas where 
traditional institutions have lost their former importance, such argu­
ments would not apply and the elected members would no doubt come from 
the ranks of the teachers, traders, officials and more successful 
farmers, that is, from those who represent the ideals that have largely 
replaced traditional ideals.
The second approach would be to compose the board of government 
officials whose expertise enabled them properly to appreciate and 
implement the goals of the land control system and whose relative ignor­
ance of local problems would ensure that proceedings were conducted 
impartially. Such a board would perhaps resemble the arbitration boards
43discussed above. A point of view frequently expressed in the debates 
on the Land Control Bill would apply with even greater reason to such 
a proposal; thus one member of the National Assembly claimed, "... the 
board will be full of no other but civil servants and civil servants' 
stooges. Therefore the people of a given area are not going to get 
the chance to be represented by people they would like to be on this
46board." This comment accurately reflects the widespread resentment, 
already noted in other contexts, of the faceless offical, the outsider 
who executes alien policies and whose loyalties are to another world.
43. Supra, p. 97.
46. Republic of Kenya, National Assembly Debates, 1967-1968, vol.13 
(pt.2), col.2497> per Mr. Shikuku.
349.
Any policy depending on local cooperation which fails to take this point
of view into account is bound to fail.
The Land Control Act 1967 takes a middle way between these two 
approaches and, while rejecting the idea of elected members, neverthe­
less provides for a substantial degree of local representation. The
47
Schedule to the Act provides:
A land control board shall consist of -
(a) the District Commissioner of the district in which
the land control area or division is situated, or a
District Officer deputed by him in writing, who shall
be chairman;
(b) not more than two other public officers;
(c) two persons nominated by the county council having 
jurisdiction within the area of jurisdiction of the 
board;and
(d) not less than three and not more than seven persons 
resident within the area of jurisdiction of the board,
all appointed by the Minister:
Provided that -
(i) not less than eight and not more than twelve persons 
shall be appointed as members of the board; and
(ii) more than one-half of the members of the board 
shall be owners or occupiers of agricultural land within 
the jurisdiction of the board.
In practice, the Minister appoints members under sub-section (d) on the 
advice of the local District Commissioner or District Officer, who may 
or may not hold elections, but will in any case seek to ensure fair 
representation for all the locations in the division. The members of
47. S.1.
both the Nyando and the Kiharu boards were drawn generally from the ranks 
of the more educated and more prosperous farmers. At the first meeting
48of the Nyando board that the writer attended the chair was taken by an
Assistant Education Officer (in the absence of the District Officer) and
the other members present included a chief, an ex-chief, a district 
councillor, a farmer, the district Agricultural Officer and the Veterinary 
Officer, all of who (except the last two) had large farms in the area.
The ex-chief and a local member of the National Assembly (absent on this 
occasion) were the two members appointed by the Kisumu District Council. 
The chief of the second location in the division was also absent on this 
particular occasion.
The composition of the Nyando board is typical. The members are 
men who, for one reason or another, have successfully exploited the 
opportunities that have arisen in recent years; they are educated, they 
speak English, they are prosperous farmers and they enjoy off-the-farm 
incomes. Though they may still exercise authority in traditional terms, 
as elders of the clan, for example, their appreciation of the realities 
of economic and political power sets them apart from the majority of 
their fellow-clansmen. It is largely on them that the effectiveness 
of the land control system depends.
(iii) Procedure of the boards:
The Land Control Act 19&7 provides that the sale, transfer, lease, 
mortgage, exchange, partition or other disposal of or dealing with
48. It took place on August 29th, 1973* The Land Registrar, Kisumu, 
acted as Secretary to the board.
agricultural land which is situated within a land control area, and the
division of any such agricultural land into two or more parcels to be
held under separate titles are void for all purposes unless the local
k9
board has given its consent; the transmission of land on the death
of the registered owner does not require the board's consent unless it
will result in the sub-division of the land, nor do mortgages in favour
50of certain public bodies.
The general procedure is as follows. The parties to a controlled 
transaction go to the land registry and fill in forms applying for the 
local board's consent; their application is entered in the presentation 
book and they are asked to attend the following board meeting. If either, 
or both, of them fails to attend the meeting, the hearing of their applica­
tion will be deferred till the next meeting; the hearing may be deferred 
a second time, but if at the third meeting (meetings occur once a month)
one of the parties is absent, then the.application is deemed to have been 
51refused. There is nothing in the Act requiring either party to attend 
the meeting, although the board has the power to order the attendance of
52
the applicant or any person interested in or affected by the application,
53
and it will be seen below that this self-imposed restriction on its 
freedom of action may, in some cases, diminish the board's effectiveness.
^9. Land Control Act 1967, s.6(l)(a) and (b).
50. Ibid., s.6(3)(a) and (b). These exceptions will be discussed infra,
P- 369.
51. Ibid., s.9(2), which provides, "Where an application for consent in 
respect of controlled transaction is made to a land control board, 
and the board does not determine the application within a period
of three months after the application is made, the application shall 
be deemed to have been refused at the expiry of that period." Thus, 
where a board defers an application beyond the three-month period, 
pending the gathering of information about the applicants' circum­
stances, and subsequently gives its consent, this consent is a nullity 
being based on a non-existent application; Wambua v. Wathome and 
another, [1968] E.A. 4^0.
52. Land Control Act 1967? s.17(1)(a).
53. Infra, p. 368.
Suffice to say here that applications are frequently cfeferred and finally 
deemed refused owing to the absence of one or other of the parties.
If both parties are present, then the hearing will go ahead and 
usually a decision will be reached on the spot, although occasionally 
hearings are deferred for the purpose of collecting further information 
or summoning witnesses. The boards have generally worked out their own 
procedures. The sittings are in private and the proceedings conducted 
in an inquisitorial manner; the parties are questioned in turn, 
first by the chairman and then by other members of the board; they are 
then asked to leave the room while the board comes to its decision. At 
this stage the Agricultural Officer may give his views, members acquainted 
with the parties may impart their knowledge and the atmosphere becomes 
almost convivial. Finally the panties are recalled to hear the board's 
decision and, if the decision is in their favour, they will be requested 
to sign the appropriate registry forms before leaving.
This procedure has little in common with that followed at the 
meetings of traditional bodies or even meetings of the land adjudication 
committees. The private nature of the hearing, the mode of cross-examina­
tion which puts a sharp distance between board and applicant, the brisk­
ness with which hearings are conducted and the hasty dismissal of pro-
55blems outside its jurisdiction all combine to illustrate this difference.
The vernacular is used, if it is understood by everyone present; 
otherwise English or Swahili would be used.
55. Thus at one meeting a man came forward to demand the repayment of a 
sum of money he had purportedly paid in pursuance of an agreement 
to sell land which the vendor had later refused to implement. The 
Chairman of the Board, the local District Officer, was clearly dis­
posed to discuss the problem, but the Land Registrar and other 
members were swift to point out that it lay outside the competence 
of the board.
(iv) The decisions of the boards.
The brief outline of the history of land control in Kenya sufficed 
to show the variety of objectives that a land control system can bq 
designed to achieve. These objectives can be conveniently, if somewhat 
crudely, be classified as economic or social. Economic objectives would 
typically include the prevention of fragmentation, uneconomic parcella- 
tion and the unproductive accumulation of land for speculative or pre­
stige purposes; a land control system designed to further these goals 
would be concerned to ensure that plots were farmed by those most likely 
to develop their full potential. Social objectives, on the other hand, 
would include the prevention of indebtedness, landlessness and land 
accumulation (whether it resulted in greater productivity or not) and 
a land control system established for these reasons would no doubt be 
obliged to investigate the financial and family circumstances of the 
applicants and the terms of every transaction.
It is obviously possible that economic and social objectives will
on occasion conflict and it is therefore particularly desirable that
the objectives of any land control system be made explicit. In the
Scheduled Areas, under the Land Control Ordinance 19^, the board was
empowered to refuse its consent on a variety of social and economic 
56grounds, although under the Constitution boards in the former Sched­
uled Areas were not empowered to refuse consent save on agricultural or 
57economic grounds. On the other hand, in the Native Lands no attempt 
was made in the Land Control (Native Lands) Ordinance 1959 or its
56. See supra, p. 3^0.
57. See supra, p. 3^2.
3 5^.
successors to define the criteria which boards should adopt, even though
the control system was a direct result of the recommendations of the East
58Africa Royal Commission and the Working Party on African Land Tenure,
By contrast the Land Control Act 1967 defines very clearly the criteria
on which boards are to proceed and it is interesting to note that the
criteria are virtually all economic. The provision is worth quoting in 
59full:
In deciding whether to grant or refuse consent in 
respect of a controlled transaction, a land control 
board shall -
(a) have regard to the effect which the grant or 
refusal of consent is likely to have on the economic 
development of the land concerned or on the main­
tenance or improvement of standards of good hus­
bandry within the land control area;
(b) act on the principle that consent ought gen- 
be refused where -
the person to whom the land is to be disposed of -
(a) is unlikely to farm the land well or to 
develop it adequately; or
(b) is unlikely to be able to use the land 
profitably for the intended purpose owing 
to its nature; or
(c) already has sufficient agricultural land; or
[Not relevant in the present context.]
the terms and conditions of the transaction 
(including the price to be paid) are markedly 
unfair or disadvantageous to one of the parties 
to the transaction; or
58. See supra, p.338. The latter report stated that boards should have 
discretion to prevent sales outside clans or families and sales which 
would result in suffering for the seller’s family; Report of the 
Working Party on African Land Tenure, 1957-1958 (195&J5 para. 101.
39* S.9(1)* as amended by the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968,
s.32.
erally to 
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv) in the case of the division of land into 
two or more parcels, the division would 
he likely to reduce the productivity of 
the land;
(c) refuse consent in any case in which the land or 
share is to be disposed of by way of sale, transfer, 
lease, exchange or partition to a person who is not -
(i) a citizen of Kenya; or
(ii) a private company or cooperative society all 
of whose members are citizens of Kenya; or
(iii) group representatives incorporated under the 
Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968.
It seems that social considerations are only relevant in two instances. 
In the first place, the board should generally refuse its consent where 
the person to whom the land is to be disposed of already has sufficient 
land;^ the definition of 'sufficient* is not clear, but in the context 
it would seem to mean 'sufficient to develop efficiently' rather than 
'sufficient for his family's needs'; if this interpretation is correct, 
then this provision merely introduces another economic criterion. That 
this is the correct interpretation would seem probable from a passage 
in the Handbook issued to guide land control boards which reads:
It would be wrong for the Board to turn down an 
application merely on the grounds that a man already 
has a bigger plot than most. The prime considera­
tions are the economic development of the land, the 
maintenance of good farming standards and the avail­
ability of land generally. 61
Secondly, section 9(1)(b)(iii), by requiring the board to refuse its 
consent where the terms of the transaction are unfair, harks back to
60. Land Control Act 19&7i s.9(1)(b)(i)(c).
61. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands and Settlement, The Land 
Control Act. A Handbook fcr the guidance of land control boards,
(1969),p . 8.
556.
62the Land Control Ordinance 19^f and introduces a wholly non-economic 
consideration inasmuch as the provision is designed to protect the unsop­
histicated landowner (and, possibly, the innocent purchaser) rather than 
to promote agricultural development. In practice, however, the boards 
ignore this provision; the writer raised this question with both the 
Nyando and the Kiharu boards and was assured on both occasions that the 
boards favour a 'willing buyer willing seller' approach and do not con­
cern themselves with the terms of the transactions. Examination of the 
records, moreover, discloses no instance where consent was refused 
either on the grounds that the purchaser already had sufficient land
or because the terms were unfair. Thus, insofaras the Land Control Act
r- 6319^7 tried to introduce non-economic criteria, it has failed.
The question then arises as to whether the boards use the economic 
criteria laid down in the Land Control Act 1967 and, if so, which part­
icular criteria are used and, if not, on what grounds are their decisions 
based. It is possible from the records to discover why consent was 
refused in any individual instance, but attendance at the board's delib­
erations is really necessary in order to appreciate the factors that 
influence its decision.
Of all the economic factors which the Land Control Act 19&7 requires
boards to take into account, only one in practice is considered rele-
6k
vant, namely the undesirability of uneconomic parcellation. It is
62. S.8(l)(b).
63. Section 9(l)(c)(i) and (ii) is an exception, though it should be 
noted that President often uses his power (conferred by section 
2k of the Act) to exempt transactions from the provisions of the 
Act in favour of non-Kenyans and non-Kenyan companies.
6k. Ibid., s.9(1)(b)(iv). As sub-divisions have been extremely rare 
in Gathinja sub-location but common in East Kadianga sub-location, 
the discussion of sub-divisions which follows is based on the 
writer's knowledge of the workings of the Nyando board.
obviously difficult to decide what is the minimum size required for an 
economically viable holding; however, the Agriculture Department attempts 
to do this and for East Kadianga sub-location has fixed the minimum at 
6 acres. As rather over 90% of the holdings in the sub-location are 
less than 6 acres, sub-divisions could rarely occur if the economic 
minimum was strictly adhered to and nowadays the question to be con­
sidered is not whether the holdings to be created by the proposed sub­
division would be less than the minimum economic size recommended by
the Agriculture Department, but whether the sub-division would reduce
65
the productivity of the land. This, of course, is a much more 
difficult question to answer but the boards do seem to take it ser­
iously and, where the relevant information is not immediately available, 
they may defer an application until the Agricultural Officer's report
has been presented. In practice, consent is given to sub-divisions in
66
the majority of cases, however minute the holdings that result.
Where, however, the board feels bound by the Land Control Act
1967 to refuse its consent to a proposed sub-division, it may either
67reject the application outright or it may attempt to satisfy the 
parties' wishes in other ways. One way is to suggest that the parties 
apply to be registered as proprietors in common of the piece of land; 
in this way, s.9(1)(b)(iv) is not infringed, the parties can sub-divide 
the land on the ground as they like and apply to the board for consent
63. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands and Settlement, The Land
Control Act. A Handbook for the guidance of land control boards,
(1969), p.10.
66. The smallest holding resulting from a registered sub-division that 
the writer encountered was two-thirds of an acre.
67. The consequences of rejection are discussed infra, p.367.
68to the partition of the land, which will never be refused. In this
roundabout way the sub-division is finally achieved. This device was
69approved by the District Land Registrar, In the period 1969-1973
(August) sixteen applications for sub-divisions coming from Kabete-
Obuya and Kamnwa-Keyo-Ogoro were approved by the Nyando board and two 
70were rejected; the parties whose applications were rejected applied
shortly afterwards to be registered as proprietors in common; they were
71successful and now intend to apply for partition. Another device for 
avoiding the provisions of s.9(l)(b)(iv) has been reported by an econ­
omist working in the Kisii and Nyeri Districts of Kenya; he writes 
that where a proposed sub-division is likely to be uneconomic, ’’the
Board's policy is to grant long leases,,, rather than approve outright 
72
sales.” It is hard to see why the grant of a lease of part of a 
holding should not be caught by s.9(1)(b)(iv), but this further illus­
trates the reluctance of the boards to refuse their consent to sub-
. . .  . 73divisions on economic grounds.
68. Strictly speaking the partition should be caught by s . 9 ( 1 ) (b)( iv )  
as it involves the division of the land into two or more parcels; 
the boards, however, are understandably reluctant to counter the 
w ishes o f the r e g is te r e d  c o -p ro p r ie to r s  who have a lread y , in  a l l  
likelihood, sub-divided the land on the ground,
69. Under the Registered Land Act 1963? ss.105(l) and 106(1), the Land 
Registrar has powers, in certain circumstances, to prevent parti­
tion where it would adversely affect the proper use of the land 
or, where the resultant share would be below a certain minimum area. 
These powers do not concern the present discussion and, in any 
case, have never to the writer's knowledge been used.
70. Minutes of the Nyando land control board, Land Registry, Kisumu.
71. Information gained from interviews with the applicants.
72. R.J.A. Wilson, ’’Land Control in Kenya's Smallholder Farming Areas”,
East African Journal of Rural Development, vol.5, Nos. 1 & 2 
(1972) p.123, at p.132.
73. Perhaps the argument of the board is that the sub-division is not 
permanent and that when the lease expires (the normal term is 10 
years), the board will consider the development that has been under­
taken before granting a renewal. The parties would be unable to avoid 
this situation by inserting in the lease an option to purchase the 
reversion, because the consent of the board would be necessary for the 
exercise of such an option, Russell v. Principal Registrar of Titles, 
[1972] E.A. 2*f9 (C.A.)
The boards, therefore, are not being very successful in preventing 
the uneconomic sub-division of holdings. They are no doubt aware that a 
large number of unregistered sub-divisions occurs and that the rejection 
of such an application is likely merely to increase this number; it is 
hard for them to predict the effect of any proposed sub-division on the 
future productivity of the land; it is much easier simply to approve the 
application. Nor do they take account of the dangers of re-fragmentation 
and the unproductive accumulation of land. Nearly every sale of land 
that occurs results in a further fragmentation of holdings; if this 
continues at the present rate, another land consolidation programme 
will become necessary in the not too distant future; yet the boards are 
given no guidance in this respect and appear totally unaware of the pro­
blem.
If economic considerations carry little weight with the boards, 
it is pertinent to ascertain what considerations do. All the evidence 
indicates that they are social considerations and, in particular, the 
concern that the applicant or his family should not be rendered landless 
or left without sufficient land for their needs. As all applicants will 
be known to at least one member of the board, there is rarely any 
difficulty in verifying their accounts of their financial and family 
circumstances and their reasons for selling their land. The records 
are full of cases where applications to sell land have been deferred 
pending information that the applicant has land elsewhere or in order 
to hear his dependants' views on the proposed sale or in order to give 
him the opportunity of obtaining land elsewhere. Applications will 
generally be rejected if the applicant has no other land to go to or
74if his family objects.
There is certainly nothing in the Land Control Act 19&7 which forbids 
the boards to take these social considerations into account or which 
requires the boards to reject applications on the grounds laid down in 
the Act and on no others; nevertheless it is clear that the land control 
system established by the Act is designed to promote agricultural develop­
ment and that, as long as boards use social rather than economic criteria 
in reaching their decisions, these aims will be frustrated. The Hand­
book issued to boards deplores the great weight attached to social con-
75
siderations and insists that they "should only take second place"; it 
emphasises that the landowner has absolute ownership of his land and
76
"isn't subject to considerations and duties based on customary law.,.".
The last statement raises an important point. The two main social
concerns of the boards seem to be to prevent landlessness and to prevent
transactions to which the applicant's family objects. The second concern
has its roots in customary law under which a man would not be able to
alienate his land without the consent of his clan elders who would often
insist on him selling to a fellow clansman. The role of the clan elders
77as a land-controlling authority has virtually disappeared today. Most 
___________________________________________________________________ r
74. Similar accounts are given by other writers e.g. C. Leys, "Politics 
in Kenya: the Development of Peasant Society", University of 
Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies, Discussion Paper no.102, 
1970, note 45. See also M. Ali, "Political implications of land 
registration: a case-study from Nyeri district in Kenya", University 
College, Dar-es-Salaam, LL.B dissertation (unpublished), 1970, p.17*
75- Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Lands and Settlement, The Land
Control Act. A Handbook for the guidance of land control boards, 
(1969), p-11-
76• Ibid.,
77- The writer encountered one man who felt unable to sell part of his 
land because his elder brother had refused his consent and one man 
who had consulted the jokakwaro elders before selling his land. 
Moreover in two cases where a man had sold his land without his 
brother's consent, the brother (who had land of his own) insisted 
in regarding the sale as redeemable; the purchaser, understandably, 
did not. Vestiges of the concept of family land are still to be 
found, but increasingly rarely.
registered owners are fully aware of their power freely to charge and 
dispose of their land. By limiting the exercise of this power in the 
way it does, the land control board appears to be playing the part 
formerly played by the clan elders. It is possible to justify imposi­
tion of this limitation on the power of the registered owner by seeing
it as a means of avoiding the injustices that inadequate land adjudica-
78tion can cause. If a person achieves first registration by fraud or 
if land adjudication fails to protect interests in the land which were 
recognised under customary law, the land control board can to some 
extent force the registered owner to take account of the interests of 
the person he has defrauded and of those whose interests are unpro­
tected, by refusing to give its consent to any transaction which ignores 
those interests. Latldable as this argument sounds, it is arguable that 
it is not an appropriate task for the land control boards to remedy 
deficiencies in the land adjudication process. The registration of 
individual title to land was introduced partly in order to free the land­
owner from the constraints of customary law, constraints which have 
largely died out in the last decade; it can hardly have been intended 
that they should be reintroduced by a statutory board.
The other main social consideration that influences the boards is 
the danger of landlessness. The chairman of the Nyando board, on being 
asked the purpose of land control, stated that it was to prevent land­
lessness and improvidence, and all his fellow-members agreed. The first 
question invariably put to someone who proposes to sell his land is 
whether he has other land to go to. If he has not, consent is likely
78. These injustices and other ways of avoiding them have been dis­
cussed supra, ch.IV.
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to be refused. It was, of course, one of the fears of the East Africa
Royal Commission that the unsophisticated landowner might be tempted
79
unwisely to sell or change his land and the Lawrance Mission criticised
the land Control Bill for failing to make suitable provision for this 
80
danger. There is no doubt that the danger has been grossly exagger­
ated; as has been suggested above,^ little would induce the Kenyan 
farmer to sell his last piece of land, be it ever so small. The writer
only came across two instances where consent was refused because the
82
vendor had no other land; so the board’s paternalist concern is 
hardly necessary. Here again, as with the board's questionable insistence 
on the concurrence of the vendor's relatives in the proposed sale, it 
is open to doubt whether it ought to be its function to prevent land­
lessness by refusing it consent to transactions which would have this
83result. In such cases it would be more appropriate to subject the
improvident vendor to the more informal pressures of the chief, sub­
chief or family.
Where a controlled transaction has been approved, the parties will, 
in the majority of cases, attend the Land Registry sometime afterwards 
to have the transaction registered. Nevertheless there remain a few
84
instances where approved transactions are not registered. One of two 
situations may arise. In the first place, the parties may have treated
79* See supra, p. 338.
80. Lawrance Mission Report, para.287. Interestingly enough, Mr.
Lawrance was able to report a few years later, "The procedure devised 
for control of dealings in land has been successful in its primary 
purpose of safeguarding the new landowners." J.C.D. Lawrance, "Land 
Consolidation and Registration in Kenya", University of London, 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Seminar paper (unpublished),
1969, p.5.
81. Supra, p. 314.
82. It would be interesting to know if the 'sales' took place unofficially; 
unfortunately both cases fell outside the writer's research area.
83. In this connection, it is curious to note that, where charges of land 
are brought before the board, consent is automatic even though non­
repayment of the loan could in theory result in the chargor being 
rendered landless.
84. The writer came across three cases of this kind, all in East 
Kadianga.
the obtaining of the board's consent as a tedious, but necessary pre­
liminary step; they may still be negotiating terms or the vendor may be
waiting for the full purchase-price to be paid. There is, of course,
85
a specifically enforceable contract in existence; equally the parties
could, be mutual agreement, resile. Alternatively, the parties may have
implemented their agreement (for example, the purchaser may have paid
the purchase-price and entered into possession), but have taken no steps
to register the transaction, perhaps because they are ignorant of the
need for registration or perhaps because they are reluctant to incur the
necessary fees and transport expenses. In view of the large number of
86
transactions that are neither registered nor approved, it may seem 
absurd to isolate for particular treatment the relatively small group 
of transactions fliat have been approved but not registered, but the 
reason is that any Land Registry anxious to maintain the efficacy of 
the Land Register could tackle the problem of the non-registration of 
approved transactions without difficulty.
One obvious way of doing this would be to take the registers and 
appropriate forms to the board meeting and effect the registration of a 
transaction as soon as it had been approved; consent would not be given 
in cases where the parties were still negotiating terms. The objections 
to such a step are practical but not insuperable; it is inconvenient to 
take registers from the Land Registry and it is undesirable to mix 
Registry business with land control board business. An alternative and
85. The application for the consent of the land control board would
usually constitute a sufficient memorandum of the agreement to
satisfy the requirements of the Law of Contract (Amendment) Act
1968, No.28 of 1968, s.2(b).
86. These were discussed supra, ch. V.
more cumbersome course of action would be for the Registrar to use his 
powers under the Registered Land Act 19&3- ^  several weeks elapse with­
out the parties registering the transaction, he may summon them and
87
require them to explain their reasons and, if he sees fit, he may
88compel registration. These powers are rarely, if ever, used; yet 
the Land Registrar could, be summoning the parties or at the board meet­
ing itself, take the opportunity of warning the purchaser or lessee of 
the precariousness of his position.
Where the board has refused its consent to a proposed transaction, 
the parties may, of course, accept the board’s decision. If they do not, 
then three courses lie open to them; they may re-apply, they may appeal 
or they may carry out their agreement regardless of the board's refusal.
If they re-apply, they will clearly have to take into account the 
board's former objections. Where a sub-division has been held unecono­
mic, an application to be registered as co-proprietors may be successful. 
Where a sale is rejected, a lease may be approved.
On the other hand, they may decide to appeal. The Land Control 
Act 1967 provides that where a land control board refuses to grant its
consent, the applicant may within thirty days appeal to the appropriate
89provincial land control appeals board. If his appeal is dismissed by
that board, he may within thirty days appeal to the Central Land Control 
90Appeals board. Two general points should be noted concerning the 
appeals procedure. In the first place, land control is throughout left
87. Registered Land Act 1963i s.8(b). It may be an offence to refuse 
to attend in accordance with the summons, ibid., s.155(3)-
88. Ibid., s.4l(l). It is an offence to fail to comply with such an 
order, ibid., s.^1(2).
89. S.11(1).
90. Ibid., s.13(1).
to be operated by administrative bodies and it is expressly provided
that decisions of boards at all three levels ’’shall be final and con-
91elusive and shall not be questioned in any court.” Such has been land
control policy ever since the Land Control (Native Lands) Ordinance 1959
and it can be justified on the grounds that the granting or refusal of
consent does not require familiarity with judicial principles, but
rather.an understanding of local circumstances.
Secondly, appeal only lies against the refusal of consent. If the
board approves an application, but its procedure is irregular or it
takes irrelevant considerations into account, a person aggrieved by its
decision will have no remedy. He cannot apply to the courts for an
order quashing the board's decision, as he will have no locus standi,
92
unless he is one of the parties to the application.
The central land control appeals board was established by the 
93Land Control Act 1967 an<* consists cf the Minister for Lands and 
Settlement (Chairman), the Attorney-General and the Ministers for 
Home Affairs, Finance and Planning, Agriculture, and Cooperatives and 
Social Services^ The provincial land control appeals boards consist of 
the Provincial Commissioner, not more than two other public officers 
appointed by the Minister for Lands and Settlement, and not less than 
2 and not more than 3 persons appointed by the same Minister, provided
91. Ibid., ss.8, 11(2), 13(2).
92. See, for example, Uasin Gishu Land Control Board v. Kipwalei 
Molosoi, Court of Appeal for East Africa, Civil Appeal No.22 of 
197^ (unreported), where the respondent unsuccessfully sought
an order quashing the appellant board’s decision in granting its 
consent to the sale to a third party of land which he (the respon­
dent) had already agreed to buy. However, where, for example, 
the seller holds the land on trust, there is nothing to prevent 
the person beneficially entitled from applying to the court for 
an order restraining any disposition in breach of trust; still 
it is probable that an agreement to sell land does not give rise 
to a trust. See infra, p.372.
93. S.12(1).
9^. Ibid., Sched. s.3.
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that more than half of the members must be owners or occupiers of
95agricultural land within the province.
Of the two provincial boards covering the areas of the present 
research, the Nyanza provincial board had heard no appeals since its 
establishment while the Central provincial board conducted a fair
amount of business. Thus in 1973? fifteen appeals were heard, all
96of which concerned sales of plots or parts of plots. All appeals
were allowed, one on condition that the purchaser provided permanent
accommodation for the vendor, who would otherwise have been rendered
landless. Where an appeal is dismissed, it is usually for social
reasons; one particular case will serve to illustrate the conflicts 
97involved. The divisional board had refused its consent to the sale 
of a plot of land on the grounds that the vendor’s deceased brother's 
widow and her five children were living there and had developed the 
plot. The vendor and the purchaser (who had paid the purchase price 
and lodged a caution) appealed arguing "that the grounds for refusal 
relied upon are contrary to the provisions of the Registered Land Act 
and that the people referred to are staying on my land without my 
consent." The appeal was dismissed "on the grounds that the children 
who live in the parcel will become destitute if consent to sell is 
given."
The central land control appeals board has heard an average of 
two appeals a year since it was established and as with the divisional
95* Ibid., s.2. The relevant boards were established by L.N.^7 of 1968.
96. Central provincial land appeals board minutes, Land Registry, 
Nairobi.
97. Ibid., 27/1/7^.
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and provincial boards, it tends to stress social considerations. Given
the large number of controlled transactions that occur each year, it
is surprising that little use is made of the appeals machinery. Part
of the reason lies in the fact that only extremely rarely do the
divisional boards refuse their consent to an application.
The third course open to parties whose application has been
rejected is to implement their agreement regardless; this is likely to
be common practice where no possibility of re-applying exists (as it
existed in the writer's field areas). However, rejections were so
rare that it was impossible to follow up this conjecture.
The tables below indicate the relative frequency with which boards
98approve and reject applications. The figures relating to the Kiharu
98. TABLE 5. Applications made toihe Kiharu divisional land
control board:
Year 1970 (from March) 1971 1972 1973
Approved 432 1,003 716 933
Rejected 6 3 2 8
Other 52 103 53 92
Total ^90 1,111 771 1,033
Source: Kiharu land control board minutes, Land Registry, 
Muranga.
TABLE 6. Applications heard by the Nyando divisional land
control board:
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973(till end of 
July)
Approved 12 17 36 38 25
Rejected 1 k 1 3 1
Other 6 14 k2 17 10
Total 19 35 79 58 36 !
Source: Nyando land control board minutes, Land Registry, 
Kisumu.
board indicate the fate of applications made during a certain year, whereas 
those relating to the Nyando board indicate the fate of those heard during 
a certain year; however the general picture is clear. The residual cate­
gory, termed "other", consists in part of applications which have subseq­
uently been withdrawn, but largely of applications which have been defer­
red owing to the absence of one or other party and those which, having
99been twice deferred, are deemed to have been rejected. The frequency
with which this occurs is noteworthy enough, but the really striking fact
demonstrated by these figures is the extreme rarity with which boards
100reject applications. This surely casts grave doubts on the effect­
iveness of the present land control system.
3. The Avoidance of Land Control.
There exist certain classes of transactions which do not require the
101consent of the land control board. Thus the Land Control Act 1967 
empowers the President to exempt (a) any land or share, or any class of 
land or /hare; or (b) any controlled transaction, or any class of contro­
lled transaction; or (c) any person in respect of controlled transactions 
or some class of controlled transaction, from all or any of the provisions 
of the Act. Such matters are in practice considered by the Attorney-
99 • This problem has been discussed supra, p.351«
100. The writer was also able to collect information about a board in 
the neighbouring province. In the four years, 1970-3i it had 
heard 1,730 applications of which it had rejected only 3* Buret 
Land Control board minutes, Land Registry, Kericho.
101. S.2k.
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General and the Ministers of Lands and Settlement, Agriculture, and
Finance and Planning. The power of exemption is generally exercised in
favour of sales or leases to non-Kenyans or companies with non-Kenyan 
102shareholders; applications to effect such transactions would other­
wise be rejected by the boards.
Successions to land do not require the consent of the board unless
they would result in the division of the land into two or more parcels
10*fto be held under separate titles; on economic grounds this sounds
a reasonable provision, but in practice the title to the land may be
vested in, say, the deceased's widow while on the ground the farm may
be divided into five uneconomic plots among his five sons.
However, it is the major concern of this part of the chapter to
deal, not with those few classes of transactions which do not require
the board's consent, but with the many transactions (usually sales of
land) which do require this consent but which occur without any attempt
105being made to obtain it. Such transactions can be conveniently 
labelled "uncontrolled transactions" and they have given rise to con­
siderable litigation, particularly in the Central Province. A variety
102. An exception to this rule is illustrated by L.N. No. 265 of 1967? 
which exempted from the provisions of the Land Control Act 1967 
mortgages in favour of the Land and Agricultural Bank of Kenya, 
the Agricultural Finance Corporation, the Agricultural Settle­
ment Trust, the Commissioner-General of Income Tax, and Lands 
Ltd. It is an important exception in the present context because, 
as we have seen(supra, p. 278 ), one of the commonest ways of 
raising a loan is by way of charge t> the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation.
103. Land Control Act 1967i s.9(l)(c).
10*f. Ibid., s.6(3)(a). Nor do transactions to which the Government 
or the Settlement Fund Trustees or (in respect of Trust Land) 
a county council is a party require the consent of the board,
Ibid., s.6(3 )(b).
105. Registered transactions which have not obtained the necessary
consent, are, for obvious reasons, extremely rare. Perhaps the 
commonest instance is where the court orders the vesting of 
trust property in the beneficiaries. This is briefly discussed 
supra, ch. IV,p.181.
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of factors may explain why the parties do not apply to the board, among 
them fraud, ignorance, dislike of the board members and reluctance to 
pay fees.
The land registrar has certain powers in respect of uncontrolled
transactions, of course; he may summon the parties*^ and he may point
out the dangers of not obtaining the board's consent. If only one of
the parties refuses to apply to the board, the other party may apply
107and the board may either order the absent party to attend or decide
the matter in his absence. If consent is given, then the applicant
may lodge a caution and apply to the Resident Magistrate's court for
an appropriate order e.g. an order requiring the absent party to sign
the necessary forms, or a vesting order, or an order to rectify the 
108register. Although this course of action has been recommended by
109the Chief Land Registrar, it has rarely, if ever, been carried out.
Where neither party proposes to apply to the board, the land registrar's
task is more difficult as he is unlikely to hear of the uncontrolled
transaction that has occurred. Chairman of boards were encouraged to
start a big campaign to get all uncontrolled transactions before the 
110boards, but the campaign cannot have been very successful. As we 
111have seen, the number of unregistered transactions is continually
106. Registered Land Act 1963» s.8(b).
107* Land Control Act 1967* s.17(l)(a).
108. Registered Land Act 1963j s.1^3(1 )•
109• Ministry of Lands and Settlement, Chief Land Registrar, Practice 
Instruction (February 2^ -th, 1972).
110. Ibid., Practice Instruction (January 12th, 1970)»
111. Supra, ch.V.
growing. The parties are often of the same clan and usually good rela­
tions subsist between them; it is only when a dispute arises that their 
exact legal rights come into question.
Most commonly this occurs where there is a contract to sell a piece
112of land. As in English law, such a contract is unenforceable by
action, unless there is either a sufficient memorandum thereof in
writing or a sufficient act of part performance. In Kenyan law, the
relevant provisions are contained in the Law of Contract Act 1960 and 
113read as follows:
No suit shall be brought upon a contract for the 
disposition of an interest in land unless the 
agreement upon which the suit is founded, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
and is signed by the party to be charged or by 
some person authorised by him to sign it.
Provided that such a suit shall not be prevented 
by reason only of the absence of writing, where 
an intending purchaser or lessee who has per­
formed or is willing to perform his part of the 
contract -
(i) has in part performance of the contract 
taken possession of the property or any 
part thereof; or
(ii) being already in possession, continues in 
possession in part performance of the con­
tract and has done some other act in fur­
therance of the contract.
The first part of the sub-section is largely based on the English Law
112. Law of Property Act 1925* s.^ fO.
113- Cap.23, s.3(3) as amended by the Law of Contract (Amendment)Act 
1968, s.2(b). Previously an almost identical provision had 
formed part of the Registered Land Act 1963* s.38(2), but this 
was deleted by the Law of Contract (Amendment) Act 1968, s.3»
of Property Act 1925* s.^ fOCl), but the proviso is interesting in that 
it attempts a codification of the law of part performance. One or two 
points may be noted in passing with regard to this codification. In 
the first place, it is not provided that the act of part performance 
must have been done by the plaintiff with the knowledge of the defend­
ant that it was done on the faith of the contract. Yet this is surely 
how the courts would interpret the proviso; since the basis of the doctrine 
is that it would be fraudulent to allow the defendant to take advantage of 
the absence of a signed memorandum after standing by and watching the 
plaintiff alter his position for the worse by carrying out acts in per­
formance of the contract. Secondly, and more importantly, the proviso 
severely restricts the scope of the doctrine of part performance; only 
the taking possession or the remaining in possession and doing some other 
act in furtherance of the contract constitute sufficient acts. Now while
in English law possession is generally linked with the doctrine, this
11*fis not invariably the case. Indeed it has recently been stated by
high authority that there is no general rule that the payment of money
115can never constitute a sufficient act of part performance. At any 
rate, the restrictive wording of the proviso will at least free the 
Kenyan courts from the need to tackle the problems that have troubled 
English courts in this field.
Even though a contract for the sale of land will be enforceable by 
action if the foregoing conditions are satisfied, the purchaser acquires 
no interest in the land until the sale is registered; the vendor does 
not become trustee for the purchaser and the beneficial ownership of
11*f. See e.g. Rawlinson v. Ames, [1925] Ch.96.
115« Steadman v. Steadman, [197^] 2 All E.R. 977* at p.981, per 
Lord Reid.
the land does not pass to the purchaser. At any rate, this seems to
116follow from the following provision of the Registered Land Act 1963:
No land, lease or charge shall he capable of being 
disposed of except in accordance with this Act, and 
every attempt to dispose of such land, lease or 
charge otherwise than in accordance with this Act 
shall be ineffectual to create, extinguish, trans­
fer, vary or effect any estate, right or interest 
in the land, lease or charge.
Provisions of this nature are found in most Acts relating to the reg­
istration of title to land and have given rise to problems of interpre­
tation. Unfortunately the provision quoted above has never been dis­
cussed in the Kenyan courts, so heavy reliance has to be placed on 
cases from other jurisdictions, in particular from jurisdictions where 
the Torrens Registration system applies.
Under the Registered Land Act 19&3 it is provided that, subject
to the provisions of the Act, the common law of England, as modified
by the doctrines of equity, shall extend and apply to Kenya in relation
to land, leases and charges registered under the Act and interests there- 
117in. Thus the doctrines of equity will apply insofaras they are not 
expressly or by implication inconsistent with the Act. Clearly, on a 
strict interpretation of s.38(1) of the Act, an enforceable contract
of sale does not operate to give the purchaser an equitable interest
in the land. This is also the view taken by the courts of East Africa 
in interpreting similar provisions in other statutes providing for reg­
istration of title.
116. s . 3 8 ( 1 ) .
117« Ibid., s. 163 (emphasis added by the writer).
The fullest discussion arose in a Ugandan case which came before the
East African Court of Appeal, Souza Figueiredo & Co. Ltd., v. Moorings 
118Hotel Co. Ltd. • The appellant and the respondent had entered into an
agreement for the lease of certain premises owned by the respondent.
The agreement was registrable but never registered. The appellant
entered into possession of the premises but soon fell into arrears with
the rent. At first instance the respondent was successful in his action
for the recovery of arrears of rent and on appeal a number of issues
were raised before the court only one of which concerns us here. It
was submitted for the appellant that since the agreement was not reg-
119istered, it was ineffectual to create any estate or interest in land
and that therefore the covenant to pay the rent was unenforceable.
The court held that the effect of s.31 of the Registration of
Titles Ordinance 1922 was that the intending lessee had no equitable
interest in the land, as he would have done in England under the doct-
120rine of Walsh v. Lonsdale, but that there was nothing in that section
to prevent an unregistered instrument operating as a contract inter 
121partes; therefore the arrears of rent were recoverable. In the
118. [1960] E.A. 926 (C.A.).
119. The defence relied principally on the Registration of Titles 
Ordinance 1922, Cap.123 (Laws of Uganda 1951)5 s-51? which reads:
MNo instrument until registered in manner herein provided shall 
be effectual to pass any estate or interest in any land under the 
operation of this Ordinance or to render such land liable to any 
mortgage; but upon such registration the estate or interest com­
prised in the instrument shall pass or (as the case may be) the 
land shall become liable in manner and subject to the covenants 
and conditions set forth and specified in the instrument or by 
this Ordinance declared to be implied in instruments of a like 
nature.n
120. (1882), 21 Ch.D.9.
121. [1960] E.A.926, at p.931.
course of his judgment the President of the Court of Appeal relied heavily
on Australian sources, quoting both from Australian cases and from
Australian authorities on the Torrens system. He found ample support
for his view that an agreement for a lease or an unregistered lease may
operate as a contract inter partes and may confer on the intending lessee
a right to enforce the contract specifically and to obtain from the intend-
122ing lessor a registrable lease.
123This decision was subsequently approved in a Kenyan case where
the interpretation of the parallel provision in the Kenya Registration
124of Titles Ordinance 1919 was in issue. The court held that an unreg­
istered agreement for a lease of land registered under the Ordinance 
operated as a contract inter partes and it seems to have been assumed 
throughout that such an agreement could not operate to create any 
interest in the land, though no argument on this point was raised. It 
would serve the interests of uniformity if section 38(1) of the Registered 
Land Act 19&3 was interpreted in the same way.
Although it is well established in English Law that where there is 
a contract for the sale of land, the purchaser becomes the owner in equity 
of the land, it is a rather special kind of trust attended by a number of
122. "So far as I can ascertain, it has been uniformly held in many, 
if not in all, jurisdictions subject to Torrens systems of reg­
istration of title, where the court has jurisdiction to apply 
equitable principles, that an agreement for a lease or an unreg­
istered lease operates as a contract inter partes". [1960] E.A. 
926, at p.935i per Sir Kenneth O'Connor, P.
123. K.T. Clarke trading as Shipping General Services v. Sondhi Ltd., 
T1983J E.A. 107 (C.A.).
124. S.32. Freehold land and Government land which have not been 
registered under the Registration of Titles Act 1919 or the 
Registered Land Act 19&3 31,0 governed by the Indian Transfer of 
Property Act 1882 (applied to Kenya by the East Africa Order in 
Council 1897, Art. 11(b)), s.34 of which provides specifically 
that a contract for the sale of immovable property".•.does not, 
of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property".
difficulties and it is not surprising that other jurisdictions should
refuse to follow the English Law in this respect. The Registered Land
Act 1963 certainly provides that instruments declaring trusts are not 
125to be registered; equitable interests may therefore be created by 
unregistered instruments and they may be protected by the entry of a
y\ 2^
caution on the register. However, the literal interpretation of 
section 38(1) of the Act, the existing case-law and general policy 
considerations all suggest that the purchaser under an enforceable 
contract of sale acquires no interest in the land, legal or equitable. 
His rights are purely contractual and he may protect them by lodging 
a caution. If he does not protect his rights in this way, he runs 
the risk that the vendor may sell the land to a third party. He will 
then be restricted to his action for damages against the vendor; having 
no interest in the land, he will be without remedy against the third 
party, whether that party had knowledge of the original agreement or 
not.127
128In one case a situation of this kind did arise. In pursuance 
of a written agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant
123. S.126(2 ).
126. Ibid., s.13l(l)(a) provides that any person who ’’claims the 
right, whether contractual or otherwise, to obtain an interest 
in any land, lease or charge, that is to say, some defined 
interest capable of creation by an instrument registrable under 
this Act" may lodge a caution forbidding the registration of 
dispositions of the land, lease or charge concerned. The Chief 
Land Registrar specifically mentions the possibility of a bene­
ficiary under a trust lodging a caution under this section. 
Ministry of Lands and Settlement, Chief Land Registrar, Practice 
Instruction (September A-th, 1969) •
127. In suitable circumstances he might be able to bring a tortious 
action against the third party for inducing a breach of contract.
128. Mungai Mukiri v. James Njoroge and Samuel Mukiri Mukono, High
Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Case No.2^8 of 1971 (unreported).
for the sale of a piece of registered land, the plaintiff (the "purchaser" 
had paid the purchase price and entered into possession. However, the 
consent of the land control board was not obtained, the transfer was not 
registered nor had the plaintiff ever lodged a caution. Several years 
later, the first defendant sold the land to the second defendant and 
the land was registered in his (the second defendant's) name. The court 
held (wrongly, it is submitted, in the light of the foregoing argument) 
that the original agreement between the plaintiff and the first defend­
ant pve rise to a trust, stating:
The intention of the parties then was clear that 
the first defendant was to transfer the plot to 
the plaintiff and until such transfer he held the 
plot on trust for the plaintiff. In these cir­
cumstances the court would presume that a trust 
existed...329
As the second defendant had bought the land with notice of the breach 
of trust, he held the land on trust for the plaintiff and rectification 
of the register in the plaintiff's favour was ordered.
Section 38(1) of the Registered Land Act 19&3 was n°t mentioned 
and it was a pity that the court did not see fit to analyse in greater 
detail the legal position of third parties in situations of this kind, 
assuming that a specifically enforceable agreement to sell land does 
give rise to a trust.
As in most registration systems, trusts are not entered on the 
register and for the purpose of registered dealings the trustee is
129« Ibid., p.8, per Muli, J.
deemed to be the absolute proprietor of the land, Mand no person dealing
with the land, a lease or a charge so registered shall be deemed to have
130notice of the trust...'! Furthermore it is provided that Mno dis­
position by such trustee to a bona fide purchaser for valuable consid­
eration shall be defeasible by reason of the fact that such disposition
131amounted to a breach of trust.” The court decided as a fact that
the second defendant had actual notice of the trust on which the first 
defendant held the land for the plaintiff and the court also found that 
there had been fraud on the part of both defendants which entitled it 
to make the declaration and order prayed for. It would have been more 
helpful if the court had discussed whether mere knowledge of the exis­
tence of the trust amounted to fraud and, if not, what did constitute 
fraud in this context. The laws of all Australian States provide that 
knowledge of the existence of a trust shall not of itself be imputed
132
as fraud, whereas in England, where (as in Kenya) no person dealing
with a registered estate is affected with notice of a trust, it seems
that ”... a purchaser can scarcely be treated as having good faith
when he knows he has bought as a result of a breach of trust and it is
possible that rectification of the register might be ordered against 
133him.” This seems also to have been the interpretation of the words
130. Registered Land Act 19&3, s.126(3).
131. Ibid., s.39(2).
132. See e.g. State of Victoria Transfer of Land Act 1958, s.^3.
133* Ruoff and Roper on the Law and Practice of Registered Conveyanc­
ing (London, Stevens, 3rd ed., 1972)^.^17.
134"bona fide purchaser" adopted by Mull, J.
The issue that arose in this case is likely to become increasingly 
important in view of the considerable body of litigation that is con­
ducted in the Central Province. The writer examined all the land cases 
that had arisen recently both in the Resident Magistrate's courts in 
Muranga and Nyeri and in the High Court in Nyeri. The tables below 
drawn from an analysis of the entries in the High Court Civil Register 
indicate the number and nature of land cases that are filed there.
TABLE 7* Number of civil cases filed in the High Court, Nyeri.
Year: 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Total
Land cases: 12 19 16 17 31 23 32 172
Total civil cases: 69 91 77 77 127 81 161 683
TABT.fl 8. Analysis of land cases filed in the High Court, Nyeri,
1967-1973.
Type of dispute No. %
Actions by purchaser for damages or specific 
performance: 70 w
Actions by vendor for price of land transferred: 2 1.5SS
Actions by vendor for possession of land: k 39 %
Actions by vendor for removal of caution: 1 0.5%
Disputes arising out of first registration: 37
Miscellaneous (succession, limitation etc): 14 9#
Total: 148 1005U
Source: Register of civil cases, High Court Registry, Nyeri.
A breakdown of the land cases filed at the Resident Magistrate's 
Court, Muranga, is given supra, p. 161. Note: 24 of the 172 land 
cases were transferred to other courts.
134. His reasoning is a little obscure; at one point he seems to argue 
that the 2nd defendant holds the land on trust for the plaintiff»
because he (the 2nd defendant) "could not have acquired more than 
what the 1st defendant had." This is clearly wrong.
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It can be seen that the number of land cases is increasing, both absol­
utely and in proportion to the total number of civil cases filed. Part­
icularly interesting is the fact that of 77 disputes arising out of agree­
ments to sell land, 7^ are instances of the seller reneging on his con­
tract. This situation arises commonly in the law reports’ an agreement 
for the sale of land is entered into by two parties, often in writing; 
the purchaser pays part or all of the purchase price and enters into 
possession; the sale is not registered nor approved by the land control 
board and the seller eventually refuses to complete either perhaps 
because his family has put pressure on him not to sell or, more likely, 
because he has found another purchaser who is willing to pay more.
If the sale has already received the board's consent, the court
is likely to order specific performance of the contract and if the
vendor still refuses to carry out his part, then the court may issue
a vesting order or a rectification order or an order requiring the
Registrar to sign the relevant forms on the vendor's behalf. Once the
board's consent has been obtained it is rare in practice for problems
135to occur. However, one problem did occur in a case whose facts in
136
many ways resemble those of Mukiri v. Njoroge and another and before 
the same judge, Muli,J. The defendant agreed to sell a piece of land 
to the plaintiff, the board's consent was obtained and the plaintiff 
paid the purchase-price and entered into possession. However the 
defendant subsequently refused to sign the transfer forms and sold the 
land (presumably with the board's consent) to one Mwangi. This sale was
135* Josphat Gitungo Njau v. Mrs. Wairimu Kairu, High Court of Kenya 
at Nairobi, Civil Case No.953 of 1970 (unreported).
136. Supra.
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registered. It is not clear from the report whether Mwangi knew of the
previous agreement made with the plaintiff, hut the judge was clearly
137incensed by the defendant's unscrupulous behaviour; atating that the 
defendant held the land on trust for the plaintiff, he ordered specific 
performance of the original agreement against the defendant, seemingly 
regardless of the fact that Mwangi was now the registered proprietor. 
The decision is clearly wrong, but the case does serve to illustrate 
the sort of problems that arise.
Where the land control board's consent has not been obtained, 
specific performance may still be ordered and the order may be made 
"subject to the board's consent". However, in view of the possibility 
that the board may refuse its consent and perhaps in reliance on the 
principle that "Equity does nothing in vain", the courts are more prone 
to award damages for breach of contract.
Unfortunately the whole area of law under discussion, that is, 
the question of remedies for breach of contract to sell land, has been 
obscured by certain provisions of the Land Control Act 19^7- The 
crucial section reads
(2) An agreement to be a party to a controlled 
transaction becomes void for all purposes -
(a) at the expiration of three months after 
the making of the agreement, if application 
for the appropriate board's consent has not 
been made within that time;
137- "This is a straight forward case, like many other cases which 
have come before this court where a party tries to rescind a 
transaction because he found another purchaser willing to offer 
more money for the same subject matter of the sale. If Courts 
were to agree with such parties then there would be utter chaos 
in the whole country. The Courts will not be a party to encou­
rage these greedy parties." Njau v. Kairu, supra, p.3i per 
Muli, J.
138. S.6(2)(a)•
It should be noted at once that in a large number of cases this provision 
is not brought to the court's attention and specific performance is 
ordered of agreements which have long ago become "void for all purposes".
Where the provision is applied, the result is often to work great 
hardship on the purchaser in possession; he loses whatever interest he 
had in the land and the vendor can apply for the removal of any caution 
he may have lodged; he can neither apply for specific performance of the 
contract nor claim damages for breach of contract, since there is no 
contract in existence; he seems restricted to the limited right of 
recovery provided for in the Act:
If any money or other valuable consideration has 
been paid in the course of a controlled trans­
action that becomes void by virtue of subsection 
(1) [i.e. for want of the board's consent], or 
under any agreement that becomes void by virtue 
of subsection (2), of section (6 ) of this Act, 
that money or consideration shall be recoverable 
as a debt by the person who paid it from the per­
son to whom it was paid...1&0
In any case, the courts have not been very successful in devising ways 
of avoiding the harsher consequences of these provisions, even though
139- E.g. Hoseah Muraya Muthee v. James Meitamei Ole Mutii, High 
Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Case No. 13 of 1973 (unrep­
orted) where in pursuance of an agreement to sell land, dated 
28/2/67, the plaintiff paid the price and entered into poss­
ession. A year later, the defendant (vendor) changed his mind 
and refused to transfer the land. The plaintiff eventually 
applied for specific performance. This was granted by the 
court even though by then the original agreement was void.
1^0. Land Control Act 19&7, s-7-
they enforce them without great relish.
An interesting point arose in Joseph Kamau Kinuthia v. John 
142Senewa Kaurai where in an agreement dated March 3th 19&7 the defen­
dant had agreed to sell the plaintiff some land. The purchaser paid 
the purchase-price and went into possession of the land. The parties 
applied to the land control hoard on November 29th 1968 and the board 
purported to approve the sale on February 4th 1969* A dispute had sub­
sequently arisen as to the size of the piece of land and the defendant 
had refused to execute the transfer; the plaintiff applied for specific 
performance. Although admitting that the Land Control Act "can readily 
enough be used as an engine of injustice" and making his order "without 
the slightest enthusiasm for the work in hand", the judge felt bound to 
refuse the order of specific performance on the grounds that there was, 
by virtue of s.6 (2)(a), no valid agreement for the board to consider. 
"Where, as here, there is evidence that an agreement has become void 
before application was made, one does not question the board's decision
143but its jurisdiction to give it." Such a harsh result could surely 
have been avoided. Certainly any attempt by either party to enforce 
the original agreement after June 3th 19&7 must have failed, but equally 
the signing of the land control board application forms by both parties
141. In one case, the respondent had sold his plot, entered into poss­
ession of the appellant's plot under an agreement for sale and paid 
the purchase price. His action for specific performance of the 
agreement failed as the agreement had become void under the Land 
Control Act 19&7? s.6(2)(a). The court came to this conclusion 
with reluctance and expressed its concern "with the question of 
probable fraud on the part of some of these purported vendors
of land who receive other people's monies and then evade and 
plead the provisions of the Land Control Act." Njoroge Mumira v. 
Njoroge Ngumi, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Appeal No.
121 of 1970 (unreported), per Miller, J.
142. High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Case No. 404 of 1970
.(unreported).
143. Ibid., p.3, per Trevelyan, J.
signified that a fresh agreement was in existence, an agreement to which 
the board had every right to give its consent.
An indication that the courts may favour such an approach is sug-
144gested by Rev. Daniel Mwangi Kigo v. Charles Kiarie Ngugi, where 
the parties entered into a written agreement of sale, dated May 30th 
1970, which subsequently became void for want of the board's consent. 
However a new document was executed by the parties by which the def­
endant confirmed the former agreement made with the plaintiff to the 
effect that he was selling his land to him by receiving the balance 
of the purchase-price. Within 3 months of the execution of this docu­
ment, the board gave its consent. The plaintiff now sought specific 
performance of the agreement. The court held that the document did 
not merely confirm a nullity (as argued by the defence) but in fact 
constituted a new agreement since it made sense even if all reference 
to the previous agreement was omitted; therefore specific performance 
could be ordered.
Where the courts refuse to order specific performance of an agree­
ment which has been avoided by s.6(2)(a), the question arises as to 
what remedy the purchaser may have. In one case, indeed, the court, 
after refusing specific performance, doubted the possibility of his 
recovering the purchase-money.
"With respect to the alternative prayer for refund 
of purchase-money, the net result is that this part 
of the claim hinges on the first prayer. There 
being in effect no legal foundation upon which the 
plaint stands in respect of the land there can be 
no subsidiary relief which is to stand on a non­
existing foundation."143
144. High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Case N0.1388 of 1970 
(unreported).
143. Justin Mwago v. Kariuki Kariraga, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, 
Civil Case No.13^3 of 1971 (unreported), per Miller, J.
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Clearly the learned judge is unaware of the right of action conferred by
1^ -6
the Land Control Act 1967* However, in another case he found no diff­
iculty ordering the vendor to refund the purchase-money plus interest and
even considered that "a prima facie case has been made out for the award­
'll?ing of damages.M
j^ iOther judges have been less chary of awarding damages. In one case
the seller was ordered to pay sh. 1^,000/- of which sh.6 ,500/- constituted
the purchase-money paid by the purchaser and sh.7,500/- the amount by
which the value of the land had increased in the meantime (i.e. it had
1^ -9more than doubled). In another case the vendor was ordered to com­
pensate the purchaser for the improvements he had made. It is hard to 
see how such awards can be justified, unless it is possible to raise 
some sort of estoppel. As soon as the three month period has elapsed, 
the purchaser remains in possession of the land as a mere licensee; 
he may have paid the purchase-price but this is recoverable at any time 
and meanwhile he enjoys the use of the land rent-free. If the owner of 
the land revokes this licence, the licensee has no right to emblements, 
let alone to damages or the cost of improvements undertaken.
It is true, of course, that in some cases the unscrupulous seller 
will exploit an unsuspecting purchaser's ignorance of the necessity for
146. S.7. The purchase-money would also be recoverable in quasi-contract.
1^7- Njoroge Mumira v. Njoroge Ngumi, supra, per Miller, J.
148. Kinyanjui s/o Kabue v. Geoffrey Gichini Nyoro, High Court of 
Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Case No. 50*f, of 1973 (unreported).
1^9. Njenga Gathama v. Karera Njuguna, High Court of Kenya at 
Nairobi, Civil Case No.15^4 of 1971 (unreported).
the consent of the land control board, but the courts in their desire to
do justice to the innocent purchaser have all too often overlooked the
legal relationship of the two parties once the agreement has become void
for all purposes. An extreme example of this judicial concern is pro-
150vided by Cyprian Muinde Mbuve v. Maingi Nzula where an agreement for 
the sale of land had become void for all purposes; the court refused 
accordingly to order specific performance but ordered the vendor to 
refund the purchase money. Muli, J. then continued:
"The defendant’s [i.e. the vendor’s] behaviour put 
the plaintiff into considerable expense which he 
stands to lose. It is equitable, therefore, that 
the plaintiff be offered the first option to purchase
the said land at the current economic value. It is
only after he fails to avail himself of the option 
that the defendant shall be at liberty to sell the 
said land to a third party. The Director of Settle­
ments and the appropriate land control board shall 
have notice of this order. "151
The court certainly has the power to order that an inhibition be reg-
152istered in the land register inhibiting certain dealings and this 
power could appropriately be used to protect the interests of a pur­
chaser under a contract for sale; however in the instant case there was 
no longer any valid agreement in existence and the plaintiff had no 
rights which he could enforce against the defendant except his right 
to recover the purchase-money and the extremely limited rights of the 
bare licensee in occupation. It is hard, therefore, to justify the 
court order on legal grounds. Hard cases make bad law.
150. High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Civil Case No.26 of 1972 (unreported).
151- Ibid., per Muli, J.
152. Registered Land Act 1963i s.128(1).
No court ever seems to have doubted the purchaser's right to recover
all the purchase-money which he has paid in pursuance of an agreement
avoided by section 6(2)(a), even though he has received some benefit;
however the question whether a lessee under an avoided agreement for a
lease can recover all the rent he has paid has proved less easy to ans-
153wer. The point arose in Chemelil Sisal Estate Ltd. v. Makongi Ltd., 
where there was a lease of land to which the Land Control Regulations 
1961 applied. The lease became void for want of the consent of the 
Divisional Land Board and the respondent claimed the recovery of moneys 
paid under the lease, relying on regulation 9(3) which provided:
Any money or other valuable consideration... paid 
in the course of any dealing, or under any agree­
ment, which... becomes void under this regulation... 
shall be recoverable as a civil debt by the person 
who paid it from the person Id whom i t  was paid.
It should be noted that the Land Control Regulations 1961, like all other 
pre-1967 land control legislation, expressly prohibited persons from 
dealing with land without the board's consent. Thus an uncontrolled 
sale, for example, would be not only void but illegal, and according to 
the general principles governing illegal contracts of this nature the 
loss would lie where it fell, ex turpi causa non oritur actio. Without 
some such provision as that laid down in the Land Control Regulations 
1961 the purchaser would be unable to recover any purchase-moneys paid; 
but such a provision seems totally unnecessary in the Land Control Act 
1967? for under that Act an uncontrolled dealing is not illegal but
153. [1967] E.A. 166 (C.A.). 
15^. Regulation 9(1)•
merely void and moneys paid in pursuance of a void contract are usually
recoverable on general contractual principles,
155In the case under discussion, all three judges of the Court of 
Appeal agreed that the purpose of regulation 9(3) was not punitive but 
merely obsigned to restore the parties to the status quo ante. It was 
pointed out that penalties could easily have been provided for and that, 
in any case, the effect of regulation 9(3) may well be merely to punish 
one party, where both are at fault. Nevertheless two of the judges held
that regulation 9(3) created a cause of action which entitled the respon-
156
dent to recover moneys paid under the void lease. They both admitted 
the unfairness of the result, but felt that no other interpretation of 
the regulation was possible; the words "valuable consideration" could 
not be construed so as to entitle the appellant to set off the value of
157sugar cane and sisal harvested during the lease, nor could the words 
"shall be recoverable" be construed as meaning "shall not be irrecover­
able", as then the words "as a civil debt" would be hard to explain.138
Spry, J.A. (dissenting) held that the words "as a civil debt" merely 
negatived the possibility that a statutory penalty was being created 
and that the words "shall be recoverable" were capable of sustaining 
the interpretation "shall not be irrecoverable" and should be interpre­
ted in that way. Unfortunately, neither of his interpretations is very 
persuasive and it is submitted that the only possible interpretation of
the words "shall be recoverable as a civil debt" is that adopted by the
159majority of the court, however unfortunate the consequences.
135- Chemelil Sisal Estate Ltd. v. Makoagi Ltd., supra.
156. Ibid., at pp.170,178.
157» Ibid., at p. 171? per Newbold, Ag.P.
158. Ibid., at p.178, per Duffus, J.A.
139. It is surprising that this point has never arisen before. In a 
Ugandan case, Eazal Visram Muman v. M.E. Lalani, [1963] E.A.^23, 
the court seems to have assumed that a lessor could not recover 
arrears of rent due under a lease that was void for want of the 
Governor's consent.
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It is a pity that the draftsmen of the Land Control Act 1967 made no 
attempt to deal with this problem. It seems as though section 7 of that 
Act was merely inserted because some such provisions had always appeared 
in previous land control legislation. However, since uncontrolled trans­
actions are, though void, no longer illegal, the need for such a provision 
is doubtful. The Law of Contract Act i960 provides that "save as may be 
provided by any written law for the time being in force, the common law
of England relating to contract, as modified by the doctrines of equity...,
1 60shall extend and apply to Kenya." The general rule in English law
is that money paid in pursuance of a void contract is recoverable as
161long as there has been a total failure of consideration; thus in
162England the respondents in Chemilil Sisal Estate Ltd. v. Makongi Ltd. 
would be unable to recover rent paid. The distinction between total and 
partial failure of consideration is not wholly satisfactory, but at least 
it avoids such harsh results.
A strong case could therefore be made for the repeal of section 7 
of the Land Control Act 19&7 possibly its replacement by a provision 
giving the courts a broad discretion to adjust the positions of the two 
parties in order to restore the status quo ante. Moreover, in view of all 
the problems to which the interpretation of section 6(2)(a) has given rise 
in the courts and in view of the hardship that its strict application 
frequently causes, the question naturally arises as to whether its 
retention serves any useful purpose. It could be argued that it works 
as a sanction to induce the parties to an agreement to apply to the board 
without delay. It is however a particularly ineffective sanction. If
160. S.2(1).
161. It is recoverable in quasi-contract. See Valentini v. Canali (1889), 
2k Q.B.D. 166.
162. Supra.
both parties are aware of the law, they will usually ensure that their 
agreement receives the board's approval. If neither party is aware of 
the law, then the sanction cannot work. If, however, as is not infreq­
uently the case, one party is aware of the law while the other party is 
not, then the former (usually the unscrupulous vendor in our examples) 
can exploit the law to his own advantage, while the latter is penalised 
by a law of whose existence he was ignorant. No more appropriate is 
the sanction provided for in section 22 of the Land Control Act 1967 
which makes it an offence to pay or receive money or to enter into or
remain in possession of any land in furtherance of a transaction avoided 
163by s.6. A concerted effort should be made to publicise the functions 
of the land control boards and to stress the necessity of obtaining its 
consent to a proposed transaction. Such an effort could suitably be 
linked with a campaign to encourage people to register dispositions and 
transmissions of registered land. Such a campaign would necessarily rely 
heavily on local officials, on chiefs and sub-chiefs, on agricultural 
and veterinary officers.
It is submitted, then, that s.6(2)(a) should be repealed. An 
agreement to be a party to a controlled transaction should not become 
void merely by reason of the fact that no application has been made to 
the appropriate board within a certain time. If this were done, many 
of the problems discussed above would never arise.
163. The writer never came across an instance where this sanction was 
used.
*f. Conclusion.
This chapter has attempted to describe the functioning of the land 
control system in certain areas of Kenya and to highlight the more 
important problems that have arisen. It is now proposed to evaluate 
the system in the light of the foregoing discussion.
Some of the problems analysed in the last section arose from cer­
tain statutory provisions whose strict interpretation may often have 
harsh consequences. In particular, the uncertain position of the pur­
chaser under an agreement for the sale of land has been dwelt upon in 
some detail together with the efforts of the courts to alleviate his 
position. However, to the extent that these problems derive from the 
existence of unfortunate statutory provisions, they can be solved by 
suitable amendments and in the course of the argument recommendations 
were made in this regard.
In this concluding section, however, the whole basis of the land 
control system will be questioned and the possibility of the repeal of 
the Land Control Act 19&7 will be canvassed. Land Control has existed 
in Kenya since 19^f in a variety of forms and nobody ever seems to have 
doubted that it served a useful purpose. Its adherents have been 
vigorous in its defence, eager to point out the diverse and often in­
consistent objectives it can achieve, but no^ne seems ever to have 
questioned its effectiveness. Yet the burden of proof lies on these 
adherents to justify its retention and research shows that such argu­
ments are hard to find. The system restricts freedom of contract, it 
fetters the power of the registered absolute proprietor to deal with 
his land as he likes and yet one of the purposes of the registration of
individual title was to create a market in land and free the individual 
from the constraints of customary law. Moreover, the system costs a 
considerable amount both in time and money; the board members are paid
fees and travelling expenses, applicants pay fees and often have to
travel long distances too. It is doubtful whether the time and the 
money are well spent.
In terms of the declared objectives of the Land Control Act 1967? 
the system is clearly a failure. It has been seen that these objectives 
are primarily economic, designed to ensure the most efficient use of 
the land. In practice, however, the boards rarely take economic con­
siderations into account and where they have done so, they have simul­
taneously devised ways which in effect enable the applicants to carry 
out their proposed transactions. The boards are influenced rather by 
social factors and this attitude will often result in a decision which 
would be hard to justify on economic grounds.
The system has failed then to achieve the purposes for which it
was designed. This failure perhaps would not need to be underlined 
if it could be justified on other criteria, for example, its success 
in ensuring an equitable distribution of land or in preventing land­
lessness. Unfortunately the evidence suggests otherwise; indeed it 
demonstrates the boards’ extreme reluctance ever to reject applications.
It is hard to see what useful function is served by a board which grants
164its consent almost as a matter of course. Moreover, even where a 
board rejects an application, there is no way it can enforce its 
decision and it is likely that the transaction will take place never-
164. The boards attended certainly felt that they performed a useful 
function, particularly by protecting the interests of the 
applicants' dependants.
the less. Finally, the applications brought before the board do not 
represent a large proportion of all the transactions that occur, trans­
actions that may be economically or socially undesirable, but which are 
never controlled, let alone registered. It could even be argued that 
many more transactions would be registered if the land control system 
were abolished and this extra, expensive, bureaucratic obstacle removed.
If the government really desires to ensure the most economic use 
of land by means of a system of laid control, then the board should not 
be largely composed of local worthies with no agricultural expertise. 
Just as farmers are often required to draw up development plans for 
their farms as a preliminary to obtaining a loan, so perhaps should 
they be required to submit such a plan for the approval of a small 
expert committee (say, the agricultural officer, the veterinary officer 
and the sub-chief) before applying for registration of the transaction. 
The problem of enforcement, however, remains.
Whatever the objectives, social or economic, they cannot generally 
be attained by a system of land control; the problems, legal, social 
and economic, discussed in earlier chapters cannot be solved in this 
way. There is no general solution. Each particular objective must 
be defined and considered on its own, in isolation from other object­
ives. Each particular problem requires individual treatment. The 
land control system in Kenya was devised to solve a wide variety of 
problems. It could never have been wholly successful; in the event 
it has wholly failed.
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C H A P T E R  VIII
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This study operates at various levels of generality and it is the 
purpose of this chapter to bring together and summarise the themes that 
have arisen in the foregoing pages. At its most specific this study has 
investigated the working of the land adjudication and registration pro­
gramme and has attempted an assessment of the programme's success in 
terms of its declared objectives. The programme also illustrates fea­
tures of official policy which are manifested in other areas of legis­
lative activity, notably a faith in the power of legislation as a tool 
for engineering social change and a preference for the use of adminis­
trative bodies rather than the courts for the purposes of determining 
individual rights. Thirdly, and at its most general level, the study 
throws light on the processes of change which are at work in Kenya; 
indeed the land adjudication and registration programme may be seen as 
a paradigm of socio-economic developments in the country as a whole.
It will be convenient to discuss these three themes in
In terms of its declared objectives it can hardly be said that 
the programme has been an unqualified success. Although the intro­
duction of a system of registration of title is commonly thought to 
make titles secure and to make conveyancing safe, ample and cheap, 
these claims are usually made with reference to jurisdictions where 
private conveyancing is practised. Different considerations apply 
where registration of title is designed to replace a system of land 
tenure based on customary law. In such a situation it is not clear
that the new system will provide simpler, cheaper conveyancing, nor will 
it give security of title where no insecurity existed beforehand. More­
over the efficacy of the system depends largely on the cooperation of 
those for whom it was designed, the landowners themselves or their legal 
advisers. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in the rural areas 
of Kenya the registration system is breaking down. Where the use of 
lawyers is extremely rare, landowners are reluctant to go through the 
relatively expensive and cumbersome registration procedures when their 
customary procedures appear to them to work well. So it happens that 
dispositions of registered land and successions to registered land fre­
quently take place off the register which increasingly fails to reflect
1
the state of affairs on the ground.
It is facile to say that the problem would be solved if landowners 
were sufficiently educated about the operation of the new system. The 
point is that the system is not seen to be necessary, that it does not 
respond to any real needs in small-scale societies where the parties to 
land dealings are still generally known to each other. However, it is 
not difficult to envisage the sort of complex disputes that will arise 
in the future. Where the land register is unreliable, the courts will 
be obliged to re-adjudicate titles and a lot of effort will have been 
wasted. The virtues of land consolidation are undeniable and land 
adjudication has undoubtedly put an end to boundary disputes, but the 
introduction of an alien system with new rules governing title to land
1. This topic is discussed at length supra, ch.V.
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and ne,.v conveyancing procedures will not necessarily earn the cooperation 
of people content with their own rules and procedures.
The programme may, however, have beneficial consequences of an 
indirect kind. Boundary disputes, as mentioned, see.m to have disappeared 
and this is seen by most farmers as the major achievement of the pro­
gramme. Nevertheless, it has been seen that while land adjudication may 
have made boundaries secure, it has also led to the emergence of a large
number of disputes concerning the title and rights of the registered 
2
owner. Litigation of this kind is likely to reach considerable propor­
tions and to cause extreme bitterness, especially in the more populous
agricultural areas. To some extent these disputes stem from inadequate 
3
adjudication and in such cases the courts may be called upon to do the 
work of the adjudication authorities, but frequently they result from 
the inherent difficulty in enshrining the existing customary rules and 
procedures governing the acquisition, alienation, control and inheri­
tance of land in legislation based on Western models.
Whatever the reasons for the increase in the number of disputes, 
it could be argued that it would be wiser to postpone land adjudication 
and registration in areas where customary law remains strong and where 
neither the adjudication authorities nor the inhabitants themselves 
can be relied upon to understand fully the working of the new system. 
Against this view it might be urged that for all its imperfections the 
programme constitutes a necessary break with customary law and that
2. Supra, ch.IV.
3. Faulty adjudication resulted in the readjudication of many areas 
of Fort Hall District in 1960.
even though cases of injustice may occur in the course of its implement­
ation and even though some form of readjudication may prove necessary in 
the future, these are merely the growing pains of a system which will 
substantially benefit the majority of those affected by it. In particular, 
the argument runs, the registered owner is given the power to deal com­
mercially with his land, to sell, to lease and to mortgage it, powers 
which were virtually unknown to customary law, but which are necessary 
if farms are to be properly developed.
k
Some doubt has been cast on these arguments and it has been sug­
gested that the introduction of a system of registration of title does 
not necessarily create a land market where none existed before. More­
over, the landowner's power to charge his land as a security for loans 
does not appear to have had a significant effect on rural development; 
indeed the role of credit may have been over-emphasised. Family hold­
ings become smaller and more fragmented and at a certain stage food-
crops begin to replace cash-crops, processes which the new system is
5
powerless to reverse. Moreover, it has been seen that any hopes of 
implementing government policies through the land control system have 
not been fulfilled, largely due to the boards' reluctance to be bound 
by purely economic considerations.
The discussion of the land adjudication and registration programme 
can be seen in a rather broader context. It throws light on certain 
aspects of government policy and, in particular, the ambiguity of
*+. Supra, ch. VI.
5. Supra, ch. VII.
official attitudes towards customary law. Official rhetoric generally 
sees customary law as an obstacle to development. Modernisation is the 
watcbirord. The birth of a new Kenya is called for, free from outmoded 
institutions and systems of values, and education and legislation are 
seen to be the midwives of the new order. Several examples of the 
official faith in legislation as an agent of social change have been 
given in the course of this study and it has been suggested that in the 
absence of enforcement machinery on a scale unthinkable in Kenya today, 
such legislation is likely to be ineffective to the extent to which it 
does not respond to the needs of the people as they perceive them. If 
landowners are satisfied with customary conveyancing procedures, they 
may be reluctant to have their dealings controlled and registered. If 
membership of a groip ranch is not seen to confer any special benefits, 
members are likely to continue traditional grazing practices. If 
effect is generally given to a person's informally expressed wishes 
as to the passing of his property on his death, few people will have 
the incentive to make use of the opportunities provided by the Africans' 
Wills Act 1961. If a statute is brought into operation which replaces 
the customary law of succession, marriage o.r divorce, it will be 
unenforceable to the extent that it diverges from the prevalent custo­
mary law. If a statute has the effect of abolishing the cutomary law 
governing tort and contract, this will not prevent the de facto appli­
cation of customary law where the persons concerned feel bound by it,
6. This seems to have been the effect of the Magistrate's Courts 
Act 19675 ss. 2 and 10(l)(a). See Kamanza Chiwaya v. Manza 
Tsuma, High Court of Kenya at Mombasa, Civil Appeal No7S~of 1970 
(unreported).
as they are likely to do in small-scale, close-knit rural communities.
In the towns, however, where Kenyans from different districts and 
tribal groups live and work together, the shortcomings of customary law 
and, in particular, the inadequacy of traditional sanctions become 
obvious. For example, it seems indisputable that certain commercial 
relationships should be governed by the same law, wherever they occur 
and whoever the parties are. Moreover, it is clear that as the urban 
population becomes larger and more settled, as inter-tribal marriage 
becomes common and the notion of private property takes root, customary 
law will become less capable of meeting the needs of Africans in Kenya. 
However, this stage has not yet been reached. Ninety per cent of 
Kenyans live in the rural areas and the majority of town-dwellers keep 
close links with their home areas. Inter-tribal marriage is extremely 
rare, commercial relationships are generally of the simplest kind and 
relatively few Africans own much property of a non-traditional nature. 
As should have become clear in the course of this study, it is only a 
tiny minority whose needs are not catered for by customary law, who 
want to make formal wills, to marry outside their tribal groups, to 
take out life insurance, to float companies and so forth. However, it 
is those people who determine policy and who see legislation as an 
effective modernising device.
At the same time it is usual for policy-makers to stress the 
importance of preserving communal values and to exalt the virtues of 
the traditional African way of life, which their policies appear 
designed to destroy. Thus Tom Mboya, one of Kenya's ablest political 
figures, admitted that the introduction of a system of registration 
of individual title in some parts of Kenya would undermine traditional
values, and concluded that the government had "... the challenge of
finding a formula by which people could be given title without destroy-
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ing the communal system." More recently the government recognised the 
problems posed by the existence of heavy pressure on the land in some 
areas and low land utilisation in others and proposed "...to solve these 
problems utilising a variety of means, one of which is land adjudication, 
and subsequent reliance upon private incentives and African traditions
g
to redistribute land in a socially desirable fashion." These quota­
tions illustrate the conviction that there is no necessary conflict 
between registration of title and customary values, between private 
incentives and African traditions or, more crudely, between individ­
ualism and communalism. It is hardly surprising that the policy­
makers of Kenya should hold this view. After all, they have a foot 
in both worlds. Their success is not only due to an ability to mani­
pulate modern institutions, but also due to the strength of the cust­
omary ties, based on tribe, locality and family, that link them with 
their constituency.
Their ambiguous attitude to traditional society has also been 
illustrated in the course of this study by the use of customary 
institutions in the implementation of land policies. The land adjud­
ication process and the land control system are both run throughout 
by administrative bodies, bodies whose members are largely drawn from 
the districts in which they work. In spite of the importance of their 
work, seen in the light of the effect of their decisions both on 
individual rights and on government policies, it seems to be
7- T. Mboya, Freedom and After (London, Andre Deutsch, 1963)? p»170.
8. Republic of Kenya, Employment, Sessional Paper No.10 of 1973?
para, 92.
considered more important that members know the area in which they work 
and that they enjoy local legitimacy rather than that they should have 
any expert understanding of official goals. Courts are seen as remote, 
expensive, essentially alien institutions whose procedures are unfamiliar 
and protracted, while the use of traditional land authorities seem likely 
to make official policies more acceptable to the people concerned and 
to save time and money at the same time.
The argument is not wholly convincing. In the first place, it 
assumes that in any given adjudication area the allocation and aliena­
tion of land are still controlled by the traditional land authorities 
and land disputes settled by them; yet in many areas, including the 
present writer's field-areas, this is not the case and, furthermore, 
it is arguable that land adjudication should not be started in areas 
where it is the case. Secondly, the argument assumes that the members 
of adjudication committees, arbitration boards and control boards will 
be drawn wholly or largely from the traditional land authorities, which 
again is not the case. Finally, it assumes that even where these 
committees and boards do contain representatives of the traditional 
land authorities, these representatives will be carrying out their 
traditional functions; however, apart from the fact that the committees 
and boards operate over a much wider geographical area than any tradi­
tional land authority would do, it is obvious that even though at first 
sight they appear to be carrying out the classic functions of the trad­
itional land authority, allocating land, controlling land transactions 
and settling land disputes, in reality they are carrying out government 
policies and operating within a completely different legal framework.
The members1 powers and duties are governed by statute and members are 
generally not intended to be bound by constraints that would tradition­
ally have circumscribed their freedom of action. Insofaras the boards 
and committees are successful in carrying out government policies, this 
cannot therefore be attributed to any legitimacy which members might 
traditionally enjoy.
Since members are not carrying out traditional functions and are 
not subject to the complex system of checks and balances that would, at 
customary law, have determined the limits of their powers and since 
they are generally not qualified to understand their statutory duties 
or to appreciate the policies they are intended to promote, it is per­
haps surprising that no provision is made at any stage of the land 
adjudication and land control processes for an appeal to the courts.
It can hardly be argued that the local Resident Magistrate's Court, 
or even the High Court, is a more remote institution than the Central 
Land Control Board or the Minister hearing appeals from the Adjudica­
tion Officer. Nor is it clear that an appeal to the courts would be 
more expensive and time-consuming than an appeal to a central adminis­
trative body. After all, the adjudication of legal rights is the fun­
ction of the courts and it is possible at present that unless they take 
a courageous attitude towards the scope of judicial review, abuses 
occurring in the course of the land adjudication and control processes 
may go unchecked.
In the preceding paragraphs a brief attempt has been made to con­
sider the light which this study has thrown on official attitudes 
towards law and social change. The belief in legislation as a power­
ful instrument of social engineering is accompanied by an insistence 
on the importance of customary values, while modernising land policies
are entrusted to administrative bodies of a traditional type to the
exclusion of the courts. If official attitudes appear ambiguous, there
can be little doubt about the general direction in which rural Kenya is
moving. Social and economic change in the present writer's field areas
9
has been discussed above and it is his purpose in these concluding 
paragraphs to put that discussion in a wider context. A study of land 
registration in Gathinja and East Kadianga inevitably tells a lot about 
socio-economic changes in those areas, which mirror in microcosm changes 
occurring at a national level.
It was argued in chapter six that with the introduction of new 
technology during the colonial period, with the considerable growth 
of market opportunities and the increasing demand for consumer products, 
land was transformed from a commonly shared subsistence base into a 
resource with commercial value. At the same time there was emerging 
a number of people who, for one reason or another, were able to manipu­
late the new institutions to their own advantage. It was they who 
supported the land adjudication and registration programme and it was 
they who derived the greatest advantages from it. Many of them had 
already begun to extend their holdings, to grow cash-crops and to hire 
labour; they thus had a definite interest in putting an end to tradi­
tional arrangements and obtaining legally sanctioned ownership of the 
10land they farmed. The whole of the process of land adjudication and 
consolidation tends to favour these people and insofaras land registra­
tion has resulted in the growth of a land market and increased access
9- Supra, ch. VI.
10. Similar developments were noted in the range areas. See ch. Ill, 
supra.
to credit and services it is the same people who have exploited these
new opportunities. The gulf between rich and poor widens further as
changes in the distribution of resources and income-earning opportunities
lead to changes in the pattern of political power.
The large majority of families living on registered smallholdings
in Kenya "... must either exist in extreme poverty or must obtain income
from sources other than their own farms by seeking work in the rural
11areas or in the towns." While it is not known how many of these
families do obtain income from outside sources, it is clear that the
expansion of employment opportunities is not keeping pace with the
growing number of people seeking employment. It seems as though rural
families will become increasingly dependent on increasingly smaller
holdings. No doubt their plight would be alleviated by a large-scale
12redistribution of land within Kenya, but this is politically unlikely
and in any case would only provide a temporary solution. Nor does there
seem to be any likelihood of a reduction of the birth rate in the rural
areas, even though the grant of individual titles to land is sometimes
thought to make birth-control schemes more attractive. Largely deprived
of the kind of supports that traditional society provided, the future
13of the "rural working poor" is bleak. Some may find work as labourers 
on the larger farms and some may rent land. Indeed as the large farms 
get larger and the small farms smaller, the familiar pattern of rural 
stratification is likely to emerge; at the top there will be a rela­
tively small number of large landowners, often absentees and invariably
11. International Labour Office, op. cit., p.37*
12. Such a policy is recommended ibid., pp. 169-171.
13- This is the phrase which the I.L.O. used in its report, ibid., p.38.
owning other business interests; in the middle there will be a larger 
number of tenant-farmers operating under a variety of tenancy arrange­
ments and at the bottom there will be a large number of virtually land­
less agricultural labourers.
Stratification along these lines has only reached a preliminary 
stage. Parochial loyalties remain strong, even though clientelist 
political structures are increasingly incapable of articulating the 
grievancesof the "rural working poor." It is much easier to discern 
the gradual formation of a rural middle class, a small group of people 
united by their education, their role in the political process and 
their economic interest. Seeking to free.themselves from traditional 
social obligations, they have an obvious interest in supporting a 
law-and-order state which protects private property and enforces con­
tracts. Modernising policies strengthen the authority of the state 
by attracting the loyalty of those they benefit. Indeed one of the 
main objectives of such policies is to create a sense of national 
identity, to forestall any tendencies towards regionalism or separa­
tism and to weaken traditional loyalties based on the tribe or kin­
ship group. Insofaras these policies tend to favour the rich, national 
unity will only be achieved at the expense of creating a gulf between 
the rich and the poor, between the government and the governed. It 
is true that there are few signs of class-consciousness among the 
rural poor today and it is likely that it will be in Nairobi that a 
recognisable proletariat will first emerge. It is there that wealth 
differentials are most visible and it is there that the landless 
poor from all over Kenya are thrown together to share a common lot 
in the shanty-towns. For some time now there have been a few politi­
cians who have taken up the cause of the urban and the rural poor and
it seems likely that appeals across tribal lines to a constituency 
based on shared socio-economic interest will become more common in 
the future.
This study of the land adjudication and registration programme 
has attempted to answer a number of questions. It has sought to assess 
the success of the programme in the light of its declared objectives, 
both legal and economic. In the course ofthis assessment it emerged 
that the strength and adaptability of customary law imposed certain 
limits on the effectiveness of legislation as an instrument of social 
engineering. Moreover it has been argued that the programme, like 
other modernising policies, has tended to favour the richer farmers 
at the expense of the poorer. The increasing wealth differentials 
noted in Gathinja and East Kadianga reflect what is happening through­
out Kenya. Whether the land adjudication and registration programme 
has been successful in terms of its own narrowly-defined objectives 
or not, it will probably be seen in retrospect to have contributed to 
the stratification of Kenya along class lines and to the creation of 
a sense of national identity.
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